Files
bot-bottle/bot_bottle/backend/docker/gateway_provision.py
T
didericis 05df21f210 refactor(gateway): introduce the Gateway service ABC (docker impl)
Replace the docker backend's ad-hoc gateway wiring with the shared `Gateway`
service ABC (in the gateway package), the first of the two per-host service
classes that supersede the per-backend infra glue.

The contract is backend-neutral: `connect_to_orchestrator(url, gateway_token)`
binds the gateway to its control plane and brings it up, `address()` reports
the agent-facing proxy target, `ca_cert_pem()` vends the mitmproxy CA, and
`provisioning_transport()` hands back the exec/cp seam git-gate provisioning
stages per-bottle repos + deploy keys through. `GatewayProvisionError` +
`GatewayTransport` move to the ABC so every backend shares them.

Key trust-model change: the gateway no longer mints its own token. It never
holds the signing key (#469), so the orchestrator mints the role-scoped
`gateway` JWT and hands it in via `connect_to_orchestrator`; the gateway only
injects it. `DockerGateway.ensure_running` becomes `connect_to_orchestrator`
(stashing the URL + token as instance state), and the docker launch flow reads
`address()` / `provisioning_transport()` off the service rather than
re-deriving the container IP + transport itself.

macOS + firecracker gateways move under the ABC in following commits.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 12:58:00 -04:00

114 lines
4.8 KiB
Python

"""Provision one bottle's git-gate state into the running shared gateway
(PRD 0070, docker slice).
The consolidated gateway serves every bottle's repos under `/git/<bottle_id>/`
with per-repo credentials under `/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/`. When a bottle
is registered the launcher must place *its* deploy keys + known_hosts into
that per-bottle creds dir and init its bare repos there — so this copies the
credential files into the live gateway container and runs the (namespaced,
init-only) provisioning script produced by `git_gate_render_provision`.
Isolating each bottle's creds dir + repo root by id is what keeps one
bottle's push credentials out of another's repos on the shared gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from .util import run_docker
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan, git_gate_render_provision
from ...gateway import GatewayProvisionError, GatewayTransport
# bottle ids index the gateway's per-bottle repo + creds dirs; they land in
# exec/cp path arguments, so validate before any path is built (a traversal
# id like "../etc" must never reach the gateway). Registry ids are token_hex —
# this is defense in depth at the transport boundary.
_SAFE_BOTTLE_ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+")
class DockerGatewayTransport:
"""`GatewayTransport` for the docker gateway container (exec/cp)."""
def __init__(self, gateway: str) -> None:
self.gateway = gateway
def exec(self, argv: list[str]) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "exec", self.gateway, *argv])
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"gateway exec {argv!r} failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def cp_into(self, src: str, dest: str) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "cp", src, f"{self.gateway}:{dest}"])
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"gateway cp {src} -> {dest} failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def _require_safe(bottle_id: str) -> None:
if not _SAFE_BOTTLE_ID.fullmatch(bottle_id):
raise GatewayProvisionError(f"unsafe bottle id {bottle_id!r}")
def _creds_dir(bottle_id: str) -> str:
return f"/git-gate/creds/{bottle_id}"
def provision_git_gate(
transport: GatewayTransport, bottle_id: str, plan: GitGatePlan,
) -> None:
"""Place `bottle_id`'s git-gate credentials into the running gateway and
init its bare repos under `/git/<bottle_id>/`.
Copies each upstream's identity key (and known_hosts, when present) into
`/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/`, then runs the namespaced provisioning
script. No-op for a bottle with no git upstreams."""
_require_safe(bottle_id)
if not plan.upstreams:
return
# The pre-receive + access hooks are bottle-agnostic and shared by every
# bottle's repos; install them into the gateway (idempotent — same content
# each time). The per-bottle model cp'd these into each bundle at start.
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", "/etc/git-gate"])
transport.cp_into(str(plan.hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/pre-receive")
transport.cp_into(str(plan.access_hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/access-hook")
# The access-hook is exec'd directly (not via `sh`), so it needs the x bit.
# Set it here rather than trusting the copy to carry the staged 0o700:
# `docker cp` preserves source mode, but the Apple `container cp` does not,
# landing the hook 0o644 → EACCES when the git-http handler tries to exec it.
# chmod on the gateway side is backend-neutral and fixes every transport.
transport.exec(["chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"])
creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
for u in plan.upstreams:
if u.identity_file:
transport.cp_into(u.identity_file, f"{creds}/{u.name}-key")
known_hosts = str(u.known_hosts_file)
if known_hosts and known_hosts != ".":
transport.cp_into(known_hosts, f"{creds}/{u.name}-known_hosts")
# Init the bare repos + per-repo credential config for this namespace.
script = git_gate_render_provision(bottle_id, plan.upstreams)
transport.exec(["sh", "-c", script])
def deprovision_git_gate(transport: GatewayTransport, bottle_id: str) -> None:
"""Remove a bottle's repos + creds from the gateway on teardown. Idempotent
— an already-absent namespace is a clean no-op (best effort; a stray dir
can't leak, since attribution is by source IP and the bottle is gone)."""
_require_safe(bottle_id)
try:
transport.exec([
"rm", "-rf", f"/git/{bottle_id}", _creds_dir(bottle_id),
])
except GatewayProvisionError:
pass # best-effort teardown; absent namespace is success
__all__ = [
"provision_git_gate", "deprovision_git_gate",
"GatewayProvisionError", "GatewayTransport", "DockerGatewayTransport",
]