22bc13dc3c
Fourth and final step of PRD 0005. Two new end-to-end tests that exercise the full chain agent -> mitmproxy(bump) -> addon -> pipelock -> upstream and pin the two paths the addon implements. - test_mitmproxy_blocks_secret_https_post: HTTPS variant of the existing test_pipelock_blocks_secret_post. Posts a credential pattern in the body over HTTPS through the bottle. mitmproxy bumps the CONNECT (the agent trusts the per-bottle ephemeral CA installed by provision_ca), the addon forwards the decrypted request to pipelock, pipelock returns 403 with the known `blocked: ...` body shape, and the addon short-circuits the flow with status=403 + X-Pipelock-Bridge: block. The two-axis assertion (status + header) proves the addon-mediated path is what produced the block, not some other layer. - test_mitmproxy_allows_normal_https: hits raw.githubusercontent.com (a baked-in allowlist host) over HTTPS through the bottle. Verifies the addon's allow path: mitmproxy bumps, addon forwards to pipelock for the scan, pipelock allows, mitmproxy proceeds to the real upstream, response comes back through. The absence of X-Pipelock-Bridge on the response is the signal that the addon didn't short-circuit. Body length sanity-checks that the response is real upstream content, not a synthesized stub. Both probes are stdlib-only Node (http.request CONNECT + tls.connect on the tunneled socket) — pulling in undici as a dep would be the clean way to do HTTPS-through-proxy but is out of scope. The earlier integration tests still pass with mitmproxy in path: their assertions hold under the new topology, though their semantic coverage shifts (e.g. test_pipelock_allow_node now exercises mitmproxy's CONNECT-200 path rather than pipelock's host allowlist on CONNECT). Updating those tests is a follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
173 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
173 lines
5.8 KiB
Python
"""Integration: with mitmproxy in front of pipelock, a credential
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POST sent over HTTPS is now blocked by pipelock's body-scan layer.
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This is the HTTPS variant of test_pipelock_blocks_secret_post — the
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two together prove the TLS-interception layer is doing the work the
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PRD targets. The earlier plain-HTTP test only fired because the agent
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was forced to bypass TLS; real Claude Code traffic to api.anthropic.com
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goes over CONNECT-tunneled HTTPS and would have slipped past pipelock
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prior to this PRD.
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End-to-end: drives `BottleBackend.prepare → launch` so the real
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image build, network plumbing, pipelock sidecar, mitmproxy sidecar,
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ephemeral CA generation, and trust-store install are all in the
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loop.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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import shutil
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import tempfile
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import unittest
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from pathlib import Path
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from claude_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
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from claude_bottle.manifest import Manifest
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from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
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# Synthetic value shaped like a GitHub Personal Access Token; not a
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# real credential. Pipelock's default DLP rules pattern-match this
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# format and mitmproxy's addon short-circuits with the 403 it
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# receives back.
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_FAKE_TOKEN = "ghp_aB3cD4eF5gH6iJ7kL8mN9oP0qR1sT2uV3wX4yZ"
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# Build the request by hand using stdlib `http` (for CONNECT) and
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# `tls` (for the bumped tunnel). Node 22's `fetch` doesn't expose
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# proxy configuration without undici as an installable dep, and
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# this project keeps the bottle image dep-light. NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS
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# is wired by launch.py so the agent trusts mitmproxy's bumped cert.
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#
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# Output contract (parsed by the test):
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# - "status=<code>" HTTP status of the decrypted response
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# - "bridge=<value>" X-Pipelock-Bridge header from the addon's
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# short-circuit, empty on the allow path
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# - "error=<...>" thrown error
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_PROBE_JS = r"""
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const http = require('http');
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const tls = require('tls');
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const proxy = new URL(process.env.HTTPS_PROXY);
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const body = 'token=' + process.env.FAKE_TOKEN;
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const connectReq = http.request({
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host: proxy.hostname,
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port: proxy.port,
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method: 'CONNECT',
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path: 'api.anthropic.com:443',
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});
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connectReq.setTimeout(8000, () => {
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console.log('timeout=connect');
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connectReq.destroy();
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});
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connectReq.on('error', (e) => {
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console.log('error=' + (e.code || '') + ' ' + e.message);
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});
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connectReq.on('connect', (res, socket) => {
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if (res.statusCode !== 200) {
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console.log('status=' + res.statusCode);
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console.log('bridge=' + (res.headers['x-pipelock-bridge'] || ''));
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return;
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}
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const tlsSocket = tls.connect({
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socket: socket,
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servername: 'api.anthropic.com',
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});
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tlsSocket.on('secureConnect', () => {
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tlsSocket.write(
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'POST /dlp-probe HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
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'Host: api.anthropic.com\r\n' +
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'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n' +
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'Content-Length: ' + Buffer.byteLength(body) + '\r\n' +
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'Connection: close\r\n' +
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'\r\n' + body
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);
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});
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let buf = '';
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tlsSocket.on('data', (c) => { buf += c.toString('utf8'); });
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tlsSocket.on('end', () => {
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const lines = buf.split('\r\n');
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const m = lines[0].match(/HTTP\/[\d.]+ (\d+)/);
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let bridge = '';
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for (let i = 1; i < lines.length; i++) {
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if (lines[i] === '') break;
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const ix = lines[i].indexOf(': ');
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if (ix < 0) continue;
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if (lines[i].slice(0, ix).toLowerCase() === 'x-pipelock-bridge') {
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bridge = lines[i].slice(ix + 2);
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}
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}
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console.log('status=' + (m ? m[1] : '?'));
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console.log('bridge=' + bridge);
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});
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tlsSocket.on('error', (e) => {
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console.log('tls_error=' + (e.code || '') + ' ' + e.message);
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});
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});
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connectReq.end();
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"""
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@skip_unless_docker()
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class TestMitmproxyBlocksSecretHttpsPost(unittest.TestCase):
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@unittest.skipIf(
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os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
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"skipped under act_runner: docker socket mount topology breaks "
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"in-process visibility of networks created on the host daemon",
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)
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def test_https_post_with_credential_body_is_blocked(self):
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manifest = Manifest.from_json_obj({
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"bottles": {
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"dev": {"env": {"FAKE_TOKEN": _FAKE_TOKEN}},
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},
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"agents": {
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"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"},
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},
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})
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backend = get_bottle_backend()
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stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-test-stage."))
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try:
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spec = BottleSpec(
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manifest=manifest,
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agent_name="demo",
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copy_cwd=False,
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user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
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forward_oauth_token=False,
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)
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plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
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with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
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script = (
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"set -e\n"
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"cat > /tmp/probe.js <<'PROBE_EOF'\n"
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f"{_PROBE_JS}\n"
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"PROBE_EOF\n"
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"node /tmp/probe.js\n"
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)
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result = bottle.exec(script)
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finally:
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shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
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self.assertEqual(
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0, result.returncode,
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f"exec wrapper failed: stdout={result.stdout!r} stderr={result.stderr!r}",
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)
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# The addon short-circuits the flow with X-Pipelock-Bridge: block
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# on a pipelock block — the cleanest signal that the chain
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# mitmproxy(bump) -> addon(forward) -> pipelock(scan) -> block
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# all happened, end to end.
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self.assertIn(
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"status=403", result.stdout,
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f"expected 403 from pipelock block; got: {result.stdout!r}",
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)
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self.assertIn(
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"bridge=block", result.stdout,
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f"X-Pipelock-Bridge header missing; the addon may not be "
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f"in path: {result.stdout!r}",
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)
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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unittest.main()
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