# Landscape: AI-agent sandbox tools

A broader survey than [`landscape-containerized-claude.md`](landscape-containerized-claude.md),
which focused on Claude-Code-specific containerizers. This one covers
general AI-agent sandbox / containment projects — some Claude-specific,
some agent-agnostic, some hosted SaaS — and contrasts them with
bot-bottle's design.

Research conducted 2026-05-11.

## Summary

Eight projects surveyed. None duplicate bot-bottle's combination of
local Docker, declarative JSON manifest, per-agent egress allowlist via
pipelock, and bottle/agent split. Two clusters stand out:

- **Closest neighbours** — agent-safehouse and litterbox: local,
  single-user, thin wrappers over an existing OS primitive
  (`sandbox-exec`, Podman + Landlock).
- **Different category** — tilde.run (hosted SaaS), boxlite and
  microsandbox (microVM libraries for platform builders), endo-familiar
  (capability-security paradigm, no OS isolation).

The microVM cluster (matchlock, smolmachines, boxlite, microsandbox) is
the most relevant for the v2 isolation discussion in
[`stronger-isolation-alternatives.md`](stronger-isolation-alternatives.md):
libkrun and Apple's Virtualization.framework have made local microVMs
ergonomic enough that a `"runtime": "microvm"` option on a bottle is now
plausible without a heavy stack.

## Per-project notes

### endo-familiar
- **Source**: https://dcfoundation.io/containing-ai-agents-the-endo-familiar-demo/ ; https://github.com/endojs/endo
- **License**: Apache 2.0
- **Isolation**: Object-capability runtime in Hardened JavaScript. Not
  OS-level — agents simply cannot reference resources they were not
  handed.
- **Locality**: Local / decentralized; WebSocket relay for capability
  sharing across machines.
- **Agent integration**: Agent-agnostic, demo only.
- **Config**: Programmatic capability passing; "pet name" system for
  human-readable capability handles.
- **Network policy**: Capability model is the policy; no allowlist or
  firewall.
- **Maturity**: Research demo, Foresight Institute grant. Production use
  of `endo` is via Agoric and MetaMask, not as a containment tool.

### litterbox
- **Source**: https://litterbox.work/ ; https://github.com/Gerharddc/litterbox
- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~66 stars)
- **Isolation**: Podman container on Linux + Wayland socket forwarding;
  optional Landlock LSM for filesystem restriction.
- **Locality**: Local, Linux only.
- **Agent integration**: Generic dev sandbox; works with any agent that
  runs inside the container.
- **Config**: Interactive CLI wizard — `define` (Dockerfile template),
  `build` (prompts), `start` (launch).
- **Network policy**: "Limited isolation by default" — no strict
  allowlist documented.
- **Notable**: Per-key SSH agent confirmation dialogs.
- **Maturity**: Early-stage, ~66 stars.

### agent-safehouse
- **Source**: https://agent-safehouse.dev/ ; https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse
- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~1,400 stars)
- **Isolation**: macOS `sandbox-exec` (Seatbelt) profiles — kernel-level
  syscall interception, no container.
- **Locality**: Local, macOS only.
- **Agent integration**: Explicit multi-agent wrapper — Claude Code,
  OpenAI Codex, Gemini CLI, Cline, Aider. Usage:
  `safehouse claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`.
- **Config**: Shell functions or custom `sandbox-exec` profile files;
  LLM-assisted profile generation supported.
- **Network policy**: Not addressed.
- **Maturity**: Active through March 2026.

### matchlock
- **Source**: https://github.com/jingkaihe/matchlock
- **License**: MIT (~574 stars, v0.2.10)
- **Isolation**: MicroVMs — Firecracker on Linux, Apple
  Virtualization.framework on macOS. Transparent proxy via nftables DNAT
  (Linux) or gVisor userspace TCP/IP (macOS).
- **Locality**: Local (Homebrew, .deb, .rpm).
- **Agent integration**: Agent-agnostic; SDK examples for Anthropic
  Claude API and OpenAI. Go, Python, TypeScript SDKs.
- **Config**: CLI flags (`--allow-host`, `--secret`, `--no-network`) or
  SDK builder pattern. No manifest file.
- **Network policy**: Default-deny + per-host allowlist.
- **Notable**: Secrets injected in-flight by the host proxy — they never
  enter the VM.
- **Maturity**: Marked experimental.

### tilde.run
- **Source**: https://tilde.run/
- **License**: Proprietary, hosted SaaS.
- **Isolation**: Cloud-hosted containers; underlying mechanism not
  publicly stated (unverified whether OCI containers or microVMs).
- **Locality**: Hosted only.
- **Agent integration**: Claude orchestration explicit; CLI
  (`tilde exec`) and Python SDK; plain-English agent instructions.
- **Config**: DSL for RBAC policies (allow / deny / require human
  approval per action, per repo, per agent).
- **Network policy**: Default-deny with per-request logging; cloud
  metadata endpoints and private networks blocked.
- **Persistence**: All changes versioned and rollback-able via lakeFS;
  atomic commits per run.
- **Maturity**: Private preview, © 2025, built by the lakeFS team.

### boxlite
- **Source**: https://boxlite.ai/ ; https://github.com/boxlite-ai/boxlite
- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~4,700 stars, YC-backed)
- **Isolation**: MicroVMs with dedicated Linux kernel per box — KVM on
  Linux, Hypervisor.framework on macOS. Not containers/namespaces.
- **Locality**: Local, no daemon.
- **Agent integration**: Explicitly targets AI agents; MCP server
  companion (boxlite-ai/boxlite-mcp). Pivoted from dev environments in
  2025.
- **Config**: SDK only — Python, Node.js, Rust, C; Go pending. No
  declarative manifest.
- **Network policy**: "Isolated Network per VM" — details not public
  *(unverified)*.
- **Notable**: Sub-50ms boot, snapshot / fork / clone of VM state. Self
  description: "the SQLite of sandboxing".
- **Maturity**: Active, YC.

### microsandbox
- **Source**: https://github.com/microsandbox/microsandbox (the
  `superradcompany/microsandbox` URL redirects to the same project).
- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~6,000 stars, YC-backed)
- **Isolation**: MicroVMs via libkrun, OCI-compatible images.
  Sub-100ms boot, rootless, no daemon, embeddable as a library.
- **Locality**: Local.
- **Agent integration**: Explicit Claude Code + Cursor targeting via
  "Agent Skills" packages and an MCP server. Agents can create their own
  sandboxes programmatically.
- **Config**: CLI (`msb`), SDKs (Rust, Python, TypeScript), MCP server.
- **Network policy**: Not detailed in public docs.
- **Maturity**: Beta, breaking changes expected; most-starred project in
  this set.

### smolmachines
- **Source**: https://smolmachines.com/ ; https://github.com/smol-machines/smolvm
- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~3,100 stars)
- **Isolation**: MicroVMs via libkrun — Hypervisor.framework on macOS,
  KVM on Linux. No shared kernel.
- **Locality**: Local, no daemon.
- **Agent integration**: Includes an `AGENTS.md`; designed with coding
  agents in mind but no MCP/Skills turnkey integration.
- **Config**: TOML Smolfiles declaring image, networking, volumes, SSH
  agent access, GPU acceleration. Portable `.smolmachine` files.
- **Network policy**: Off by default; per-host allowlist via
  `--allow-host`.
- **Persistence**: Named machines persistent by default; ephemeral runs
  also supported.
- **Maturity**: Active through April 2026.

## Comparison table

| Axis | bot-bottle | endo-familiar | litterbox | agent-safehouse | matchlock | tilde.run | boxlite | microsandbox | smolmachines |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Isolation | Docker + internal net + pipelock; gVisor if present | Object-capability (no OS isolation) | Podman + opt. Landlock | macOS `sandbox-exec` | MicroVM (Firecracker / Virt.fw) | Hosted container (unverified) | MicroVM (KVM / Hypervisor.fw) | MicroVM (libkrun) | MicroVM (libkrun / KVM) |
| Local vs hosted | Local | Local | Local (Linux) | Local (macOS) | Local | Hosted SaaS | Local | Local | Local |
| Open source | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | MIT | No | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 |
| Agent target | Claude Code | Generic (demo) | Generic | Multi-agent wrapper | Generic (+ Claude/OpenAI SDKs) | Claude focus | Generic | Claude + Cursor (MCP/Skills) | Generic (AGENTS.md) |
| Network policy | Default-deny via pipelock + per-bottle allowlist + DLP | Capability model only | Limited | Not addressed | Default-deny + allowlist + secret-injecting proxy | Default-deny + logging | Per-VM net (unverified) | Not documented | Off by default + allowlist |
| Parallel agents | Yes (one bottle per agent) | n/a | Not addressed | One at a time | Multiple VMs | Yes (dashboard) | SDK-level | SDK-level | Architectural |
| Config | JSON manifest (bottles + agents) | Programmatic refs | CLI wizard | Profile files / shell fns | CLI / SDK | DSL + CLI + SDK | SDK | CLI / SDK / MCP | TOML Smolfile |
| Maturity | Active May 2026 | Research (2022+) | Early (~66 ⭐) | Active (~1.4k ⭐) | Experimental (~574 ⭐) | Private preview | YC, ~4.7k ⭐ | YC, ~6k ⭐, beta | ~3.1k ⭐ |

## What's closest, what's different

**Closest in design and scope.** agent-safehouse and litterbox sit
nearest bot-bottle: local, single-user, thin wrappers over an
existing OS primitive, low-dep. The split is the isolation primitive —
bot-bottle uses Docker + pipelock egress (plus gVisor where
available); agent-safehouse uses `sandbox-exec`; litterbox uses Podman +
Landlock. matchlock and smolmachines are spiritually close on the
*policy* side (default-deny net, per-host allowlist) but use microVMs
instead of containers.

**Solving a different problem.** tilde.run is hosted SaaS for team /
production agent pipelines with data-versioned rollback — explicitly
opposite to bot-bottle's "infrastructure I control" goal. boxlite and
microsandbox are infrastructure libraries aimed at platform builders
embedding sandboxes into agent frameworks; they would be a *backend*
bot-bottle could call, not a competitor to its manifest layer.
endo-familiar is in a different paradigm entirely: capability passing
rather than kernel boundaries.

## Borrowable ideas

What bot-bottle already has that the survey suggested as
differentiators:
- Default-deny egress with a per-agent allowlist (pipelock).
- DLP scanning of outbound traffic.
- Bottle / agent split (manifest layer above the isolation primitive).
- gVisor auto-detection on Linux.

Ideas worth considering, without abandoning the Python-stdlib-first / local-Docker
stance:

1. **Per-use SSH key confirmation** (from litterbox). Even with
   KnownHostKey pinning and pipelock egress, a wrapper SSH agent that
   prompts on each key use (e.g. via `osascript` / `notify-send`) would
   catch an agent doing something off-policy with a key it legitimately
   holds. Pure-stdlib, no new deps.
2. **In-flight secret injection** (from matchlock). Pipelock already
   does egress allowlisting and DLP; teaching it to *inject* tokens at
   proxy time so e.g. `GITEA_TOKEN` never appears in the container's
   env would close the "agent reads its own env and exfiltrates" path.
   Fits the existing pipelock architecture.
3. **MicroVM backend as an opt-in bottle type** — already on the radar
   in `stronger-isolation-alternatives.md`. microsandbox, smolmachines,
   and matchlock all show that libkrun + Apple's
   Virtualization.framework is ergonomic enough that a
   `"runtime": "microvm"` field on a bottle is plausible without a heavy
   stack.

Not worth borrowing: the SDK-first programmatic API style of boxlite /
microsandbox (cuts against the declarative-manifest stance), and the
hosted-SaaS dashboard model of tilde.run (cuts against the
"infrastructure I control" goal).

## Caveats

- Star counts and last-commit dates are point-in-time snapshots.
- Several projects' network and persistence behaviour is not
  documented publicly; items so derived are marked *(unverified)*.
- The `superradcompany/microsandbox` URL in the original prompt
  redirects to `microsandbox/microsandbox`; the surveyed project is the
  same.