docs: redesign forge identity trust boundary

Revised per PR #480 (#5607 owner clarification + #5608 codex resolution;
#5612 directs the update):

- The audit row no longer implies upstream observation or agent-only
  authorship. Reworded the guarantee: the row cryptographically binds
  commit bytes (control-plane-RECOMPUTED SHA) to access to the activation
  signing key, and binds that key to control-plane-owned activation
  metadata. An agent can sign arbitrary contents but cannot verify as a
  different activation or choose the recorded metadata.
- Control plane accepts gateway-delivered opaque bytes, independently
  recomputes the Git object ID, verifies the embedded signature against
  the activation key, and stamps its own metadata. Trusts no gateway
  SHA/key/verdict/metadata. No upstream fetch.
- Purged overclaims: removed "a compromised gateway cannot fabricate an
  audit binding" (the sidecar holds the signing capability, so it can —
  and that's acceptable under the intended guarantee), plus "accepted
  push" / "introduced upstream" framing.
- Resolved the control-plane-transport open question in-PRD (was left
  open; codex asked to resolve): transport is gateway bytes +
  recompute + verify; mirror-read is no stronger.

Issue: #423

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/prds/prd-new-signed-commits-attribution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,651 @@
+# PRD prd-new: Trusted agent forge identity, signed commits & audit attribution
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** didericis-claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-25
+- **Issue:** #423
+
+## Summary
+
+Give each **host-trusted agent definition** an author identity and named forge
+accounts, and let a bottle associate each git-gate repository with one of those
+accounts. The resolved association provisions authenticated forge API access
+through the egress proxy and injects provider-specific workflow instructions
+into the agent's system prompt without exposing the token. Repository-local
+agent and bottle definitions are no longer discovered because they would
+otherwise be able to select host credential references or impersonate an agent.
+
+For bottles that opt into signing, give each bottled agent a **per-activation
+signing key** so every commit it produces is signed in the git-gate trust
+boundary (outside the bottle) and recorded in bot-bottle's **host-owned audit
+store**, which is the portable source of truth. Each row cryptographically binds
+a commit's bytes (and their control-plane-recomputed SHA) to **access to that
+activation's signing key**, and binds the key to control-plane-owned activation
+metadata — bottle, host, manifest, agent, activation interval, retained public
+key, configured agent author — and separately records the commit's *claimed*
+author/committer. The gate mints a short-lived Ed25519 key at spin-up, holds the
+private half in the sidecar `ssh-agent`, and forwards only `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` into
+the bottle. The gate rejects any commit it forwards that is not signed by the
+activation key; separately, the **control plane** independently recomputes each
+commit's object ID and verifies its signature before recording attribution — it
+never trusts a SHA, key, or verdict asserted by the gate.
+
+This PRD deliberately does **not** enforce or cryptographically vouch
+author/committer identity. The trusted agent definition supplies the configured
+name/email, while the values in each commit remain claims carried inside the
+signed object; making the gate reject a mismatch is a possible future add (see
+**Non-goals** and **Deferred: identity enforcement**). Git push capability stays
+exactly as PRD 0048 deploy keys. Forge API identity uses an operator-provided,
+agent-specific token referenced from the trusted host environment; bot-bottle
+does not mint forge users or tokens.
+
+Successor to:
+
+- **PRD 0027 (agent git identity, #94)** / **ADR 0002** — established that
+  agent name/email is *claimed, not vouched*. This PRD moves that identity from
+  the bottle/git-gate overlay to the trusted agent definition and adds signed
+  **provenance** plus a durable host record, not identity enforcement.
+- **PRD 0011 (per-file manifests)** — allowed repository-local agent files to
+  override home agents. This PRD removes that trust path: agents and bottles are
+  loaded only from the host-owned `~/.bot-bottle` tree.
+- **PRD 0048 (deploy-key provisioning, #169)** — the host-side mint-at-spin-up /
+  revoke-at-teardown lifecycle the signing key follows. Deploy keys are
+  unchanged.
+- **PRD 0070 (per-host orchestrator, #351)** — the orchestrator/control plane is
+  the sole owner of `bot-bottle.db`; audit verification and recording live
+  there, not in the data-plane gate (see **Trust boundary**).
+
+## The guarantee
+
+The crisp property this feature provides:
+
+> The **host-owned audit store** binds a set of commit bytes — whose Git object
+> ID the control plane **recomputes** itself — to **access to this activation's
+> signing key**, and binds that key to **control-plane-owned activation
+> metadata**: bottle, host, manifest, agent, activation interval, retained public
+> key, configured agent author. An agent may author and sign arbitrary commit
+> contents, but it cannot make that signature verify as a *different*
+> activation, and it cannot choose the activation metadata the control plane
+> records. The commit's author/committer identity is **recorded separately as a
+> claim**, not enforced or vouched. The forge is an external transport and
+> collaboration surface, not the source of attribution truth.
+
+What this does and does not prove (issue #423, comments #5554 / #5607 / #5608):
+
+- It proves **access to activation *Y*'s signing key**: whoever assembled these
+  commit bytes could sign with that key. Recomputing the object ID and verifying
+  the embedded signature binds the SHA to activation *Y*, and the control plane's
+  own records bind *Y*'s key to *Y*'s metadata.
+- It does **not** prove the commit was ever pushed, observed upstream, kept
+  (vs. later reverted or dropped), or produced by the *agent* rather than by any
+  other holder of the activation signing capability (the sidecar itself). The
+  store deliberately makes no claim about publication or sole-agent authorship
+  — the owner's requirement is attribution of *what manifest/agent/etc. was in
+  use when a commit was signed*, not proof of where the commit went (#5607).
+- It does **not** make author/committer identity cryptographically vouched. The
+  bottle chooses every byte sent through the forwarded agent, so a signature over
+  `author Mallory <mallory@example>` is just as valid. Those fields are a claim
+  carried inside the signed object and recorded as-is.
+- The binding is trustworthy because the **control plane** supplies the SHA (it
+  recomputes it), the public key, and the activation metadata from its own state
+  — never from a value the gateway asserts (see **Trust boundary**). The
+  residual, by design: anything that holds the activation signing capability can
+  produce commits that attribute to that activation. That is inherent to a
+  binding on *activation-key access*, not a defect.
+
+## Problem
+
+An agent runs on the developer's machine as a *subrole*, scoped down per role.
+Locally that is fine because the machine is single-tenant. The git history an
+agent produces, however, is a durable artifact that outlives the session and
+can be pushed to shared repositories, and today bot-bottle offers no
+tamper-evidence over it:
+
+- **No provenance.** Nothing ties a pushed commit to the bottle/activation that
+  actually produced it. The configured name/email is forgeable and cosmetic
+  (ADR 0002); a commit could be produced anywhere.
+- **No durable, portable record.** There is no host-side ledger that says "SHA
+  *X* was produced by agent *A* in bottle *B* on host *H* during interval
+  *[t0,t1]*, signed by key *K*," independent of any forge and surviving key
+  rotation.
+- **Forge workflow context is missing.** The agent prompt does not know which
+  forge backs a git-gate repository, which API base URL to use, or that
+  authenticated requests must go through the egress proxy. Bespoke prompt text
+  has drifted between agents, causing incorrect PR creation behavior such as
+  using Gitea AGit review refs instead of a branch-backed pull request.
+- **Identity is owned by the wrong layer.** `git-gate.user` puts an agent
+  property on a repository transport component. The same author identity and
+  forge actor should follow the agent across bottles and repositories.
+- **Repository-local agents are a trust escalation.** Today
+  `$CWD/.bot-bottle/agents/*.md` can override a host agent. Once an agent
+  definition may reference a forge token, allowing the checked-out repository
+  to choose that definition would let untrusted workspace content select host
+  identities and credentials.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- **Per-activation signing key.** A fresh Ed25519 keypair is minted host-side at
+  each activation; the private half lives only in the sidecar `ssh-agent`, never
+  in the bottle. Only `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` crosses the boundary.
+- **Agent-owned identity.** Author name/email and named forge accounts live on
+  the agent definition, not under `git-gate`.
+- **Bottle-owned repository policy.** Signing remains an opt-in property of the
+  bottle, and each bottle repository may associate itself with one named forge
+  account from the selected agent.
+- **Forge-aware prompting.** The resolved agent+bottle manifest contributes a
+  generated, provider-specific system-prompt section describing the forge API
+  URL, proxy-authenticated access path, repository mapping, and safe PR
+  workflow. No token value or token environment-variable name appears in the
+  prompt.
+- **Proxy-held forge credential.** The host resolves the forge account's token
+  reference and gives it only to the egress proxy, which injects authentication
+  for the configured forge origin. The bottle receives neither the token nor a
+  credential file containing it.
+- **Trusted definitions only.** Agent and bottle files are discovered only
+  under the host-owned `~/.bot-bottle/{agents,bottles}` directories.
+  `$CWD/.bot-bottle/{agents,bottles}` never contributes definitions or
+  overrides.
+- **Signed commits with no SHA divergence.** Commits produced in the bottle are
+  signed at commit time; the SHA the agent observes is the SHA that reaches the
+  upstream through the gate.
+- **Gate rejects unsigned commits.** Before the gate forwards a push, every
+  newly-introduced commit (those not already reachable from the advertised
+  upstream refs) must verify against the activation public key; a push with any
+  unsigned or wrong-key new commit is rejected, loudly, with the offending SHA.
+  This is a **signature** check only — no author/committer matching.
+- **Control-plane-owned attribution.** The orchestrator/control plane (sole
+  owner of `bot-bottle.db`, PRD 0070) recomputes each commit's object ID from the
+  bytes, verifies the embedded signature against the activation public key it
+  holds, and attaches activation metadata from its own state — accepting no SHA,
+  key, verdict, or metadata asserted by the gateway. No upstream fetch is
+  required.
+- **Host is the source of truth.** The audit record binds each recomputed SHA to
+  the bottle, host, manifest, agent, configured agent author, activation
+  interval, and retained public key, and separately records the commit's claimed
+  author/committer.
+- **Verifiable after teardown.** The audit record retains the **full public
+  key, fingerprint, principal, and validity interval** — enough to regenerate an
+  allowed-signers file and run `git verify-commit` long after the activation
+  ends and the key is gone.
+- **Reprovision-per-activation, fail-loud teardown.** The signing key is minted
+  once per activation (persists across restarts within that activation) and
+  discarded at teardown; deploy-key revocation continues to follow PRD 0048's
+  fail-loud discipline.
+- **Push capability unchanged.** Git transport remains PRD 0048 deploy keys.
+  The forge account token is for forge API actions such as opening and
+  commenting on pull requests; it is not used for Git push.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- **Author/committer enforcement.** Explicitly out of scope for this PRD (issue
+  #423, comment #5590). The gate does not reject a commit for carrying a foreign
+  author or committer; those fields are recorded as claims. We rely on the
+  cross-forge audit store of signed commits and the authors recorded there. See
+  **Deferred: identity enforcement** for what a future add would look like.
+- **Cryptographically-vouched author identity.** Not claimed — see **The
+  guarantee**.
+- **Forge account or token minting.** Bot-bottle does not create subusers or
+  PATs. The operator creates the agent-specific account/token out of band and
+  names the host environment secret in the trusted agent definition.
+- **Forge-side attribution surfaces.** No commit-status badges, no forge
+  "Verified" badge. The latter is doubly unsuitable: it renders dynamically
+  against a *currently registered* key (so it would lie the moment a
+  reprovisioned key is revoked), and on Gitea registering a signing key also
+  grants push. Attribution lives in the host record and local `git
+  verify-commit`, not the forge.
+- **Non-Gitea forges, dashboard UI for orphan cleanup, mid-session rotation,
+  dirty-teardown reconciliation.** As before; a separate cleanup/sync pass
+  handles orphans left by a crash or discarded snapshot.
+
+## Scope evolution
+
+This PRD started as "forge subroles" (forge subuser accounts + provisioned API
+tokens + optional forge status posting + signing). Review first narrowed it,
+then restored only the part needed for correct agent operation:
+
+1. **Dropped forge account/token provisioning** (#5518 → #5556): the PAT
+   bootstrap is not implementable as sketched (Basic-Auth-as-target-user
+   constraint), and the signature never vouched the author anyway. The host
+   audit store remains the portable source of truth.
+2. **Dropped author/committer enforcement** (#5590): rely on the audit store of
+   signed commits and the authors recorded there; gate enforcement of the
+   identity fields is a possible future add, not part of this slice.
+3. **Restored declarative forge accounts, not provisioning** (#6002): agents
+   still need an operator-supplied API identity and forge-specific system
+   instructions to open and update PRs correctly. The trusted agent definition
+   therefore references an existing host secret; bot-bottle neither creates nor
+   rotates that credential.
+4. **Moved identity to the agent trust domain** (#6002): author and forge
+   accounts are agent properties. Bottle repositories select an account by
+   name, while git-gate remains transport-only. Because these references grant
+   access to host credentials, repository-local agent/bottle discovery is
+   removed.
+
+The resulting feature is **trusted agent identity + operator-provided forge API
+access + forge-aware prompting + signed commits + a host-owned,
+independently-verified audit record.** Identity enforcement (the gate rejecting
+a foreign author/committer) remains a candidate future PRD.
+
+## Design
+
+### Trust boundary (control plane vs data plane)
+
+git-gate is the **data plane**: it parses hostile bytes from inside the bottle
+and forwards pushes. The orchestrator is the **control plane** and, per PRD
+0070, is the sole owner of `bot-bottle.db`. These are different trust boundaries,
+and the audit record must be anchored in the control plane:
+
+- The gate performs a **synchronous pre-forward signature check** (below) and
+  can reject a push before it reaches the upstream. This is a data-plane gate on
+  what leaves the bottle, not the audit binding.
+- The **control plane** takes the commit bytes to attribute (gateway-delivered
+  opaque bytes are fine), **recomputes the Git object ID**, **verifies the
+  embedded signature** against the activation public key it minted and holds, and
+  writes `attributed_commit` attaching metadata from its own state. It accepts
+  **no** gateway-supplied `verified` flag, claimed SHA, public key, or activation
+  identity.
+
+The precise trust statement (issue #423, review by didericis-codex on d8362ec,
+resolved in #5608): the row binds *these commit bytes / this recomputed SHA* to
+*access to this activation's signing key*, and the control plane binds that key
+to the recorded activation metadata. It does **not** assert forge observation or
+that only the agent (not the signing sidecar) authored the commit — so this PRD
+does **not** claim a compromised gateway cannot obtain an attribution row.
+Because the sidecar holds the activation signing capability, a compromised
+gateway *can* assemble and sign a commit and have it attributed to that
+activation; what it cannot do is make the signature verify as a *different*
+activation or choose the metadata the control plane records. That residual is
+acceptable under the intended guarantee (#5607) and is why the guarantee is
+worded as activation-key access, not agent-only authorship or upstream
+publication. The gate therefore cannot stand in for host-side verification: the
+control plane recomputes the object ID and verifies the signature itself rather
+than trusting the gate's word.
+
+### Identity model
+
+Per **bottled agent** (agent definition ∘ sealed bottle), realized per
+activation:
+
+| Part | Value | Source | Role |
+|------|-------|--------|------|
+| Signing key | one Ed25519 keypair | minted host-side per activation | signs every commit; private half sidecar-only; the anchor of provenance |
+| Author/committer | name + email | trusted agent definition `author` | written into commits and **recorded** as a claim; **not** enforced |
+| Forge actor | named account + API origin + token reference | trusted agent definition `forge-accounts` | authenticates forge API actions through the egress proxy |
+| Repository/forge association | forge account name | bottle `git-gate.repos.<repo>.forge` | selects the actor and generated workflow guidance for that repository |
+
+### Manifest surface
+
+Identity belongs to the agent. Repository capability and policy belong to the
+bottle. The following files are both host-owned:
+
+```yaml
+# ~/.bot-bottle/agents/claude.md
+---
+author:
+  name: didericis-claude
+  email: eric+claude@dideric.is
+forge-accounts:
+  didericis-gitea:
+    auth:
+      type: token
+      token_secret: GITEA_CLAUDE_TOKEN
+    url: https://gitea.dideric.is/api/v1
+---
+```
+
+```yaml
+# ~/.bot-bottle/bottles/dev.md
+---
+git-gate:
+  signing:
+    enabled: true                # NEW — opt-in per-activation signing + audit
+  repos:
+    bot-bottle:
+      url: ssh://git@100.78.141.42:30009/didericis/bot-bottle.git
+      provisioned_key:           # PRD 0048 — push capability, UNCHANGED
+        provider: gitea
+        token_env: GITEA_DEPLOY_TOKEN
+      host_key: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA..."
+      forge: didericis-gitea     # account from the selected agent definition
+---
+```
+
+- `author` is agent-only and replaces the `git-gate.user` agent/bottle overlay.
+  It is required when `git-gate.signing.enabled` is true or when any selected
+  repository has a `forge` association. The resolved values populate
+  `user.name` and `user.email`.
+- `forge-accounts` is an agent-only map keyed by the existing manifest
+  kebab-case identifier grammar (`[a-z][a-z0-9-]*`). Each entry contains:
+  - `url`: an HTTPS forge API base URL. This PRD supports Gitea API URLs; a
+    future provider must add explicit typed validation and prompt generation
+    rather than accepting arbitrary prompt text supplied by a repository.
+  - `auth.type`: `token` in this slice.
+  - `auth.token_secret`: the name of a host environment variable containing the
+    operator-provided, agent-specific API token. The value is resolved only by
+    host provisioning and passed only to the egress proxy.
+- `git-gate.repos.<name>.forge` is bottle-only and must resolve to an account in
+  the selected agent definition. An unknown account, an unsupported forge URL,
+  a non-HTTPS URL, or a missing/empty host secret fails launch before creating
+  the bottle.
+- `git-gate.signing.enabled: true` opts a bottle in. Without it, behavior is
+  exactly as today. There is **no `enforce` sub-key** — this PRD does not enforce
+  identity fields, so no knob is needed (and a knob that weakened a guarantee
+  was flagged as a contradiction in review).
+- `git-gate.signing`, `git-gate.repos`, and their `forge` associations are
+  bottle-only. `author` and `forge-accounts` are agent-only. Validation errors
+  point to the correct file/type instead of silently ignoring misplaced keys.
+- `provisioned_key.token_env` remains the deploy-key administration credential
+  from PRD 0048. It is separate from the forge actor's `token_secret`: the
+  former provisions Git push capability, while the latter performs API actions
+  as the agent.
+- Existing `git-gate.user` fields fail with migration guidance to move the
+  values into the selected home agent's `author` block. There is no period where
+  bottle identity silently overrides agent identity.
+
+### Definition trust and discovery
+
+Only the host-owned manifest tree is authoritative:
+
+- Agents: `~/.bot-bottle/agents/*.md`
+- Bottles: `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/*.md`
+
+`$CWD/.bot-bottle/agents/*.md` no longer contributes new agents and no longer
+overrides a home agent. `$CWD/.bot-bottle/bottles/*.md` remains unusable. If
+either repository-local directory contains manifest files, bot-bottle emits a
+warning that they are ignored and points to the home paths. Agent enumeration,
+`require_agent`, lazy loading, and dashboard selectors all use the same
+home-only index so there is no alternate path that can still select a workspace
+definition.
+
+This intentionally supersedes PRD 0011's repository-agent overlay. Workspace
+instructions remain repository content (for example `AGENTS.md`), but executable
+runtime policy, host secret references, and actor identity do not.
+
+Programmatic in-memory manifests remain available for tests and internal
+composition; they are already supplied by trusted host code and are not a
+filesystem discovery path.
+
+### Forge API provisioning and generated prompt
+
+For each distinct forge account referenced by the selected bottle's repos, the
+host:
+
+1. Parses and canonicalizes the HTTPS API origin and rejects credentials in the
+   URL, fragments, and unsupported path shapes.
+2. Resolves `auth.token_secret` from the host environment. The secret value is
+   copied only into the egress proxy's credential environment.
+3. Adds an inspected egress route scoped to that forge origin/API prefix with
+   the provider's authentication scheme (`token` for Gitea). Authentication is
+   injected by the proxy; the bottle sends an unauthenticated request to the
+   configured URL.
+4. Appends a generated, non-secret section to bot-bottle's existing system
+   prompt file. The section is derived from validated typed fields, not copied
+   Markdown from a repository.
+
+For the example above, the generated guidance communicates:
+
+- account alias `didericis-gitea` and API base
+  `https://gitea.dideric.is/api/v1`;
+- repository `bot-bottle` uses that account;
+- forge API calls must use the configured HTTPS URL through the proxy and must
+  not read, print, or manually attach an authorization token;
+- Git pushes still use the bottle's git-gate remote;
+- create/update a normal `refs/heads/<branch>` and open a branch-backed Gitea
+  pull request through the API; do not push `refs/for/*`, `refs/draft/*`, or
+  `refs/for-review/*`;
+- use the API for review/comment operations and verify the returned object/state
+  before claiming the action completed.
+
+The prompt includes neither the token value nor `GITEA_CLAUDE_TOKEN`. Keeping
+even the environment-variable name out of the bottle reduces accidental
+credential probing and prevents bespoke agent prompts from needing secret
+implementation details.
+
+### Signing: sign at commit time via a forwarded ssh-agent
+
+The reason SHAs never diverge:
+
+- The **sidecar** (the git-gate trust boundary) runs an `ssh-agent` holding the
+  short-lived signing private key.
+- **Only `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`** is forwarded into the bottle — a bounded signing
+  capability, not the key.
+- The provisioner writes the bottle `.gitconfig`:
+
+  ```ini
+  [commit]
+      gpgsign = true
+  [gpg]
+      format = ssh
+  [user]
+      name = didericis-claude
+      email = eric+claude@dideric.is
+      signingkey = ssh-ed25519 AAAA...   # activation signing PUBLIC key
+  ```
+
+- `git commit` asks the forwarded agent to sign; the signature is embedded at
+  object creation, so the agent-space SHA equals the pushed SHA. No transcoder,
+  no SHA translation table.
+
+### Gate pre-forward signature check (data plane)
+
+The gate already fetches from upstream before every `upload-pack` and mirrors
+bidirectionally (PRD 0008). When `git-gate.signing.enabled` is set, after
+gitleaks and before forwarding a push upstream:
+
+1. **Compute the newly-introduced set.** Commits reachable from the pushed ref
+   tips but **not** reachable from any ref already advertised by the upstream
+   (which the gate knows because it fetches upstream first) — equivalent to
+   `git rev-list <new-tips> --not <all-known-upstream-refs>`. This excludes
+   pulled/merged existing history; a merge commit the bottle creates is itself
+   new and is checked, its already-upstream ancestors are not.
+2. **Verify each new commit's signature** against the activation public key. A
+   commit that is unsigned or signed by any other key causes the push to be
+   **rejected** with the offending SHA.
+3. No author/committer matching is performed.
+
+This is a synchronous safety gate on what leaves the bottle; it is not the audit
+record.
+
+### Control-plane verification & recording
+
+For each commit to attribute (the gate hands the control plane the commit bytes;
+opaque gateway-delivered bytes are acceptable because nothing the gateway *says*
+about them is trusted), the orchestrator/control plane:
+
+1. **Recomputes the Git object ID** from the bytes itself. The stored `sha` is
+   this recomputed value, never a SHA the gateway claims.
+2. **Verifies the embedded signature** against the activation public key it
+   minted and holds for that activation (via a generated allowed-signers file) —
+   ignoring any `verified` flag, key, or activation identity supplied by the
+   gateway.
+3. Writes `attributed_commit` only for bytes that pass, stamping the activation
+   metadata (bottle/manifest/agent/host/interval) from its **own** state — not
+   from anything the gateway provides — and recording the commit's claimed
+   author/committer.
+
+No upstream fetch is required: the guarantee is a byte↔activation-key binding, so
+the object does not need to come from the forge (issue #423, #5608). Bytes that
+do not verify against the activation key are **not** recorded as attributed (they
+may be logged as an anomaly instead).
+
+### Audit trail
+
+The host SQLite store (PRD 0067, `~/.bot-bottle/bot-bottle.db`, owned by the
+control plane per PRD 0070) records the signing-key lifecycle and per-commit
+attribution. Retention is the **full public key, fingerprint, principal, and
+validity interval** — enough to regenerate an allowed-signers file and verify
+commits after teardown (issue #423, comment #5554, resolution 3). Never any
+private key material.
+
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE bottled_agent_activation (
+    bottled_agent_slug TEXT NOT NULL,
+    activation_id      TEXT NOT NULL,     -- one per activation cycle
+    host              TEXT NOT NULL,
+    manifest_digest   TEXT NOT NULL,      -- ties the record to the sealed manifest
+    agent             TEXT NOT NULL,
+    configured_author_name  TEXT NOT NULL, -- trusted agent definition value
+    configured_author_email TEXT NOT NULL, -- trusted agent definition value
+    signing_pubkey    TEXT NOT NULL,      -- full ssh-ed25519 public key (for verify-commit)
+    signing_fpr       TEXT NOT NULL,      -- SHA256:... fingerprint (stable handle)
+    principal         TEXT NOT NULL,      -- allowed-signers principal, e.g. the author email
+    valid_from        TEXT NOT NULL,
+    valid_until       TEXT,               -- NULL while active; set at teardown
+    status            TEXT NOT NULL,      -- active | retired
+    PRIMARY KEY (bottled_agent_slug, activation_id)
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE attributed_commit (
+    sha                TEXT NOT NULL,      -- control-plane-RECOMPUTED object ID, not gateway-claimed
+    bottled_agent_slug TEXT NOT NULL,
+    activation_id      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    repo               TEXT NOT NULL,
+    author_name        TEXT NOT NULL,     -- CLAIMED, recorded as-is (not enforced)
+    author_email       TEXT NOT NULL,     -- CLAIMED
+    committer_name     TEXT NOT NULL,     -- CLAIMED
+    committer_email    TEXT NOT NULL,     -- CLAIMED
+    observed_at        TEXT NOT NULL,
+    PRIMARY KEY (sha, repo)
+);
+```
+
+Verification/allowed-signers generation is a stated part of the design: for a
+given SHA, join `attributed_commit → bottled_agent_activation`, emit
+`<principal> <signing_pubkey>` to a temporary allowed-signers file, and
+`git verify-commit` (or `ssh-keygen -Y verify`) against it. The
+`(pubkey, principal, valid_from/until)` tuple is exactly what that requires. The
+activation's `configured_author_*` columns preserve the trusted agent
+configuration. The attributed commit's author/committer columns are the
+commit's *claim*; consumers compare the two if useful, understanding that a
+mismatch is recorded but not rejected.
+
+### Credential lifecycle
+
+Signing follows PRD 0048's lifecycle discipline. The operator-provided forge
+actor token is referenced, not provisioned:
+
+- **Activation:** mint a fresh Ed25519 signing keypair; load the private half
+  into the sidecar `ssh-agent`; write the public half into `.gitconfig` and the
+  `bottled_agent_activation` row (`active`, `valid_from` set). Deploy keys are
+  provisioned exactly as PRD 0048. Resolve each referenced forge actor token
+  from the host environment and install it only in the egress proxy process.
+  Minting is **per activation** (a restart re-attaches the same key; a new
+  activation mints a new key and retires the old row), so frozen snapshots
+  don't accumulate live keys.
+- **Teardown (fail-loud):** revoke provisioned deploy keys via the forge API
+  (0048); discard the signing key from the sidecar agent and set the activation
+  row to `retired` with `valid_until`. The signing key was never on the forge,
+  so there is nothing to revoke there — only the local retire. Deploy-key
+  revocation failure halts teardown (0048); 404 = already-gone = success. Stop
+  the egress proxy to discard its copy of the forge actor token. The
+  operator-owned token itself is not revoked because bot-bottle did not mint it
+  and it may be reused by later activations of the same trusted agent.
+- **Dirty teardown** is assumed handled; a separate cleanup/sync pass reconciles
+  orphaned deploy keys.
+
+## Deferred: identity enforcement
+
+If a future PRD wants the gate to *enforce* that new commits carry the manifest
+identity, the natural shape is: extend the gate pre-forward check to also require
+each new commit's author **and** committer name/email to equal the resolved
+agent `author`,
+rejecting mismatches — with the same control-plane re-verification before
+recording. This is deliberately left out now (issue #423, comment #5590); it is
+noted so the door stays open and the current schema (which records the claimed
+author/committer) already carries what such a check would compare against. Note
+that even then the property would be gate-*enforced*, not signature-*vouched*; a
+validating signing broker in front of the key would be required for the latter.
+
+## Implementation chunks
+
+1. **This PRD.** Sets the revised design and trust boundary.
+2. **Trusted definition boundary.** Remove `$CWD/.bot-bottle/agents` from
+   discovery, override, enumeration, lazy loading, and selectors. Keep both
+   agent and bottle definitions home-only; warn on ignored repository files.
+   Update PRD 0011-facing docs and migration guidance.
+3. **Identity and forge manifest surface.** Add agent-only `author` and
+   `forge-accounts`; remove `git-gate.user`; add bottle-only
+   `git-gate.signing` (`enabled` only) and
+   `git-gate.repos.<name>.forge`. Validate account references after composing
+   the selected agent+bottle and fail closed on missing host secrets or
+   unsupported URLs/providers.
+4. **Forge proxy + prompt provisioning.** Resolve referenced actor tokens into
+   scoped egress proxy routes and generate provider-specific, non-secret system
+   instructions from typed manifest fields. Gitea guidance covers API usage,
+   branch-backed PRs, prohibited AGit refs, and verifying mutations. Test that
+   neither token values nor token secret names enter the bottle or prompt.
+5. **Signing pipeline.** Sidecar `ssh-agent` provisioning; forward
+   `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` into the bottle across docker, smolmachines, macOS-container,
+   and firecracker backends; emit the `commit.gpgsign` / `gpg.format=ssh` /
+   `user.signingkey` gitconfig. Integration test: a bottle commit is
+   `verify-commit`-valid and its SHA is unchanged through the gate; the private
+   key is absent from the bottle.
+6. **Gate pre-forward signature check.** Compute the newly-introduced set
+   (excluding upstream-reachable commits), verify each against the activation
+   key, reject unsigned/wrong-key with the offending SHA. Tests: unsigned
+   rejected; wrong-key rejected; pulled/merged upstream history passes; an
+   all-signed push succeeds. A foreign-author commit that is correctly signed
+   **passes the gate** (identity is not enforced here).
+7. **Control-plane verification + audit.** `bottled_agent_activation` /
+   `attributed_commit` tables (PRD 0067 store, control-plane-owned per PRD 0070);
+   the control plane recomputes each commit's object ID and verifies the
+   signature before writing a row; retain full pubkey + fingerprint + principal +
+   validity interval; record claimed author/committer; allowed-signers generation
+   + a post-teardown `verify-commit` helper. Tests: a gateway-claimed SHA/key/
+   verdict is ignored — the row's `sha` is the recomputed ID and bytes not signed
+   by the activation key produce **no** row.
+8. **Docs.** Glossary entries for forge account and per-bottle signed commits;
+   README agent/bottle schema and home-only migration; ADR note that
+   signing-enabled bottles gain signed *provenance* and a host-owned audit
+   record while authorship stays *claimed* (ADR 0002 unchanged).
+
+## Testing strategy
+
+- **Unit — trust boundary (must):** cwd agent files are ignored with a warning,
+  cannot override a home agent, are absent from enumeration/selectors, and
+  cannot be loaded by name. Cwd bottle behavior remains home-only.
+- **Unit — manifest (must):** `author`, `forge-accounts`,
+  `git-gate.signing`, and repo `forge` parsing/validation; misplaced-field
+  rejection; kebab-case account names; unknown account references; HTTPS/API
+  URL validation; missing token-secret environment values.
+- **Unit — prompt/proxy (must):** only referenced forge accounts produce proxy
+  routes and guidance; Gitea instructions name the API/repo and branch-backed
+  workflow; token values and `token_secret` names are absent from the prompt and
+  bottle environment; auth is scoped to the validated forge API origin.
+- **Integration — signing (must):** end-to-end signed commit verifies with
+  `git verify-commit`; SHA observed in the bottle equals the SHA upstream; the
+  private key is absent from the bottle.
+- **Integration — gate check (must):** unsigned rejected; wrong-key rejected;
+  the upstream-reachable exclusion (pull + merge human history and push a signed
+  merge); a correctly-signed foreign-author commit **passes** (no identity
+  enforcement); a clean all-signed push succeeds.
+- **Control plane (must):** the control plane recomputes the object ID and
+  records a row for bytes genuinely signed by the activation key; a gateway-
+  supplied SHA/key/verdict is ignored (the stored `sha` is the recomputed value);
+  bytes signed by a foreign/invalid key produce **no** row; the activation
+  retains the configured agent author while a differing commit author is
+  recorded separately as an unenforced claim.
+- **Lifecycle:** activation mints the key and writes an `active` row; teardown
+  retires it (`valid_until`) and revokes deploy keys fail-loud; a restart
+  re-attaches the same key (no new row); a fresh activation mints a new key and
+  retires the old.
+- **Post-teardown verification:** regenerate the allowed-signers file from a
+  `retired` row and confirm `verify-commit` still succeeds for an attributed SHA.
+
+## Resolved: control-plane transport
+
+Raised in review and **resolved** (issue #423, #5608): the commit object does not
+need to come from the forge, and reading the gateway-owned mirror is no stronger
+than accepting gateway-delivered bytes — both are fabricatable, and neither
+matters because the control plane trusts nothing the gateway *asserts*. The
+transport is therefore: the gate hands the control plane the raw commit bytes,
+the control plane **recomputes the object ID** and **verifies the signature**
+against the activation key, and stamps its own activation metadata. No upstream
+fetch. This is exactly what makes the byte↔activation-key binding sound
+regardless of transport.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- **Where the gate check slots into PRD 0008 ordering.** Modeled as a
+  pre-forward step after gitleaks; confirm it composes with the existing
+  access-hook / mirror ordering rather than needing a separate hook.