docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md

@@ -19,17 +19,25 @@ field names, timestamps, or how a bottled agent is identified.
 This PRD defines **one canonical audit-event contract** every producer
 emits into:
 
-1. A **versioned envelope** — schema version, event id, event type,
-   monotonic + wall-clock timestamps, and an explicit **trust boundary**
-   between host-supplied and agent-claimed fields.
-2. **Canonical JSON serialization + a per-writer hash chain**, so any
-   deletion or edit of a past record breaks the chain and is detectable
-   offline.
+1. A **versioned envelope** — schema version, event id, event/observed
+   timestamps, host-attributed identity (`bottle`/`bottled_agent`/
+   `activation`), provenance (`manifest_digest`, `policy_version`),
+   host-observed `actor`/`action`/`resource`/`outcome`, correlation/
+   causation ids, a sensitivity class, a typed payload, and an explicit
+   **trust boundary** between host-supplied and agent-claimed fields.
+2. **Canonical JSON serialization + a per-writer hash chain** (with
+   normative test vectors), so any deletion, edit, or reorder of a past
+   record breaks the chain and is detectable offline.
 3. An **append-only JSONL journal as the source of truth**, with a
-   **rebuildable SQLite index** for local search — no paid platform, no
-   network dependency.
-4. An **initial event registry** covering lifecycle, decision, egress,
-   auth, and forge events.
+   **rebuildable SQLite index** and a local `audit query`/`verify` surface
+   — no paid platform, no network dependency.
+4. An **initial event registry** covering lifecycle, host-controller,
+   supervise decision, egress (request/decision/cutoff/anomaly), git-gate
+   and signed-commit (#480), auth/authz, and audit self-events — each with
+   its trusted-vs-claimed fields and redaction rules.
+5. A **stable export projection** (CloudEvents / OpenTelemetry Logs) and
+   the **#324 delivery contract** (payload, `(epoch, seq)` cursor, dedup,
+   backpressure, retention ordering).
 
 It is explicitly scheduled to land **immediately after the host
 controller (#468)** so the host controller's lifecycle transitions are the
@@ -126,44 +134,108 @@ stable top level:
 
 ```
 {
-  // --- everything at the top level is host-established (trusted) ---
+  // ---- schema + integrity (host-owned) ----
   "v": 1,                          // schema version — bumped only on a breaking change
-  "id": "<uuid4>",                 // globally unique event id
+  "id": "<uuid4>",                 // globally unique event id; stable across export/replay (dedup key)
   "type": "egress.decision",       // dotted event type from the registry
   "epoch": 7,                      // writer-boot counter, bumped once per host-controller (writer) start
   "seq": 1287,                     // monotonic sequence within this epoch (gap-detectable)
-  "prev": "<hex>",                 // hash of the previous record in the chain ("" for genesis)
+  "segment": "20260726T000000Z",   // journal segment id (rotation boundary); chain continues across segments
+  "prev": "<hex>",                 // hash of the previous record in the chain ("" for a segment genesis)
   "hash": "<hex>",                 // sha256(prev + canonical(this event with hash=""))
-  "producer": "host-controller",   // which host component wrote this
-  "host": "mac-studio-1",
-  "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12", // slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events)
-  "ts_wall": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // host wall-clock, RFC3339 UTC
-  "ts_mono": 90142.55,             // host monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only)
 
-  // --- the ONLY untrusted region: anything the agent or a remote claimed ---
+  // ---- timestamps (host-owned) ----
+  "ts_event": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.061Z",    // when the underlying event occurred at the boundary
+  "ts_recorded": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // when the single writer appended it (authoritative)
+  "ts_mono": 90142.55,             // monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only)
+
+  // ---- attribution + provenance (host-established) ----
+  "producer": "egress",            // host component that emitted the event
+  "host": "mac-studio-1",
+  "bottle": "amber-fox",           // bottle (container/VM) identity
+  "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12", // bottled-agent slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events)
+  "activation": "01J8Z...",        // activation id: one run/session of the bottled agent (null if n/a)
+  "manifest_digest": "sha256:9f2…", // digest of the manifest the bottled agent is running (null if n/a)
+  "policy_version": "egress-2026-07-20", // policy/config version in force at decision time (null if n/a)
+
+  // ---- semantics: host-observed facts of what happened ----
+  "actor": "bottled-agent:amber-fox-12", // who acted, as a host-attributed identity
+  "action": "egress.connect",      // what was attempted / done
+  "resource": "registry.npmjs.org:443",  // what it acted on, as observed at the boundary
+  "outcome": "blocked",            // host-decided result: allowed|blocked|deferred|success|failure
+  "sensitivity": "security",       // classification: normal|security|restricted (drives redaction + export)
+
+  // ---- correlation (host-assigned) ----
+  "correlation_id": "flow-9c2a…",  // groups a related flow (request → decision → cutoff)
+  "causation_id": "<event id>",    // the event that directly caused this one ("" if root)
+
+  // ---- typed, trusted, event-specific payload (shape fixed per type in the registry) ----
+  "payload": {
+    "route_id": 4,
+    "detector": "token_patterns"
+  },
+
+  // ---- the ONLY untrusted region: agent- or remote-claimed data ----
   "untrusted": {
-    "reason": "npm install needs registry.npmjs.org",
-    "target": "registry.npmjs.org:443"
+    "reason": "npm install needs registry.npmjs.org"  // the agent's stated justification
   }
 }
 ```
 
 The **trust boundary is a single region, not a split.** Everything outside
-`untrusted` is trusted by construction — the host established it: the
-schema/chain metadata (`v`, `id`, `type`, `epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`),
-the producer and host identity, the source-IP → `bottled_agent` slug
-attribution, and the host clock (`ts_wall`/`ts_mono`). `untrusted` is the
-**one** place anything an agent or a remote claimed may go. A reader (or a
-future policy engine) trusts every top-level field for attribution and
-treats `untrusted.*` — and only `untrusted.*` — as adversarial claims.
+`untrusted` is trusted by construction — the host established it: schema and
+chain metadata, both timestamps, the attribution/provenance fields
+(source-IP → `bottled_agent`/`bottle`/`activation`, `manifest_digest`,
+`policy_version`), the host-observed semantics
+(`actor`/`action`/`resource`/`outcome`), the host-assigned correlation ids,
+and the typed `payload`. `untrusted` is the **one** place anything an agent
+or a remote claimed may go (e.g. the agent's free-text `reason`). A reader
+(or a future policy engine) trusts every field outside `untrusted` for
+attribution and treats `untrusted.*` — and only `untrusted.*` — as
+adversarial claims.
 
-Framing it as "one untrusted region, everything else trusted" (rather than
-two parallel `trusted`/`untrusted` blocks) removes the mistake where a
-producer forgets to nest a host field under `trusted`: a field is trusted
-unless it is deliberately placed inside `untrusted`. The construction API
-enforces this — producers pass trusted fields positionally and hand all
-agent/remote-claimed data as the single `untrusted` mapping, so there is no
-way to emit a top-level field that *looks* authoritative but isn't.
+Framing it as "one untrusted region, everything else trusted" removes the
+mistake where a producer forgets to mark a claimed field: a field is
+trusted unless it is deliberately placed inside `untrusted`. The
+construction API enforces this — producers pass trusted fields explicitly
+and hand all agent/remote-claimed data as the single `untrusted` mapping,
+so there is no way to emit a top-level field that *looks* authoritative but
+isn't.
+
+**Two timestamps** because they answer different questions and can diverge
+under backpressure: `ts_event` is when the thing happened at the boundary
+(the proxy saw the connect, the gate saw the push); `ts_recorded` is when
+the single writer durably appended it. Ordering and the chain use
+`(epoch, seq)`, never either wall clock. Both are host-set — a bottled
+agent never supplies a timestamp.
+
+**Optionality.** `bottle`/`bottled_agent`/`activation`, `manifest_digest`,
+`policy_version`, and `payload`/`untrusted` are `null`/absent for events
+that have no such subject (a host-level `hostctl.*` or `audit.*` event has
+no bottled agent). Absent ≠ empty: a reader distinguishes "no subject" from
+"unknown". `id`, `type`, the chain fields, both timestamps, `producer`,
+`host`, `actor`, `action`, `outcome`, and `sensitivity` are always present.
+
+#### Trust provenance of every common field
+
+| Field | Trust | Set by |
+|---|---|---|
+| `v` `id` `type` `epoch` `seq` `segment` `prev` `hash` | trusted | the single writer |
+| `ts_event` | trusted | emitting host component (boundary) |
+| `ts_recorded` `ts_mono` | trusted | the single writer |
+| `producer` `host` | trusted | the single writer |
+| `bottle` `bottled_agent` `activation` | trusted | gateway source-IP → slug attribution |
+| `manifest_digest` `policy_version` | trusted | control plane (what was in force) |
+| `actor` `action` `resource` `outcome` | trusted | host component that observed/decided it |
+| `sensitivity` | trusted | registry default for `type`, overridable up (never down) by the producer |
+| `correlation_id` `causation_id` | trusted | the single writer (assigned as it threads the flow) |
+| `payload.*` | trusted | emitting host component (shape fixed per `type`) |
+| `untrusted.*` | **claimed** | copied verbatim from a bottle / gateway / forge / remote |
+
+Every registry entry (below) restates, per event type, which `payload`
+keys are required and names any `untrusted` keys it carries — so "trusted
+vs claimed" is explicit for every event-specific attribute, not just the
+common ones.
 
 ### Canonical serialization + hash chain
 
@@ -183,11 +255,92 @@ The `hash` field is computed over the canonical form of the event **with
 digest = sha256_hex(prev_hash + canonical({**event, "hash": ""}))
 ```
 
-`prev` is the prior record's `hash`; genesis uses `prev = ""`. This makes
-the journal an append-only Merkle-style chain: editing or deleting record
-*n* changes its hash, so record *n+1*'s `prev` no longer matches — the
-break is local and points at the tampered record. Verification needs only
-the journal itself (no keys), so it runs offline and in CI.
+`prev` is the prior record's `hash`; a segment genesis uses `prev = ""`.
+Two exact rules pin the bytes so the chain is reproducible anywhere:
+
+1. **Serialize the record with its own `hash` field set to `""`** (present,
+   empty), never omitted — the key set is identical before and after
+   hashing.
+2. **Digest = `sha256_hex(prev + canonical(record_with_empty_hash))`**,
+   where `prev` is the previous record's `hash` string (`""` at genesis),
+   `+` is string concatenation, and `canonical` is the function above.
+   `ts_mono`, being a float, is serialized by Python's shortest-round-trip
+   `repr` via `json.dumps`; producers therefore emit it as a JSON number
+   they do not post-process. (All other fields are strings/ints/objects,
+   which serialize unambiguously.)
+
+Editing or deleting record *n* changes its hash, so record *n+1*'s `prev`
+no longer matches — the break is local and names the tampered record.
+Verification needs only the journal itself (no keys), so it runs offline
+and in CI.
+
+#### Test vectors (normative)
+
+Two records, reduced to the chain-relevant fields, demonstrate the exact
+serialization and linkage. An implementation is conformant iff it
+reproduces these bytes and hashes.
+
+```
+# Record 0 — segment genesis (prev = "")
+canonical(record0, hash=""):
+{"hash":"","id":"11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111","prev":"","seq":0,"type":"audit.segment_open"}
+hash0 = sha256(""  + canonical) =
+  942ea5729bcac6efdbdea942396bfa574ab0d6ebf5615402595359422f2aeb83
+
+# Record 1 — chains onto record 0 (prev = hash0)
+canonical(record1, hash=""):
+{"hash":"","id":"22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222","prev":"942ea5729bcac6efdbdea942396bfa574ab0d6ebf5615402595359422f2aeb83","seq":1,"type":"lifecycle.bottled_agent_start"}
+hash1 = sha256(hash0 + canonical) =
+  bc082347680405fee50b60a9c304611aa026950b15d869b7e3ae56e1c451b856
+
+# Tamper check: flip record0.type → recompute →
+#   4553eda647f33f0c608cfea44be28efbbaca45ed30b873fcbd4405fa5ce737ed
+# which no longer equals record1.prev (942ea5…) — the break is detected at record1.
+```
+
+The implementation PR ships these plus full-envelope vectors (every field
+populated, and a redaction case) as committed fixtures, so a schema-version
+bump that changes the bytes fails a golden test loudly.
+
+### Ordering, idempotency, and duplicate handling
+
+- **Ordering.** `(epoch, seq)` is a strict total order per host and, because
+  the writer is single, a strict order per bottle/activation within that
+  host — satisfying "at least strict causal order per activation/bottle".
+  `causation_id` records the explicit cause edges (a DAG) on top of the
+  total order, so a consumer can reconstruct request → decision → cutoff
+  even if unrelated events interleave between them.
+- **Idempotency.** `id` is the idempotency key. A producer that retries an
+  emit (e.g. after a writer restart mid-handoff) **reuses the same `id`**;
+  the writer drops a second append bearing an `id` already present in the
+  current segment's in-memory set, and the index `UPSERT`s by `id`, so a
+  duplicate never double-counts or forks the chain.
+- **Deduplication downstream.** Because `id` is stable across export and
+  replay, #324's cursor replay and any cross-host merge dedup on `id` — no
+  consumer needs to invent a second identity.
+
+### Behavior across rotation, restart, import, truncation
+
+- **Rotation.** At a segment boundary the writer opens a new segment file,
+  sets its `segment` id, and carries the rotated-out segment's head as the
+  new genesis `prev` — so the chain is continuous *across* segments while
+  each file stays independently openable. `verify` walks segments in order
+  and checks the head-to-genesis link at each seam.
+- **Restart.** Covered above: read last line → adopt its `hash` as `prev`,
+  bump `epoch`, reset `seq`. The chain never restarts even though the
+  counters do.
+- **Import.** `audit import <segment>` appends an externally supplied
+  segment (e.g. recovered from another host or a backup). Import verifies
+  the incoming chain in isolation first, then links it only if its genesis
+  `prev` matches a known head or is explicitly grafted; imported records
+  keep their original `id` (dedup) and are marked with their origin host so
+  attribution is not laundered.
+- **Truncation.** A crash can leave a partial final line; `verify` reports
+  it as `truncated-tail` (recoverable — replay resumes from the last intact
+  record). A chain that ends before a persisted head, or a missing interior
+  `seq`, is reported as `gap`/`missing-suffix` (evidence of deletion, not a
+  clean crash). The two are distinguished so an operator can tell "power
+  loss" from "someone trimmed the log".
 
 ### Single writer; ordering across restarts
 
@@ -209,7 +362,7 @@ start the writer:
    0 for the new boot.
 
 Total order is therefore `(epoch, seq)` — monotonic across restarts by
-construction — with `ts_wall` for human reading and `ts_mono` for
+construction — with `ts_event`/`ts_recorded` for human reading and `ts_mono` for
 sub-second ordering inside an epoch. A crash mid-append truncates at most
 the last (partial) line; the verifier flags it and replay resumes from the
 last intact record.
@@ -220,35 +373,91 @@ last intact record.
   alongside `host_db_path()`), one canonical event per line, opened
   `O_APPEND`. This is authoritative.
 - **Index:** a new `audit_events` table via the existing `DbStore` /
-  `TableMigrations` machinery, holding the envelope columns plus JSON
-  blobs, indexed on `(bottled_agent, type, ts_wall)`. It is a **derived
-  cache**: `audit rebuild` truncates and replays the journal, re-verifying
-  the chain as it goes. If the DB is deleted or drifts, it is regenerated
-  from the journal with no data loss. (This supersedes the free-standing
-  `supervise_audit_entries` table, which becomes a view/producer onto the
-  new index.)
+  `TableMigrations` machinery. It is a **derived cache, not a second source
+  of truth**: `audit rebuild` truncates and replays the journal,
+  re-verifying the chain as it goes, so a deleted or drifted DB is
+  regenerated from the journal with no data loss. On a `verify` failure
+  during rebuild it stops and reports rather than indexing past a break.
+  (This supersedes the free-standing `supervise_audit_entries` table, which
+  becomes a producer onto the new index.)
+
+**Indexable fields** (columns + indices): `ts_event`, `ts_recorded`,
+`type`, `host`, `bottle`, `bottled_agent`, `activation`, `actor`,
+`outcome`, `sensitivity`, `correlation_id`, `causation_id`, plus two
+event-specific projections promoted out of `payload` for query —
+`repository` and `commit_sha` (populated for `forge.*`/`commit.*`, null
+otherwise). The full canonical record is stored verbatim in a `raw` column
+so the index never loses fidelity to the journal.
+
+**Local query surface** — `audit query`, no egress, no paid platform:
+
+```
+audit query \
+  [--since T] [--until T] [--type egress.*] [--host H] [--bottle B] \
+  [--activation A] [--agent SLUG] [--actor ID] [--outcome blocked] \
+  [--repository R] [--correlation-id C] [--commit SHA] \
+  [--follow BOTTLE]        # a bottled agent's events in (epoch, seq) order
+  [--json | --table]
+audit verify [--segment S] # offline chain check; exit non-zero on any break
+audit rebuild              # drop + replay journal → index
+audit import <segment>     # graft an external segment (see above)
+```
+
+Type filters accept a `group.*` glob. A read-only local HTTP endpoint
+mirrors the same filters for the future review console; both are pure reads
+over the index and can never mutate the journal.
 
 ### Event registry (initial)
 
-Dotted `type` names, grouped; the registry is a table mapping type →
-required `untrusted` keys so producers and the verifier agree on shape:
+Dotted `type` names, grouped. The registry is a table mapping each type to
+its required `payload` keys, its `untrusted` keys (if any), a default
+`sensitivity`, and its correlation behavior — so producers and the verifier
+agree on shape and "trusted vs claimed" is pinned per type. Initial
+coverage (the issue's mandated set):
 
-- **lifecycle.*** — `lifecycle.bottled_agent_start`,
-  `lifecycle.bottled_agent_stop`, `lifecycle.bottled_agent_crash`
-  (producer: host-controller, #468). Leaf names use `bottled_agent` to match
-  the top-level `bottled_agent` field — one term for the subject everywhere.
-- **decision.*** — `decision.proposed`, `decision.resolved`
-  (producer: supervise; carries operator action + justification, replacing
-  PRD 0013's row shape).
-- **egress.*** — `egress.decision` (allow/block at the proxy),
-  `egress.route_added`.
-- **auth.*** — `auth.token_minted`, `auth.token_rejected` (control-plane;
-  **never** the token itself — see redaction).
-- **forge.*** — `forge.push_accepted`, `forge.push_rejected` (git-gate),
-  `forge.pr_opened`.
+| Group / type | Producer | Required `payload` (trusted) | `untrusted` | Default sensitivity |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| **lifecycle.*** — `bottled_agent_start` / `_stop` / `_crash` | host-controller (#468) | `manifest_digest`, `exit` (for stop/crash) | — | normal |
+| **hostctl.*** — `broker_launch`, `broker_teardown`, `broker_reject` | host-controller (#468) | `op`, `request_digest` | — | security |
+| **decision.*** — `proposed`, `resolved` | supervise | `tool`, `operator_action`, `justification`, `diff_digest` | `agent_rationale` | security |
+| **egress.*** — `request`, `decision`, `cutoff`, `anomaly` | egress proxy | `route_id`, `detector` (on match), `bytes` (cutoff) | `reason`, `target_claimed` | security |
+| **forge.*** — `push_accepted`, `push_rejected`, `pr_opened` | git-gate | `repository`, `ref`, `gitleaks_result` | `title`, `description` | security |
+| **commit.signed** (#480) | git-gate | `repository`, `commit_sha`, `activation_key_id`, `signature_ref` | `commit_message` | security |
+| **auth.*** — `token_minted`, `token_rejected`, `authz_denied` | control plane | `role`, `token_id`, `reason_code` | — | security |
+| **audit.*** — `segment_open`, `verify_failed`, `truncation_detected`, `export_failed` | audit writer/verifier | `segment`, `detail` | — | security |
 
-New types are additive; adding one does not bump `v`. Removing or
-re-typing a field bumps `v`.
+Notes:
+- **`egress.request` vs `egress.decision`** share a `correlation_id`; the
+  `decision`'s `causation_id` points at the `request`, and a later `cutoff`
+  chains onto the `decision` — so a flow is reconstructable.
+- **`audit.*` self-events** make the audit subsystem audit itself: a failed
+  verification, a detected truncation, or a dropped export is itself a
+  chained, tamper-evident record — you cannot silence the alarm without
+  breaking the chain that carries it.
+- **Free-text and remote-echoed fields are always `untrusted`** (`reason`,
+  `agent_rationale`, PR `title`/`description`, `target_claimed`), because
+  they originate in the bottle or a remote response; the host-observed
+  counterpart (`resource`, `outcome`, `gitleaks_result`) is the trusted
+  fact.
+
+**Sensitivity + redaction per type.** Every type's default `sensitivity`
+is listed above; a producer may raise it (never lower it). `restricted`
+events keep their `payload` in the journal but the export projection ships
+only the envelope + a payload digest unless the consumer is authorized —
+so a `security`/`restricted` record is still counted and correlated
+downstream without leaking its body. The credential-shape redaction rules
+(next) apply to **every** type regardless of sensitivity.
+
+**Schema evolution & backward-compatible readers.** The registry is
+append-only: **adding** a type, an optional `payload` key, or an
+`untrusted` key does **not** bump `v`; readers ignore unknown fields
+(forward-compatible) and treat absent optional fields as `null`.
+**Removing** or **re-typing** a field, or making an optional field
+required, bumps `v`. A reader declares the max `v` it understands and
+refuses to *interpret* a higher-`v` record, but the **verifier is
+version-agnostic** — the hash covers whatever fields exist, so chain
+integrity is checkable across versions without understanding semantics.
+Every `v` bump ships a migration note and updated golden vectors.
 
 ### Redaction rule
 
@@ -288,6 +497,14 @@ and keep the event) rather than drop, so a producer bug can never make an
 audit event vanish; the key deny-list stays a hard refusal because a
 credential in a named field is always a producer bug worth surfacing.
 
+**No raw-payload capture by default.** The envelope carries *decisions and
+metadata*, not traffic. Prompts, model responses, request/response bodies,
+and file contents are **not** recorded unless a producer opts a specific,
+reviewed field in — and such a field is `untrusted` and subject to both
+redaction layers. This keeps the audit log from becoming a covert copy of
+the very data the sandbox exists to contain (the issue's "unsafe payload
+capture" non-goal).
+
 ### Export / interoperability (CloudEvents, OpenTelemetry Logs)
 
 #487 requires the envelope to map onto the **OpenTelemetry Logs data
@@ -302,14 +519,14 @@ subtree.
 cannot be a context attribute — so a nested `trusted` block would have had
 to be flattened for CloudEvents anyway. Our flat top level maps directly:
 `id`→`id`, `type`→`type`, `producer`+`host`→`source`,
-`bottled_agent`→`subject`, `ts_wall`→`time`; the integrity/chain fields
+`bottled_agent`→`subject`, `ts_event`→`time` (`ts_recorded` as an extension); the integrity/chain fields
 (`epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`, `v`) ride as **extension attributes**
 (scalars — legal). The `untrusted` map goes in `data`. Only mechanical
 transform needed: extension attribute names must be lowercase-alphanumeric,
 so `bottled_agent`/`ts_mono`/etc. are renamed at export (e.g. a
 `botbottle`-prefixed form) — a naming rule, not a schema conflict.
 
-**OpenTelemetry Logs.** `ts_wall`→`Timestamp`; `type`→the `event.name`
+**OpenTelemetry Logs.** `ts_event`→`Timestamp`, `ts_recorded`→`ObservedTimestamp`; `type`→the `event.name`
 attribute; the flat trusted fields → `Attributes` under a `botbottle.*`
 namespace (`botbottle.bottled_agent`, `botbottle.producer`,
 `botbottle.chain.hash`, …); `untrusted.*` → `Attributes` under
@@ -334,9 +551,47 @@ integrity fields along; verification stays on the canonical journal. This
 satisfies "without losing integrity or attribution semantics": both are
 carried, neither is *relied upon* in the foreign format.
 
-The export adapters themselves (and #324's webhook delivery / causal
-ordering) are follow-up implementation — this PRD fixes the *schema* so
-that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat.
+The export adapters themselves are follow-up implementation — this PRD
+fixes the *schema* so that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat.
+
+#### The #324 delivery contract (payload, cursor, backpressure)
+
+#324 transports events off-box; it must not invent a second envelope. This
+PRD fixes the contract it depends on:
+
+- **Payload.** #324 ships the **native canonical record verbatim** (the
+  exact bytes the hash covers), optionally wrapped in the CloudEvents
+  projection whose `data` *is* that record. Either way the integrity fields
+  travel intact and the receiver can verify against the same bytes.
+- **Cursor.** The export cursor is `(epoch, seq)` (equivalently the last
+  exported `hash`). It advances **only on acknowledgement**, so delivery is
+  at-least-once and gap-free; a crash re-sends from the last acked cursor.
+- **Idempotency / replay.** Dedup is on `id` (stable across replay), so
+  at-least-once delivery is safe — the receiver collapses re-sends.
+- **Backpressure.** The outbox is the journal itself plus a cursor; when
+  the endpoint is slow the cursor simply lags — the writer never blocks on
+  export, and audit never applies backpressure to the data plane it
+  records.
+- **Retention interaction.** Retention/rotation **must not** prune a
+  segment whose records are still behind the export cursor; the reaper
+  honors `min(cursor)` across all configured consumers. (The schedule
+  itself stays the retention follow-up; this is the *ordering* constraint
+  that follow-up must respect.)
+
+#### #480 signed-commit attribution maps in without weakening it
+
+#480 binds a commit's bytes to a per-activation signing key. It maps to the
+`commit.signed` event: `payload` carries `repository`, `commit_sha`,
+`activation_key_id`, and a `signature_ref` (the detached-signature
+location or its digest) — **not** the private key and not a re-derived
+signature. The audit event therefore *references and timestamps* #480's
+existing byte-to-activation-key proof inside the tamper-evident chain; it
+does not re-implement or replace it, so #480's guarantee is unweakened —
+the signature still verifies against the commit bytes independently, and
+the audit record adds only "this binding was observed at this point in the
+chain". The trusted `actor`/`activation` fields and the `commit_sha`
+payload are host-observed at the gate, so attribution cannot be forged by
+the committing agent.
 
 ## Implementation chunks
 
@@ -349,21 +604,49 @@ that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat.
    `redact_tokens`); unit tests for determinism, chain-break detection,
    `epoch`/`seq` continuity across a simulated restart, and redaction of
    both a deny-listed key and a token-shaped value.
-3. **SQLite index + `audit rebuild` / `audit verify` CLI.** New
-   `audit_events` migration; replay-from-journal; offline chain verifier;
-   local query commands (by bottled-agent / type / time / producer).
+3. **SQLite index + `audit` CLI.** New `audit_events` migration (indexable
+   fields above); replay-from-journal; offline chain verifier
+   (`truncated-tail` vs `gap`); `query` / `verify` / `rebuild` / `import`;
+   idempotent `UPSERT` by `id`.
 4. **Host controller as first producer (#468).** Wire
-   `lifecycle.bottled_agent_*` emission into the host controller's
-   start/stop/crash paths; establish the `epoch` bump + chain-head carry on
-   writer restart here (the host controller owns the single writer).
+   `lifecycle.bottled_agent_*` and `hostctl.*` emission into the host
+   controller; establish the `epoch` bump + chain-head carry + segment
+   rotation on writer restart here (it owns the single writer).
 5. **Migrate existing producers.** Re-emit supervise `decision.*` (retiring
    the standalone `supervise_audit_entries` shape behind the index), egress
-   `egress.*`, git-gate `forge.*`, control-plane `auth.*`.
-6. **CloudEvents / OTel export adapters.** A projection layer emitting each
-   event as a CloudEvents JSON envelope and/or an OTel LogRecord (field
-   re-map per *Export / interoperability*); feeds #324's webhook delivery.
-7. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport (#324); per-writer signing +
-   external anchoring on the chain head; retention/rotation policy.
+   `egress.*`, git-gate `forge.*` + `commit.signed` (#480), control-plane
+   `auth.*`; add the `audit.*` self-events (verify/truncation/export
+   failure).
+6. **CloudEvents / OTel export adapters + #324 delivery.** Projection layer
+   (field re-map per *Export / interoperability*) plus the outbox cursor,
+   ack-driven advance, and retention-ordering guard the #324 contract
+   specifies.
+7. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport; per-writer signing +
+   external anchoring on the chain head; retention/rotation *schedule*.
+
+## Acceptance-criteria coverage (#487)
+
+The issue defines the contract; implementation is explicitly split into
+follow-up PRs. This PRD is the durable decision record; each acceptance box
+maps to a section:
+
+| #487 acceptance criterion | Where |
+|---|---|
+| Durable PRD defines versioned envelope + initial registry | *The envelope*, *Event registry* |
+| Canonical JSON + hash-chain rules, unambiguous, with test vectors | *Canonical serialization + hash chain* → *Test vectors* |
+| Trust provenance explicit for every common + event-specific field | *Trust provenance of every common field*; per-type `untrusted` in *Event registry* |
+| Redaction prohibits credentials / raw secrets / unsafe capture by default | *Redaction rule*; `untrusted`-only claims; sensitivity classes |
+| JSONL journal canonical; SQLite index fully rebuildable | *Journal + SQLite index* (`audit rebuild`) |
+| Minimum local search/query contract | *Journal + SQLite index* → *Local query surface* |
+| #324 can transport/replay without a second envelope | *The #324 delivery contract* |
+| #480 maps in without weakening its byte-to-activation-key guarantee | *#480 signed-commit attribution maps in…* |
+| Schema evolution + backward-compatible readers | *Schema evolution & backward-compatible readers* |
+| Integrity detects modification / deletion / reorder / bad continuation | *Test vectors* (tamper), *Behavior across rotation…truncation*, `audit verify` |
+
+Two acceptance items are **specified here, implemented later** by design
+(the issue permits this): the concrete test-vector *fixtures* and the
+`audit` CLI land in impl chunks 2–3; the #324 outbox lands in chunk 6.
+Nothing in the contract is left undefined — only its code is deferred.
 
 ## Resolved in review (#495)