Chunk 2 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's **durable
secret** gap and replace chunk 1's BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET stopgap.
- trust_domain.py: two new domains. LAUNCH_BROKER holds the durable
HS256 key both the orchestrator (signer) and the host control server
(verifier) share for the broker's launch JWT — a host-canonical key
file minted 0600 on first use, so a restarted orchestrator re-verifies
against the same key. HOST_CONTROLLER is the separate domain for the
controller's own lifecycle endpoints, keyed by a key the orchestrator
never holds (its role is `host`, deliberately outside control-plane
ROLES). LaunchBrokerProvisioning is the fail-closed seam.
- orchestrator_auth.py: ROLE_HOST, outside ROLES.
- paths.py: key-file + env-var constants for both domains.
Key resolution is split by owner (addresses codex review on #497):
broker_secret(allow_host_file=...) — the host controller / dev-harness
(True) may mint/read the durable host key file it owns; the GUEST
orchestrator (--broker http, default False) must be *injected* the key
and fails closed if it isn't. A guest that fell back to the host file
would mint a process-local key unrelated to the host controller's, so
startup would succeed but every launch would 401 — this prevents that
silent divergence.
Tested: domain boundary + separation, provisioning fail-closed, and
broker_secret env-only (guest) vs host-file (host) resolution. pyright
clean; pylint 9.86.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
didericis-claude
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