claude_bottle/backend/docker/launch.py

@@ -18,13 +18,20 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Callable, Generator
 
 from ...log import die, info
+from ...pipelock import pipelock_build_config, pipelock_render_yaml
 from . import network as network_mod
 from . import util as docker_mod
 from .bottle import DockerBottle
 from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
 from .cred_proxy import DockerCredProxy
 from .git_gate import DockerGitGate
-from .pipelock import DockerPipelockProxy, pipelock_proxy_url, pipelock_tls_init
+from .pipelock import (
+    PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
+    PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
+    DockerPipelockProxy,
+    pipelock_proxy_url,
+    pipelock_tls_init,
+)
 from .provision.ca import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
 
 
@@ -68,6 +75,14 @@ def launch(
         egress_network = network_mod.network_create_egress(plan.slug)
         stack.callback(network_mod.network_remove, egress_network)
 
+        # Docker assigns a CIDR to the new internal network. Pipelock's
+        # SSRF guard otherwise rejects any destination resolving into
+        # RFC1918 space — which includes the cred-proxy / git-gate /
+        # pipelock sidecars themselves. Allowlist the bottle's own
+        # internal subnet so the agent can reach its sidecars via
+        # pipelock; api_allowlist + body-scanning still apply.
+        internal_cidr = network_mod.network_inspect_cidr(internal_network)
+
         # Per-bottle ephemeral CA for pipelock's TLS interception
         # (PRD 0006). One-shot pipelock container writes ca.pem +
         # ca-key.pem under plan.stage_dir; .start docker-cp's them
@@ -75,9 +90,25 @@ def launch(
         # stage dir, which start.py's outer finally `shutil.rmtree`s
         # after the sidecar is torn down.
         ca_cert_host, ca_key_host = pipelock_tls_init(plan.stage_dir)
+
+        # Re-render the pipelock yaml with the SSRF allowlist now that
+        # we know the internal CIDR. Prepare wrote the yaml without
+        # the ssrf block (CIDR wasn't known yet); overwrite the same
+        # path so .start docker-cp's the updated content.
+        bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
+        cfg = pipelock_build_config(
+            bottle,
+            ca_cert_path=PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
+            ca_key_path=PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
+            ssrf_ip_allowlist=(internal_cidr,),
+        )
+        plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
+        plan.proxy_plan.yaml_path.chmod(0o600)
+
         proxy_plan = dataclasses.replace(
             plan.proxy_plan,
             internal_network=internal_network,
+            internal_network_cidr=internal_cidr,
             egress_network=egress_network,
             ca_cert_host_path=ca_cert_host,
             ca_key_host_path=ca_key_host,

claude_bottle/backend/docker/network.py

@@ -81,6 +81,29 @@ def network_create_egress(slug: str) -> str:
     return _network_create_with_prefix(network_egress_name_for_slug(slug), internal=False)
 
 
+def network_inspect_cidr(name: str) -> str:
+    """Return the IPv4 CIDR Docker assigned to a user-defined network.
+
+    Used by pipelock's SSRF guard exception: the bottle's internal
+    network sits in RFC1918 space, so pipelock's `internal:` list
+    would block any agent request whose destination resolves there
+    — including the cred-proxy sidecar's address. Adding the
+    network's CIDR to pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist` lets traffic
+    targeted at the bottle's own sidecars through while pipelock
+    still body-scans and api_allowlist-gates as usual."""
+    result = subprocess.run(
+        ["docker", "network", "inspect",
+         "--format", "{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Subnet}}{{end}}", name],
+        capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
+    )
+    if result.returncode != 0:
+        die(f"docker network inspect {name} failed: {result.stderr.strip()}")
+    cidr = result.stdout.strip()
+    if not cidr:
+        die(f"network {name!r} has no IPAM subnet configured")
+    return cidr
+
+
 def network_attach(network: str, container: str) -> None:
     result = subprocess.run(
         ["docker", "network", "connect", network, container],

claude_bottle/pipelock.py

@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
     *,
     ca_cert_path: str = "",
     ca_key_path: str = "",
+    ssrf_ip_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = (),
 ) -> dict[str, object]:
     """Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
 
@@ -166,7 +167,17 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
     Pass both or neither: both → emit `tls_interception` block with
     `enabled: true`; neither → omit the block entirely (pipelock
     falls back to its built-in default of `enabled: false`). Used
-    by PRD 0006 to turn on pipelock's native TLS interception."""
+    by PRD 0006 to turn on pipelock's native TLS interception.
+
+    `ssrf_ip_allowlist` is the list of IPs / CIDRs that bypass
+    pipelock's SSRF guard. Pipelock blocks RFC1918-resolved
+    destinations by default, which would catch the agent's
+    cred-proxy traffic (cred-proxy sits on the bottle's internal
+    Docker network in 172.x space). Pass the bottle's internal
+    network CIDR here so `cred-proxy:9099` requests get through
+    pipelock while api_allowlist + body-scanning still apply. Empty
+    by default; omitted from the rendered yaml when empty so
+    pipelock keeps its built-in SSRF defaults."""
     cfg: dict[str, object] = {
         "version": 1,
         "mode": "strict",
@@ -193,6 +204,8 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
             "ca_key": ca_key_path,
             "passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle),
         }
+    if ssrf_ip_allowlist:
+        cfg["ssrf"] = {"ip_allowlist": list(ssrf_ip_allowlist)}
     return cfg
 
 
@@ -236,6 +249,13 @@ def pipelock_render_yaml(cfg: dict[str, object]) -> str:
             lines.append("  passthrough_domains:")
             for d in passthrough:
                 lines.append(f'    - "{d}"')
+    if "ssrf" in cfg:
+        lines.append("")
+        lines.append("ssrf:")
+        ssrf = cast(dict[str, object], cfg["ssrf"])
+        lines.append("  ip_allowlist:")
+        for ip in cast(list[str], ssrf["ip_allowlist"]):
+            lines.append(f'    - "{ip}"')
     return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
 
 
@@ -252,14 +272,21 @@ class PipelockProxyPlan:
     already so it doesn't need the host paths to be valid). The
     remaining fields are populated by the backend's launch step
     via `dataclasses.replace`: internal/egress networks once
-    those networks exist, and the CA host paths once the
+    those networks exist, the CA host paths once the one-shot
-    one-shot `pipelock tls init` has run. Empty defaults are
+    `pipelock tls init` has run, and `internal_network_cidr` once
-    sentinels meaning "not yet set"; `.start` validates that
+    Docker has assigned a subnet to the internal network. Empty
-    they are populated."""
+    defaults are sentinels meaning "not yet set"; `.start` validates
+    that they are populated.
+
+    `internal_network_cidr` ends up on pipelock's `ssrf.ip_allowlist`
+    so the agent's requests at `cred-proxy:9099` (or any other
+    bottle-internal sidecar) bypass pipelock's RFC1918 SSRF guard
+    while api_allowlist and body-scanning still apply."""
 
     yaml_path: Path
     slug: str
     internal_network: str = ""
+    internal_network_cidr: str = ""
     egress_network: str = ""
     ca_cert_host_path: Path = Path()
     ca_key_host_path: Path = Path()

tests/unit/test_pipelock_yaml.py

@@ -77,6 +77,21 @@ class TestBuildConfig(unittest.TestCase):
                 ca_cert_path="/etc/pipelock-ca.pem",
             )
 
+    def test_ssrf_block_omitted_when_no_allowlist(self):
+        cfg = pipelock_build_config(fixture_minimal().bottles["dev"])
+        self.assertNotIn("ssrf", cfg)
+
+    def test_ssrf_block_emitted_when_allowlist_supplied(self):
+        # The bottle's internal Docker subnet lands here at launch
+        # time so cred-proxy:9099 (172.x.x.x) doesn't trip pipelock's
+        # RFC1918 SSRF guard.
+        cfg = pipelock_build_config(
+            fixture_minimal().bottles["dev"],
+            ssrf_ip_allowlist=("172.20.0.0/16",),
+        )
+        self.assertIn("ssrf", cfg)
+        self.assertEqual({"ip_allowlist": ["172.20.0.0/16"]}, cfg["ssrf"])
+
 
 class TestRenderAndWrite(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):
@@ -148,6 +163,18 @@ class TestRenderAndWrite(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("passthrough_domains:", content)
         self.assertIn('- "api.anthropic.com"', content)
 
+    def test_render_emits_ssrf_block_when_allowlist_given(self):
+        cfg = pipelock_build_config(
+            fixture_minimal().bottles["dev"],
+            ca_cert_path="/etc/pipelock-ca.pem",
+            ca_key_path="/etc/pipelock-ca-key.pem",
+            ssrf_ip_allowlist=("172.20.0.0/16",),
+        )
+        text = pipelock_render_yaml(cfg)
+        self.assertIn("ssrf:", text)
+        self.assertIn("ip_allowlist:", text)
+        self.assertIn('- "172.20.0.0/16"', text)
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()