# claude-bottle

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Spins up an isolated container for running Claude Code with a curated set of skills and env vars.

## Why "claude-bottle"?

Each container is a bottle; Claude is the genie inside. The genie has
broad powers within the bottle — read, write, run anything — but it
cannot escape to the host. You uncork one bottle per agent
(`./cli.py start <agent>`), many bottles run in parallel, and each
one's powers are scoped to what the manifest grants it: a curated set
of skills, env vars, and a starting prompt. When the session ends the
bottle is destroyed and the genie does not persist.

## Goals

- Minimize risk of running claude with full permissions
- Allow me to easily spin up agent tasks in parallel
- Create isolated, well defined, easily updated, shareable agents

## Security model

Each agent runs in its own bottle: its own container, its own internal
Docker network, and its own pipelock sidecar. Bottles don't share
state, don't talk to each other, and only get the env vars, skills,
SSH identities, and egress hosts the manifest grants them — nothing
more. Any one agent only has the access it needs to do its job.

The container is the boundary against an uncoordinated agent reaching
the host: a misbehaving Claude Code session can't read files outside
the bottle, can't reach the host's network without going through
pipelock, and can't see other bottles. By default it is not a hardened
boundary against a determined attacker with kernel-level escape
capability — see `docs/research/stronger-isolation-alternatives.md`
for the broader v2 discussion.

Linux hosts can opt into [gVisor](https://gvisor.dev/) per bottle for
a userspace syscall barrier between the agent and the host kernel:

```jsonc
{
  "bottles": {
    "default": { "runtime": "runsc" }
  }
}
```

When `runtime` is set to `"runsc"`, claude-bottle verifies the runtime
is registered with Docker before launch and passes `--runtime=runsc`
to the agent container. Default is `"runc"` (Docker's default). gVisor
is not available on macOS.

The egress proxy and OAuth-token handling below are the load-bearing
pieces of v1.

## Quickstart

Requires Docker on the host and a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token in
your shell env.

```sh
./cli.py start <agent>   # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude
```

The container is removed automatically when the session ends. If the script
is killed with SIGKILL the exit trap won't fire and the container may be
left running; remove it with `docker rm -f <container-name>`.

## Egress

Agent containers route HTTP / HTTPS traffic through a per-agent
[pipelock](https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock) sidecar
attached to a Docker `--internal` network. The sidecar enforces a
hostname allowlist, runs DLP scanning (48 default credential
patterns), and detects URL-embedded high-entropy secret leaks. Without
the proxy the agent has no route off-box at all — the internal network
has no default gateway. The sidecar and network are torn down with the
agent on session exit.

The effective allowlist is the union of a baked-in default for Claude
Code's required hosts (`api.anthropic.com`, `claude.ai`, ...) and the
optional `bottles.<name>.egress.allowlist` field in
`claude-bottle.json`:

```jsonc
{
  "bottles": {
    "default": {
      "env":    { },
      "ssh":    [ ],
      "egress": { "allowlist": ["github.com"] }
    }
  }
}
```

The resolved allowlist is shown in the y/N preflight before launch.
See `docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md` for the
design and `docs/research/pipelock-assessment.md` for the rationale.

## Auth: OAuth token, not API key

claude-bottle authenticates `claude` inside the container with the same
Pro/Max subscription you already use on the host, via a long-lived OAuth
token. No `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is needed.

**Why a token instead of mounting `~/.claude.json`:** on macOS, Claude
Code stores OAuth credentials in the encrypted Keychain, not in
`~/.claude.json`. Mounting that file into a Linux container does not
carry the credentials with it. Linux hosts keep credentials in
`~/.claude/.credentials.json`, but to keep the launcher portable
claude-bottle uses the env-var path on every host.

**One-time setup on the host:**

```sh
claude setup-token   # browser login, prints a ~1-year OAuth token
```

Stash the token in your shell env (e.g. `~/.zshrc` or a secret manager)
as `CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN`:

```sh
export CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN="<token>"
```

`cli.py` automatically forwards it to every container as
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` via `docker run -e` — no manifest wiring
required, and the value is never written to disk or placed on argv.

Inside the container, `claude` picks up `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` and
authenticates against your subscription. Caveats: the token is bound
to your subscription tier (Pro/Max/Team/Enterprise), it does not work
with `claude --bare` (which only reads `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`), and if it
leaks, regenerate via `claude setup-token` again. Reference:
<https://code.claude.com/docs/en/authentication>.