Files
bot-bottle/claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py
T
didericis 27b2d78b11
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 15s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 29s
fix(cred_proxy): close git-push bypass + route through pipelock (PRD 0010)
Three coupled fixes that close a documented bypass of git-gate's
gitleaks pre-receive hook:

1. cred-proxy refuses git smart-HTTP push at runtime. Any path
   ending in /git-receive-pack or /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack
   returns 403 with a pointer at the bottle.git SSH path. Fetch
   (upload-pack) is still allowed — the bypass we're closing is
   push, where gitleaks is the load-bearing scanner. Hard guarantee.

2. The provisioner suppresses the cred-proxy `~/.gitconfig` insteadOf
   rewrite for any host already declared in bottle.git. git-gate is
   the canonical git path there; we don't write a competing rule
   that would let `git clone https://<host>/...` succeed in ways
   that confuse on push. Defense in depth — (1) is the hard guarantee.

3. cred-proxy routes its outbound HTTPS through pipelock. The
   sidecar's environ now sets HTTPS_PROXY=<pipelock-url>, and the
   image's entrypoint runs `update-ca-certificates` over the
   per-bottle pipelock CA (docker cp'd into
   /usr/local/share/ca-certificates/pipelock.crt before start) so
   the proxy's HTTPS client trusts pipelock's bumped certs.

   Consequence: pipelock's allowlist + body scanner now sit in the
   cred-proxy egress path the same way they sit in front of direct
   agent traffic. The cred-proxy upstream hosts (api.github.com,
   github.com, gitea hosts, registry.npmjs.org) come OFF
   pipelock's passthrough_domains. Only api.anthropic.com remains
   on passthrough (LLM body content legitimately trips DLP).

PRD 0010 updated to reflect all three. Tests adjusted: the
"cred-proxy hosts go on passthrough" assertion in
test_pipelock_allowlist flips to "they don't", a new
TestIsGitPushRequest exercises the smart-HTTP refusal predicate,
and the gitconfig renderer tests cover the per-host suppression
matrix.
2026-05-13 21:09:33 -04:00

202 lines
8.2 KiB
Python

"""Launch step for the Docker bottle backend.
`launch` is a context manager: builds the image(s), creates the per-
agent networks, brings up the pipelock sidecar, starts the agent
container, then runs the provision step. Teardown is sequenced via an
ExitStack so callbacks fire in reverse-order of registration even if
something raises mid-bring-up.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import subprocess
import sys
from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...log import die, info
from . import network as network_mod
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .cred_proxy import DockerCredProxy
from .git_gate import DockerGitGate
from .pipelock import DockerPipelockProxy, pipelock_proxy_url, pipelock_tls_init
from .provision.ca import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
@contextmanager
def launch(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
proxy: DockerPipelockProxy,
git_gate: DockerGitGate,
cred_proxy: DockerCredProxy,
provision: Callable[[DockerBottlePlan, str], str | None],
) -> Generator[DockerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Docker bottle. Teardown on exit.
`provision` is the backend's provision orchestrator (passed in so
this module stays free of backend-class plumbing)."""
stack = ExitStack()
def teardown() -> None:
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException:
# Teardown must not raise; swallow so the caller's
# __exit__ path can still propagate the original error.
pass
try:
docker_mod.build_image(plan.image, _REPO_DIR)
if plan.derived_image:
docker_mod.build_image_with_cwd(
plan.derived_image, plan.image, plan.spec.user_cwd
)
internal_network = network_mod.network_create_internal(plan.slug)
stack.callback(network_mod.network_remove, internal_network)
egress_network = network_mod.network_create_egress(plan.slug)
stack.callback(network_mod.network_remove, egress_network)
# Per-bottle ephemeral CA for pipelock's TLS interception
# (PRD 0006). One-shot pipelock container writes ca.pem +
# ca-key.pem under plan.stage_dir; .start docker-cp's them
# into the sidecar. The private key never leaves the host
# stage dir, which start.py's outer finally `shutil.rmtree`s
# after the sidecar is torn down.
ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.stage_dir)
proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.proxy_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,
)
# Re-bind the outer plan so provision_ca (which runs later
# from `provision(plan, container)`) can read the populated
# CA paths off plan.proxy_plan.
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, proxy_plan=proxy_plan)
pipelock_name = proxy.start(plan.proxy_plan)
stack.callback(proxy.stop, pipelock_name)
# Git gate (PRD 0008). One sidecar per agent, only brought up
# when the bottle has git entries. Same internal + egress
# network attachment as the other sidecars; agent dials it as
# `git://<container-name>/<name>.git` via the pushInsteadOf
# rules provision_git writes into ~/.gitconfig.
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.git_gate_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan)
git_gate_name = git_gate.start(plan.git_gate_plan)
stack.callback(git_gate.stop, git_gate_name)
# Cred-proxy (PRD 0010). One sidecar per bottle when
# bottle.tokens declares any kind. Must come up AFTER pipelock
# — cred-proxy routes its outbound HTTPS through pipelock
# (HTTPS_PROXY in environ + the per-bottle CA in its trust
# store) so the egress allowlist + body scanner sit in the
# cred-proxy path too. Must come up BEFORE the agent so DNS
# resolution for `cred-proxy` succeeds on the agent's first
# call; tokens flow from the host env into the sidecar's
# environ, not the agent's.
if plan.cred_proxy_plan.upstreams:
cred_proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.cred_proxy_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
pipelock_ca_host_path=ca_cert_host,
pipelock_proxy_url=pipelock_proxy_url(plan.slug),
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(plan, cred_proxy_plan=cred_proxy_plan)
cred_proxy_name = cred_proxy.start(plan.cred_proxy_plan)
stack.callback(cred_proxy.stop, cred_proxy_name)
container = _run_agent_container(plan, internal_network)
stack.callback(docker_mod.force_remove_container, container)
prompt_path = provision(plan, container)
yield DockerBottle(container, teardown, prompt_path)
finally:
teardown()
def _run_agent_container(plan: DockerBottlePlan, internal_network: str) -> str:
"""Build the `docker run` argv and execute it, handling name-
conflict races by incrementing the suffix (unless the name was
user-pinned). Returns the resolved container name."""
proxy_url = pipelock_proxy_url(plan.slug)
docker_args: list[str] = [
"--rm", "-d",
"--name", plan.container_name,
"--network", internal_network,
"-e", f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
"-e", "NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1",
# CA trust trio for the agent process. Docker propagates
# run-time env into `docker exec`, so `claude` sees these
# without per-exec threading. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS points at
# the cert file (Node appends it to its bundled roots);
# SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE point at the system
# bundle that `update-ca-certificates` rebuilds in
# provision_ca.
"-e", f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
"-e", f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
"-e", f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
if plan.use_runsc:
docker_args.extend(["--runtime", "runsc"])
if plan.env_file.stat().st_size > 0:
docker_args.extend(["--env-file", str(plan.env_file)])
for name in plan.forwarded_env:
docker_args.extend(["-e", name])
docker_args.extend([plan.runtime_image, "sleep", "infinity"])
info(f"starting container {plan.container_name} from {plan.runtime_image}")
# Inject forwarded values (secrets, interpolated host vars, the
# renamed OAuth token) into the docker-run child's env so the
# `-e NAME` flags above pick them up — without touching our own
# os.environ or putting values on argv.
child_env: dict[str, str] = {**os.environ, **plan.forwarded_env}
name_idx = docker_args.index("--name") + 1
for candidate in docker_mod.container_name_candidates(plan.container_name):
docker_args[name_idx] = candidate
run_result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", *docker_args],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
env=child_env,
check=False,
)
if run_result.returncode == 0:
return candidate
err_text = run_result.stderr
if plan.container_name_pinned or "is already in use" not in err_text:
sys.stderr.write(err_text + "\n")
die(f"docker run failed for container '{candidate}'")
info(f"name conflict on {candidate}; retrying with next candidate")
die(
f"could not find a free container name after "
f"{plan.container_name}-{docker_mod.MAX_CONTAINER_SUFFIX} retries; "
f"clean up old containers"
)