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# claude-bottle [![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/claude-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/claude-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml) Run multiple Claude Code agents on your own machine, each scoped to its own secrets, skills, and egress allowlist. ![pipelock and git-gate blocking exfil attempts against a live bottle](docs/demo.gif) Four prompts to the agent inside a real bottle: claude replies to `hello there` — proof api.anthropic.com routes through pipelock's bumped TLS end-to-end; asked to GET a non-allowlisted host, the agent's curl gets 403 back from pipelock; asked to POST a credential-shaped body to an allowlisted host, the same 403 — pipelock's DLP body scanner caught it; asked to commit and push an AKIA-shaped key, git-gate's gitleaks pre-receive hook rejects the ref. Run it yourself with `bash scripts/demo.sh`. ## Why "claude-bottle"? Each container is a bottle; Claude is the genie inside. The genie's powers are exactly what the manifest grants it — a specific set of skills, a specific set of secrets, and a specific set of hosts it can reach — nothing more. You uncork one bottle per agent (`./cli.py start `), many bottles run in parallel, and each is scoped to its task. When the session ends the bottle is destroyed and the genie does not persist. ## Goals - Scope each agent to the minimum credentials and network egress its task actually needs - Run multiple agents in parallel, isolated from each other - Keep code, credentials, and agent activity on infrastructure I control — no third-party agent runtime ## Security model Each agent runs in its own bottle: its own container, its own internal Docker network, and its own pipelock sidecar. Bottles don't share state, don't talk to each other, and only get the env vars, skills, SSH identities, and egress hosts the manifest grants them — nothing more. Any one agent only has the access it needs to do its job. The bottle limits both what an agent can see and where it can send it. Each bottle gets only the secrets and SSH identities the manifest grants it — a Gitea token but not a GitHub token, a deploy key but not a personal SSH key — so even a compromised or misbehaving agent only handles credentials it was already trusted with for its job. Egress flows through pipelock, which constrains where those credentials can travel: an agent with a Gitea token can reach `gitea.dideric.is`, not arbitrary attacker-controlled hosts. The same constraint blocks DNS-over-HTTPS as an exfil channel — a DoH resolver like `cloudflare-dns.com` would have to be on the allowlist for the agent to reach it at all. The container itself adds a layer between the agent and the host, but the v1 design leans more on secret minimization and egress allowlisting than on the container as a hardened boundary. On Linux hosts where [gVisor](https://gvisor.dev/) is registered with Docker, claude-bottle auto-detects it and launches every bottle under `runsc` for a userspace syscall barrier — no manifest configuration required. The broader v2 discussion lives in `docs/research/stronger-isolation-alternatives.md`. The egress proxy and OAuth-token handling below are the load-bearing pieces of v1. ## Architecture A bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container, and a `sidecars` container that bundles pipelock + egress + git-gate + supervise behind a Python init supervisor (PRD 0024). They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box. All HTTP and HTTPS egress funnels through pipelock, where the egress allowlist, TLS interception, and request-body DLP scanner enforce the manifest before any byte leaves the host. The only egress that doesn't traverse pipelock is git-gate's SSH push/fetch to `bottle.git` upstreams — pipelock can't proxy SSH, so git-gate is its own L4-style egress path with gitleaks doing the pre-receive scan. The agent dials the bundle by the legacy short names (`pipelock`, `egress`, `git-gate`, `supervise`); the renderer registers those as docker-network aliases on the bundle so existing HTTPS_PROXY URLs and MCP endpoints resolve without an agent-side change. ``` host ( ./cli.py ) │ starts │ stops ▼ ┌─────────────────────────── bottle ──────────────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ ┌──────────────────┐ │ │ │ agent image │ HTTPS_PROXY │ │ │ (claude-code, │ ────────────────────────┐ │ │ │ built locally) │ │ │ │ │ │ plain HTTP │ │ │ │ skills, env, │ (token injection) ┌────▼─────────┐ │ │ │ ~/.gitconfig, │ ──────────────────►│ cred-proxy │ │ │ │ ~/.npmrc, tea │ │ (strips/inj │ │ │ │ │ │ Authoriz.) │ │ │ │ environ: URLs │ └─────┬────────┘ │ │ │ only, no real │ HTTPS_PROXY │ │ │ │ tokens │ ▼ │ │ │ │ ┌────────────────┐ │ HTTPS to │ │ │ │ pipelock image │──────────┼──► allowlisted │ │ │ │ (TLS bump, DLP │ │ hosts (incl. │ │ │ │ body scan, │ │ cred-proxy │ │ │ │ allowlist) │ │ upstreams) │ │ │ └────────────────┘ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ git:// ┌────────────────┐ │ SSH push/fetch │ │ │ ────────────────►│ git-gate image │──────────┼──► to bottle.git │ │ │ │ (gitleaks + │ │ upstreams │ └──────────────────┘ │ git daemon) │ │ (direct — not │ └────────────────┘ │ via pipelock) │ │ │ agent on internal network (no default route); pipelock, │ │ cred-proxy, and git-gate straddle internal + egress networks. │ │ pipelock is the single HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint — cred-proxy's │ │ outbound traverses it too. git-gate's SSH egress is direct │ │ because pipelock is HTTP-only. │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ ``` - **agent image** — built from the repo `Dockerfile` (`node:22-slim` base) on first run; runs `claude` with the manifest-granted skills, env vars, and `~/.gitconfig` (the latter for the git-gate's `insteadOf` rules when `bottle.git` is set). - **pipelock image** — per-agent sidecar. Terminates the agent's outbound HTTP/HTTPS, enforces the resolved allowlist, runs DLP scanning. Design in `docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md` and `docs/prds/0006-pipelock-tls-interception.md`. - **git-gate image** — per-agent sidecar built on `zricethezav/gitleaks` (alpine + gitleaks + git-daemon + openssh-client). Runs `git daemon` over `git://` as a bidirectional mirror of each declared upstream. A pre-receive hook gitleaks-scans incoming refs and forwards clean refs to the real upstream over SSH; an access-hook runs `git fetch origin --prune` against the upstream before every upload-pack so an agent fetch returns whatever the upstream has *now* (fail-closed if unreachable). The agent's `~/.gitconfig` rewrites the real URL to the gate via `insteadOf`, so push, fetch, clone, and pull all route through. The agent never sees the upstream credential. If the upstream's hostname isn't resolvable from the gate container (e.g. a Tailscale-only host whose public DNS points elsewhere), pin its IP via `ExtraHosts: { "": "" }` on the `bottle.git` entry — the gate's `/etc/hosts` gets the override while the agent's `insteadOf` rewrite still keys off the original hostname. Brought up only when `bottle.git` has entries. Design in `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`. - **cred-proxy image** — per-bottle sidecar (`python:3.13-alpine` base, stdlib-only) that holds API tokens declared in `bottle.cred_proxy.routes`. Each route names a `path`, `upstream`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_ref` (host env var); the agent dials `http://cred-proxy:9099...` over plain HTTP and the proxy strips any inbound `Authorization`, injects ` ` using the value held only in its own container's environ, and forwards to the real upstream over HTTPS. SSE responses stream back unbuffered. The cred-proxy's outbound HTTPS routes through pipelock (it trusts pipelock's per-bottle CA), so pipelock's egress allowlist + body scanner apply to cred-proxy traffic the same way they apply to direct agent traffic. Smart-HTTP push paths (`/git-receive-pack`, `/info/refs?service=git-receive-pack`) are refused at the proxy — push must go through `bottle.git` / git-gate where gitleaks runs. Optional per-route `role` tags drive agent-side rewrites: `anthropic-base-url`, `npm-registry`, `git-insteadof`, `tea-login`. The agent's `printenv` shows only proxy URLs — none of the real token values. Design in `docs/prds/0010-cred-proxy.md`. When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every sidecar that was brought up and the two networks; nothing about a bottle persists between runs. ## Quickstart Requires Docker on the host and a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token in your shell env. ```sh ./cli.py start # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude ``` The container is removed automatically when the session ends. If the script is killed with SIGKILL the exit trap won't fire and the container may be left running; remove it with `docker rm -f `. ## Manifest Bottles and agents live as Markdown files with YAML frontmatter under `~/.claude-bottle/`. Each bottle is one file in `bottles/`, each agent is one file in `agents/`: ``` ~/.claude-bottle/ ├── bottles/ │ ├── dev.md │ └── gitea-dev.md └── agents/ ├── implementer.md └── researcher.md ``` The filename (without `.md`) is the entity's name. Filenames must match `[a-z][a-z0-9-]*`; files that don't are skipped with a warning. A repo can ship its own agent files alongside its code at `/.claude-bottle/agents/.md`. Those agents reference bottles defined in `~/.claude-bottle/bottles/` (the only place bottles can come from); a `bottles/` subdir in a repo is ignored with a warning. **This is the trust boundary**: bottle infrastructure — credentials, egress allowlists, git remotes — comes from your home directory only. A cloned repo cannot redirect a host env var to an attacker-named upstream because it has no way to declare a bottle. ### Example bottle (`~/.claude-bottle/bottles/gitea-dev.md`) ````markdown --- env: GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: didericis git: - Name: claude-bottle Upstream: ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/didericis/claude-bottle.git IdentityFile: /Users/didericis/.ssh/id_ed25519_gitea KnownHostKey: ssh-ed25519 AAAA... # Routes declared here are held by a per-bottle cred-proxy sidecar, # not the agent. Each route names a path the agent dials, the # upstream the proxy forwards to, an auth_scheme, and a token_ref # (host env var). The value goes into the sidecar's environ via # `docker create -e`, never touches argv or disk. Optional `role` # tags drive agent-side rewrites: anthropic-base-url (sets # ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL), npm-registry (writes ~/.npmrc), git-insteadof # (writes ~/.gitconfig), tea-login (writes ~/.config/tea/config.yml). # See docs/prds/0010-cred-proxy.md. cred_proxy: routes: - path: /anthropic/ upstream: https://api.anthropic.com auth_scheme: Bearer token_ref: CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN role: anthropic-base-url - path: /gh-api/ upstream: https://api.github.com auth_scheme: Bearer token_ref: GH_PAT - path: /gh-git/ upstream: https://github.com auth_scheme: Bearer token_ref: GH_PAT role: git-insteadof - path: /npm/ upstream: https://registry.npmjs.org auth_scheme: Bearer token_ref: NPM_TOKEN role: npm-registry # Egress is forced through a per-agent pipelock sidecar on a Docker # `--internal` network — without the proxy the agent has no route # off-box. The effective allowlist is the union of baked-in defaults # (api.anthropic.com, claude.ai, ...) and the hostnames listed here. # Pipelock also runs DLP scanning and detects URL-embedded # high-entropy secrets. The resolved allowlist is shown in the y/N # preflight before launch. egress: allowlist: - github.com - registry.npmjs.org - pypi.org --- The `gitea-dev` bottle. Backs my work on personal projects: Anthropic OAuth via cred-proxy, gitea.dideric.is over SSH (with PAT for tea API), and npm for publishing scoped packages. ```` ### Example agent (`~/.claude-bottle/agents/gitea-helper.md`) ````markdown --- bottle: gitea-dev skills: - init-prd --- You help maintain Gitea-hosted projects. ```` The agent's Markdown body is its system prompt (whitespace stripped). The frontmatter declares the bottle to launch in and any skills to mount. You can also include Claude Code subagent fields (`name`, `description`, `model`, `color`, `memory`) in the frontmatter — claude-bottle ignores them at launch but doesn't reject them, so the same file can drop into `~/.claude/agents/` as a Claude Code subagent. Unknown top-level frontmatter keys die at load with a "did you mean" pointer; typos don't silently ghost into an empty config. The YAML subset the frontmatter accepts is bounded (flat keys, strings / ints / true-or-false bools / null / lists / one-level nested dicts). Anchors, multi-line block scalars, tags, and ambiguous bare strings (`yes` / `NO` / `2026-05-24` / `0x...`) all die with a clear pointer at the spec — quote your strings when in doubt. The full schema lives in `claude_bottle/yaml_subset.py` (~450 lines, stdlib-only, no PyYAML). Working examples live under `examples/`. Pipelock's design lives in `docs/prds/0001-per-agent-egress-proxy-via-pipelock.md` and the rationale in `docs/research/pipelock-assessment.md`. The trust boundary rationale lives in `docs/prds/0011-per-file-md-manifest.md`. ## Auth: OAuth token, not API key claude-bottle authenticates `claude` inside the container with the same Pro/Max subscription you already use on the host, via a long-lived OAuth token. No `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` is needed. **Why a token instead of mounting `~/.claude.json`:** on macOS, Claude Code stores OAuth credentials in the encrypted Keychain, not in `~/.claude.json`. Mounting that file into a Linux container does not carry the credentials with it. Linux hosts keep credentials in `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, but to keep the launcher portable claude-bottle uses the env-var path on every host. **One-time setup on the host:** ```sh claude setup-token # browser login, prints a ~1-year OAuth token ``` Stash the token in your shell env (e.g. `~/.zshrc` or a secret manager) as `CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN`: ```sh export CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN="" ``` The bottle reaches the Anthropic API only through the cred-proxy sidecar. To let `claude` authenticate, declare a route in `bottle.cred_proxy.routes` with `role: "anthropic-base-url"` and `token_ref: "CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN"`: ```jsonc { "path": "/anthropic/", "upstream": "https://api.anthropic.com", "auth_scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "role": "anthropic-base-url" } ``` At launch, `cli.py` reads `CLAUDE_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN` from the host env and forwards it into the cred-proxy container's environ — never into the agent's. The agent receives `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` pointing at `http://cred-proxy:9099/anthropic` and a non-secret placeholder for `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (claude-code refuses to start without one; the proxy strips and replaces the header on every request). `printenv` inside the agent does not surface the real token, and the value is never written to disk or placed on argv on the host. A bottle without an `anthropic-base-url` route has no path to the Anthropic API — there is no fallback that forwards the token directly to the agent. Caveats: the token is bound to your subscription tier (Pro/Max/Team/Enterprise), it does not work with `claude --bare` (which only reads `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`), and if it leaks, regenerate via `claude setup-token` again. Reference: . ## Trademarks claude-bottle is an independent project and is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Anthropic, PBC. "Claude" and "Claude Code" are trademarks of Anthropic, PBC; the project name uses "claude" descriptively to indicate that the tool runs Claude Code inside a sandbox. ## License Copyright 2026 Eric Bauerfeld Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.