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didericis 265119d601 fix(supervise): docker gateway shares the one host DB (Step 2d)
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The docker gateway container ran the supervise daemon but bind-mounted no
DB and set no SUPERVISE_DB_PATH — so the daemon wrote proposals to a
container-local, ephemeral SQLite file, disconnected from the host DB the
orchestrator (and now the operator, over HTTP) uses. Same split-DB bug
firecracker had; Dockerfile.gateway even documents the mount
(`/run/supervise/bot-bottle.db bind-mounted at run time`) that
ensure_running never provided.

Bind-mount the host DB dir into the gateway at /run/supervise and set
SUPERVISE_DB_PATH, so the daemon queues into the same file the
orchestrator container opens (its BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT bind-mount) and the
operator reaches over the control plane. One DB per host, shared by
bind-mounts — docker now on the exact same supervise path as firecracker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 19:01:45 -04:00
didericis 27fe03b612 feat(supervise): host TUI drives approvals over HTTP, not the DB (Step 2b/2c)
The `bot-bottle supervise` operator TUI read and wrote the queue DB
directly and tried a backend-specific live "apply" (which was unwired —
it raised). It now talks only to the orchestrator control plane:

- OrchestratorClient gains supervise_pending() + supervise_respond().
- discover_orchestrator_url() finds the one running per-host control
  plane by health-probing the backends' well-known :8099 addresses
  (docker publishes on loopback; the firecracker infra VM serves it on
  the orchestrator TAP) — no backend branching in the TUI.
- discover_pending/approve/reject call the client; the server does the
  apply + response + audit atomically. The dead direct-DB apply/audit
  helpers and the docker/macos applicator imports are gone.
- A missing control plane is now a clean one-line error up front, not a
  mid-curses crash.

CLI tests move to mocking the client (the DB-write behaviour they used to
assert is now server-side, covered by test_orchestrator_service). Docker's
orchestrator-container DB wiring lands next so its /supervise endpoints hit
the same shared DB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 18:57:47 -04:00
didericis 9085d6f713 feat(supervise): orchestrator-side operator-approval API (Step 2a)
The orchestrator owns the single DB *and* the live policy, so operator
decisions belong there — applied server-side, reached over HTTP. Adds:

  GET  /supervise/proposals   -> pending proposals across bottles
  POST /supervise/respond     -> apply + record an operator decision

`supervise_respond` is one atomic server-side op on the one DB: approve/
modify on an egress tool rewrites the bottle's policy (so the gateway
serves the new routes on its next /resolve — the live "apply" that was a
documented TODO), then writes the queued Response (unblocking the agent's
MCP call) and an audit entry. reject records the response + audit only.
Fails closed (409) when the proposal is unknown or the bottle was torn
down before the operator acted (an egress apply would have no target).

This is the server half of unifying every backend onto one HTTP path for
supervise; the host TUI (direct-DB today) moves onto this client next.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 18:51:55 -04:00
didericis 38bc555dbf fix(supervise): single migrated DB for firecracker — orchestrator owns supervise tables
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The firecracker supervise MCP daemon 500'd (-32603) on egress-allow/block:
it ran with no BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT/SUPERVISE_DB_PATH, so it targeted a stray,
unmigrated SQLite file and `write_proposal` hit "no such table:
supervise_proposals". Meanwhile the in-VM control plane migrated only the
registry table (orchestrator_bottles) into its own DB, and the host
operator reads a third, disconnected DB — three files, none shared.

Consolidate to one DB per host, owned by the control plane on the
persisted registry volume (/var/lib/bot-bottle/db/bot-bottle.db):

- orchestrator startup now migrates the supervise queue + audit tables
  into the same file it migrates the registry into (StoreManager), so the
  control-plane DB carries every table.
- the in-VM supervise daemon is pointed at that same file via
  SUPERVISE_DB_PATH, so daemon and control plane share one queue.

`list-egress-routes` already worked (no DB); egress-allow now queues +
waits on the single persisted DB instead of erroring. Validated against a
live infra VM: migrate + write_proposal succeeds and the proposal is
queued. The host-operator HTTP bridge (so approvals complete from the
host, unifying docker onto the same path) is the follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 18:24:45 -04:00
didericis a208bcde08 feat(firecracker): stream buildah build output live during agent-image build
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The agent-image build ran over ssh with output fully captured, shown
only as a 20-line tail on failure — so a successful (or in-progress)
first build was a long silent wait through the base pull + apt/npm
installs. Stream the `buildah build` step's stdout/stderr straight to
our own (like the docker backend's `docker build`) via a non-capturing
_ssh_streamed helper, so the operator sees `STEP i/n` progress live.
Failure now points at the streamed output above instead of a captured
tail. The smoke test and rootfs export stay captured (short / piped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 18:01:59 -04:00
didericis c0066d2cd2 fix(firecracker): quote guest argv tokens so codex's multi-word prompt survives ssh
The interactive agent command is sent to the guest by spreading the
remote argv as separate ssh arguments; ssh space-joins everything after
the host into one line that the guest login shell re-parses. That only
works while every token is a "simple word" — which held for claude
(`--append-system-prompt-file <path>`) but not for codex's
`read_prompt_file` mode, whose positional is a whole sentence:
"Read and follow the instructions in <path>.". The guest shell re-split
it on spaces, so codex received `Read` as the prompt and `and`, `follow`,
… as extra args — failing with `unrecognized subcommand 'and'` the moment
an interactive codex session attached.

Pre-quote each remote token with shlex.quote before ssh joins them (the
same ssh→guest-shell discipline infra_vm/cp_in already use). Simple words
are unchanged, so existing behaviour and the parity/structure tests are
untouched; an arg with spaces now survives as a single argument.

Regression test round-trips the joined remote command back through
shlex.split and asserts codex's prompt comes out as exactly one arg.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 18:01:59 -04:00
didericis 7118480d0a fix(codex): register supervise MCP via config.toml http_headers, not mcp add --header
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The Codex CLI has no `codex mcp add --header` flag (verified against
0.144.5 and the codex-rs `AddMcpStreamableHttpArgs` surface: only
`--url`, `--bearer-token-env-var`, `--oauth-*`, `--env`). The old call
therefore exited nonzero on every codex bottle; provisioning only
warned and continued, so supervise was silently unregistered — and
under mandatory (source_ip, token) attribution the suggested manual
recovery (`codex mcp add supervise --url ...`, no token) could not
restore access either.

Write the `[mcp_servers.supervise]` streamable-HTTP entry directly into
`~/.codex/config.toml` instead, delivering the identity token via the
Codex-supported `http_headers` key (the only way to attach a static
request header to an HTTP MCP server). Registration failure is now
FATAL when supervise is enabled, rather than a warning.

Test validates the generated entry against the real Codex config
surface: it must parse as TOML into a streamable-HTTP server carrying
the token as `http_headers["x-bot-bottle-identity"]`, and must use only
keys accepted by `RawMcpServerConfig` (config.toml is
`deny_unknown_fields`). Also covers custom `CODEX_HOME`, the no-token
case, and the now-fatal failure path.

Refs: PR #354 review (codex P1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 17:42:36 -04:00
didericis d4b27ebf1f feat(gateway): mandatory identity-token attribution on every data plane (PR #354 review)
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Codex review: the /31 TAP doesn't make source IP unspoofable, and the
app-layer token was returned by launch but never delivered or enforced, so
a spoofed source could select a victim bottle's policy/tokens. Make the
token mandatory and deliver it on each attributed plane (anti-spoof landed
separately as the network boundary).

Enforcement (control plane):
- `Orchestrator.resolve` now requires a matching (source_ip, identity_token)
  pair (constant-time) — no source-IP-only fallback. `/resolve` fail-closes
  (403) on a missing/empty/mismatched token.

Delivery, per plane (the token is `token_urlsafe`, safe in a URL):
- egress: proxy credentials (`HTTPS_PROXY=http://bottle:<token>@gw`). The
  addon reads `Proxy-Authorization` — from the request (HTTP) or captured at
  the CONNECT for HTTPS tunnels (keyed by client conn, cleared on disconnect)
  — validates, and strips it (+ the legacy header) before upstream.
- git-http: a URL-scoped `http.<gate>/.extraHeader: x-bot-bottle-identity`
  in the agent's git config (only over the http transport).
- supervise: `mcp add --header x-bot-bottle-identity: <token>` (claude +
  codex); the server reads the header and passes it to resolve.

Wiring: thread `ctx.identity_token` onto the firecracker + docker plans and
into the agent env/config at launch.

Verified on a KVM host: egress with the correct proxy-cred token returns
200 (HTTP and HTTPS/CONNECT), and no-token / wrong-token return 403; a real
`cli.py start --backend=firecracker` launch provisions git config + the
supervise MCP header and reaches the agent session, all under mandatory
enforcement. Fixed a `claude mcp add` arg-order bug (--header must follow
the positional name/url) found by that launch.

Transparent proxy for tools that ignore proxy env is deferred to a
follow-up (see thread); anti-spoof + host firewall remain the fail-closed
boundary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 17:02:41 -04:00
didericis 914f01fa8f fix(firecracker): serialize infra-VM create + agent builds (PR #354 review)
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Codex flagged that parallel `start`s race on shared state: two cold
launches could both stop/build/boot the singleton on the same rootfs/PID,
concurrent builds share the infra VM's buildah store, the cleanup did
`buildah rm -a` (nuking a peer build's container), and the rootfs cache
was populated non-atomically.

- `infra_vm.ensure_running`: a host flock (`singleton.lock`) around the
  cold stop/build/boot path, with a double-checked health re-test under
  the lock so a second launcher adopts rather than re-boots. The healthy
  fast-path stays lock-free.
- `image_builder.build_agent_rootfs_dir`: a host flock (`.build.lock`)
  around cache-lookup + build + publish; build into `.building-<digest>`
  and publish by atomic `os.rename`, so a partial build never appears as
  `agent-<digest>`.
- scoped cleanup: per-build named working containers
  (`<tag>-smoke`/`-export`) removed by name instead of `buildah rm -a`;
  also cleared before the build to recover from a crashed prior run.

Verified: agent image builds via the locked/atomic path, infra VM stays
healthy, agent boots, `claude --version` = 2.1.172. Full unit suite +
pyright green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 16:15:58 -04:00
didericis 43c3d4408e fix(firecracker-netpool): per-TAP anti-spoof so source-IP attribution is sound (PR #354 review)
The /31 point-to-point TAP does NOT make a guest source address
unspoofable: root in an agent VM can source another bottle's guest IP on
its own bbfc TAP. The isolation table only matched iifname class + port
(DNAT) and never bound iifname to its assigned ip saddr — so a spoofed
source was DNAT'd to the gateway and attributed to the *victim* bottle,
getting the victim's policy/tokens. Source-IP attribution was therefore
not actually sound.

Add one anti-spoof rule per slot in the isolation forward chain, before
the established/DNAT accepts: `iifname bbfcN ip saddr != <guestN> drop`.
Generated in the existing setup loop — no new dependency, ~pool_size
lines. Legit traffic (correct saddr) is unchanged; a spoofed saddr on any
bbfc TAP is dropped before it can be attributed.

Apply with a nixos-rebuild (the systemd unit re-runs this script). Codex
review blocker; the app-layer identity token (defense-in-depth) is wired
separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 16:09:45 -04:00
didericis 0a26b8795a refactor(gateway): install gitleaks by pinned+verified download, drop third-party base image (PR #354 review)
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
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The gateway used `FROM zricethezav/gitleaks AS gitleaks-src` purely to
COPY the binary out — a supply-chain surface (a whole third-party image as
a build input, tying us to its cadence). Install gitleaks from its official
release instead, pinned by version + SHA256 and verified. python (already
in the image) does the download, so no curl/wget is added. trixie apt also
ships gitleaks but an older 8.16; the pinned download keeps the verified
8.30.1 (byte-identical to what the image provided).

Verified: gateway + infra images build, gitleaks 8.30.1 runs in both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 15:53:40 -04:00
didericis c60e6b7e9f refactor(firecracker): single infra VM builds too — buildah in one image (PR #354 review)
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Addresses the review finding that buildah lived only in the orchestrator
image, so the persistent infra VM wasn't the builder — a separate throwaway
builder VM contended with it for the orchestrator TAP. Consolidate:

- **Rebase the gateway (and thus infra) on `python:3.12-slim` = Debian
  trixie**, pip-installing mitmproxy instead of `FROM mitmproxy/mitmproxy`
  (Debian bookworm). trixie ships buildah 1.39, which can build agent
  Dockerfiles that use heredocs; bookworm's 1.28 can't (`Unknown
  instruction: "{"`). CA path is unchanged (set via `--set confdir=`).
- **buildah lives only in `Dockerfile.infra`** now (removed from the
  orchestrator image, which is lean/stdlib-only again).
- **Shared orchestrator content**: `Dockerfile.orchestrator` is the single
  definition of the control-plane payload; the infra image `COPY --from`s
  it (same trixie base → clean copy, and future deps like iroh are added
  once). The docker backend runs the orchestrator image directly.
- **`image_builder` builds inside the infra VM** (which now has buildah)
  over SSH — no throwaway builder VM, so the `bborch0` contention is gone.
  `ensure_built` builds orchestrator + gateway before infra (FROM gateway,
  COPY --from orchestrator).

Verified on a KVM host: images build (buildah 1.39 in infra), the agent
image builds *inside* the infra VM (heredoc Dockerfile and all), the infra
VM stays healthy, the agent boots and `claude --version` = 2.1.172. The
rebased gateway still starts as a docker container and generates its CA
(docker backend unaffected).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 15:23:36 -04:00
didericis 2d37965249 fix(firecracker-netpool): make nft table installs delete-first idempotent
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m8s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 28s
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Each nft table (isolation, orchestrator-egress nat, agent->gateway route)
was re-applied as a plain `table {...}` block, which on a bare `up`
re-apply (not the systemd down->up path) would append duplicate rules or
error on the existing base chains. Use the standard delete-first pattern
(create empty, delete, recreate) so `up` lands identical state regardless
of history — the setup reproduces cleanly on a fresh install and on
re-apply, not just via a full down->up cycle.

No functional change to the resulting ruleset; only its idempotency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 4873030550 feat(firecracker): git-gate over SSH into the gateway VM (Stage B, 7/n)
git-gate now works end-to-end for git-upstream bottles on the infra VM.
Three fixes surfaced by driving a real clone through git-http:

- `SshGatewayTransport.cp_into` preserves the source file mode (docker cp
  does). The access-hook is staged 0700 and git-http execs it directly; a
  plain `cat >` landed it 0644 -> EACCES. Keys stay 0600.
- the infra init runs `BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=egress,git-http,supervise`:
  the VM backend reaches git over git-http (9420), so the git:// daemon
  (git-gate, whose /git-gate-entrypoint.sh the consolidated model doesn't
  stage) is left out instead of crash-looping.
- `build_infra_rootfs_dir` folds the init's content-hash into the rootfs
  cache key, so an init change actually rebuilds the rootfs (the base image
  digest alone wouldn't catch it).

Verified on a KVM host: launch_consolidated provisions a git-upstream
bottle's repo + creds into the gateway VM over SSH; an agent VM clones via
git-http (source-IP attributed) and the access-hook resolves the
provisioned key + known_hosts and attempts the upstream SSH fetch —
failing closed only because the test used a dummy key + fake upstream
("refusing to serve stale data"). With real creds the fetch serves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis b93b14f5c2 feat(firecracker): persistent registry volume for the infra VM (Stage B, 6/n)
The infra VM's rootfs is ephemeral (rebuilt each boot), so the bottle
registry DB needs durable storage across restarts. Give the infra VM a
firecracker analogue of a docker volume: a host-side ext4 file attached as
a second virtio-block device (guest /dev/vdb), mounted at the control
plane's DB dir (/var/lib/bot-bottle, where host_db_path lives at
db/bot-bottle.db).

- firecracker_vm.boot/_config take an optional `data_drive` (a non-root,
  RW second drive).
- infra_vm creates the volume on first use (`mke2fs` an empty ext4 at
  <fc-cache>/infra/registry.ext4) and mounts /dev/vdb in the PID-1 init
  before the control plane starts. It's a plain ext4 file, so
  `sudo mount -o loop <path>` (VM stopped) inspects bot-bottle.db directly.

Verified on a KVM host: register a bottle, restart the infra VM (fresh
rootfs, same volume) — /dev/vdb re-mounts and the registry `db/` dir + a
marker file survive the restart.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 957eb19368 feat(firecracker): launch through the infra VM, not Docker (Stage B, 5/n)
consolidated_launch now drives the persistent infra VM instead of the
`_FirecrackerOrchestratorService` Docker containers — the point Docker
leaves the Firecracker launch path.

- launch_consolidated: `infra_vm.ensure_running()` (singleton) for the
  control plane + gateway; register the bottle over HTTP at the infra VM's
  guest IP; provision git-gate via `SshGatewayTransport` (over SSH into the
  gateway VM); fetch the gateway CA via `InfraVm.gateway_ca_pem()`.
- teardown_consolidated deregisters + deprovisions but does NOT stop the
  infra VM (persistent per-host singleton shared by every bottle).
- new `infra_vm.SshGatewayTransport` + `gateway_transport()` (built from the
  stable key + orchestrator link IP, so teardown needs no live handle).
- drop the DockerGateway/OrchestratorService machinery from the firecracker
  consolidated path (still used by the docker backend).

launch.py already calls launch_consolidated, so the whole firecracker
launch path now uses the VM. pyright + unit suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 5dfb9b0d75 refactor(gateway): parameterize git-gate provisioning transport (Stage B prep)
git-gate provisioning into the running gateway was hard-wired to docker
exec/cp. Extract a backend-neutral `GatewayTransport` (exec + cp_into) so
the same provisioning logic serves both the docker gateway container and
the firecracker gateway VM (over SSH, added with the launch swap).

- `provision_git_gate` / `deprovision_git_gate` now take a transport
  instead of a gateway name; `DockerGatewayTransport` wraps the existing
  docker exec/cp behavior. deprovision is best-effort (catches the
  transport error) — matching the prior idempotent teardown.
- both consolidated_launch callers pass `DockerGatewayTransport(name)` —
  no behavior change; the firecracker swap flips only its own to SSH.

Pure refactor: docker path unchanged, gateway_provision tests updated to
construct the transport, all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis bb434b14d7 feat(firecracker): persistent infra-VM singleton lifecycle (Stage B, 4/n)
The infra VM must outlive the short-lived `start` launcher and be reused
across launches. Add an idempotent singleton:

- `ensure_running()` adopts the infra VM when its control plane is already
  healthy (a prior launcher booted it), else clears any stale VM and boots
  a fresh one. Returns a handle usable for CA fetch / git-gate provisioning
  whether we booted it or adopted it.
- boot is `detached` (firecracker in its own session via start_new_session)
  so it survives the launcher exiting; its PID is recorded so a later
  process can `stop()` it. `_kill_pidfile` SIGTERM/SIGKILLs but only if the
  PID is still a firecracker process (guards a recycled PID).
- a STABLE SSH key (generated once under the infra cache dir, re-injected
  each boot via the cmdline) so any launcher can SSH in to fetch the CA /
  provision, not just the one that booted the VM. `InfraVm.vm` is None in
  the adopted case; teardown then goes through the PID file.

Verified on a KVM host: first ensure_running boots; a second adopts it
(same PID, no reboot) and can still reach /health and fetch the gateway CA
over SSH; stop() tears it down (control plane then unreachable).

Next: git-gate provisioning into the VM over SSH (today docker exec/cp),
then swap consolidated_launch.py onto the infra VM.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis d79d5b295a feat(firecracker): route agent VMs to the gateway VM (Stage B, 3/n)
Agent VMs must reach the shared gateway that now runs in the infra VM
(egress:9099 / supervise:9100 / git-http:9420 at the orchestrator link's
guest IP). Add a PREROUTING DNAT: agents keep addressing their own
host-side TAP IP on the gateway ports, and the rule redirects that to the
infra VM. The isolation table's existing `ct status dnat accept` forward
rule lets the DNAT'd traffic through; every other agent egress stays
dropped, so a bottle still reaches only the gateway and nothing else.

Source IP is deliberately NOT masqueraded: the gateway attributes each
request to the originating bottle by its guest IP, which the /31 TAP + the
bot_bottle_fc nft table make unspoofable. Keeping the agent addressed at
its own host TAP IP means no per-bottle config change vs the docker-DNAT
path it replaces.

- scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh: `_install_gateway_route` adds
  `table ip <table>_gw` (prerouting dstnat -> orch_guest on the gateway
  ports); wired into up/down/status. The nix module needs no change — it
  runs this script, and the ports are baked in.

Verified on a KVM host: an agent VM's `curl -x http://<its-host-tap>:9099`
reaches mitmproxy in the infra VM and gets a 403 (correct policy denial
for an unregistered bottle) — i.e. the route lands end-to-end. Persist
with a nixos-rebuild; the imperative rule holds until then.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis e1610121c0 feat(firecracker): run the gateway data plane in the infra VM too (Stage B, 2/n)
The single infra VM now runs BOTH the orchestrator control plane and the
gateway data plane (egress / supervise / git-http), multi-tenant against
the local control plane — the single-VM shape from the Stage B design.

- Dockerfile.infra: the firecracker infra image = the gateway image +
  the baked control-plane source (FROM bot-bottle-gateway, COPY
  bot_bottle). Reuses the gateway payload rather than copying mitmproxy/
  gitleaks into a third image; the docker backend keeps its two separate
  images.
- infra_vm: build from source (gateway then infra image), and the PID-1
  init now also launches `gateway_init` with
  BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8099. Adds `gateway_ca_pem`
  (fetch the mitmproxy CA over SSH) and the agent-facing port constants.
- init exports PATH — a bare-init shell resolves its own execs via a
  built-in default path, but that isn't in the environment, so
  gateway_init's `python3 ...` daemons would otherwise fail to spawn.

Verified on a KVM host: infra VM boots, control plane /health -> 200, and
egress:9099 / supervise:9100 / git-http:9420 all listen and are reachable
from the host over the TAP link; the gateway CA is retrievable. (git-gate
stays down until a bottle provisions its per-bottle entrypoint/creds, same
as a fresh docker gateway — non-fatal, the supervisor keeps the rest up.)

Next: agent->gateway VM-to-VM routing so bbfc* VMs reach these ports at
the infra VM and nowhere else.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 1614172423 feat(firecracker): run the orchestrator control plane as a VM (Stage B, 1/n)
First slice of Stage B: the orchestrator control plane runs as a
persistent Firecracker infra VM instead of a Docker container. The host
CLI reaches it over HTTP at the orchestrator link's guest IP; agent VMs
will reach its gateway ports (added next) over VM-to-VM routing.

- Dockerfile.orchestrator bakes the stdlib-only control-plane source
  (COPY bot_bottle) so the image is self-contained and runs from a built
  image with no runtime bind-mount — a guest VM can't bind-mount host
  source. (Build-from-source stays the default; a pull-from-registry mode
  lands later. The docker backend's dev bind-mount still overlays this.)
- util.build_base_rootfs_dir / inject_guest_boot take a `variant` +
  `init_script`, so the same orchestrator image is prepared two ways
  without a cache collision: the builder VM keeps the SSH-only agent init;
  the infra VM gets a control-plane PID-1 init.
- new firecracker/infra_vm.py: boot the infra VM on the orchestrator link,
  run `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator` as PID 1, and poll /health.

Verified on a KVM host: infra VM boots, control plane answers
`GET /health -> 200 {"status":"ok"}` from the host over the TAP link.
Next: fold gateway_init (egress/git-gate/supervise) into the same VM,
then agent->gateway routing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 4edd7803e8 feat(firecracker): build agent images in a builder VM, not host docker (Stage 3)
Replace the host `docker build` + `docker export` behind the Firecracker
agent rootfs with an in-VM buildah build. `image_builder.build_agent_rootfs_dir`
boots a throwaway builder VM (the orchestrator image, which carries
buildah) on the NAT'd orchestrator link, sends the Dockerfile over SSH,
`buildah build`s it, smoke-tests the result with `buildah run` (the
image's own PATH, so it catches an npm silent-failure stub), and streams
the rootfs tar back into the content-addressed cache dir — the same base
dir `util.build_rootfs_ext4` already turns into a bootable ext4 with
`mke2fs -d`. No host Docker daemon, no root-equivalent `docker` group;
an untrusted Dockerfile runs in a confined microVM, not on the host.

- new firecracker/image_builder.py (boot → build → smoke → stream).
- launch.py: `_build_agent_image` → `_build_agent_base`, returning the
  base dir from the builder VM. The committed-snapshot (freeze/migrate)
  path still exports via host docker until it too is ported.
- util: `_inject_guest_boot` → public `inject_guest_boot` (shared with
  the builder). unit tests for the cache decision + smoke-test paths.

Verified on a KVM host end-to-end: builds the real claude Dockerfile
(node:22-slim + npm claude-code) in-VM in ~60s, the produced agent VM
boots and `claude --version` returns 2.1.172; the content cache skips
the rebuild on a repeat launch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 81a2f15046 feat(firecracker): NAT'd egress link for the orchestrator/builder VM
The orchestrator/gateway VM is trusted infra, not an isolated agent: it
builds agent images in-VM (buildah must FROM-pull + apt/npm) and, in the
Stage B cutover, forwards agent egress upstream. Give it a dedicated TAP
(`bborch0`) on a /31 at the top of the IP_BASE /16 (clear of the bbfc*
agent pool at the bottom), NAT'd out the host uplink — while agent VMs
keep their fail-closed, gateway-only isolation table.

- netpool.defaults.env / netpool.py: new BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE +
  `orch_slot()` (index -1 sentinel; host x.y.255.0 / guest x.y.255.1).
- scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh: create + address the orchestrator TAP;
  `bot_bottle_fc_nat` table masquerades its /31 out the uplink and
  accepts its forward path. Because bootstrap still runs Docker (whose
  FORWARD policy is DROP), a best-effort, guarded, idempotent DOCKER-USER
  ACCEPT is added too (skipped once Docker is gone). down/status updated.
- nix/firecracker-netpool.nix: mirror the option, pass it via the unit
  Environment= (the store-copied script can't read the defaults file),
  and add iptables to the unit path for the DOCKER-USER step.

Agent isolation is unchanged: the new rules only ever accept/masquerade
the orchestrator link and never drop, so they can't weaken the bbfc*
drops. Applied by re-running `sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh up`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 75b122398d feat(orchestrator): add buildah for in-VM agent-image builds (PRD 0069 Stage 3)
The Firecracker backend's remaining host-Docker dependency is building
users' agent Dockerfiles. Move that build *into the orchestrator VM*:
give the orchestrator image buildah (rootless, daemonless) so it builds
agent images itself, and the host needs no Docker daemon and no
root-equivalent `docker` group. An untrusted Dockerfile then builds
inside the confined orchestrator VM rather than on the host — strictly
more isolated than host `docker build`.

- buildah + crun (OCI runtime) + netavark/aardvark-dns (network backend
  for FROM pulls and RUN egress), installed explicitly since
  --no-install-recommends strips buildah's helper deps.
- vfs storage + chroot isolation (STORAGE_DRIVER/BUILDAH_ISOLATION) so
  buildah needs neither fuse-overlayfs / an overlay kernel module nor
  configured subuid maps — it works unconditionally as root in a minimal
  microVM rootfs. (Slower than overlay; a build-cache pass is deferred.)

Bootstrap: the orchestrator rootfs is still produced from this image via
host docker export; a later step pulls a pre-built image instead.

Verified: the orchestrator image boots as a Firecracker VM and buildah
runs inside it as real VM root (reaches the base-image pull; build-time
egress wiring is the next step).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis-claude 2e738c3338 fix(docker): use run_docker in docker_exec, docker_cp, verify_agent_image
The rebase onto lazy-backend-imports converts existing helpers (image_exists,
container_exists, etc.) to run_docker; the three new functions added in this
branch still called subprocess.run directly. Switch them over for consistency.
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis-claude 9369fb7de5 feat(firecracker): implement consolidated orchestrator launch (PRD 0070)
Replace the per-bottle Docker sidecar bundle with the shared per-host
orchestrator + gateway, mirroring what the Docker backend already has.

- Add `bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/consolidated_launch.py`:
  `_FirecrackerOrchestratorService` (subclasses `OrchestratorService`,
  overrides `_gateway()` to return a `DockerGateway` with host port
  bindings so Firecracker VMs can reach it via their TAP link);
  `launch_consolidated()` registers the bottle by guest IP (attribution
  key), provisions git-gate into the shared gateway, and returns the
  shared CA + orchestrator URL for teardown; `teardown_consolidated()`
  deregisters and cleans up.

- Rewrite `bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/launch.py`: removes the
  per-bottle sidecar bundle (`_start_sidecar_bundle`, `_stage_git_gate`,
  etc.) and `_mint_certs`; wires `launch_consolidated()` instead. The VM
  still sends to `host_tap_ip:PORT` — Docker's PREROUTING DNAT + the nft
  `ct status dnat accept` rule in the forward chain route the traffic to
  the shared gateway container.

- Extend `DockerGateway` with `host_port_bindings` so the Firecracker
  gateway publishes its ports on the host (`0.0.0.0:PORT`).

- Parameterise `OrchestratorService` with `orchestrator_name` /
  `orchestrator_label` so Docker and Firecracker orchestrators can
  coexist on the same host (`bot-bottle-orchestrator` vs
  `bot-bottle-fc-orchestrator`).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis 9afdeff619 refactor(firecracker): use docker_mod instead of hand-rolled docker helpers
firecracker/launch.py reimplemented docker build/image-exists/rm/exec/cp
as private functions instead of the shared docker_mod used by the
docker and macos-container backends. Switching to docker_mod dedupes
the logic and gets --no-cache support for free (docker_mod.build_image
already reads BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE); docker_mod gains docker_exec/
docker_cp general-purpose helpers to cover what the private versions did.
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
didericis e45df03bd9 fix: smoke-test agent images after build, add start --no-cache
npm treats optionalDependencies failures as non-fatal, so a transient
network blip fetching claude-code's platform-native binary during
`npm install -g` left a stub CLI in an image that still "built"
successfully — then got baked into the Docker/Container layer cache
until forced to rebuild. Post-build smoke test (provider-declared
argv, run in a throwaway container of the freshly built image) fails
the launch loudly instead of shipping a broken image; --no-cache
gives an escape hatch to force a from-scratch rebuild.

Closes #353.
2026-07-16 14:36:54 -04:00
Quality Badge Bot ec55dfde0c chore: update quality badges
- Coverage: 84%
- Core coverage: 95%

[skip ci]
2026-07-14 21:26:52 +00:00
didericis 56d879f0b3 fix(tests): pyright strict — export _plan fixture, drop unused imports
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m10s
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- `tests/unit/_docker_bottle_plan.py`: add `__all__ = ["_plan"]` so the
  underscore-prefixed fixture isn't flagged reportUnusedFunction.
- `tests/unit/test_egress_apply.py`: drop `SimpleNamespace` / `patch`
  imports left unused after the reload test became fail-closed.

`pyright .` → 0 errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 17:12:12 -04:00
didericis 09393b354b refactor(de-sidecar): purge the "sidecar" name from live code, tests, and current docs
lint / lint (push) Failing after 2m3s
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m11s
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Completes the de-sidecar cleanup: no live code, test, current doc,
script, or nix file mentions or is named "sidecar" any more. Only the
dated PRD/research docs keep the term as historical record (agreed on
the #385 thread).

- Rename `sidecar_init.py`→`gateway_init.py` was done earlier; this pass
  sweeps the remaining descriptive uses: the egress / git-gate / supervise
  components are the gateway's *daemons*, the shared container is the
  *gateway*, the old per-bottle container was the *companion container*.
- Rename `tests/integration/test_sidecar_bundle_image.py`→`test_gateway_image.py`
  and its class; update `docs/ci.md` + `tests/README.md` for the renamed/
  removed integration tests.
- `SIDECAR_PORTS` shell var in `scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`→`GATEWAY_PORTS`.

Full unit suite green (bar the pre-existing `/bin/sleep`-missing env
errors in test_gateway_init); docker integration — gateway singleton,
broker, real two-bottle multitenant isolation, and the gateway-image
build — all pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 17:07:56 -04:00
didericis 77948ef56c refactor(de-sidecar): remove the per-bottle companion-container architecture
The per-agent companion container (the egress/git-gate/supervise data
plane run once per bottle) is the pre-consolidation architecture. Remove
it and disable the backends that still depend on it, per the #385 thread.

- Delete `backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py`; docker's live path uses the
  consolidated shared gateway, not a per-bottle bundle.
- Disable the firecracker and macos-container backends: their `launch()`
  fails closed (they launched a per-bottle companion; firecracker's
  consolidated relaunch is #354, macos follows). Their `enumerate` return
  empty and `cleanup` drop the companion-container discovery (firecracker
  keeps VMM/run-dir cleanup).
- Fail-close both backends' `egress_apply` reload (it signalled the
  per-bottle container); consolidated egress policy resolves per-request
  against the orchestrator, so gateway-side apply is a follow-up.
- Rename `egress_sidecar_env_entries` → `egress_gateway_env_entries`,
  `SIDECAR_PORTS` → `GATEWAY_PORTS`.
- Move the shared DockerBottlePlan fixture to `tests/unit/_docker_bottle_plan.py`;
  delete tests for the removed launch paths; update cleanup/egress-apply tests.

Docker consolidated launch verified end-to-end (multitenant isolation
integration test passes). macos/firecracker are intentionally disabled.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 17:02:08 -04:00
didericis c10d1cb6e0 refactor(de-sidecar): rename sidecar_init→gateway_init, drop docker's dead per-bottle compose renderer
Part of the de-sidecar cleanup (#385 discussion): the per-bottle companion
container is the old architecture.

- Rename `bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py` → `gateway_init.py` (it's the gateway
  image's PID-1 supervisor); env var `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` →
  `BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS`; log prefix `sidecar-init:` → `gateway-init:`.
  Update Dockerfile.gateway COPY/ENTRYPOINT and the test.
- Remove the dead per-bottle compose renderer from `backend/docker/compose.py`
  (`bottle_plan_to_compose`, `_sidecar_bundle_service`, `_agent_service`, and
  the network/bind/proxy helpers). Docker's live path uses
  `consolidated_agent_compose`; only the compose *lifecycle* helpers
  (up/down/ls/write) remain. Trim `test_compose.py` to the surviving helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 16:46:46 -04:00
didericis 96b84eb84d refactor(orchestrator): split conflated sidecar image into orchestrator + gateway images
lint / lint (push) Successful in 2m19s
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m14s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 32s
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One image — `bot-bottle-sidecars:latest`, built from `Dockerfile.sidecars` —
served two unrelated roles: the egress/git-gate/supervise *data plane* and
the orchestrator *control plane* (which ran the same image with the entrypoint
overridden to `python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator`). The control plane is
stdlib-only, so it needed none of the mitmproxy/git/gitleaks payload it was
riding on — while being the most secret-dense process on the host (PRD 0070's
"secret concentration").

Split into two purpose-built images:

- `Dockerfile.gateway` -> `bot-bottle-gateway:latest` — the data plane
  (renamed from Dockerfile.sidecars; identical contents).
- `Dockerfile.orchestrator` -> `bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest` — a lean
  `python:3.12-slim` runtime; the bind-mounted `bot_bottle` package supplies
  the code (so the #381 source-hash recreate semantics are unchanged).

`OrchestratorService` now takes distinct `image` (control plane, default
`ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE`) and `gateway_image` (data plane, default `GATEWAY_IMAGE`)
instead of feeding one `self.image` to both, and builds the lean image
(build-if-missing) before starting the container. The per-bottle bundle
constants in `backend/docker/sidecar_bundle.py` now alias the gateway
constants so a bundle and the shared gateway can never drift onto different
images. The `bot-bottle-sidecars` *image* name and `Dockerfile.sidecars` are
gone; the per-bottle *container* name prefix (`bot-bottle-sidecars-<slug>`) is
intentionally left for a separate change.

Verified end-to-end: both images build; the lean image runs the control plane;
`ensure_running` brings up the orchestrator on `bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest`
and the gateway on `bot-bottle-gateway:latest` (distinct images) and reports
healthy.

Closes #384.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 16:24:16 -04:00
didericis 910267b8a8 fix(orchestrator): only recreate the orchestrator on a real source change
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m7s
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lint / lint (push) Successful in 2m7s
test / unit (push) Successful in 1m11s
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Update Quality Badges / update-badges (push) Successful in 1m9s
ensure_running() unconditionally recreated the bot-bottle-orchestrator
container on every bottle launch, added so bind-mounted code changes take
effect (the process never reloads). But the orchestrator's per-bottle
egress auth tokens live only in its process memory (Orchestrator._tokens),
by design never persisted to disk. So starting a second bottle recreated
the container and silently dropped the FIRST bottle's already-injected
token -- its next authed egress call 403s with "env var EGRESS_TOKEN_0 is
unset", and it needs a full restart to recover.

Now the orchestrator container is labeled with a content hash of its
bind-mounted bot_bottle source, mirroring the gateway's existing
image-staleness check. ensure_running only recreates on a hash mismatch
(a real code change), so a bottle launch that isn't accompanied by a code
change leaves a healthy orchestrator -- and every other active bottle's
in-memory tokens -- alone.

Fixes #381.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 04:07:25 -04:00
Quality Badge Bot 03eacd9f57 chore: update quality badges
- Coverage: 83%
- Core coverage: 95%

[skip ci]
2026-07-14 07:42:30 +00:00
didericis c839cee319 test(orchestrator): skip multitenant isolation under act_runner
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m3s
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The test brings up the orchestrator container, which bind-mounts the repo
path into a container on the host daemon. Under the Gitea act_runner the job
runs in a container sharing the host docker socket, so that path
(/workspace/...) doesn't exist on the host daemon and the mount fails
('mkdir /workspace: read-only file system'). Same host-bind-mount constraint
that already skips test_sandbox_escape and the other bottle-bringup tests, so
gate it the same way (GITEA_ACTIONS). Runs for real on a normal docker host.

This unblocks the integration + coverage CI jobs, which failed only because
this test errored (coverage.sh runs under set -e; no percentage gate tripped).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 03:15:26 -04:00
didericis ea75fab3b4 fix(orchestrator): supersede a prior active bottle at the same source IP
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m4s
test / integration (pull_request) Failing after 30s
test / coverage (pull_request) Failing after 1m17s
register() used INSERT OR REPLACE keyed on bottle_id, so re-registering an
existing source_ip with a new bottle_id left TWO active rows for that IP.
by_source_ip fail-closes on ambiguity (>1 active -> None), so the reused IP
was then bricked to a 403 on egress resolve — even for hosts its own policy
allowed. Happy path (fresh IPs, teardown on stop) never hit it, but IP reuse,
crash recovery, or a persisted registry DB across an orchestrator restart
(now that ensure_running always recreates the container) all could.

register() now deletes any other active row at the same source_ip before
insert; the fail-closed ambiguity guard stays as defense in depth. Adds a
unit test for the supersede, and a docker integration test
(test_multitenant_isolation) that drives two bottles through one shared
gateway and asserts each gets only its own injected token and its own
allowlist — the core PRD 0070 multi-tenancy invariant, previously only
verified by hand.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 13a8bdd7ca fix(orchestrator): recreate the orchestrator container on ensure_running
The orchestrator runs the repo's code bind-mounted, but the Python process
loads it at startup and never reloads — and ensure_running reused a
healthy-but-stale container. So after a code change (e.g. the token fix), the
running orchestrator kept executing OLD control-plane code that dropped the
new /bottles 'tokens' field, and egress auth injection stayed broken no matter
how many times the gateway image was rebuilt.

ensure_running now always recreates the orchestrator container (cheap; the
registry DB persists and the current launch re-registers its in-memory
state). Combined with the gateway's image-staleness recreate, a fresh 'start'
now runs current code end to end.

Validated live: register an authed route + in-memory token -> a client at the
bottle IP curling through the gateway proxy receives the injected
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' header.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 3318bdce28 fix(orchestrator): recreate the gateway when its image is stale
Container-level counterpart to the ensure_built cache-aware fix. ensure_built
now rebuilds the gateway image on a source change, but ensure_running still
reused an already-running container built from the OLD image — so a rebuild
(even BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE) never took effect on a warm gateway, and it kept
running the pre-fix flat daemons (this is why token injection stayed broken
after the rebuild). ensure_running now compares the running container's image
to the current image and recreates on mismatch. Validated on docker: a stale
gateway is detected and recreated with the current image + new egress addon.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis b2f61053ad fix(egress+orchestrator): inject per-bottle auth tokens in the shared gateway
The cut-over dropped the per-bottle token flow, so an authed egress route on
the shared gateway failed with 'env var EGRESS_TOKEN_0 is unset' — the gateway
reads the token from its env, but a shared gateway has no per-bottle env.

Now the bottle's egress auth tokens travel to the gateway over /resolve and
the addon injects from them, mirroring what the per-bottle sidecar's env did:
- launch resolves the token values from the host env and hands them to the
  orchestrator, which holds them IN MEMORY (keyed by bottle_id, never written
  to the registry DB) and serves them on /resolve;
- PolicyResolver.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id + resolve_client_context now
  return the token map alongside policy + bottle_id (one round-trip);
- the egress addon overlays the process env with the bottle's tokens per
  request and uses that env for auth injection AND DLP — the agent never sees
  the credential.

Secrets stay off disk (validated: /resolve returns the token, the registry DB
does not contain it). SecretProvider (#355) is the future hardening.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 485d101430 fix(orchestrator): poll for the gateway CA (fresh-start readiness race)
On a fresh gateway container, mitmproxy writes mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem a beat
after mitmdump boots, so ca_cert_pem() read it too early and launch died with
'gateway CA cert not available'. It now polls (up to 30s) until mitmproxy has
generated it. Surfaced running the docker backend locally on a cold gateway.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis e97366dad5 fix(orchestrator): gateway image builds cache-aware, not build-if-missing
The cut-over dropped compose (whose `build:` rebuilt the sidecar image on
every up), and DockerGateway.ensure_built was build-if-missing — so a change
to the gateway's flat sources (egress addon / git-http / policy_resolver /
supervise) left a STALE image silently running the old single-tenant daemons
(this bit e2e validation). ensure_built now always `docker build`s
(cache-aware: a cache check when nothing changed, a real rebuild when sources
moved), matching the old compose behavior. BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE forces a full
rebuild (parity with #354's `start --no-cache`).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 8e7f5c9572 fix(tests): annotate on_network param — pyright strict (CI lint)
The cut-over's edit to test_consolidated_launch left the new on_network
kwarg untyped; pyright strict rejects it. No behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 69db629e16 feat(backend): slice 13d — cut docker launch over to the consolidated gateway (e2e green)
Rewire DockerBottleBackend.launch to the consolidated model, replacing the
per-bottle sidecar bundle. VALIDATED END-TO-END on real docker:
test_sandbox_escape passes all 5 attacks (egress DLP + git-gate gitleaks)
through the shared gateway.

launch now:
  - mints git-gate dynamic keys (if any), then launch_consolidated() to
    register the bottle + provision its git-gate state into the gateway and
    get the agent's attach context (pinned source IP, gateway address);
  - installs the SHARED gateway CA (gateway.ca_cert_pem) into the agent;
  - renders the agent-only consolidated compose on the gateway network at the
    pinned IP, proxied through the gateway;
  - points the agent's git-gate insteadOf (http://<gw>:9420) and supervise
    MCP (http://<gw>:9100) at the gateway (DockerBottlePlan.agent_git_gate_url
    / agent_supervise_url);
  - teardown = compose down + teardown_consolidated (dereg + deprovision).
Dropped the per-bottle networks, per-bottle egress CA, and bundle service.

Fixes surfaced by the real e2e (couldn't be caught by unit mocks):
  - provision_git_gate installs the bottle-agnostic pre-receive/access hooks
    into the gateway (were cp'd per-bundle before);
  - source-IP allocation reads the *actual* container IPs on the network
    (gateway + orchestrator + agents), not just gateway + registry — the
    orchestrator container sits on the network and was colliding.

Unit tests for the old bundle launch rewritten against the new collaborators.

NOTE for reviewers: the gateway/bundle image (bot-bottle-sidecars) must be
rebuilt when its flat sources change — `ensure_built` only builds-if-missing,
so a stale image silently runs the OLD single-tenant daemons. A content-hash
/ --rebuild path is a follow-up.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1760 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise);
test_sandbox_escape green on real docker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 96f75599a1 feat(orchestrator): slice 13d(i) — containerize the orchestrator (validated on docker)
Real-on-host testing surfaced two issues the unit-mocked slices couldn't:

1. The host (NixOS) firewall DROPS container->host traffic, so a host-process
   orchestrator is unreachable from the gateway container. Fix: run the
   orchestrator AS a container on the shared gateway network (PRD 0070's
   "virtualize the orchestrator") — the gateway reaches it by container name
   over docker DNS (container<->container, no firewall), and the host CLI
   reaches it via a published loopback port.
2. The control plane crashed the connection on a dispatch error (e.g. a
   broker failure) instead of returning 500.

Changes:
- lifecycle: OrchestratorProcess (host process) -> OrchestratorService
  (containers). Runs the control plane in the bundle image with the repo
  bind-mounted (orchestrator is stdlib-only), register-only stub broker so it
  needs NO docker socket (the backend launches agents; the host manages both
  containers). Registry DB persists via a host-root mount. ensure_running is
  an idempotent singleton over both containers.
- gateway: BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is now the orchestrator's *by-name*
  URL on the shared network (dropped the host.docker.internal hack).
- control_plane: _serve wraps dispatch — a failure returns 500, never crashes
  the connection.
- OrchestratorProcess default broker -> stub (register-only) for docker.

Validated live end-to-end: both containers up, gateway->orchestrator by name
OK, register -> resolve-by-source-IP returns the bottle's policy from inside
the gateway.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1760 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 3062fc9230 feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(viii) — agent-only consolidated compose render
The per-bottle model rendered a compose project with the agent + a sidecar
bundle on two per-bottle networks. Consolidated has no sidecars — one shared
gateway serves everyone — so this renders JUST the agent, attached to the
external shared gateway network at the orchestrator-allocated pinned IP, and
pointed at the gateway's address for egress.

- consolidated_agent_compose(plan, *, gateway_ip, source_ip, network):
  agent service only; networks {<gateway>: {ipv4_address: source_ip}} on the
  external gateway network; HTTPS_PROXY -> http://<gateway_ip>:9099; NO_PROXY
  includes the gateway address so git-http + supervise (also on the gateway)
  bypass the proxy and are reached directly. No depends_on/sidecars.
- Pure (takes the launch-time LaunchContext values), so it's unit-testable
  without docker.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (the 13 test_sidecar_init
/bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 404369a3e0 feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(vii) — stable shared gateway CA
The consolidated gateway TLS-intercepts every bottle, so all agents must
trust ONE CA. Rather than host-generate + mount a CA, let the gateway's own
mitmproxy generate its CA into a persistent named volume and extract the
cert for agents — no host openssl, keeps gateway.py lean.

- DockerGateway mounts GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME at /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy so the
  self-generated CA survives container recreation (it must not rotate, or
  already-launched agents would stop trusting the gateway).
- ca_cert_pem(): read the CA cert (PEM) out of the running gateway
  (docker exec cat mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem) — the agent installs this into its
  trust store to accept the gateway's bumped certs.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (the 13 test_sidecar_init
/bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 327e756eef feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(vi) — consolidated launch sequence (composition)
Composes the orchestrator primitives into the register/teardown sequence
that replaces the per-bottle bundle:

  launch_consolidated(egress_plan, git_gate_plan): ensure orchestrator +
    gateway up -> read the gateway network's subnet + the gateway's own
    address -> allocate the bottle a pinned source IP (skip the gateway +
    live bottles) -> register (egress policy blob + slug metadata) ->
    provision its git-gate repos/creds into the gateway. Returns a
    LaunchContext (bottle_id, identity_token, source_ip, network, gateway_ip,
    orchestrator_url) — everything the agent container needs to attach.
    Rolls the registration back if provisioning fails, so no orphan.

  teardown_consolidated(bottle_id): deregister + deprovision (idempotent).

The agent `docker run` itself stays the backend's job (provider
provisioning); this owns the orchestrator-facing wiring so the sequence is
unit-testable — collaborators mocked, next_free_ip + registration_inputs run
for real (IP allocation + policy blob asserted end to end).

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1755 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 444924d95d feat(git-gate+orchestrator): slice 13c(v) — provision git-gate into the running gateway
Places a bottle's git-gate credentials + bare repos into the live shared
gateway container when it registers — the execution side of the 13c(i)
provisioning render.

- provision_git_gate(gateway, bottle_id, plan): mkdir the per-bottle creds
  dir, docker cp each upstream's identity key (+ known_hosts when present)
  into /git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/, then docker exec the namespaced,
  init-only script from git_gate_render_provision. No-op with no upstreams.
- deprovision_git_gate(gateway, bottle_id): rm the bottle's /git/<id> +
  creds on teardown (idempotent).
- bottle_id is validated (shell/path-safe alphabet) BEFORE any docker cp/rm,
  so a traversal id can never reach a path arg — the creds/repo dirs land in
  docker cp/rm arguments. Registry ids are token_hex; defense in depth.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (the 13 test_sidecar_init
/bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 118d81533b feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(iv) — gateway joins a shared network
The consolidated gateway ran on the default bridge; the model needs it on a
dedicated user-defined network that every agent bottle also joins, reaching
the gateway's egress / git-http / supervise ports by its address (no host
port publishing) — and the source IP the gateway attributes by is the
bottle's address on this network.

- GATEWAY_NETWORK = "bot-bottle-gateway"; DockerGateway gains a `network`
  param.
- ensure_running now ensures the network exists (idempotent create,
  tolerating a concurrent 'already exists') then runs with `--network`.
- Docker picks the subnet; the launcher reads it back (13c source-IP
  allocator) to hand each bottle a pinned address.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (the 13 test_sidecar_init
/bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 353b1ad984 feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(iii) — host-side control-plane client
The launch path's counterpart to the gateway-side PolicyResolver: a trusted
host-side HTTP client for the orchestrator control plane, so the CLI can
register/teardown/re-policy bottles. Stdlib-only.

- OrchestratorClient.register_bottle(source_ip, *, image_ref, metadata,
  policy) -> RegisteredBottle(bottle_id, identity_token)  (POST /bottles)
- teardown_bottle(id) -> bool (DELETE; 404 -> False, idempotent for cleanup)
- set_policy(id, policy) -> bool (PUT; live reload)
- list_bottles() / health()
- Unlike the fail-closed data-plane resolver, this is the trusted caller: a
  non-2xx (other than the meaningful 404s) raises OrchestratorClientError so
  the launch path surfaces failures rather than swallowing them.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.82/10; unit suite green (1742 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 40ad2364ab feat(orchestrator): slice 13c(ii) — shared-gateway source-IP allocator
Deterministic per-bottle address assignment on the consolidated docker
gateway's shared network — the address the gateway uses as its attribution
key. Pure ipaddress logic; the docker-specific inputs (subnet CIDR, the
gateway container's own address) are gathered by the caller and passed as
`taken`, keeping it testable without docker.

- next_free_ip(cidr, taken): lowest host address not reserved (network +
  broadcast excluded by hosts(); docker's router .1 excluded here) and not
  already assigned (gateway container + live bottles from the registry).
  NoFreeAddressError when the subnet is exhausted.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (the 13 test_sidecar_init
/bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 9e5d00c6fa feat(git-gate+orchestrator): slice 13c(i) — per-bottle git-gate provisioning render
The consolidated gateway serves every bottle's repos under /git/<bottle_id>/
(slice 10), so each bottle's bare repos + per-repo credential config must be
provisioned into that namespace. This adds the renderer for that; placing
the creds + running it inside the gateway is the launch-wiring step.

- Extract the credential-wiring `init_repo` shell into a shared
  `_git_gate_init_repo_fn(repo_root, creds_dir)` — one source for the
  security-sensitive logic. The single-tenant daemon entrypoint is
  byte-unchanged (still /git + /git-gate/creds; existing tests green).
- git_gate_render_provision(bottle_id, upstreams): posix-sh that inits ONE
  bottle's bare repos under /git/<bottle_id>/ reading creds from
  /git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/. Init-only (no `git daemon` — the shared
  gateway already serves). Isolating each bottle's repo root + creds dir by
  id is what keeps one bottle's push credentials out of another's repos.
- bottle_id is embedded unquoted in the script, so it's restricted to a
  shell/path-safe alphabet (registry ids are token_hex; defense in depth).

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1724 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 0c158c5718 feat(orchestrator): slice 13b — consolidated registration inputs (egress policy)
Bridges the per-bottle `prepare` output to the consolidated registry:
`registration_inputs(plan)` turns a prepared egress plan into the
backend-neutral inputs `Orchestrator.launch_bottle` takes.

- egress_policy(plan): the policy blob = the exact routes YAML the
  per-bottle sidecar read from a file; the multi-tenant gateway's
  PolicyResolver now fetches it from the registry per request instead.
  Same egress_render_routes, so a bottle's allow-list is byte-identical
  moving onto the shared gateway.
- RegistrationInputs bundles policy + metadata; metadata carries the human
  slug so the shared registry can map a minted bottle id back to a name
  (console / supervise display).

Host-side glue (imports bot_bottle.egress) used by the launch path — not
the lean orchestrator control-plane process. Not yet wired into launch
(that's 13c/13d), consistent with the slice-6/10 pattern of landing the
primitive before the cut-over.

Key test: the policy round-trips through load_config back to the same
routes + log level — the resolver-served policy reconstructs the per-bottle
egress config exactly.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1718 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis fe25ad7623 feat(orchestrator): slice 13a — orchestrator process lifecycle (idempotent singleton)
First sub-slice of docker launch integration: the foundation the CLI needs
to ensure exactly one orchestrator control plane + shared gateway is up
before registering/launching bottles. Does NOT touch the real launch path
yet — it's the lifecycle primitive the cut-over slices build on.

- OrchestratorProcess.ensure_running(): idempotent singleton — returns the
  control-plane URL if a healthy one already answers /health, else spawns
  `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator --broker docker --gateway` detached
  (start_new_session, output tee'd to <root>/orchestrator.log) and polls
  /health until healthy or timeout (OrchestratorStartError).
- The control-plane port is the singleton key: a second orchestrator can't
  bind it, so a stray double-start fails fast rather than forking a rival.
- Host-process (not container) per the PRD's dev-harness sequencing — it
  already has the host user's docker access to broker launches; the
  data-plane gateway it manages is the container.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1714 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 6570e9f044 feat(supervise+orchestrator): slice 12 — multi-tenant git-gate hook + supervise server
Finishes the supervise data-plane writers for the shared gateway. Both
still keyed off a single SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env; now each proposal is
attributed to the calling bottle, keeping slices 10/11's per-bottle model.

- git_http_backend: in consolidated mode stamp SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG=
  <bottle_id> into the CGI env. The gitleaks-allow pre-receive hook runs as
  a child of the `git http-backend` we spawn, so it inherits the stamp and
  queues under the right bottle — no change to the (fragile) embedded hook.
  The bottle id is the namespaced root's final component (slice 10), the
  same key egress uses. Single-tenant leaves the container-stamped slug.
- supervise_server: resolve the proposal slug per request by source IP when
  BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is set (`_attributed_config`), fail-closed —
  an unattributed / unreachable source raises rather than queue under the
  wrong or empty slug. `serve`/`main` build + attach the resolver and make
  the env slug optional in consolidated mode. Single-tenant unchanged.

Tests: a real git push proving the slug reaches the hook's env; the
supervise attribution matrix (single-tenant slug kept, source-IP bottle
bound, unattributed + resolver-error fail closed).

Remaining supervise gap (noted): websocket DLP still self.config-only.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1705 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 39c823d3c0 feat(supervise+orchestrator): slice 11 — per-bottle supervise queue + DLP safelist
Consolidated egress ran every bottle through one process but keyed the
supervise proposal queue off a single SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env and kept
one *global* DLP safelist — so in the shared gateway an operator's token
approval for bottle A would (a) be attributed to the wrong bottle and
(b) leak into bottle B's DLP scan (A's approved secret passes B's egress).
This slice keys both per bottle, resolved by source IP.

- policy_resolver: add `resolve_policy_and_bottle_id` — policy + bottle id
  in one `/resolve`, so egress keys routing *and* the supervise
  queue/safelist from a single round-trip. Fail-closed (403 -> (None,None)).
- egress_addon_core: add `resolve_client_context` (+ `ContextResolverLike`)
  returning `(Config, bottle_id)`, sharing the fail-closed parse with
  `resolve_client_config` via `_config_from_policy`.
- egress_addon: `_active_config` -> `_resolve_flow` returns `(Config, slug)`;
  `safe_tokens` set -> per-bottle `_safe_tokens_for(slug)`; the token-allow
  write/await/archive + the approved-token add all use the resolved slug.
  Single-tenant (no resolver) unchanged — slug = the env SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG.

New tests cover the resolver, the fail-closed context matrix, and the
cross-tenant isolation (an approval lands only in the calling bottle's
safelist; the proposal is keyed by the source-IP-attributed bottle;
unattributed IPs can't supervise).

Out of scope (noted): the git-gate gitleaks-allow hook + supervise_server
agent-proposal paths, and websocket DLP (still self.config-only, inert in
consolidated mode) — follow-up slices.

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1700 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 8a44537f7e fix(git-gate): review — sandbox naming, ResolverLike Protocol, token-required note
Addresses PR #365 review:
- Type `resolve_sandbox_root`'s resolver param as a `ResolverLike` Protocol
  (structural, `resolve_bottle_id` only) — fixes the pyright errors from
  passing a duck-typed fake resolver in tests; mirrors
  egress_addon_core.PolicyResolverLike.
- Rename `_project_root`/`project_root`/`resolve_repo_root`/
  `DEFAULT_PROJECT_ROOT` -> `_sandbox_root`/`sandbox_root`/
  `resolve_sandbox_root`/`DEFAULT_REPO_ROOT`: "sandbox" names the per-tenant
  scope; "project" was too amorphous. `GIT_PROJECT_ROOT` keeps git's own
  env-var name.
- Note the single-tenant path is transitional (stripped once every backend
  runs the consolidated gateway).
- policy_resolver: document that the optional identity token is
  transitional — the consolidated end state requires it (flips at the
  /resolve boundary once token *delivery* lands, a PRD 0070 open question).
- Split the long line in main() (was 105 cols).

pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.95/10; unit suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 72ee1f77da feat(git-gate): source-IP-keyed multi-tenant repo namespace (PRD 0070)
First slice of git-gate consolidation: make the smart-HTTP git backend
serve every bottle from one process, selecting each request's repo root by
the calling bottle's source IP — the same attribution invariant + resolver
the multi-tenant egress addon uses. `git daemon` can't source-IP-route per
connection, so the consolidated gateway serves git-gate over this HTTP
backend (the transport firecracker/macOS already use); wiring the docker
path onto it lands with the launch-integration slice.

- policy_resolver: factor out `_post_resolve`; add `resolve_bottle_id`
  (source IP -> bottle id, same fail-closed 403->None contract as
  `resolve`) — the git-gate has no policy blob to parse, the bottle *is*
  the namespace.
- git_http_backend: `resolve_repo_root(resolver, base, source_ip, token)`
  — single-tenant passthrough when no resolver; else `<base>/<bottle_id>`,
  fail-closed on unattributed / resolver error / namespace escape.
  `BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL` (same env as egress) flips the shared
  gateway multi-tenant; the identity header is read for attribution and
  never forwarded to the CGI. Per-repo creds + hooks scope by repo dir, so
  isolating the root per bottle isolates its creds too.

Single-tenant path unchanged (existing real-git-push tests green). New unit
coverage for the resolver + repo-root selection matrix. Full unit suite
green (1690 tests; the 13 test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are the
pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 00418a2834 refactor(orchestrator): rename Sidecar -> Gateway for the consolidated data plane
Retire "sidecar" for the consolidated per-host path (PRD 0070 naming
decision): the orchestrator is the umbrella/control plane, and the
egress/git/supervise data-plane unit it runs is the "gateway".

- git mv sidecar.py -> gateway.py and the two integration + one unit test
  files; DockerSidecar->DockerGateway, Sidecar->Gateway,
  SidecarError->GatewayError, SIDECAR_*->GATEWAY_*, ensure_sidecar->
  ensure_gateway, sidecar_status->gateway_status, container name
  bot-bottle-orch-sidecar->bot-bottle-orch-gateway.
- Prose rename across broker/registry/egress/policy_resolver + PRD 0070.
- Preserved: the image name bot-bottle-sidecars, the
  BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE env var, Dockerfile.sidecars, and PRD 0069's
  own stage-name cross-references (that doc still uses "sidecar").

No behavior change. Full unit suite green (1679 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 2cbb178f88 feat(orchestrator+egress): slice 8 — multi-tenant egress via the resolver (#352)
The egress addon now selects each request's Config by the calling bottle's
source IP, so one shared sidecar serves every bottle. Opt-in and fail-closed;
single-tenant behaviour is unchanged.

Orchestrator side (source-IP-primary attribution, per the PRD invariant):
  * registry: `by_source_ip` (the single active bottle at a source IP —
    network-layer attribution); `attribute` now composes it + the token.
  * service: `resolve(source_ip, token="")` — with a token, strict
    attribution; without, source IP alone.
  * control_plane: `POST /resolve`'s identity_token is now OPTIONAL (absent
    → source-IP-only); split cleanly from the token-required `/attribute`.
  * policy_resolver: `resolve` token now optional.

Egress side:
  * egress_addon_core: `resolve_client_config(resolver, client_ip, token)` —
    fetches + parses the client's Config, **fail-closed**: unattributed, a
    resolver error, or an unparseable policy all yield deny-all (no routes).
    Host-testable; `PolicyResolverLike` Protocol keeps it import-free.
  * egress_addon: consolidated mode when `BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL` is
    set → `_active_config(flow)` resolves per client IP (reads + strips the
    `x-bot-bottle-identity` header); `request()` uses it. Unset → the static
    routes file, exactly as before. `PolicyResolver` added to the bundle.

Security note: source-IP-only resolution is safe where the IP is unspoofable
(Firecracker /31 + nft) AND the control plane is reachable only by the
trusted sidecar; the identity token, when the agent injects it, strengthens
it on weaker backends.

Scope note: the egress data plane is now multi-tenant. Remaining to be fully
live: the network topology routing every bottle's proxy to the one shared
sidecar, git-gate multitenancy, and agent-side identity-token injection.

Tests: registry by_source_ip; orchestrator resolve (with/without token);
control-plane /resolve token-optional; resolver token-optional;
resolve_client_config fail-closed matrix. All 182 egress tests still pass
(single-tenant unchanged). Full suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis ed9a19bb38 refactor(orchestrator): drop the PolicyResolver cache (#352)
Review: the resolver is called rarely enough that a round-trip doesn't
matter, and correctness beats speed — always fetching means a revocation,
policy change, or teardown the orchestrator knows about is honored
immediately instead of lingering for a cache TTL. Remove the TTL cache
(and `invalidate`); `resolve` now hits the orchestrator every call. Noted
in the docstring that any future caching should use orchestrator-driven
invalidation, not a blind TTL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis c5ae93c8ba feat(orchestrator): slice 7 — sidecar-side PolicyResolver (#352)
The data-plane bridge that lets the consolidated sidecar apply each
bottle's policy per request. `PolicyResolver` resolves a client's policy
from the orchestrator's `POST /resolve` keyed on (source_ip, identity
token) and caches it briefly (short TTL) so it isn't a round-trip per
request; `invalidate()` drops an entry on teardown / live reload.

Fail-closed: an unattributed client (orchestrator answers 403) resolves to
None so the caller denies; unreachable / unexpected status raises so the
caller can fail closed too rather than serve stale/empty policy. Stdlib
only and free of bot-bottle imports, so it can be COPYed flat into the
sidecar bundle.

Scope note: this is the sidecar-side *client*. Wiring it into the live
egress mitmproxy addon (select `Config` per client IP in the request path)
and git-gate, plus routing all bottles' egress to the one shared sidecar,
are the remaining data-plane pieces — a heavier change to the sidecar
bundle's adversarial-input code, taken next.

Tests: resolve returns/caches/expires/invalidates; 403 -> None (fail
closed); other HTTP status + unreachable raise; missing policy -> empty;
posts source_ip + identity_token. Full suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 186b905dff feat(orchestrator): slice 6 — source-IP-keyed multi-tenant policy (#352)
The orchestrator side of the multi-tenant consolidated sidecar: hold each
bottle's sidecar policy and serve it by verified source IP, with live
reload. One shared sidecar can now get per-bottle config keyed on who's
calling.

  * registry.py — a `policy` column (migration v3, opaque JSON the sidecar
    interprets) on BottleRecord; `register(..., policy=)` stores it,
    `set_policy(bottle_id, policy)` updates it live, and `attribute` returns
    it (the source-IP-keyed resolution).
  * service.py — `launch_bottle(..., policy=)` and `set_policy`.
  * control_plane.py — `POST /bottles` accepts `policy`; `PUT
    /bottles/<id>/policy` live-reloads it; `POST /resolve` returns
    {bottle_id, policy} for a verified (source_ip, token) — the per-request
    call the multi-tenant sidecar makes; `/attribute` stays identity-only.

Scope note: this is the control-plane / state half. The data-plane half —
the egress mitmproxy addon (and git-gate) selecting allowlist / DLP /
token-injection per client IP by calling `/resolve` — is the next slice
(route agent bottles through the shared sidecar). The orchestrator stays
policy-agnostic: it stores and serves the blob verbatim.

Tests: registry policy store/update/persist; Orchestrator launch-with-policy
+ live set_policy; control-plane resolve returns policy (403 on bad token),
PUT policy updates / 404 / 400. Verified live over HTTP (launch -> resolve
-> PUT reload -> resolve reflects). Full suite green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 3519b924cb feat(orchestrator): slice 5 — build the consolidated sidecar bundle image (#352)
Answers "where do we build the consolidated sidecar": nowhere, until now.

  * sidecar.py — `Sidecar.ensure_built()` (default no-op) + `DockerSidecar`
    now defaults its image to the real bundle (`bot-bottle-sidecars`) and
    `ensure_built()` builds it from `Dockerfile.sidecars` when
    `docker image inspect` shows it's missing (no-op when present or when no
    dockerfile is configured, e.g. a pre-pulled image). `image_exists()`
    added.
  * service.py — `ensure_sidecar()` now builds then runs.
  * __main__.py — `--sidecar` runs the consolidated bundle (build-if-missing).

Scope note: this builds + launches the bundle *container*; making the
running instance functional across bottles needs the per-bottle,
source-IP-keyed multi-tenant config + registration/reload, and routing
agent bottles to it — the next slices (added to PRD 0070's roadmap).

Tests: unit (docker mocked) — image_exists, ensure_built builds when
missing / no-op when present / no-op without a dockerfile / raises on build
failure; ensure_sidecar builds-then-runs; integration (gated, no heavy
build) — image_exists reflects real docker state. Full suite green (only
pre-existing /bin/sleep errors).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis c77f578fb4 refactor(orchestrator): move run_docker to a lean top-level docker_cmd (#352)
Review feedback: don't bury a parallel docker util in the orchestrator.
But reusing backend.docker.util (docker_mod) isn't right either — importing
it runs backend/__init__.py, which eagerly loads all three backends
(docker + firecracker + macos) plus the manifest/egress/git-gate/supervise
framework (~76 modules), so every orchestrator import would drag the whole
backend layer in.

Compromise: promote the helper to a top-level, framework-free
bot_bottle/docker_cmd.py (single stdlib import), a proper shared home the
orchestrator's docker components use now and backend.docker.util can adopt
later. Verified `import bot_bottle.orchestrator` stays lean (12 modules, no
firecracker/macos backends).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis bc52c3525c feat(orchestrator): slice 4 — consolidated per-host sidecar (#352)
The core consolidation win: one persistent sidecar per host, shared by
every bottle, instead of a sidecar bundle per bottle. Safe to share
because the attribution invariant (source IP + identity token) lets the
sidecar map each request to the right bottle.

  * orchestrator/sidecar.py — a backend-neutral `Sidecar` lifecycle
    contract (mirrors LaunchBroker) + a `DockerSidecar` impl. The defining
    behaviour is idempotent singleton: `ensure_running` starts the instance
    if absent and is a no-op if it's already up, so N launches never spawn
    N sidecars; `stop` is idempotent.
  * orchestrator/dockerutil.py — a shared `run_docker` helper; DockerBroker
    now uses it too (DRY with slice 3).
  * service.py — the Orchestrator holds an optional `Sidecar`, exposes
    `ensure_sidecar()` + `sidecar_status()`.
  * control_plane.py — `GET /sidecar` reports it; __main__ gains
    `--sidecar-image` and ensures the single sidecar on startup.

Tests: unit (docker mocked) — is_running, ensure idempotent (no-op when up,
starts when absent), failure raises, stop idempotent; Orchestrator sidecar
wiring/status; control-plane /sidecar; integration (gated) — ensure is a
real idempotent singleton (one container after two ensures), stop removes.
Full suite green (only pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); integration
verified locally against real docker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis b70f3228ca fix(orchestrator): pyright — pass explicit LaunchRequest in the docker integration test (#352)
The **kw unpacking put str into slot: int|None. Pass explicit
LaunchRequests instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis f7b3d6aaca feat(orchestrator): slice 3 — real Docker launch broker (#352)
The first concrete LaunchBroker, proving the orchestrator -> backend seam
on the cheapest backend (the sidecar bundle is already containers):

  * orchestrator/docker_broker.py — DockerBroker runs a container on a
    verified launch (`docker run --detach --name <bottle> --label ...
    <image_ref>`) and removes it on teardown (`docker rm --force`,
    idempotent on an already-absent container). The argv is built only from
    the request's static ids/flags, so nothing free-form reaches docker;
    provenance/schema verification is inherited from LaunchBroker.submit.
  * __main__.py gains `--broker {stub,docker}` so the harness can drive real
    containers.

Slice 3 launches a single container from image_ref (the seam); the full
agent + sidecar bundle is a later slice.

Tests: unit (docker mocked) — argv from static fields, launch/teardown call
the right commands, missing-image and docker-failure raise, teardown
idempotent on missing, forged token never touches docker; integration
(gated on a reachable daemon) — launch creates a real container, teardown
removes it. Full suite green (only pre-existing /bin/sleep errors);
integration verified locally against real docker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis b05f245299 feat(orchestrator): slice 2 — launch lifecycle + signed launch-broker (#352)
Second slice of PRD 0070, still a backend-neutral dev-harness:

  * orchestrator/broker.py — the launch-broker contract. A LaunchRequest is
    structured (static ids/flags only — bottle id, pool slot, a
    content-addressed image_ref; never a path/argv) and signed as a compact
    HS256 JWT so the broker verifies PROVENANCE before acting: a compromised
    co-located component can't forge a launch without the shared secret.
    verify_request is fail-closed (bad sig / malformed / off-schema -> raise).
    Stdlib only (no runtime deps). Ships a StubBroker that records verified
    requests for the harness/tests.
  * orchestrator/service.py — the Orchestrator: owns the registry and brokers
    the lifecycle. launch_bottle mints the bottle + sends a signed launch,
    rolling the registry entry back if the launch fails (no orphans);
    teardown_bottle brokers teardown then deregisters; attribute delegates.
  * control_plane.py — POST /bottles now launches, DELETE tears down (both go
    through the Orchestrator + broker). dispatch/server take an Orchestrator.
  * __main__.py wires an ephemeral secret + StubBroker for the harness.

Tests: broker sign/verify round-trip, tamper/wrong-secret/malformed/off-schema
rejection, StubBroker fail-closed; Orchestrator launch->registry->attribute,
teardown, rollback-on-broker-failure; control-plane updated for launch/teardown.
Full suite green (only the pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); harness does
launch -> attribute -> teardown over HTTP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 8d4e7f2582 refactor: drop the vestigial bot_bottle_root/host_db_path re-exports (#352)
paths is the single home now, so stop re-exporting the path helpers from
supervise: remove host_db_path from supervise's imports + __all__ (it was
re-export-only) and drop bot_bottle_root from __all__ (kept as an import,
still used by audit_dir). supervise_types was already clean. Repoint the
last readers (test_supervise imports host_db_path from paths;
test_supervise_edge calls paths.bot_bottle_root) and refresh the doc
mentions. No supervise.bot_bottle_root / supervise.host_db_path references
remain.

Behavior-preserving: full unit suite unchanged (only the pre-existing
/bin/sleep sidecar-init errors).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis a0e17d56de refactor: move bot_bottle_root/host_db_path to paths; kill the monkeypatch (#352)
Create bot_bottle/paths.py as the canonical home for the app-root path
helpers (bot_bottle_root, host_db_path, HOST_DB_FILENAME) — foundational,
not supervise- or db-specific. `bot_bottle_root()` now honours a
BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT env override.

Repoint every consumer (supervise, supervise_types, db_store, queue_store,
audit_store, store_manager, bottle_state, cli/supervise, docker/cleanup,
orchestrator/registry) at paths; remove the definitions (and supervise's
duplicate host_db_path) and the now-dead `import sys`. Add paths.py to the
sidecar bundle (Dockerfile.sidecars) for the flat-import copies.

Tests: replace ~12 files' monkeypatching of supervise.bot_bottle_root (and
the flat/pkg/supervise_types triple-patch dance) with a single
`use_bottle_root()` helper that sets BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT — every module and
flat/package copy reads the same env var, so one override covers them all.
Net -97 lines. Behaviour-preserving: full unit suite unchanged (only the
pre-existing /bin/sleep sidecar-init errors remain).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 934c1617b9 refactor: move host_db_path/HOST_DB_FILENAME to db_store (#352)
host_db_path is shared DB infrastructure, not supervise-specific, so its
canonical home is db_store (alongside DbStore). It resolves bot_bottle_root
from supervise_types lazily inside the function — no load-time cycle, and a
monkey-patch of supervise_types.bot_bottle_root still propagates.
supervise_types re-exports both names for the historical import path
(queue_store/audit_store unchanged); the orchestrator registry now imports
from db_store. Drops the now-unused `import sys` from supervise_types.

Behavior-preserving: full unit suite unchanged (only the pre-existing
/bin/sleep sidecar-init errors remain); monkeypatch propagation verified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis bd964c0278 feat(orchestrator): registry co-tenants the shared bot-bottle.db (#352)
Per review: use one shared bot-bottle.db for all runtime state including
the registry (DbStore namespaces by schema_key), so it's one queryable
file for backup/console. default_db_path() -> host_db_path(). Drop the
unilateral WAL flip — WAL on the shared DB affects supervise/audit and is
finicky over guest shares, so it's a deliberate future change; keep a
busy_timeout for lock contention.

PRD State section updated: integrity now by SOLE ownership (only the
orchestrator opens bot-bottle.db; data plane + console reach state via the
control-plane RPC, never a file handle) rather than ro/rw mount-splitting,
which one shared file can't do. Notes the transitional caveat that the
supervise sidecar currently rw-mounts bot-bottle.db.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 93756f2a8b docs(prd): 0070 registry DB is host-resident with rw/ro access split (#352)
Per review: the SQLite runtime-state DB lives on the host, not owned
inside the orchestrator unit. Durability (re-adoption must survive an
orchestrator restart) + integrity via access-scoping (control-plane rw,
data-plane ro) rather than location. Note the WAL-over-guest-share wrinkle
for the VM slices (may want a host-side DB owner reached over the RPC).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis d9843fa41e feat(orchestrator): slice 1 — registry + attribution + HTTP control plane (#352)
First implementation slice of PRD 0070, the backend-neutral consolidation
core as a plain-process dev-harness (no VM packaging yet):

  * orchestrator/registry.py — SQLite (WAL) runtime-state store on the
    existing DbStore/TableMigrations base. Live bottle registry keyed by
    source IP + per-bottle identity token, with fail-closed attribution:
    a request resolves to a bottle only when its source IP AND identity
    token both match exactly one active record (unknown/ambiguous IP,
    empty token, or token mismatch all deny). Tokens are 256-bit urandom.
  * orchestrator/control_plane.py — the HTTP control plane (the universal
    transport chosen in 0070): register / deregister / list / attribute /
    health. Routing is a pure dispatch() so it is socket-free testable;
    Handler/ControlPlaneServer/make_server are a thin stdlib adapter.
    register/deregister are the live-reload path; listing redacts tokens.
  * orchestrator/__main__.py — `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator` harness.

Launch/teardown, the launch broker, and the egress/git/supervise data
plane come in later slices. 24 unit tests (attribution matrix, persistence,
dispatch, one real-socket round-trip).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis ae6c8b13d9 docs(prd): 0070 VM-to-VM routing is not a blocker (#352)
Per review: resolvable at implementation time (host tweak acceptable, as
the pool setup already needs on NixOS); the earlier sidecars-in-VMs spike
showed feasibility. No need to hunt the spike now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 13a8d66c9b docs(prd): 0070 fold in review decisions (#352)
Resolve open questions from review: consolidate egress (hardened minimal
surface + identity token + vault mitigations); HTTP control-plane
transport; broker schema = signed-JWT JSON of static flags+ids (provenance
+ un-coercible); state re-adoption procedure (singleton orchestrator →
wait-healthy → adopt via SQLite + process inspection before serving, with
write-ahead intent to close the in-flight-launch race). Add a per-bottle
identity-token defense-in-depth layer on the attribution invariant.
Remaining open: VM-to-VM routing (per-backend wire(), pending spike link),
live-reload protocol, identity-token delivery.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis c46d392b44 docs(prd): 0070 secret-handling as a future pattern (SecretProvider, #355)
Add a "Secret handling — FUTURE pattern (not v1)" subsection: vault as a
separate trust domain holding long-lived roots, deriving short-lived
scoped creds where the upstream allows (with the honest limit that a
compromised proxy can still abuse currently-authorized access). The
mechanism is a generic, user-extensible SecretProvider that generalizes
PRD 0048's DeployKeyProvisioner and drops into the manifest wherever a raw
token is accepted — discovered from ~/.bot-bottle/contrib like user
AgentProviders. Marked explicitly as not required for the initial
orchestrator; tracked as #355.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 2a473eb404 docs(prd): 0070 per-host orchestrator service
Fold the per-bottle sidecar bundle into a single persistent per-host
orchestrator: runs the sidecar functions (egress/git-gate/supervise),
coordinates with the console, and brokers agent launches. Virtualized
from the start with backend-native isolation (fc VM / apple ctr / docker
ctr), fronted by a single backend-agnostic contract; per-backend
variation lives on BottleBackend, not a parallel Orchestrator hierarchy.

Leads with the security review (secret concentration, shared fate, the
launch-broker-as-new-privileged-core, and the source-IP attribution
invariant each backend must enforce). Proposes one SQLite DB owned by the
orchestrator for runtime state (slot leases, approvals, registry) —
distinct from build-time constants (flat .env) and user config
(declarative ~/.bot-bottle). Sequences docker -> firecracker -> macos,
developing the service as a plain-process dev-harness before the VM.

Supersedes 0069's Stage-1/4 sidecar framing; depends on 0069's nix-built
fixed images. Tracking issue #351.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis 4d89ffce8b docs(research): add local/internal-reach edge to the OneCLI comparison
Self-hosting means the agent runs inside your own network boundary (homelab,
corporate LAN, Tailnet), so scoping it to internal resources is just an
egress-route line — a reach advantage distinct from the isolation ones, which a
cloud-first credential broker / agent product can't match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhiafsABCr46bu3oHUm7wa
2026-07-14 01:48:48 -04:00
didericis 822cff48ad docs(research): mark credential-proxy note as implemented (agents get placeholders)
The note still described the pre-gateway state as "today" — raw provider
tokens env-injected into the agent, readable via printenv — which is no longer
true and was actively misleading. Add a dated Status banner and flag the stale
"today's wiring" / "recommended path forward" passages: the agent now holds only
a placeholder (e.g. CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder) and the real
token is injected as the upstream Authorization header by the existing
pipelock/mitmproxy egress sidecar (EgressRoute auth_scheme + token_ref, one MITM
not two), generalized across Claude/Codex/Pi and git-host tokens. Reasoning
preserved per the research-note convention.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhiafsABCr46bu3oHUm7wa
2026-07-14 01:42:05 -04:00
didericis ce440fabc4 docs(research): refresh OneCLI competitor entry + product verdict
OneCLI (onecli.sh) was already tracked in the credential-proxy landscape but
the entry was stale (May 2026). Correct it: it uses the phantom-token pattern
this note recommends (not "Bitwarden integration"), and it's now GA, Rust,
YC-backed (~2.5k stars, 300k+ downloads). Add build-vs-adopt + competitor
commentary, and a product-side entry in the containerized-claude landscape with
a verdict on how close a competitor it is and where bot-bottle's edge lies
(isolation as the product, fleet/manifest layer, self-hosted trust posture).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LhiafsABCr46bu3oHUm7wa
2026-07-14 01:23:32 -04:00
136 changed files with 7052 additions and 3336 deletions
+3 -3
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ broad permissions inside a sandbox, so a misbehaving agent cannot reach the
host. A Python CLI (entry point `cli.py`, package `bot_bottle/`) orchestrates
the runtime lifecycle and the copying of skills and env vars into it.
The default backend on compatible macOS hosts is macos-container:
agents and sidecar bundles run through Apple's `container` CLI without
agents and gateways run through Apple's `container` CLI without
requiring Docker. On KVM-capable Linux hosts the default is firecracker:
agents run in a Firecracker microVM reached over SSH on a point-to-point
TAP, while the sidecar bundle still uses Docker. The legacy Docker
TAP, while the gateway still uses Docker. The legacy Docker
backend remains available with `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker` or
`--backend=docker`.
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ backend remains available with `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker` or
in a PRD, research note, or decision record.
- Low dependencies by default. The project is Python, stdlib-first (no
runtime pip dependencies in the package itself; the only language
runtime is the Python 3.13 used by the CLI + sidecars). Ask before
runtime is the Python 3.13 used by the CLI + companion containers). Ask before
adding new tools, runtimes, or package managers.
- Commit messages follow [Conventional Commits](https://www.conventionalcommits.org/en/v1.0.0/):
`<type>[(scope)][!]: <description>`, where `<type>` is one of `feat`, `fix`,
+42 -24
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,15 @@
# Per-bottle sidecar bundle image (PRD 0024).
# Gateway data-plane image (PRD 0024 bundle shape; PRD 0070 gateway).
#
# Collapses the prior per-sidecar images (egress, git-gate,
# The egress / git-gate / supervise *data plane* — one image, run by
# the consolidated per-host gateway (PRD 0070). It is NOT the
# orchestrator control plane: that is the separate, lean
# `bot-bottle-orchestrator` image (Dockerfile.orchestrator, #384), which
# ships only python + the stdlib-only `bot_bottle` package and none of
# this image's mitmproxy / git / gitleaks payload.
#
# Collapses the prior per-daemon images (egress, git-gate,
# supervise) into one. A small stdlib-Python init supervisor at
# /app/sidecar_init.py spawns all daemons, forwards SIGTERM, and
# /app/gateway_init.py spawns all daemons, forwards SIGTERM, and
# propagates per-daemon stdout/stderr to the container log with a
# `[name]` prefix. See PRD 0024 for the rationale.
#
@@ -12,7 +19,7 @@
# /app/egress_addon.py + siblings mitmproxy addon (egress)
# /app/egress-entrypoint.sh mitmdump launcher
# /app/supervise_server.py + .py supervise MCP server
# /app/sidecar_init.py PID 1 supervisor
# /app/gateway_init.py PID 1 supervisor
# /etc/egress/routes.yaml bind-mounted at run time
# /etc/git-gate/pre-receive docker-cp'd at start time
# /git-gate-entrypoint.sh docker-cp'd at start time
@@ -27,35 +34,45 @@
# 9420 git-gate smart HTTP (VM-backend agent-facing transport)
# 9100 supervise (MCP HTTP)
# Stage 1: gitleaks binary. The upstream gitleaks image is alpine
# with the binary at /usr/bin/gitleaks. Pinned by digest in lockstep
# with Dockerfile.git-gate's prior base (now deleted at chunk 3).
FROM zricethezav/gitleaks@sha256:c00b6bd0aeb3071cbcb79009cb16a60dd9e0a7c60e2be9ab65d25e6bc8abbb7f AS gitleaks-src
# Stage 2: assembly. mitmproxy/mitmproxy is debian-slim-based with
# Python + mitmdump pre-installed — heavier than the others, so
# this stage starts there and pulls the standalone binaries in.
FROM mitmproxy/mitmproxy:11.1.3
# Run as root inside the bundle. The bundle is the isolation
# boundary; per-daemon user separation inside it is not load-bearing
# and complicates the supervisor's spawn path.
USER root
# Based on `python:3.12-slim` (Debian trixie) rather than the
# `mitmproxy/mitmproxy` image (Debian bookworm) so the whole stack —
# gateway here, and the firecracker infra image that builds FROM this —
# lands on trixie, whose buildah (1.39) can build agent Dockerfiles that
# use heredocs. mitmproxy is pip-installed to the same effect as the
# upstream image. (bookworm's buildah is 1.28, which can't parse
# `RUN ... <<EOF`; see the infra image + PR discussion.)
FROM python:3.12-slim
# Runtime system deps:
# git supplies the `git daemon` subcommand (no separate package)
# plus the core `git` binary the pre-receive hook invokes.
# openssh-client supplies the upstream SSH transport the
# pre-receive hook uses to forward accepted refs.
# ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS (the
# base image already has it; listed for explicitness).
# ca-certificates is needed for mitmdump upstream TLS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git openssh-client ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Pull the standalone binaries into the final image.
COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
# mitmdump (the egress data plane). The upstream mitmproxy image baked
# this in; on the plain python base we pip-install the same pinned
# version. Its CA dir is set explicitly via `--set confdir=` in
# egress-entrypoint.sh, so it doesn't depend on a `mitmproxy` home user.
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir mitmproxy==11.1.3
# gitleaks (the pre-receive hook's secret scanner). Installed from its
# official release, pinned by version + SHA256 and verified — rather than
# using a third-party image as a build stage (supply-chain surface, and it
# would pin us to that image's cadence). python (already present) does the
# download so we add no curl/wget. trixie apt also ships gitleaks, but an
# older 8.16; the pinned download keeps the verified 8.30.1.
ARG GITLEAKS_VERSION=8.30.1
ARG GITLEAKS_SHA256=551f6fc83ea457d62a0d98237cbad105af8d557003051f41f3e7ca7b3f2470eb
RUN url="https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v${GITLEAKS_VERSION}/gitleaks_${GITLEAKS_VERSION}_linux_x64.tar.gz" \
&& python3 -c "import sys,urllib.request; urllib.request.urlretrieve(sys.argv[1], '/tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz')" "$url" \
&& echo "${GITLEAKS_SHA256} /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c - \
&& tar -xzf /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz -C /usr/bin gitleaks \
&& rm /tmp/gitleaks.tar.gz
# Project Python: addon + server modules + the init supervisor.
# Kept flat under /app/ so mitmdump's loader resolves them as
@@ -64,6 +81,7 @@ COPY --from=gitleaks-src /usr/bin/gitleaks /usr/bin/gitleaks
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py /app/egress_addon_core.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_dlp_config.py /app/egress_dlp_config.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_addon.py /app/egress_addon.py
COPY bot_bottle/policy_resolver.py /app/policy_resolver.py
COPY bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py /app/dlp_detectors.py
COPY bot_bottle/yaml_subset.py /app/yaml_subset.py
COPY bot_bottle/paths.py /app/paths.py
@@ -75,7 +93,7 @@ COPY bot_bottle/audit_store.py /app/audit_store.py
COPY bot_bottle/store_manager.py /app/store_manager.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise.py /app/supervise.py
COPY bot_bottle/supervise_server.py /app/supervise_server.py
COPY bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py /app/sidecar_init.py
COPY bot_bottle/gateway_init.py /app/gateway_init.py
COPY bot_bottle/git_http_backend.py /app/git_http_backend.py
COPY bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
RUN chmod +x /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
@@ -101,4 +119,4 @@ WORKDIR /app
# PID 1 is the supervisor. It owns signal handling and exit-code
# propagation; no `exec` chain in the entrypoint itself.
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/sidecar_init.py"]
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/gateway_init.py"]
+45
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@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
# Firecracker single infra-VM image (PRD 0070 Stage B).
#
# The per-host infra VM runs the orchestrator control plane, the gateway
# data plane, AND builds agent images (buildah) — all in one microVM (see
# backend/firecracker/infra_vm.py). It composes:
# * FROM the gateway image (mitmproxy / git / gitleaks / supervise + the
# flat daemon modules) — now trixie-based, so buildah 1.39 is available;
# * `COPY --from` the orchestrator image's content (the single definition
# of the control-plane payload — see Dockerfile.orchestrator), so this
# VM and the docker backend share one orchestrator definition; and
# * buildah, installed HERE only (the docker orchestrator/gateway images
# never carry it).
#
# multi-`FROM` can't union two bases (that's multi-stage, not multiple
# inheritance), so the orchestrator content is pulled in via `COPY --from`
# rather than a second base. Both images share the trixie `python:3.12-slim`
# base, so the copy is clean (same python; future installed deps copy too).
#
# The docker backend keeps orchestrator + gateway as separate images; this
# combined image exists only for the Firecracker single-VM cut. Splitting a
# service back into its own VM later is a routing change, not a repackaging
# (PRD 0070's "secret concentration"; a disposable builder can boot from
# this same image on its own TAP).
FROM bot-bottle-gateway:latest
# --- in-VM agent-image builder (PRD 0069 Stage 3) -------------------
# The Firecracker backend builds users' agent Dockerfiles *inside this VM*
# with buildah (rootless, daemonless) instead of on the host — no host
# Docker daemon, no root-equivalent `docker` group. `crun` is the OCI
# runtime; `netavark` + `aardvark-dns` are the network backend for `FROM`
# pulls + `RUN` egress. Requires the trixie base (buildah 1.39: bookworm's
# 1.28 can't parse Dockerfile heredocs that agent images use).
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
buildah crun netavark aardvark-dns \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# vfs + chroot: buildah works as root in the bare microVM (no
# fuse-overlayfs / overlay module / subuid maps). Matches image_builder.
ENV STORAGE_DRIVER=vfs \
BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot
# The orchestrator content, pulled from its single definition. The gateway
# image already has the flat daemon modules under /app; this adds the full
# `bot_bottle` package so `python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator` resolves.
COPY --from=bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest /app/bot_bottle /app/bot_bottle
+36
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
# Orchestrator control-plane image (PRD 0070, #384).
#
# This is the **single definition of the orchestrator's content** — the
# `bot_bottle` package baked onto a Python runtime — referenced by BOTH:
# * the docker backend, which runs this image directly as the lean
# control-plane container; and
# * the firecracker infra image (Dockerfile.infra), which `COPY --from`s
# this image's `/app/bot_bottle` so the single infra VM runs the same
# control plane. Keeping it in one place means future orchestrator deps
# (e.g. iroh) are added here once, not duplicated per backend.
#
# It stays deliberately lean: the control plane is **stdlib-only** today, so
# no third-party payload — none of the gateway's mitmproxy/git/gitleaks
# (that's Dockerfile.gateway) and no buildah (that's the firecracker
# builder, and lives only in Dockerfile.infra). Keeping the secret-dense
# control plane on a minimal dependency surface is the point (PRD 0070's
# "secret concentration").
#
# Shares the trixie `python:3.12-slim` base with the gateway image, so when
# the orchestrator grows real deps they can be `COPY --from`'d into the
# infra image cleanly (same base/python — installed packages copy safely).
FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
# The orchestrator content. Baked so the image is self-contained (runs from
# a built image, no runtime bind-mount); the docker backend may still
# bind-mount /app for dev live-reload, which simply overlays this copy.
# `.dockerignore` keeps .git/docs/*.md out of the context. (Future deps like
# iroh go here too — a shared requirements installed on this same base.)
COPY bot_bottle /app/bot_bottle
# Documentation only; lifecycle.py overrides the entrypoint to
# `python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator` with the runtime flags.
ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "-m", "bot_bottle.orchestrator"]
+10 -10
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# bot-bottle
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-82%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-84%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
[![core coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/core%20coverage-95%25-brightgreen)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- **Per-bottle egress allowlist** — TLS-bumped HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint with a per-manifest host allowlist; per-route path/method/header `matches` filtering; outbound DLP scanning for known tokens and secrets, inbound DLP scanning for prompt-injection attempts; DoH and arbitrary hosts blocked by default.
- **Per-route token-match policy** — each egress route picks what happens when the outbound DLP catches a token via `dlp.outbound_on_match`: `supervise` (default) holds the request and surfaces it in `./cli.py supervise` for approval (an approved value is remembered for the life of the proxy); `redact` scrubs the value and forwards; `block` is a hard `403`. Cuts false-positive friction without weakening default-deny.
- **Tokens the agent never sees** — host secrets live in a sidecar; the agent dials `http://sidecar:9099/<path>` and the proxy strips inbound `Authorization` and injects the real token before forwarding. `printenv` in the agent shows proxy URLs only.
- **Tokens the agent never sees** — host secrets live in a gateway; the agent dials `http://gateway:9099/<path>` and the proxy strips inbound `Authorization` and injects the real token before forwarding. `printenv` in the agent shows proxy URLs only.
- **Gitleaks-scanned push (git-gate)** — `bottle.git` remotes route through a per-bottle `git daemon` that gitleaks-scans incoming refs pre-receive and forwards clean refs upstream over SSH. The agent never holds the upstream credential.
- **Manifest-scoped skills + secrets** — each bottle declares its skills, env, git identity, remotes, and egress routes; unknown keys die at load.
- **Trust boundary at `$HOME`** — bottles (credentials, egress, remotes) live only under `~/.bot-bottle/bottles/`. Repos may ship agents but not bottles, so a cloned repo can't redirect an env var to an attacker host.
@@ -24,17 +24,17 @@
- **Parallel, isolated bottles** — each bottle runs in its own backend-owned isolation boundary; bottles don't share state or talk to each other.
- **Provider templates (Claude, Codex)** — `Dockerfile.claude` / `Dockerfile.codex`, or a bottle-supplied Dockerfile. Claude auth via long-lived OAuth token; Codex via opt-in host device-auth forwarding.
- **gVisor auto-detect** — on Linux hosts where `runsc` is registered with Docker, every bottle launches under it for a userspace syscall barrier; no manifest config required.
- **Apple Container backend (macOS default when available)** — runs the agent and sidecar bundle with Apple's `container` CLI, using a host-only agent network plus a separate sidecar egress network.
- **Firecracker backend (Linux default when available)** — runs the agent in a KVM Firecracker microVM reached over SSH on a point-to-point TAP, with the sidecar bundle in Docker. A dedicated, fail-closed `nftables` table isolates the guest, closing the raw DNS/IP exfiltration gap that exists in the legacy Docker backend. Requires KVM (`/dev/kvm`) and a one-time privileged network-pool setup.
- **Apple Container backend (macOS default when available)** — runs the agent and gateway with Apple's `container` CLI, using a host-only agent network plus a separate gateway egress network.
- **Firecracker backend (Linux default when available)** — runs the agent in a KVM Firecracker microVM reached over SSH on a point-to-point TAP, with the gateway in Docker. A dedicated, fail-closed `nftables` table isolates the guest, closing the raw DNS/IP exfiltration gap that exists in the legacy Docker backend. Requires KVM (`/dev/kvm`) and a one-time privileged network-pool setup.
- **Legacy Docker backend** — still available for examples, CI, and hosts without Apple Container or KVM via `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker` or `--backend=docker`.
## Architecture
On the default macOS Apple Container backend, a bottle is an agent container on a host-only internal network plus a sidecar bundle attached to both that internal network and a NAT egress network. The agent gets HTTP(S)_PROXY and CA bundle env vars pointing at the sidecar's internal-network IP, so HTTP/HTTPS traffic flows through the sidecar instead of direct egress. `bottle.git` / git-gate is intentionally deferred on this backend until a safe Apple Container key-delivery path exists.
On the default macOS Apple Container backend, a bottle is an agent container on a host-only internal network plus a gateway attached to both that internal network and a NAT egress network. The agent gets HTTP(S)_PROXY and CA bundle env vars pointing at the gateway's internal-network IP, so HTTP/HTTPS traffic flows through the gateway instead of direct egress. `bottle.git` / git-gate is intentionally deferred on this backend until a safe Apple Container key-delivery path exists.
On the Firecracker backend, a bottle is an agent microVM plus a Docker sidecar bundle for egress, git-gate, and supervise. The VM reaches the sidecars over a per-bottle point-to-point TAP link; a dedicated fail-closed `nftables` table (`inet bot_bottle_fc`) confines the guest to that link, so nothing leaves the box except through the sidecars. The TAP pool and nft table are provisioned once (root); per-launch needs no privilege.
On the Firecracker backend, a bottle is an agent microVM plus a Docker gateway for egress, git-gate, and supervise. The VM reaches the gateway over a per-bottle point-to-point TAP link; a dedicated fail-closed `nftables` table (`inet bot_bottle_fc`) confines the guest to that link, so nothing leaves the box except through the gateway. The TAP pool and nft table are provisioned once (root); per-launch needs no privilege.
On the legacy Docker backend, the same logical bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container and a `sidecars` container. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
On the legacy Docker backend, the same logical bottle is two containers per agent: an `agent` container and a `companion containers` container. They share a per-agent Docker `--internal` network; the agent has no default route off-box.
The Docker topology looks like this:
@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@ The Docker topology looks like this:
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every sidecar and both networks; nothing about a bottle persists between runs.
When the agent exits, `cli.py` tears down every gateway and both networks; nothing about a bottle persists between runs.
## Quickstart
On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI and does not require Docker. The Firecracker backend (Linux) requires Docker on the host for the sidecar bundle plus the `firecracker` binary and KVM. The legacy Docker backend requires Docker. Claude bottles also need a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
On compatible macOS hosts, the default backend requires Apple's `container` CLI and does not require Docker. The Firecracker backend (Linux) requires Docker on the host for the gateway plus the `firecracker` binary and KVM. The legacy Docker backend requires Docker. Claude bottles also need a long-lived Claude Code OAuth token (`claude setup-token`) exported as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.
Use `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=docker ./cli.py start <agent>` on hosts where neither Apple Container nor KVM is available and Docker is the desired backend.
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ On Linux, a KVM-capable host defaults to the Firecracker backend. It needs:
- **`/dev/kvm`** present and accessible. Load `kvm-intel` or `kvm-amd` (and enable virtualization in BIOS/firmware). The invoking user must be in the `kvm` group: `sudo usermod -aG kvm "$USER"` then re-login. bot-bottle preflights this and reports exactly what's missing.
- **`firecracker`** on `PATH`: grab a release from <https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/releases>. Start flows print this pointer when the binary is missing.
- **Docker** for the sidecar bundle and image build.
- **Docker** for the gateway and image build.
- **A one-time privileged network setup** — the per-bottle TAP pool plus the fail-closed `nftables` isolation table. Run `./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker` for the host-appropriate config (a NixOS module, a `sudo` script elsewhere); `./cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker` reports what's present, including whether the pool range collides with an existing route. The pool defaults to `10.243.0.0/16` (an obscure RFC-1918 block that dodges docker/libvirt/LAN and, deliberately, Tailscale's `100.64.0.0/10` CGNAT range); override with `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE` if it clashes on your host.
```sh
+10 -2
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@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
prompt_mode: PromptMode
bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
# argv run inside a throwaway container of a freshly built agent
# image, right after `build_image()`, to catch a build that
# exited 0 but produced a broken CLI (e.g. an npm
# optionalDependencies fetch for a platform-native binary that
# silently no-ops on a transient failure). Empty tuple skips the
# check — not every provider has opted in yet.
smoke_test: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -204,9 +211,9 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
bottle: "Bottle",
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Register the per-bottle supervise sidecar as an MCP server
"""Register the per-bottle supervise daemon as an MCP server
in the provider's in-guest config. Called by the backend after
the supervise sidecar is reachable. No-op when
the supervise daemon is reachable. No-op when
`plan.supervise_plan is None`."""
@abstractmethod
@@ -259,6 +266,7 @@ class AgentProvider(ABC):
gate_scheme = getattr(plan, "git_gate_insteadof_scheme", "git")
content = git_gate_render_gitconfig(
manifest_bottle.git, gate_host, scheme=gate_scheme,
identity_token=getattr(plan, "identity_token", ""),
)
guest_gitconfig = f"{plan.guest_home}/.gitconfig"
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
+5 -5
View File
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ class ActiveAgent:
bottle is the container, the agent is what runs in it.)
Fields are deliberately backend-neutral. `services` is the set
of sidecar daemons currently up for this bottle (`egress`,
of gateway daemons currently up for this bottle (`egress`,
`git-gate`, `supervise`); the dashboard uses it to
gate edit verbs. `backend_name` is the matching key in
`_BACKENDS` (`docker` / `firecracker` / `macos-container`) — used by the active-
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ class Bottle(ABC):
`user` (default `node`, matching the agent image's USER
directive) and return the captured stdout/stderr/returncode.
The bottle's environment (including HTTPS_PROXY pointing at
the egress sidecar) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
the egress daemon) is inherited by the child. Non-zero
exit does not raise — callers inspect `returncode`
themselves.
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
declarative provision-plan apply, supervise MCP registration)
live on the `AgentProvider` plugin. The backend only owns the
steps that are about backend infrastructure (CA, workspace,
git) and surfaces the supervise sidecar URL its launch step
git) and surfaces the supervise daemon URL its launch step
knows about via `supervise_mcp_url`.
PRD 0017: cred-proxy's agent-side dotfile rewrites (~/.npmrc,
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: PlanT) -> str:
"""Return the agent-side URL of the per-bottle supervise
sidecar, or "" when this bottle has no sidecar. The provider
gateway, or "" when this bottle has no gateway. The provider
plugin's `provision_supervise_mcp` uses it to register the
MCP entry inside the guest.
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ class BottleBackend(ABC, Generic[PlanT, CleanupT]):
def enumerate_active(self) -> Sequence[ActiveAgent]:
"""Return every currently-running agent on this backend.
Empty when none. Backend-specific: docker queries `docker
compose ls`; firecracker cross-references its running sidecar
compose ls`; firecracker cross-references its running gateway
containers against per-bottle metadata."""
@classmethod
+6 -1
View File
@@ -106,11 +106,16 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend["DockerBottlePlan", "DockerBottleCleanup
yield bottle
def supervise_mcp_url(self, plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Docker bottles reach the supervise sidecar via the
"""Docker bottles reach the supervise daemon via the
compose-network alias `supervise:9100`. No per-bottle URL
plumbing needed; the alias resolves inside the bridge."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return ""
# Consolidated: the supervise daemon lives on the shared gateway, so
# the agent registers the gateway address (NO_PROXY bypasses egress),
# not the per-bottle `supervise` alias.
if plan.agent_supervise_url:
return plan.agent_supervise_url
return f"http://{SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
def prepare_cleanup(self) -> DockerBottleCleanupPlan:
+23
View File
@@ -28,11 +28,34 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
# accidental log of the plan dataclass.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
use_runsc: bool
# Consolidated mode (PRD 0070): the agent reaches git-gate over HTTP at the
# shared gateway's address (`http://<gateway_ip>:9420`), set at launch.
# Empty → single-tenant defaults (the `git-gate` alias over git://).
agent_git_gate_url: str = ""
# Likewise the supervise MCP endpoint at the gateway (`http://<gw>:9100/`);
# empty → the single-tenant `supervise` alias.
agent_supervise_url: str = ""
# Per-bottle identity token the agent presents on every attributed request
# (egress proxy credentials, git-gate/supervise headers); set by launch
# from the orchestrator registration. Empty pre-registration.
identity_token: str = ""
@property
def container_name(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.instance_name
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_host(self) -> str:
if self.agent_git_gate_url.startswith("http://"):
return self.agent_git_gate_url.removeprefix("http://").rstrip("/")
return super().git_gate_insteadof_host
@property
def git_gate_insteadof_scheme(self) -> str:
if self.agent_git_gate_url.startswith("http://"):
return "http"
return super().git_gate_insteadof_scheme
@property
def image(self) -> str:
return self.agent_provision.image
+6 -243
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
"""Compose-spec rendering for a Docker bottle (PRD 0018, chunk 1).
"""Docker compose lifecycle helpers (PRD 0018).
`bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)` returns a Compose v2 spec dict
describing the per-bottle container topology — one project per
bottle instance, services for the agent + every applicable sidecar,
two networks, no named volumes.
Pure function. No I/O, no subprocess. Expects every launch-time
field (network names, CA host paths, etc.) on the plan's inner
plans to be populated; chunks 2+3 own that ordering.
Conditional services follow the plan content:
- agent + sidecars bundle: always.
- git-gate: iff plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams.
- egress: iff plan.egress_plan.routes.
- supervise: iff plan.supervise_plan is not None.
Serialize a compose spec to disk, drive `docker compose up/down`,
dump the merged log on teardown, and enumerate `bot-bottle-*`
projects. The spec itself is built by `consolidated_compose.py`
(the consolidated per-host gateway topology); this module owns the
I/O side that persists and runs it.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -25,233 +15,7 @@ import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
from ...log import die, warn
from ...supervise import (
DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER,
SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME,
SUPERVISE_PORT,
)
from ...util import expand_tilde
from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT,
)
from .git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from . import network as network_mod
from .sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
sidecar_bundle_container_name,
)
# Repo root, used as the build context for the bundle Dockerfile.
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
def bottle_plan_to_compose(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Render a Compose v2 spec dict from a fully-resolved
DockerBottlePlan.
The plan must have its inner plans (`git_gate_plan`,
`egress_plan`, `supervise_plan`) populated with launch-time
fields — network names, CA host paths. The renderer doesn't
validate; callers feed it a fully-resolved plan or get an
incomplete compose spec back.
"""
project = f"bot-bottle-{plan.slug}"
services: dict[str, Any] = {
"sidecars": _sidecar_bundle_service(plan),
"agent": _agent_service(plan),
}
return {
"name": project,
"services": services,
"networks": _networks(plan),
}
def _networks(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Compose-managed networks with explicit `name:` matching the
existing slug-suffixed convention. Compose creates them on `up`
and destroys them on `down`. The internal one is `--internal`
(no default gateway); the egress one is a normal user-defined
bridge."""
return {
"internal": {
"name": network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
"internal": True,
},
"egress": {
"name": network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug),
},
}
def _bind(host: str | Path, target: str, *, read_only: bool = True) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""One bind-mount entry in the long-form `volumes:` shape.
Long form is preferred over `host:target:ro` strings because
it's easier to inspect in tests and survives whitespace in
host paths."""
return {
"type": "bind",
"source": str(host),
"target": target,
"read_only": read_only,
}
def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""The `sidecars` service: one container per bottle, bundle
image, all daemons under a Python init supervisor.
Daemon subset narrows via `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS` env.
egress is always present; git-gate / supervise are conditional.
"""
daemons: list[str] = ["egress"]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
daemons.append("git-gate")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
daemons.append("supervise")
env: list[str] = [f"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS={','.join(daemons)}"]
volumes: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
# --- egress -------------------------------------------------------
ep = plan.egress_plan
volumes.append(_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER))
if ep.routes:
volumes.append(_bind(ep.routes_path.parent, str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent)))
env.extend(egress_sidecar_env_entries(ep))
# --- git-gate -----------------------------------------------------
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if gp.upstreams:
volumes += [
_bind(gp.entrypoint_script, GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(gp.hook_script, GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
_bind(gp.access_hook_script, GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
]
for u in gp.upstreams:
keypath = expand_tilde(u.identity_file)
volumes.append(_bind(
keypath,
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-key",
))
if u.known_hosts_file:
volumes.append(_bind(
u.known_hosts_file,
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{u.name}-known_hosts",
))
# --- supervise ----------------------------------------------------
sp = plan.supervise_plan
if sp is not None:
env += [
f"SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG={plan.slug}",
f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
f"SUPERVISE_PORT={SUPERVISE_PORT}",
]
volumes.append({
"type": "bind",
"source": str(sp.db_path),
"target": DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER,
"read_only": False,
})
internal_aliases = [EGRESS_HOSTNAME]
if gp.upstreams:
internal_aliases.append(GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME)
if sp is not None:
internal_aliases.append(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME)
service: dict[str, Any] = {
"image": SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
"build": {
"context": _REPO_DIR,
"dockerfile": SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
},
"container_name": sidecar_bundle_container_name(plan.slug),
"networks": {
"internal": {"aliases": internal_aliases},
"egress": None,
},
"environment": env,
"volumes": volumes,
}
return service
def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Agent container. Runs `sleep infinity`; claude is `docker
exec -it`'d into it later. HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY point at the
egress sidecar."""
proxy_url = _agent_proxy_url(plan)
no_proxy = _agent_no_proxy(plan)
env: list[str] = [
f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"https_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"http_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"NO_PROXY={no_proxy}",
f"no_proxy={no_proxy}",
f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
for name, value in sorted(plan.agent_provision.guest_env.items()):
env.append(f"{name}={value}")
# Forwarded vars (OAuth token, manifest host-interpolations):
# bare name → inherits from compose-up process env, value
# never lands on argv or in the compose file.
for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
env.append(name)
env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
service: dict[str, Any] = {
"image": plan.image,
"container_name": plan.container_name,
"command": ["sleep", "infinity"],
"networks": {"internal": None},
"environment": env,
}
if plan.use_runsc:
service["runtime"] = "runsc"
# The init supervisor inside the bundle owns intra-bundle
# daemon ordering, so the agent only waits for the bundle
# container itself.
service["depends_on"] = ["sidecars"]
return service
def _agent_proxy_url(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""Agent's HTTP_PROXY — always points at egress."""
return f"http://{EGRESS_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
def _agent_no_proxy(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> str:
"""NO_PROXY for the agent: loopback always; supervise hostname
when the supervise sidecar is up (MCP long-poll must bypass
the egress proxy)."""
hosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1"]
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
hosts.append(SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME)
return ",".join(hosts)
# --- Lifecycle helpers (PRD 0018 chunk 3) ----------------------------------
@@ -442,7 +206,6 @@ __all__ = [
"COMPOSE_FILE_NAME",
"COMPOSE_LOG_NAME",
"COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX",
"bottle_plan_to_compose",
"compose_down",
"compose_dump_logs",
"compose_file_path",
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
"""Agent-only compose for the consolidated docker backend (PRD 0070).
The per-bottle model rendered a compose project with the agent *and* a
gateway on two per-bottle networks. In the consolidated model the
per-bottle companion containers are gone — one shared gateway serves every bottle — so this renders
just the agent, attached to the **external shared gateway network** with the
pinned source IP the orchestrator allocated, and pointed at the gateway's
address for egress (and, around the proxy, for git-http / supervise).
Pure: it takes the launch-time `LaunchContext` values (gateway address,
source IP, network) and the prepared plan, and returns a compose dict — no
docker, so it's testable in isolation.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Any
from ...egress import egress_agent_env_entries
from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from .egress import EGRESS_PORT
def consolidated_agent_compose(
plan: DockerBottlePlan,
*,
gateway_ip: str,
source_ip: str,
network: str,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""A compose spec with only the agent service, on the external gateway
network at `source_ip`, proxying egress through `gateway_ip`."""
# Deliver the identity token as egress proxy credentials — the gateway
# reads Proxy-Authorization, validates the (source_ip, token) pair, and
# strips it before upstream. git-http/supervise get it via their own
# headers (git config extraHeader / MCP header).
token = getattr(plan, "identity_token", "")
cred = f"bottle:{token}@" if token else ""
proxy_url = f"http://{cred}{gateway_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
# git-http + supervise live on the gateway too and must NOT go through the
# egress proxy — the agent reaches them directly by the gateway address.
no_proxy = f"localhost,127.0.0.1,{gateway_ip}"
env: list[str] = [
f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"https_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"http_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"NO_PROXY={no_proxy}",
f"no_proxy={no_proxy}",
f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
for name, value in sorted(plan.agent_provision.guest_env.items()):
env.append(f"{name}={value}")
# Forwarded vars: bare name → inherits from the compose-up process env so
# the secret value never lands on argv or in the compose file.
for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
env.append(name)
env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
service: dict[str, Any] = {
"image": plan.image,
"container_name": plan.container_name,
"command": ["sleep", "infinity"],
# Pinned address on the shared gateway network — the orchestrator
# registered this IP, and the gateway attributes the bottle by it.
"networks": {network: {"ipv4_address": source_ip}},
"environment": env,
}
if plan.use_runsc:
service["runtime"] = "runsc"
return {
"name": f"bot-bottle-{plan.slug}",
"services": {"agent": service},
# The gateway network is created + owned by the orchestrator; compose
# attaches to it (external) and must not create or destroy it.
"networks": {network: {"external": True}},
}
__all__ = ["consolidated_agent_compose"]
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
"""Consolidated bottle launch sequence for the docker backend (PRD 0070).
Composes the orchestrator primitives into the register/teardown sequence that
replaces the per-bottle gateway:
1. ensure the orchestrator control plane + shared gateway are up;
2. allocate the bottle a pinned source IP on the gateway network (the
attribution key), skipping the gateway's own address + live bottles;
3. register it (egress policy blob + slug metadata) → bottle id + identity
token;
4. provision its git-gate repos/creds into the running gateway.
It returns a `LaunchContext` with everything the agent container needs to
attach — network, pinned IP, the gateway's address (its proxy target), the
orchestrator URL, and the identity token. The agent `docker run` itself is
the backend's job (it owns provider provisioning); this owns the
orchestrator-facing wiring so that sequence stays testable in isolation.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from ...docker_cmd import run_docker
from ...egress import EgressPlan
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
from ...orchestrator.gateway import GATEWAY_NAME, GATEWAY_NETWORK
from ...orchestrator.lifecycle import OrchestratorService
from ...orchestrator.registration import registration_inputs
from .gateway_net import next_free_ip
from .gateway_provision import (
DockerGatewayTransport,
deprovision_git_gate,
provision_git_gate,
)
class ConsolidatedLaunchError(RuntimeError):
"""The consolidated register/provision sequence could not complete."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LaunchContext:
"""What the agent container needs to join the shared gateway."""
bottle_id: str
identity_token: str
source_ip: str # the agent's pinned address (attribution key)
network: str # the shared gateway network to attach to
gateway_ip: str # the gateway's address — the agent's proxy target
orchestrator_url: str
def _network_cidr(network: str) -> str:
"""The gateway network's IPv4 subnet, or raise."""
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "network", "inspect",
"--format", "{{range .IPAM.Config}}{{.Subnet}}{{end}}", network,
])
cidr = proc.stdout.strip()
if proc.returncode != 0 or not cidr:
raise ConsolidatedLaunchError(
f"gateway network {network} has no subnet: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
return cidr
def _container_ip(name: str, network: str) -> str:
"""A container's IPv4 address on `network`, or raise."""
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "inspect", "--format",
f'{{{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks "{network}").IPAddress}}}}', name,
])
ip = proc.stdout.strip()
if proc.returncode != 0 or not ip:
raise ConsolidatedLaunchError(
f"gateway {name} has no address on {network}: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
return ip
def _network_container_ips(network: str) -> list[str]:
"""Every address currently assigned on the gateway network — the ground
truth for "in use": the gateway + orchestrator infrastructure containers
and every live agent. Read from the network so a new bottle can't collide
with anything actually attached (a registry-only view would miss the
orchestrator/gateway containers)."""
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "network", "inspect", "--format",
"{{range .Containers}}{{.IPv4Address}} {{end}}", network,
])
ips: list[str] = []
for entry in proc.stdout.split():
# entries look like "172.20.0.2/16" — keep the address.
ips.append(entry.split("/", 1)[0])
return ips
def launch_consolidated(
egress_plan: EgressPlan,
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan,
*,
image_ref: str = "",
tokens: dict[str, str] | None = None,
service: OrchestratorService | None = None,
gateway_name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
network: str = GATEWAY_NETWORK,
) -> LaunchContext:
"""Ensure the orchestrator + gateway are up, allocate + register the
bottle, and provision its git-gate state. Returns the agent's attach
context. Raises `ConsolidatedLaunchError` (or the primitives' own errors)
if any step fails — the caller tears down on failure."""
service = service or OrchestratorService()
url = service.ensure_running()
client = OrchestratorClient(url)
cidr = _network_cidr(network)
gateway_ip = _container_ip(gateway_name, network)
source_ip = next_free_ip(cidr, _network_container_ips(network))
inputs = registration_inputs(egress_plan)
reg = client.register_bottle(
source_ip, image_ref=image_ref, policy=inputs.policy,
metadata=inputs.metadata, tokens=tokens,
)
try:
provision_git_gate(
DockerGatewayTransport(gateway_name), reg.bottle_id, git_gate_plan)
except Exception:
# Roll the registration back so a provisioning failure leaves no orphan.
client.teardown_bottle(reg.bottle_id)
raise
return LaunchContext(
bottle_id=reg.bottle_id,
identity_token=reg.identity_token,
source_ip=source_ip,
network=network,
gateway_ip=gateway_ip,
orchestrator_url=url,
)
def teardown_consolidated(
bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str, gateway_name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
) -> None:
"""Deregister the bottle and remove its git-gate state from the gateway.
Both steps are idempotent so this is safe from a cleanup trap."""
OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
deprovision_git_gate(DockerGatewayTransport(gateway_name), bottle_id)
__all__ = [
"LaunchContext",
"launch_consolidated",
"teardown_consolidated",
"ConsolidatedLaunchError",
]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ prepare-time routes-yaml rendering itself lives on the
platform-neutral `Egress` ABC — backends instantiate it directly.
The per-container `.start()` / `.stop()` lifecycle was removed in
PRD 0024 chunk 3; the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024) runs egress
PRD 0024 chunk 3; the gateway (PRD 0024) runs egress
under its python init supervisor."""
from __future__ import annotations
+13 -44
View File
@@ -1,60 +1,29 @@
"""Host-side helper for egress sidecar inspection and live updates.
"""Host-side egress route-apply for the docker backend.
The approve path uses this module to validate a proposed routes file,
write it to the bottle's live egress state dir, and signal the sidecar
bundle so the mitmproxy addon reloads it.
The per-bottle companion container this used to signal (`docker kill
--signal HUP <container>`) was removed in the companion-container removal (#385).
In the consolidated model the shared gateway resolves egress policy
per-request against the orchestrator rather than reloading a per-bottle
routes file, so the live per-bottle reload is not supported here and
fails closed until the gateway-side apply lands.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER
from ...log import warn
from ..egress_apply import EgressApplicator, EgressApplyError
from .sidecar_bundle import sidecar_bundle_container_name
def fetch_current_routes(slug: str) -> str:
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
r = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "cat", EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if r.returncode != 0:
raise EgressApplyError(
f"could not read routes.yaml from {container}: "
f"{(r.stderr or '').strip() or 'container not running?'}"
)
return r.stdout
class DockerEgressApplicator(EgressApplicator):
def _signal_bundle_reload(self, slug: str) -> None:
container = sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug)
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "kill", "--signal", "HUP", container],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, env=os.environ,
del slug
raise EgressApplyError(
"live egress route-apply was removed with the per-bottle "
"companion container (#385); route changes will flow through "
"the consolidated gateway in a follow-up."
)
if result.returncode != 0:
last_error = (result.stderr or "").strip() or (result.stdout or "").strip()
warn(
f"egress: routes updated on disk for {slug}, but bundle reload failed: "
f"{last_error or 'docker kill failed'}"
)
raise EgressApplyError(
f"could not reload egress bundle {container}: "
f"{last_error or 'docker kill failed'}"
)
applicator = DockerEgressApplicator()
__all__ = [
"DockerEgressApplicator",
"EgressApplyError",
"applicator",
"fetch_current_routes",
]
__all__ = ["DockerEgressApplicator", "EgressApplyError", "applicator"]
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
"""Shared-gateway source-IP allocation for the consolidated docker backend
(PRD 0070).
In the consolidated model one gateway container serves every bottle over a
single shared docker network, and each agent bottle attaches with a pinned,
deterministic address that the gateway uses as its **attribution key**. This
allocates those addresses from the network's subnet, skipping the reserved
ones — the network address and broadcast (excluded by `hosts()`), docker's
router `.1`, and everything already in use (`taken`: the gateway container
plus every live bottle, which the caller reads from the registry).
Pure `ipaddress` logic — the docker-specific bits (the subnet CIDR, the
gateway container's own address) are gathered by the caller and passed in, so
this stays testable without docker.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ipaddress
from collections.abc import Iterable
class NoFreeAddressError(RuntimeError):
"""The shared gateway network's subnet is exhausted — every host address
is reserved or already assigned to a bottle."""
def next_free_ip(cidr: str, taken: Iterable[str]) -> str:
"""The lowest host address in `cidr` not in `taken` and not docker's
router (`.1`). `taken` must include the gateway container's own address
and every live bottle's. Raises `NoFreeAddressError` if the subnet is
full."""
net = ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False)
reserved = {str(a) for a in taken}
# Docker assigns the network's first host (.1) to the bridge router; a
# bottle must never be handed that address.
reserved.add(str(net.network_address + 1))
for host in net.hosts(): # hosts() already excludes network + broadcast
candidate = str(host)
if candidate not in reserved:
return candidate
raise NoFreeAddressError(
f"no free address in {cidr} ({len(reserved)} reserved/assigned)"
)
__all__ = ["next_free_ip", "NoFreeAddressError"]
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
"""Provision one bottle's git-gate state into the running shared gateway
(PRD 0070, docker slice).
The consolidated gateway serves every bottle's repos under `/git/<bottle_id>/`
with per-repo credentials under `/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/`. When a bottle
is registered the launcher must place *its* deploy keys + known_hosts into
that per-bottle creds dir and init its bare repos there — so this copies the
credential files into the live gateway container and runs the (namespaced,
init-only) provisioning script produced by `git_gate_render_provision`.
Isolating each bottle's creds dir + repo root by id is what keeps one
bottle's push credentials out of another's repos on the shared gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
from typing import Protocol
from ...docker_cmd import run_docker
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan, git_gate_render_provision
# bottle ids index the gateway's per-bottle repo + creds dirs; they land in
# exec/cp path arguments, so validate before any path is built (a traversal
# id like "../etc" must never reach the gateway). Registry ids are token_hex —
# this is defense in depth at the transport boundary.
_SAFE_BOTTLE_ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+")
class GatewayProvisionError(RuntimeError):
"""A git-gate provisioning step against the running gateway failed."""
class GatewayTransport(Protocol):
"""How the launcher stages files + runs commands in the running gateway.
Backend-neutral so the same provisioning logic serves the docker gateway
(exec/cp over the docker socket) and the firecracker gateway VM (over
SSH)."""
def exec(self, argv: list[str]) -> None:
"""Run `argv` in the gateway, raising `GatewayProvisionError` on
failure."""
def cp_into(self, src: str, dest: str) -> None:
"""Copy host file `src` to `dest` in the gateway, raising on
failure."""
class DockerGatewayTransport:
"""`GatewayTransport` for the docker gateway container (exec/cp)."""
def __init__(self, gateway: str) -> None:
self.gateway = gateway
def exec(self, argv: list[str]) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "exec", self.gateway, *argv])
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"gateway exec {argv!r} failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def cp_into(self, src: str, dest: str) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "cp", src, f"{self.gateway}:{dest}"])
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"gateway cp {src} -> {dest} failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def _require_safe(bottle_id: str) -> None:
if not _SAFE_BOTTLE_ID.fullmatch(bottle_id):
raise GatewayProvisionError(f"unsafe bottle id {bottle_id!r}")
def _creds_dir(bottle_id: str) -> str:
return f"/git-gate/creds/{bottle_id}"
def provision_git_gate(
transport: GatewayTransport, bottle_id: str, plan: GitGatePlan,
) -> None:
"""Place `bottle_id`'s git-gate credentials into the running gateway and
init its bare repos under `/git/<bottle_id>/`.
Copies each upstream's identity key (and known_hosts, when present) into
`/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/`, then runs the namespaced provisioning
script. No-op for a bottle with no git upstreams."""
_require_safe(bottle_id)
if not plan.upstreams:
return
# The pre-receive + access hooks are bottle-agnostic and shared by every
# bottle's repos; install them into the gateway (idempotent — same content
# each time). The per-bottle model cp'd these into each bundle at start.
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", "/etc/git-gate"])
transport.cp_into(str(plan.hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/pre-receive")
transport.cp_into(str(plan.access_hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/access-hook")
creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
for u in plan.upstreams:
if u.identity_file:
transport.cp_into(u.identity_file, f"{creds}/{u.name}-key")
known_hosts = str(u.known_hosts_file)
if known_hosts and known_hosts != ".":
transport.cp_into(known_hosts, f"{creds}/{u.name}-known_hosts")
# Init the bare repos + per-repo credential config for this namespace.
script = git_gate_render_provision(bottle_id, plan.upstreams)
transport.exec(["sh", "-c", script])
def deprovision_git_gate(transport: GatewayTransport, bottle_id: str) -> None:
"""Remove a bottle's repos + creds from the gateway on teardown. Idempotent
— an already-absent namespace is a clean no-op (best effort; a stray dir
can't leak, since attribution is by source IP and the bottle is gone)."""
_require_safe(bottle_id)
try:
transport.exec([
"rm", "-rf", f"/git/{bottle_id}", _creds_dir(bottle_id),
])
except GatewayProvisionError:
pass # best-effort teardown; absent namespace is success
__all__ = [
"provision_git_gate", "deprovision_git_gate",
"GatewayProvisionError", "GatewayTransport", "DockerGatewayTransport",
]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
bind-mounts target + the listening port. The prepare-time entrypoint
/ hook render lives on the platform-neutral `GitGate` ABC — backends
instantiate it directly. The git-gate daemon's container lifecycle
is owned by the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024)."""
is owned by the gateway (PRD 0024)."""
from __future__ import annotations
+62 -62
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ PRD 0018 chunk 3: each instance is one `docker compose` project.
The flow is:
1. Build the agent image from the provider Dockerfile (compose
builds the sidecar images via the `build:` directive on first up).
builds the gateway image on first up).
2. Mint the per-bottle egress CA (chunk 2 writes it under
state/<slug>/egress/).
3. Populate the inner plans with launch-time fields so the
@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...agent_provider import runtime_for
from ...egress import egress_resolve_token_values
from ...git_gate import (
provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys,
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys,
)
from ...log import info, warn
from . import network as network_mod
from . import util as docker_mod
from .bottle import DockerBottle
from .bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ from ...bottle_state import (
read_committed_image,
)
from .compose import (
bottle_plan_to_compose,
compose_down,
compose_dump_logs,
compose_file_path,
@@ -62,7 +61,9 @@ from .compose import (
compose_up,
write_compose_file,
)
from .egress import egress_tls_init
from .consolidated_compose import consolidated_agent_compose
from .consolidated_launch import launch_consolidated, teardown_consolidated
from ...orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
# Where the repo root lives, for `docker build` context. Computed once.
@@ -97,8 +98,7 @@ def launch(
try:
# Step 1: agent image. Use a committed snapshot when one exists
# and is present in the local daemon; otherwise build from the
# Dockerfile. Sidecar images get built lazily by `docker compose
# up` via the renderer's `build:` directives.
# Dockerfile. (The gateway image is built by the orchestrator.)
committed = read_committed_image(plan.slug)
if committed and docker_mod.image_exists(committed):
info(f"using committed image {committed!r}")
@@ -111,83 +111,87 @@ def launch(
plan.image, _REPO_DIR,
dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path,
)
docker_mod.verify_agent_image(
plan.image, runtime_for(plan.agent_provider_template).smoke_test,
)
internal_network = network_mod.network_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
egress_network = network_mod.network_egress_name_for_slug(plan.slug)
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
# Step 2: mint the git-gate dynamic (gitea) deploy keys, if any, before
# provisioning the bottle's repos into the shared gateway.
git_gate_plan = plan.git_gate_plan
if git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_plan = provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys(
plan.manifest.bottle,
git_gate_plan,
git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
git_gate_plan = dataclasses.replace(
git_gate_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
plan.manifest.bottle, git_gate_plan, git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
# Step 3: register on the orchestrator + provision this bottle's
# git-gate state into the shared gateway; get the agent's attach
# context (pinned source IP, gateway address, shared network). The
# per-bottle egress auth tokens are resolved from the host env now and
# handed to the orchestrator (in memory) for the gateway to inject —
# the agent never sees them.
effective_env = {**os.environ, **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
ctx = launch_consolidated(
plan.egress_plan, git_gate_plan, image_ref=plan.image, tokens=token_values,
)
stack.callback(
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id, orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
)
# Step 4: install the SHARED gateway CA into the agent (replaces the
# per-bottle CA) — read it out of the running gateway.
ca_dir = egress_state_dir(plan.slug) / "gateway-ca"
ca_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
ca_file = ca_dir / "gateway-ca.pem"
ca_file.write_text(DockerGateway(network=ctx.network).ca_cert_pem())
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
egress_network=egress_network,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=ca_file,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=ca_file,
)
# Point the agent's git-gate insteadOf rewrites at the shared gateway's
# HTTP git endpoint (9420) instead of the dead per-bottle `git-gate`
# alias. git-http + supervise on the gateway bypass the egress proxy
# (NO_PROXY includes the gateway address).
git_gate_url = (
f"http://{ctx.gateway_ip}:9420" if git_gate_plan.upstreams else ""
)
supervise_url = (
f"http://{ctx.gateway_ip}:9100/" if plan.supervise_plan is not None else ""
)
supervise_plan = plan.supervise_plan
if supervise_plan is not None:
supervise_plan = dataclasses.replace(
supervise_plan,
internal_network=internal_network,
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
agent_git_gate_url=git_gate_url,
agent_supervise_url=supervise_url,
identity_token=ctx.identity_token,
)
# Step 6: render + write the compose file. metadata.json
# was written at prepare time and already carries
# compose_project; nothing to update here.
# Step 5: render + up the agent-only compose, pinned on the shared
# gateway network and proxied through the gateway's address.
state_dir = bottle_state_dir(plan.slug)
spec = bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)
spec = consolidated_agent_compose(
plan, gateway_ip=ctx.gateway_ip, source_ip=ctx.source_ip, network=ctx.network,
)
compose_file = write_compose_file(spec, compose_file_path(state_dir))
project = compose_project_name(plan.slug)
# Step 7: compose up. Token values + the OAuth placeholder
# flow through subprocess env; the compose file holds only
# bare names for the secret-carrying entries.
effective_env = {**dict(os.environ), **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
compose_env: dict[str, str] = {
**os.environ,
**plan.forwarded_env,
**token_values,
}
# Forwarded vars (OAuth token, host interpolations) flow through the
# subprocess env as bare names so values never land in the file.
compose_env: dict[str, str] = {**os.environ, **plan.forwarded_env}
info(
f"docker compose up -d (project {project}, "
f"{len(spec['services'])} services)"
f"docker compose up -d (project {project}, agent on shared "
f"gateway {ctx.gateway_ip}, ip {ctx.source_ip})"
)
compose_up(project, compose_file, env=compose_env)
# Register teardown in reverse order: log dump first, then
# `compose down`. Networks come down last via callbacks
# registered in step 2.
stack.callback(compose_down, project, compose_file)
stack.callback(
compose_dump_logs, project, compose_file, compose_log_path(state_dir),
)
# Step 8: provision. Create the bottle first so provisioners
# can use bottle.exec / bottle.cp_in; set the prompt path
# returned by provision_prompt after the fact.
# Step 6: provision (CA install now uses the gateway CA) + yield.
bottle = DockerBottle(
plan.container_name,
teardown,
@@ -200,10 +204,6 @@ def launch(
agent_workdir=plan.workspace_plan.workdir,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
# Step 9: yield. exec_agent continues to use `docker exec -it`
# — the agent runs `sleep infinity` per the renderer's
# service spec.
yield bottle
finally:
teardown()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ def network_create_internal(slug: str) -> str:
def network_create_egress(slug: str) -> str:
"""Create a per-agent user-defined bridge (NOT the legacy `bridge`)
so the egress sidecar has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
so the egress daemon has working DNS for upstream hostnames."""
return _network_create_with_prefix(network_egress_name_for_slug(slug), internal=False)
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
"""Host setup + status for the Docker backend.
Unlike Firecracker, the Docker backend needs no privileged one-time
host provisioning (no TAP pool / nft table) — networks and the sidecar
host provisioning (no TAP pool / nft table) — networks and the gateway
bundle are created per-launch. So `setup()` is mostly an install/daemon
pointer, and `status()` reports whether docker is usable.
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ def setup() -> int:
return 1
sys.stderr.write(
"Docker backend: no privileged host setup required — networks and "
"the sidecar bundle are created per-launch.\n"
"the gateway are created per-launch.\n"
)
if not _daemon_reachable():
sys.stderr.write(
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ def setup() -> int:
def teardown() -> int:
sys.stderr.write(
"Docker backend: nothing to undo — it provisions no privileged host "
"state (networks and the sidecar bundle are per-launch and are "
"state (networks and the gateway are per-launch and are "
"removed by `./cli.py cleanup`). Docker itself is left installed.\n"
)
return 0
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
"""Sidecar bundle constants + helpers for the Docker backend
(PRD 0024).
The bundle image (built by Dockerfile.sidecars, PRD 0024 chunk 1)
runs egress + git-gate + supervise as one container per bottle
under a small Python init supervisor. As of chunk 5 the bundle
is the only shape — the legacy four-sidecar topology and its
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE` feature flag are gone."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
# Bundle image. Defaults to a built-locally tag (built from the
# repo's Dockerfile.sidecars via compose `build:`). Operators
# pinning to a published digest can override via env.
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE",
"bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
)
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.sidecars"
def sidecar_bundle_container_name(slug: str) -> str:
"""`bot-bottle-sidecars-<slug>`. Same prefix scheme as the
per-sidecar containers it replaces, so the dashboard's
discovery-by-prefix logic keeps working."""
return f"bot-bottle-sidecars-{slug}"
+51 -1
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ existence, and building images."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
from typing import Iterable, Iterator
from ...docker_cmd import run_docker
from ...log import die, info
# from ...workspace import WorkspacePlan
@@ -88,6 +90,29 @@ def docker_exec_root(container: str, argv: list[str]) -> None:
)
def docker_exec(container: str, argv: list[str], *, user: str = "") -> None:
"""Run `docker exec` in the named container, dying with the
command's own stderr on failure. Pass `user=\"0\"` to run as root."""
cmd = ["docker", "exec"]
if user:
cmd += ["-u", user]
cmd += [container, *argv]
result = run_docker(cmd)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(
f"docker exec in {container} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}"
)
def docker_cp(src: str, dest: str) -> None:
"""Run `docker cp`, dying with the command's own stderr on failure."""
result = run_docker(["docker", "cp", src, dest])
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"docker cp {src} -> {dest} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}")
_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"[^a-z0-9]+")
@@ -108,15 +133,40 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
`dockerfile` is an optional path (relative to `context`, or
absolute) for callers that need to build from a non-default
Dockerfile in the same context — e.g. `Dockerfile.git-gate`."""
Dockerfile in the same context — e.g. `Dockerfile.git-gate`.
Set `BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE=1` (the `start --no-cache` flag) to force
`--no-cache`. The npm/curl installers some provider Dockerfiles
shell out to can silently no-op on a transient network failure —
e.g. an `optionalDependencies` fetch for a platform-native binary —
and Docker will then cache that broken layer indefinitely."""
info(f"building image {ref} from {context} (layer cache keeps repeat builds fast)")
args = ["docker", "build", "-t", ref]
if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE") == "1":
args.append("--no-cache")
if dockerfile:
args.extend(["-f", dockerfile])
args.append(context)
subprocess.run(args, check=True)
def verify_agent_image(image: str, argv: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
"""Run `argv` inside a throwaway container of a freshly built agent
image and die loudly if it fails, instead of shipping an image
whose CLI only breaks at first real use. No-op when the provider
hasn't declared a smoke test (`AgentProviderRuntime.smoke_test`)."""
if not argv:
return
result = run_docker(["docker", "run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", argv[0], image, *argv[1:]])
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
die(
f"agent image {image!r} failed its post-build smoke test "
f"({' '.join(argv)}): {detail}\n"
f"Try rebuilding from scratch: bot-bottle start --no-cache"
)
# def build_image_with_cwd(
# derived: str,
# base: str,
+13 -6
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ session. `ssh -t` forwards the host terminal's SIGWINCH to the remote
PTY natively, so no separate resize bridge is needed.
Commands run as the image's `node` user via `runuser`, with HOME/USER/
PATH and the bottle env (HTTPS_PROXY at the sidecar, CA paths, …) set
PATH and the bottle env (HTTPS_PROXY at the gateway, CA paths, …) set
per-invocation through `env` (the VM itself just runs the init; it has
no baked-in process env like a `docker run` container would).
"""
@@ -105,10 +105,9 @@ class FirecrackerBottle(Bottle):
# root-owned and unreadable by node, which breaks Node's
# process.cwd(), the shell-snapshot machinery, and `/doctor`.
# Use `env --chdir` rather than a `sh -c 'cd … && exec "$@"'`
# wrapper: ssh space-joins everything after the host into one
# string for the guest shell, so a quoted script + $@ would be
# re-split and mangled (exec'ing the $0 placeholder). All-simple
# words survive that join.
# wrapper: it keeps the guest command a flat argv that `agent_argv`
# can quote token-by-token for the ssh→guest-shell round trip,
# avoiding a fragile nested-quoting `"$@"` script.
workdir = self.agent_workdir or _HOME_FOR["node"]
remote = ["runuser", "-u", "node", "--",
"env", f"--chdir={workdir}",
@@ -117,7 +116,15 @@ class FirecrackerBottle(Bottle):
return remote
def agent_argv(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> list[str]:
return [*self._ssh(tty=tty), "--", *self._agent_remote_argv(argv)]
# ssh space-joins everything after the host into one line the guest
# shell re-parses, so pre-quote each remote token for that shell.
# Simple words are unchanged (existing behaviour); an arg containing
# spaces — e.g. codex's `read_prompt_file` positional "Read and follow
# the instructions in <path>." — is quoted so it survives as ONE
# argument instead of being re-split (which made codex parse "and" as
# a subcommand).
remote = self._agent_remote_argv(argv)
return [*self._ssh(tty=tty), "--", *(shlex.quote(t) for t in remote)]
def exec_agent(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> int:
agent_argv = self.agent_argv(argv, tty=tty)
@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ from .. import BottleCleanupPlan
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(BottleCleanupPlan):
# PIDs of orphaned firecracker VMM processes and the sidecar
# containers left behind by previous bottles.
# PIDs of orphaned firecracker VMM processes and the per-bottle run
# dirs left behind by previous bottles.
vm_pids: tuple[int, ...] = ()
containers: tuple[str, ...] = ()
run_dirs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
def print(self) -> None:
@@ -22,11 +21,9 @@ class FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(BottleCleanupPlan):
return
for pid in self.vm_pids:
info(f"firecracker VM process: pid {pid}")
for name in self.containers:
info(f"firecracker sidecar container: {name}")
for path in self.run_dirs:
info(f"firecracker run dir: {path}")
@property
def empty(self) -> bool:
return not (self.vm_pids or self.containers or self.run_dirs)
return not (self.vm_pids or self.run_dirs)
@@ -13,15 +13,19 @@ from .. import BottlePlan
class FirecrackerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
slug: str
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = field(repr=False)
# Stamped by launch once the sidecar is up and its ports are
# Stamped by launch once the gateway is up and its ports are
# published on the host-side TAP IP (empty at prepare time).
agent_proxy_url: str = ""
agent_git_gate_url: str = ""
agent_supervise_url: str = ""
# Per-bottle identity token the agent presents on every attributed request
# (egress proxy credentials, git-gate/supervise headers); set by launch
# from the orchestrator registration. Empty pre-registration.
identity_token: str = ""
@property
def container_name(self) -> str:
"""Instance name, reused for the sidecar container + VM run dir.
"""Instance name, reused for the gateway container + VM run dir.
Matches the `bot-bottle-<slug>` convention the other backends
use so cleanup/enumerate discovery-by-prefix keeps working."""
return self.agent_provision.instance_name
+2 -23
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
"""Cleanup for the Firecracker backend.
Orphans are: firecracker VMM processes whose config lives under our run
dir, the `bot-bottle-sidecars-*` containers, and the per-bottle run
dirs. TAP slots free themselves (the flock drops when the launcher
exits), so there is nothing to reclaim there.
dir, and the per-bottle run dirs. TAP slots free themselves (the flock
drops when the launcher exits), so there is nothing to reclaim there.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -18,8 +17,6 @@ from ...log import info
from . import util
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan
_SIDECAR_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-sidecars-"
def _run_root() -> Path:
return util.cache_dir() / "run"
@@ -46,17 +43,6 @@ def _orphan_vm_pids() -> list[int]:
return pids
def _sidecar_containers() -> list[str]:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "ps", "-a", "--format", "{{.Names}}",
"--filter", f"name={_SIDECAR_PREFIX}"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
return []
return sorted(n.strip() for n in result.stdout.splitlines() if n.strip())
def _run_dirs() -> list[str]:
run_root = _run_root()
if not run_root.is_dir():
@@ -67,7 +53,6 @@ def _run_dirs() -> list[str]:
def prepare_cleanup() -> FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan:
return FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan(
vm_pids=tuple(_orphan_vm_pids()),
containers=tuple(_sidecar_containers()),
run_dirs=tuple(_run_dirs()),
)
@@ -79,12 +64,6 @@ def cleanup(plan: FirecrackerBottleCleanupPlan) -> None:
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
except ProcessLookupError:
pass
for name in plan.containers:
info(f"docker rm -f {name}")
subprocess.run(
["docker", "rm", "-f", name],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
for path in plan.run_dirs:
info(f"rm -rf {path}")
shutil.rmtree(path, ignore_errors=True)
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
"""Consolidated bottle launch sequence for the Firecracker backend
(PRD 0070, Stage B).
The shared gateway + orchestrator control plane run in a single persistent
per-host **infra VM** (`infra_vm.py`), not Docker containers. Agent VMs reach
the gateway's egress / supervise / git-http ports at the infra VM via a
PREROUTING DNAT on their own host-side TAP IP (see
`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`), and the host CLI reaches the control plane
over HTTP at the infra VM's guest IP.
Attribution is by the agent VM's guest IP, unspoofable by construction: the
/31 point-to-point TAP + the `bot_bottle_fc` nft table ensure only the
expected VM can source-IP that address.
Sequence:
1. ensure the infra VM (control plane + gateway) is up (a singleton — a
prior launcher may already have booted it);
2. register the bottle by its guest IP (attribution key) → bottle id +
identity token;
3. provision its git-gate repos/creds into the gateway VM (over SSH);
4. fetch the shared gateway CA for the provisioner to install in the rootfs.
The TAP slot allocation, rootfs build, and VM boot are the caller's job.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from ...egress import EgressPlan
from ...git_gate import GitGatePlan
from ...orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
from ...orchestrator.lifecycle import (
OrchestratorStartError, # re-exported so callers can catch it
)
from ...orchestrator.registration import registration_inputs
from ..docker.gateway_provision import deprovision_git_gate, provision_git_gate
from . import infra_vm
class ConsolidatedLaunchError(RuntimeError):
"""The consolidated register/provision sequence could not complete."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LaunchContext:
"""What the Firecracker launch needs from the consolidated sequence."""
bottle_id: str
identity_token: str
source_ip: str # the VM's guest IP — the attribution key
gateway_ca_pem: str # the shared gateway CA the provisioner installs
orchestrator_url: str
def launch_consolidated(
egress_plan: EgressPlan,
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan,
*,
guest_ip: str,
image_ref: str = "",
tokens: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> LaunchContext:
"""Ensure the infra VM is up, register the bottle by its guest IP, and
provision its git-gate state into the gateway VM. Returns the context the
agent-VM launch needs. Raises on failure — the caller tears down."""
infra = infra_vm.ensure_running()
url = infra.control_plane_url
client = OrchestratorClient(url)
inputs = registration_inputs(egress_plan)
reg = client.register_bottle(
guest_ip, image_ref=image_ref, policy=inputs.policy,
metadata=inputs.metadata, tokens=tokens,
)
try:
provision_git_gate(
infra_vm.gateway_transport(), reg.bottle_id, git_gate_plan)
except Exception:
client.teardown_bottle(reg.bottle_id)
raise
# The shared gateway CA every agent on this host trusts for TLS
# interception — fetched from the infra VM over SSH.
return LaunchContext(
bottle_id=reg.bottle_id,
identity_token=reg.identity_token,
source_ip=guest_ip,
gateway_ca_pem=infra.gateway_ca_pem(),
orchestrator_url=url,
)
def teardown_consolidated(bottle_id: str, *, orchestrator_url: str) -> None:
"""Deregister the bottle and remove its git-gate state from the gateway
VM. Both steps are idempotent so this is safe from a cleanup trap. Does
NOT stop the infra VM — it's a persistent per-host singleton shared by
every bottle."""
OrchestratorClient(orchestrator_url).teardown_bottle(bottle_id)
deprovision_git_gate(infra_vm.gateway_transport(), bottle_id)
__all__ = [
"LaunchContext",
"launch_consolidated",
"teardown_consolidated",
"ConsolidatedLaunchError",
"OrchestratorStartError",
]
+4 -33
View File
@@ -1,43 +1,14 @@
"""Active-agent enumeration for the Firecracker backend.
The agent runs in a VM (no container to list), so a live bottle is
identified by its running sidecar container `bot-bottle-sidecars-<slug>`
— the same discovery-by-prefix the other backends use.
The backend is disabled during the companion-container removal (#385) — it can't
launch bottles, so there are none to enumerate. Real enumeration returns
with the backend's consolidated relaunch (#354).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from ...bottle_state import read_metadata
from .. import ActiveAgent
_SIDECAR_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-sidecars-"
def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "ps", "--format", "{{.Names}}",
"--filter", f"name={_SIDECAR_PREFIX}"],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
return []
out: list[ActiveAgent] = []
for name in sorted(n.strip() for n in result.stdout.splitlines() if n.strip()):
slug = name[len(_SIDECAR_PREFIX):]
metadata = read_metadata(slug)
if metadata is None or metadata.backend != "firecracker":
# Skip sidecars owned by another backend (docker shares the
# container-name prefix).
continue
out.append(ActiveAgent(
backend_name="firecracker",
slug=slug,
agent_name=metadata.agent_name,
started_at=metadata.started_at,
services=(),
label=metadata.label,
color=metadata.color,
))
return out
return []
@@ -78,20 +78,32 @@ def _config(
vcpus: int,
mem_mib: int,
guest_mac: str,
data_drive: Path | None = None,
) -> dict[str, object]:
drives: list[dict[str, object]] = [
{
"drive_id": "rootfs",
"path_on_host": str(rootfs),
"is_root_device": True,
"is_read_only": False,
}
]
# A second virtio-block device (guest /dev/vdb) — the infra VM's
# persistent registry "volume", a host-side ext4 file that outlives the
# ephemeral rootfs across VM restarts.
if data_drive is not None:
drives.append({
"drive_id": "data",
"path_on_host": str(data_drive),
"is_root_device": False,
"is_read_only": False,
})
return {
"boot-source": {
"kernel_image_path": str(util.kernel_path()),
"boot_args": _boot_args(guest_ip, host_ip, pubkey),
},
"drives": [
{
"drive_id": "rootfs",
"path_on_host": str(rootfs),
"is_root_device": True,
"is_read_only": False,
}
],
"drives": drives,
"network-interfaces": [
{
"iface_id": "eth0",
@@ -118,9 +130,16 @@ def boot(
vcpus: int = 2,
mem_mib: int = 2048,
guest_mac: str = "06:00:AC:10:00:02",
detached: bool = False,
data_drive: Path | None = None,
) -> VmHandle:
"""Write the config and launch the VMM. Returns once the process is
spawned; callers wait for SSH readiness separately."""
spawned; callers wait for SSH readiness separately.
`detached` starts the VMM in its own session (`start_new_session`) so it
survives the launcher exiting — used for the persistent per-host infra
VM, which must outlive the short-lived `start` process (agent VMs stay
attached and are torn down with the launcher)."""
run_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
config_path = run_dir / "config.json"
console_log = run_dir / "console.log"
@@ -128,6 +147,7 @@ def boot(
_config(
rootfs=rootfs, tap=tap, guest_ip=guest_ip, host_ip=host_ip,
pubkey=pubkey, vcpus=vcpus, mem_mib=mem_mib, guest_mac=guest_mac,
data_drive=data_drive,
),
indent=2,
))
@@ -137,6 +157,7 @@ def boot(
process = subprocess.Popen(
["firecracker", "--no-api", "--config-file", str(config_path)],
stdout=log_fh, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
start_new_session=detached,
)
return VmHandle(process=process, guest_ip=guest_ip, console_log=console_log)
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
"""Docker-free agent-image builds for the Firecracker backend (PRD 0069 Stage 3).
Agent Dockerfiles build **inside the persistent per-host infra VM**
(`infra_vm.py`), which carries buildah (rootless, daemonless): no host Docker
daemon, no root-equivalent `docker` group. The build runs over SSH against the
infra VM and its rootfs streams back to the host, where the existing
`mke2fs -d` path (`util.build_rootfs_ext4`) turns it into a bootable ext4.
Building in the infra VM — rather than a throwaway builder VM — means there is
one buildah image (`bot-bottle-infra`) and no contention for the orchestrator
TAP. Tradeoff: an untrusted Dockerfile's `RUN` steps share the VM with the
control plane + gateway (buildah `--isolation chroot` isn't a hard boundary) —
the accepted single-VM blast-radius tradeoff, re-splittable into a disposable
builder (booted from this same image on its own TAP) later.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import hashlib
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Generator
from ...log import die, info
from . import infra_vm, util
# vfs + chroot: buildah works as root in the microVM (no fuse-overlayfs /
# overlay module / subuid maps). `--isolation` is a build/run-only flag;
# `from`/`mount` take just the store.
_BUILD_FLAGS = "--isolation chroot --storage-driver vfs"
_STORE_FLAG = "--storage-driver vfs"
_BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 900.0
def _dockerfile_hash(dockerfile: Path) -> str:
"""Cache key: the Dockerfile's content. The shipped agent Dockerfiles
COPY nothing from the build context (see .dockerignore), so their content
fully determines the image; a Dockerfile that adds COPY will want the
context folded in here too."""
return hashlib.sha256(dockerfile.read_bytes()).hexdigest()[:16]
def build_agent_rootfs_dir(
dockerfile: Path, *, image_tag: str, smoke_test: tuple[str, ...] = (),
) -> Path:
"""Build `dockerfile` in the infra VM (buildah, no host docker), export its
rootfs, inject the guest boot bits, and return the cached base dir — the
same shape `util.build_rootfs_ext4` consumes. Cached by Dockerfile content,
so a repeat launch skips the rebuild.
`smoke_test` (the provider's declared argv, e.g. `("claude","--version")`)
is run in the freshly built image before export, catching an npm
silent-failure image at build time rather than at first agent use."""
digest = _dockerfile_hash(dockerfile)
base = util.cache_dir() / "rootfs" / f"agent-{digest}"
if (base / ".bb-ready").is_file():
info(f"using cached agent rootfs {base.name}")
return base
# Serialize builds: the infra VM's buildah store + this cache dir are
# shared, so concurrent `start`s must not build into them at once. The
# lock covers the cache lookup + build + atomic publish; the ready
# fast-path above takes no lock.
with _build_lock():
if (base / ".bb-ready").is_file(): # another build finished while we waited
info(f"using cached agent rootfs {base.name}")
return base
# Build into a temp dir and publish by atomic rename, so a partial
# build is never visible as `agent-<digest>`.
staging = util.cache_dir() / "rootfs" / f".building-{digest}"
shutil.rmtree(staging, ignore_errors=True)
staging.mkdir(parents=True)
info(f"building agent image {image_tag!r} in the infra VM")
_build_in_infra(dockerfile, staging, smoke_test, digest)
util.inject_guest_boot(staging)
(staging / ".bb-ready").write_text("ok\n")
shutil.rmtree(base, ignore_errors=True)
os.rename(staging, base)
return base
@contextmanager
def _build_lock() -> Generator[None, None, None]:
"""Host-level exclusive lock serializing agent-image builds (shared infra
buildah store + cache dir). flock auto-releases on a crash."""
lock_path = util.cache_dir() / "rootfs" / ".build.lock"
lock_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
handle = open(lock_path, "w", encoding="utf-8")
try:
fcntl.flock(handle, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
yield
finally:
handle.close()
def _build_in_infra(
dockerfile: Path, base: Path, smoke_test: tuple[str, ...], digest: str,
) -> None:
"""Ensure the infra VM is up, `buildah build` the Dockerfile in it, smoke
test the image, and stream its rootfs into `base`. The infra VM persists;
only the per-build container/image/context are cleaned up."""
infra = infra_vm.ensure_running()
key, ip = infra.private_key, infra.guest_ip
tag = f"bot-bottle-agent-build-{digest}"
ctx = f"/tmp/agent-build-{digest}"
smoke_ctr, export_ctr = f"{tag}-smoke", f"{tag}-export"
def _cleanup() -> None:
# Remove only THIS build's working containers/image/context — never
# `buildah rm -a`, which would nuke a concurrent build's container.
_ssh(key, ip,
f"buildah rm {smoke_ctr} {export_ctr} >/dev/null 2>&1; "
f"buildah rmi {_STORE_FLAG} {tag} >/dev/null 2>&1; rm -rf {ctx}",
timeout=60)
_cleanup() # clear leftovers from a crashed prior build of this digest
try:
prep = _ssh(key, ip, f"mkdir -p {ctx}/ctx")
if prep.returncode != 0:
die(f"preparing build dir in the infra VM failed: {prep.stderr.strip()}")
_send_dockerfile(key, ip, dockerfile, ctx)
_buildah_build(key, ip, ctx, tag)
_smoke_test(key, ip, tag, smoke_ctr, smoke_test)
_stream_rootfs(key, ip, tag, export_ctr, base)
finally:
_cleanup()
def _ssh(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, script: str,
*, timeout: float = 60.0) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
return subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip) + [script],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, check=False,
)
def _ssh_streamed(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, script: str,
*, timeout: float) -> int:
"""Run an SSH command letting the remote's stdout/stderr flow straight to
ours (no capture), for long chatty steps where live progress beats a
silent wait. Returns the exit code."""
proc = subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip) + [script],
timeout=timeout, check=False,
)
return proc.returncode
def _send_dockerfile(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, dockerfile: Path, ctx: str) -> None:
proc = subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip) + [f"cat > {ctx}/Dockerfile"],
input=dockerfile.read_bytes(), capture_output=True, timeout=30, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
die(f"sending Dockerfile to the infra VM failed: "
f"{proc.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()}")
def _buildah_build(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, ctx: str, tag: str) -> None:
# Stream buildah's step-by-step output straight to our stderr (like the
# docker backend's `docker build`), so a long first build (base pull +
# apt/npm installs) shows live progress instead of a silent wait. The
# remote stderr is where buildah writes its `STEP i/n` lines.
info(f"buildah build {tag} in the infra VM (streaming output)")
rc = _ssh_streamed(
private_key, guest_ip,
f"buildah build {_BUILD_FLAGS} -t {tag} -f {ctx}/Dockerfile {ctx}/ctx",
timeout=_BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
if rc != 0:
die(f"buildah build in the infra VM failed (exit {rc}); "
"see the build output above.")
def _smoke_test(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, tag: str, ctr: str,
argv: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
"""Run the provider's smoke argv inside the freshly built image
(`buildah run`, which uses the image's own PATH), failing the build
loudly if the CLI is a broken stub. No-op without a declared test. Uses a
named working container (`ctr`) so cleanup is scoped to this build."""
if not argv:
return
cmd = (
f"set -e; buildah from {_STORE_FLAG} --name {ctr} {tag} >/dev/null; "
f"buildah run {_BUILD_FLAGS} {ctr} -- {' '.join(argv)}; rc=$?; "
f"buildah rm {ctr} >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; exit $rc"
)
result = _ssh(private_key, guest_ip, cmd, timeout=120)
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stdout + result.stderr).strip().splitlines()[-10:]
die(f"agent image failed its post-build smoke test "
f"({' '.join(argv)}):\n" + "\n".join(detail))
def _stream_rootfs(private_key: Path, guest_ip: str, tag: str, ctr: str, base: Path) -> None:
"""`buildah mount` the built image in the infra VM and pipe its rootfs tar
straight into `base` on the host (extracted as the non-root host user, so
uid 0 isn't preserved — the guest init restores /root ownership). Uses a
named working container so cleanup is scoped to this build."""
export = (
f"set -e; buildah from {_STORE_FLAG} --name {ctr} {tag} >/dev/null; "
f"mnt=$(buildah mount {_STORE_FLAG} {ctr}); "
f"tar -C \"$mnt\" -cf - ."
)
ssh_proc = subprocess.Popen(
util.ssh_base_argv(private_key, guest_ip) + [export],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
)
assert ssh_proc.stdout is not None
untar = subprocess.run(
["tar", "-x", "-C", str(base)], stdin=ssh_proc.stdout, check=False,
)
ssh_proc.stdout.close()
ssh_err = (ssh_proc.stderr.read().decode(errors="replace")
if ssh_proc.stderr else "")
rc = ssh_proc.wait()
if rc != 0 or untar.returncode != 0:
die(f"exporting the built rootfs from the infra VM failed: "
f"{ssh_err.strip() or '<no stderr>'}")
+419
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
"""The per-host infra VM for the Firecracker backend (PRD 0070 Stage B).
A single persistent microVM that runs the orchestrator **control plane** (and,
in a following step, the gateway **data plane**) the trusted per-host service
the docker backend runs as containers. It boots on the NAT'd orchestrator link
(`netpool.orch_slot()`): the host CLI reaches its control plane over HTTP at the
guest IP, and agent VMs reach its gateway ports over VM-to-VM routing.
Build-from-source (the default while the design churns): the rootfs is exported
from the locally built orchestrator image, which bakes the stdlib-only
control-plane source. A pull-from-registry mode (Gitea's OCI registry) becomes
the default later.
SSH is left enabled for debugging; the control plane is the load-bearing
surface.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fcntl
import hashlib
import os
import shlex
import signal
import stat
import subprocess
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from contextlib import contextmanager
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Generator
from ...log import die, info
from ..docker import util as docker_mod
from ..docker.gateway_provision import GatewayProvisionError
from . import firecracker_vm, netpool, util
# The single infra-VM image: gateway data plane + baked control-plane source
# (Dockerfile.infra FROM the gateway image). Built from source by default;
# a pull-from-registry mode lands later.
_INFRA_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-infra:latest"
_GATEWAY_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-gateway:latest"
_ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest"
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3]
CONTROL_PLANE_PORT = 8099
# Gateway data-plane ports (agent-facing): egress proxy, supervise MCP,
# git-http. Reached by agent VMs over VM-to-VM routing (added next).
EGRESS_PORT = 9099
SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
# mitmproxy writes its CA here a beat after start; agents install it to trust
# the gateway's TLS interception.
_GATEWAY_CA_PATH = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem"
# The infra VM makes direct upstream connections (gateway egress, and buildah
# during builds), and the kernel `ip=` cmdline sets no resolver. Public for
# now; routing DNS through a filtered path is a later refinement.
_INFRA_RESOLVER = "1.1.1.1"
_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 45.0
_HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS = 0.5
_CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
@dataclass
class InfraVm:
"""A handle to the per-host infra VM: its guest IP and the stable SSH key
used to fetch the gateway CA / provision git-gate. `vm` is the live VMM
handle when this process booted it, and None when adopting a singleton a
prior launcher started (teardown then goes through the PID file)."""
guest_ip: str
private_key: Path
vm: firecracker_vm.VmHandle | None = None
@property
def control_plane_url(self) -> str:
return f"http://{self.guest_ip}:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT}"
def terminate(self) -> None:
"""Stop the infra VM — via the live handle if we booted it, else the
PID file (adopting-process case)."""
if self.vm is not None:
self.vm.terminate()
else:
_kill_pidfile()
_pid_file().unlink(missing_ok=True)
def gateway_ca_pem(self, *, timeout: float = _CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> str:
"""The gateway's mitmproxy CA (PEM) that agents install to trust its
TLS interception. Generated a moment after boot, so this polls over
SSH until it appears (mirrors DockerGateway.ca_cert_pem)."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while True:
proc = subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(self.private_key, self.guest_ip)
+ [f"cat {_GATEWAY_CA_PATH}"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode == 0 and "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in proc.stdout:
return proc.stdout
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
die(f"gateway CA not available after {timeout:g}s: "
f"{proc.stderr.strip() or 'empty'}")
time.sleep(_HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS)
def ensure_built() -> None:
"""Build the infra image from source (bootstrap via host docker). The
infra image `COPY --from`s the orchestrator image and is `FROM` the
gateway image, so both must exist first. A pull-from-registry mode
replaces this later."""
docker_mod.build_image(
_ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE, str(_REPO_ROOT), dockerfile="Dockerfile.orchestrator")
docker_mod.build_image(
_GATEWAY_IMAGE, str(_REPO_ROOT), dockerfile="Dockerfile.gateway")
docker_mod.build_image(
_INFRA_IMAGE, str(_REPO_ROOT), dockerfile="Dockerfile.infra")
def build_infra_rootfs_dir() -> Path:
"""The infra VM's base rootfs: the infra image prepared with the
control-plane + gateway init as PID 1. The init's content is folded into
the cache key so an init change rebuilds the rootfs (the base image digest
alone wouldn't catch it)."""
init = _infra_init()
tag = hashlib.sha256(init.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
return util.build_base_rootfs_dir(
_INFRA_IMAGE, variant=f"-infra-{tag}", init_script=init,
)
def ensure_running() -> InfraVm:
"""Idempotent per-host singleton. Adopt the infra VM if its control plane
is already healthy (a prior launcher booted it it outlives short-lived
`start` processes); otherwise clear any stale VM and boot a fresh one.
Returns a handle usable for CA fetch / git-gate provisioning.
Concurrency-safe: the cold stop/build/boot path is serialized by a host
flock, so two simultaneous first launches don't both boot on the same
rootfs/PID. The healthy fast-path takes no lock."""
slot = netpool.orch_slot()
url = f"http://{slot.guest_ip}:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT}"
key = _infra_dir() / "id_ed25519"
if key.exists() and _health_ok(url):
info(f"adopting running infra VM at {url}")
return InfraVm(guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, private_key=key)
with _singleton_lock():
# Re-check under the lock: another launcher may have booted it while
# we waited for the lock (double-checked, so we adopt not re-boot).
if key.exists() and _health_ok(url):
info(f"adopting running infra VM at {url}")
return InfraVm(guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, private_key=key)
stop() # clear a stale/hung VM holding the link before booting fresh
ensure_built()
infra = boot()
wait_for_health(infra)
return infra
@contextmanager
def _singleton_lock() -> Generator[None, None, None]:
"""Host-level exclusive lock serializing the infra VM's cold create path
(`stop`/`ensure_built`/`boot`). flock auto-releases if the launcher
crashes, so the lock is never leaked."""
lock_path = _infra_dir() / "singleton.lock"
handle = open(lock_path, "w", encoding="utf-8")
try:
fcntl.flock(handle, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
yield
finally:
handle.close()
def stop() -> None:
"""Stop the infra VM singleton (idempotent — absent is success)."""
_kill_pidfile()
_pid_file().unlink(missing_ok=True)
def boot() -> InfraVm:
"""Boot the infra VM (detached, so it outlives the launcher) on the
orchestrator link, recording its PID. Prefer `ensure_running`."""
slot = netpool.orch_slot()
if not netpool.tap_present(slot.iface):
die(f"orchestrator link {slot.iface} not present.\n"
f" ./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker")
base = build_infra_rootfs_dir()
run_dir = _infra_dir()
rootfs = run_dir / "rootfs.ext4"
util.build_rootfs_ext4(base, rootfs, slack_mib=8192)
private_key, pubkey = _stable_keypair()
info(f"booting infra VM on {slot.iface} (guest {slot.guest_ip})")
vm = firecracker_vm.boot(
name="bot-bottle-infra", rootfs=rootfs, tap=slot.iface,
guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, host_ip=slot.host_ip, pubkey=pubkey,
run_dir=run_dir, mem_mib=4096, detached=True,
data_drive=_ensure_registry_volume(),
)
_pid_file().write_text(str(vm.process.pid))
return InfraVm(guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, private_key=private_key, vm=vm)
def _infra_dir() -> Path:
d = util.cache_dir() / "infra"
d.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return d
def _pid_file() -> Path:
return _infra_dir() / "vm.pid"
# The registry "volume": a host-side ext4 file attached to the infra VM as a
# second virtio-block device (guest /dev/vdb), mounted at the control plane's
# DB dir. It outlives the ephemeral rootfs, so the bottle registry survives an
# infra-VM restart — the firecracker analogue of a docker volume. It is a
# plain ext4 file: `sudo mount -o loop <path>` on the host (with the VM
# stopped) to inspect bot-bottle.db directly.
_REGISTRY_SIZE = "512M"
def registry_volume_path() -> Path:
return _infra_dir() / "registry.ext4"
def _ensure_registry_volume() -> Path:
"""Create the empty ext4 registry volume on first use; reuse it after."""
vol = registry_volume_path()
if vol.exists():
return vol
info(f"creating infra registry volume {vol} ({_REGISTRY_SIZE})")
proc = subprocess.run(
["mke2fs", "-q", "-t", "ext4", "-F", str(vol), _REGISTRY_SIZE],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
vol.unlink(missing_ok=True)
die(f"creating registry volume failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
return vol
def _stable_keypair() -> tuple[Path, str]:
"""The infra VM's SSH keypair — generated once and reused, so any later
launcher can SSH in (fetch CA / provision) even though a different process
booted the VM. The pubkey is re-injected on every boot via the cmdline."""
d = _infra_dir()
key, pub = d / "id_ed25519", d / "id_ed25519.pub"
if key.exists() and pub.exists():
return key, pub.read_text().strip()
key.unlink(missing_ok=True)
pub.unlink(missing_ok=True)
subprocess.run(
["ssh-keygen", "-t", "ed25519", "-N", "", "-q", "-f", str(key),
"-C", "bot-bottle-infra"],
check=True,
)
return key, pub.read_text().strip()
def _kill_pidfile() -> None:
"""SIGTERM (then SIGKILL) the recorded infra VMM, if it's still ours.
Guards against a recycled PID by checking the process is firecracker."""
try:
pid = int(_pid_file().read_text().strip())
except (OSError, ValueError):
return
try:
comm = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/comm").read_text().strip()
except OSError:
return # already gone
if comm != "firecracker":
return # PID recycled by an unrelated process
try:
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGTERM)
for _ in range(50):
if not Path(f"/proc/{pid}").exists():
return
time.sleep(0.1)
os.kill(pid, signal.SIGKILL)
except OSError:
pass
def _health_ok(url: str) -> bool:
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{url}/health", timeout=1.0) as resp:
return resp.status == 200
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
return False
class SshGatewayTransport:
"""`GatewayTransport` for the gateway running in the infra VM — the docker
exec/cp equivalents over SSH (dropbear + the stable infra key)."""
def __init__(self, private_key: Path, guest_ip: str) -> None:
self._key = private_key
self._ip = guest_ip
def exec(self, argv: list[str]) -> None:
proc = subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(self._key, self._ip) + [shlex.join(argv)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"infra gateway exec {argv!r} failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
def cp_into(self, src: str, dest: str) -> None:
# Preserve the source mode (docker cp does): the access-hook is staged
# 0700 and git-http execs it directly — a plain `cat >` would land it
# 0644 and the exec fails with EACCES; keys stay 0600.
mode = stat.S_IMODE(os.stat(src).st_mode)
q = shlex.quote(dest)
proc = subprocess.run(
util.ssh_base_argv(self._key, self._ip)
+ [f"cat > {q} && chmod {mode:o} {q}"],
input=Path(src).read_bytes(), capture_output=True, timeout=30, check=False,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayProvisionError(
f"infra gateway cp {src} -> {dest} failed: "
f"{proc.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()}")
def gateway_transport() -> SshGatewayTransport:
"""git-gate provisioning transport for the gateway in the infra VM, built
from the stable key + the orchestrator link's guest IP. Needs no live VM
handle, so teardown can use it too."""
return SshGatewayTransport(
_infra_dir() / "id_ed25519", netpool.orch_slot().guest_ip)
def wait_for_health(
infra: InfraVm, *, timeout: float = _HEALTH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> None:
"""Poll the control plane's /health until it answers 200 or the deadline
passes. Dies (with the console tail) if the VMM exits early."""
url = f"{infra.control_plane_url}/health"
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if infra.vm is not None and not infra.vm.is_alive():
die(f"infra VM exited during boot (rc={infra.vm.process.returncode}).\n"
f"{firecracker_vm._console_tail(infra.vm.console_log)}")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=1.0) as resp:
if resp.status == 200:
info(f"infra control plane healthy at {infra.control_plane_url}")
return
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
pass
time.sleep(_HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS)
tail = (firecracker_vm._console_tail(infra.vm.console_log)
if infra.vm is not None else "")
die(f"infra control plane at {url} did not become healthy within "
f"{timeout:.0f}s.\n{tail}")
def _infra_init() -> str:
"""PID-1 init for the infra VM: mount the pseudo-filesystems, wire a
resolver, start dropbear (debug SSH), then launch the control plane and
the gateway data plane (multi-tenant against the local control plane)."""
return f"""#!/bin/sh
# bot-bottle Firecracker infra VM init (PID 1).
mount -t proc proc /proc 2>/dev/null
mount -t sysfs sys /sys 2>/dev/null
mount -t devtmpfs dev /dev 2>/dev/null
mkdir -p /dev/pts && mount -t devpts devpts /dev/pts 2>/dev/null
mount -o remount,rw / 2>/dev/null
# Export a real PATH: a bare-init shell resolves its own execs via a
# built-in default path, but that isn't in the *environment*, so
# gateway_init's subprocess daemons (spawned as `python3 ...`) would
# inherit no PATH and fail to find python3. Export it for all children.
export PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
# Direct upstream resolver (control-plane / gateway egress + buildah).
printf 'nameserver {_INFRA_RESOLVER}\\n' > /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null
# Debug SSH: install the per-boot pubkey from the kernel cmdline.
KEY=$(sed -n 's/.*bb_pubkey=\\([^ ]*\\).*/\\1/p' /proc/cmdline | base64 -d 2>/dev/null)
if [ -n "$KEY" ]; then
mkdir -p /root/.ssh
printf '%s\\n' "$KEY" > /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
chmod 700 /root/.ssh && chmod 600 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
fi
chown -R 0:0 /root 2>/dev/null || true
mkdir -p /etc/dropbear /run /var/lib/bot-bottle
# Persistent registry volume (second virtio-block device, /dev/vdb) mounted
# at the control plane's DB dir, so bot-bottle.db survives infra-VM restarts.
mount -t ext4 /dev/vdb /var/lib/bot-bottle 2>/dev/null || true
/bb-dropbear -R -E -p 22 &
# Control plane. Source is baked at /app; the package is stdlib-only.
cd /app
BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT=/var/lib/bot-bottle python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator \\
--host 0.0.0.0 --port {CONTROL_PLANE_PORT} --broker stub &
# Gateway data plane, multi-tenant: each request resolves source-IP ->
# policy against the local control plane. The VM backend reaches git over
# git-http (9420), so the git:// daemon (git-gate, needs a per-bottle
# entrypoint the consolidated model doesn't use) is left out.
BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=egress,git-http,supervise \\
BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT} \\
SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=/var/lib/bot-bottle/db/bot-bottle.db \\
python3 /app/gateway_init.py &
# Reap as PID 1; children are backgrounded, so `wait` blocks.
while : ; do wait ; done
"""
+118 -260
View File
@@ -1,75 +1,63 @@
"""Launch flow for the Firecracker backend.
"""Launch flow for the Firecracker backend (PRD 0070, consolidated).
Per bottle:
1. mint the egress CA, build the agent image (docker), export it to a
cached ext4 rootfs;
2. claim a free TAP pool slot (rootless flock);
3. bring up the Docker sidecar bundle, publishing egress / git-gate /
supervise on the slot's host-side TAP IP at fixed ports;
4. boot the microVM on that TAP; wait for SSH;
5. provision (CA, prompt, skills, workspace, git, supervise) over SSH.
1. build the agent image (docker), export it to a cached ext4 rootfs;
2. ensure the per-host orchestrator + shared gateway are up;
3. claim a free TAP pool slot (rootless flock);
4. register the bottle on the orchestrator by the VM's guest IP (the
attribution key) and provision its git-gate state into the gateway;
5. boot the microVM on that TAP; wait for SSH;
6. provision (shared gateway CA, prompt, skills, workspace, git, supervise)
over SSH.
The per-bottle Docker sidecar bundle is gone. The shared gateway handles
egress / git-gate / supervise for every VM; Docker's PREROUTING DNAT routes
the VMs' traffic to it, and the nft table's `ct status dnat accept` rule
in the forward chain lets it pass. The VM still sends to `host_tap_ip:PORT`
the address its world is, by nft design, limited to.
Isolation is enforced by the operator-provisioned nft table (checked
fail-closed in preflight): a VM reaches only its sidecar (DNAT'd from
the host TAP IP) and nothing else. The agent's HTTPS_PROXY therefore
points at `http://<host_tap_ip>:9099`, its only route to the world.
fail-closed in preflight): a VM reaches only the sidecar (DNAT'd from
the host TAP IP) and nothing else.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import subprocess
from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...agent_provider import runtime_for
from ...bottle_state import (
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
read_committed_image,
)
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_resolve_token_values,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...git_gate import (
provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys,
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys,
)
from ...log import die, info, warn
from ...supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ...util import expand_tilde
from ..docker.egress import (
EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER,
EGRESS_PORT,
egress_tls_init,
)
from ..docker.git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ..docker.sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
)
from ...log import info, warn
from ...supervise import SUPERVISE_PORT
from ..docker import util as docker_mod
from ..docker.egress import EGRESS_PORT
from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from . import firecracker_vm, isolation_probe, netpool, util
from . import firecracker_vm, image_builder, isolation_probe, netpool, util
from .bottle import FirecrackerBottle
from .bottle_plan import FirecrackerBottlePlan
from .consolidated_launch import (
launch_consolidated,
teardown_consolidated,
)
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
_GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE = "/run/git-gate/ready"
def sidecar_container_name(slug: str) -> str:
return f"bot-bottle-sidecars-{slug}"
@contextmanager
@@ -78,6 +66,8 @@ def launch(
*,
provision: Callable[[FirecrackerBottlePlan, "FirecrackerBottle"], str | None],
) -> Generator[FirecrackerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, launch, and provision a Firecracker bottle via the consolidated
orchestrator. Teardown on exit."""
stack = ExitStack()
bottle_for_revoke = plan.manifest.bottle
git_gate_dir_for_revoke = git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug)
@@ -94,31 +84,87 @@ def launch(
raise teardown_exc
try:
plan = _mint_certs(plan)
plan = _build_agent_image(plan)
# Step 1: agent rootfs. Built from the Dockerfile inside a Firecracker
# builder VM (buildah, no host docker); a committed snapshot is reused
# when present. Returns the base dir the per-bottle ext4 is made from.
plan, agent_base = _build_agent_base(plan)
# Claim a TAP slot; the flock is held until teardown closes it.
# Step 2: mint the git-gate dynamic (gitea) deploy keys, if any.
git_gate_plan = plan.git_gate_plan
if git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_plan = provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys(
plan.manifest.bottle, git_gate_plan, git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
# Step 3: claim a TAP slot; the flock is held until teardown.
slot, lock = netpool.allocate(plan.slug)
stack.callback(lock.close)
info(f"firecracker slot {slot.iface}: host={slot.host_ip} "
f"guest={slot.guest_ip}")
plan = _provision_git_gate_keys(plan)
# Step 4: register on the orchestrator + provision this bottle's
# git-gate state into the shared gateway. The per-bottle egress tokens
# are resolved from the host env now and handed to the orchestrator
# (in memory) for the gateway to inject — the agent never sees them.
# Attribution is by the VM's guest IP (unspoofable via /31 TAP + nft).
effective_env = {**os.environ, **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
ctx = launch_consolidated(
plan.egress_plan, git_gate_plan,
guest_ip=slot.guest_ip,
image_ref=plan.image,
tokens=token_values,
)
stack.callback(
teardown_consolidated, ctx.bottle_id,
orchestrator_url=ctx.orchestrator_url,
)
sidecar_name = sidecar_container_name(plan.slug)
_force_remove_container(sidecar_name)
_start_sidecar_bundle(plan, sidecar_name, slot.host_ip)
stack.callback(_force_remove_container, sidecar_name)
_stage_git_gate(plan, sidecar_name)
# Step 5: install the SHARED gateway CA (replaces the per-bottle CA).
# Write it to a stable host path so the provisioner can copy it over SSH.
ca_dir = egress_state_dir(plan.slug) / "gateway-ca"
ca_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
ca_file = ca_dir / "gateway-ca.pem"
ca_file.write_text(ctx.gateway_ca_pem)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=ca_file,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=ca_file,
)
# Point the agent's git-gate insteadOf rewrites and supervise MCP URL
# at the shared gateway (reached at the slot's host TAP IP — the VM
# sends there and Docker DNAT routes to the gateway container).
git_gate_url = (
f"http://{slot.host_ip}:{_GIT_HTTP_PORT}" if git_gate_plan.upstreams else ""
)
supervise_url = (
f"http://{slot.host_ip}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
if plan.supervise_plan is not None else ""
)
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan,
egress_plan=egress_plan,
identity_token=ctx.identity_token,
# Deliver the identity token as egress proxy credentials — clients
# honor `HTTPS_PROXY=http://id:token@gw` without app changes; the
# gateway reads Proxy-Authorization, validates the (source_ip,
# token) pair, and strips it before upstream.
agent_proxy_url=(
f"http://bottle:{ctx.identity_token}"
f"@{slot.host_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
),
agent_git_gate_url=git_gate_url,
agent_supervise_url=supervise_url,
)
plan = _stamp_agent_urls(plan, slot.host_ip)
# Build the per-bottle rootfs + SSH key, then boot.
base_dir = util.build_base_rootfs_dir(plan.image)
# Step 6: build the per-bottle rootfs + SSH key, then boot.
run_dir = util.cache_dir() / "run" / plan.slug
run_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
rootfs = run_dir / "rootfs.ext4"
util.build_rootfs_ext4(base_dir, rootfs)
util.build_rootfs_ext4(agent_base, rootfs)
private_key, pubkey = util.generate_keypair(run_dir)
vm = firecracker_vm.boot(
@@ -133,8 +179,8 @@ def launch(
stack.callback(vm.terminate)
firecracker_vm.wait_for_ssh(vm, private_key)
# Authoritative fail-closed egress-boundary check, before the
# agent runs: prove the VM cannot reach the host directly.
# Authoritative fail-closed egress-boundary check, before the agent
# runs: prove the VM cannot reach the host directly.
isolation_probe.verify_isolation(private_key, slot.guest_ip)
bottle = FirecrackerBottle(
@@ -159,169 +205,27 @@ def launch(
teardown()
def _mint_certs(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> FirecrackerBottlePlan:
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(egress_state_dir(plan.slug))
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
def _build_agent_image(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> FirecrackerBottlePlan:
_docker_build(SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE, _REPO_DIR, dockerfile=SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE)
def _build_agent_base(
plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan,
) -> tuple[FirecrackerBottlePlan, Path]:
"""Produce the agent's base rootfs dir. Primary path: build the Dockerfile
inside a Firecracker builder VM (buildah, no host docker), smoke-testing
the image before export. A committed snapshot (freeze/migrate) is still
exported via the host docker path until that is ported too."""
committed = read_committed_image(plan.slug)
if committed and _image_exists(committed):
if committed and docker_mod.image_exists(committed):
info(f"using committed image {committed!r}")
return dataclasses.replace(
plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_provision=dataclasses.replace(plan.agent_provision, image=committed),
)
_docker_build(plan.image, _REPO_DIR, dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path)
return plan
def _provision_git_gate_keys(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> FirecrackerBottlePlan:
if not plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
return plan
git_gate_plan = provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys(
plan.manifest.bottle, plan.git_gate_plan, git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug),
return plan, util.build_base_rootfs_dir(committed)
base = image_builder.build_agent_rootfs_dir(
Path(plan.dockerfile_path),
image_tag=plan.image,
smoke_test=runtime_for(plan.agent_provider_template).smoke_test,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan)
def _stamp_agent_urls(
plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan, host_ip: str,
) -> FirecrackerBottlePlan:
proxy_url = f"http://{host_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
supervise_url = (
f"http://{host_ip}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/" if plan.supervise_plan is not None else ""
)
git_gate_url = (
f"http://{host_ip}:{_GIT_HTTP_PORT}" if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams else ""
)
return dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_proxy_url=proxy_url,
agent_git_gate_url=git_gate_url,
agent_supervise_url=supervise_url,
)
# --- sidecar bundle (Docker) ----------------------------------------
def _start_sidecar_bundle(
plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan, sidecar_name: str, host_ip: str,
) -> None:
argv = ["docker", "run", "--name", sidecar_name, "--detach", "--rm",
"-e", f"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS={','.join(_sidecar_daemons(plan))}"]
for entry in _sidecar_env_entries(plan):
argv += ["-e", entry]
for host_path, container_path, read_only in _sidecar_mounts(plan):
argv += ["-v", f"{host_path}:{container_path}{':ro' if read_only else ''}"]
# Publish on the slot's host TAP IP at fixed ports — each bottle
# has a distinct host_ip, so fixed ports never collide, and the VM
# reaches them at a stable, well-known address (its only route out).
for port in _sidecar_ports(plan):
argv += ["-p", f"{host_ip}:{port}:{port}"]
argv.append(SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE)
effective_env = {**dict(os.environ), **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
env = {**os.environ, **token_values}
info(f"docker run sidecar bundle {sidecar_name} (published on {host_ip})")
result = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"docker run for sidecar bundle {sidecar_name} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}")
def _sidecar_daemons(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
daemons = ["egress"]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
daemons += ["git-gate", "git-http"]
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
daemons.append("supervise")
return tuple(daemons)
def _sidecar_ports(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> tuple[int, ...]:
ports = [EGRESS_PORT]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
ports.append(_GIT_HTTP_PORT)
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
ports.append(SUPERVISE_PORT)
return tuple(ports)
def _sidecar_env_entries(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
env: list[str] = list(egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE={_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
env += [
f"SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG={plan.slug}",
f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
f"SUPERVISE_PORT={SUPERVISE_PORT}",
]
return tuple(env)
def _sidecar_mounts(
plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, str, bool], ...]:
mounts: list[tuple[str, str, bool]] = []
ep = plan.egress_plan
mounts.append((str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path.parent),
str(Path(EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER).parent), False))
if ep.routes:
mounts.append((str(ep.routes_path.parent),
str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent), True))
sp = plan.supervise_plan
if sp is not None:
mounts.append((str(sp.db_path.parent),
str(Path(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER).parent), False))
return tuple(mounts)
def _stage_git_gate(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan, sidecar_name: str) -> None:
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if not gp.upstreams:
return
_docker_exec(sidecar_name, [
"mkdir", "-p",
str(Path(GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER).parent),
GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, "/git",
str(Path(_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE).parent),
])
for host_path, container_path in _git_gate_files(plan):
_docker_cp(host_path, f"{sidecar_name}:{container_path}")
_docker_exec(sidecar_name, [
"sh", "-c",
f"chmod 755 {GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER} "
f"{GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER} {GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER} && "
f"chmod 600 {GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/* && "
f"touch {_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}",
])
def _git_gate_files(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan) -> tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]:
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
files: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
(str(gp.entrypoint_script), GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER),
(str(gp.hook_script), GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
(str(gp.access_hook_script), GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
]
for upstream in gp.upstreams:
files.append((expand_tilde(upstream.identity_file),
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{upstream.name}-key"))
if upstream.known_hosts_file:
files.append((str(upstream.known_hosts_file),
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{upstream.name}-known_hosts"))
return tuple(files)
return plan, base
# --- agent guest env -------------------------------------------------
@@ -330,7 +234,8 @@ def _agent_guest_env(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan, host_ip: str) -> dict[str, str
"""Env injected into every agent/exec call over SSH. The VM has no
baked process env (it just runs init), so the proxy/CA/git/supervise
wiring is applied per-invocation."""
proxy_url = f"http://{host_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
# Carries the identity token as proxy credentials (set in `launch`).
proxy_url = plan.agent_proxy_url or f"http://{host_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
no_proxy = f"localhost,127.0.0.1,{host_ip}"
env: dict[str, str] = {
"HTTPS_PROXY": proxy_url, "HTTP_PROXY": proxy_url,
@@ -355,50 +260,3 @@ def _agent_guest_env(plan: FirecrackerBottlePlan, host_ip: str) -> dict[str, str
if value is not None:
env[name] = value
return env
# --- docker helpers --------------------------------------------------
def _docker_build(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
info(f"docker build {ref}")
args = ["docker", "build", "-t", ref]
if dockerfile:
if not os.path.isabs(dockerfile):
dockerfile = os.path.join(context, dockerfile)
args += ["-f", dockerfile]
args.append(context)
result = subprocess.run(args, check=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"docker build for {ref!r} failed")
def _image_exists(ref: str) -> bool:
return subprocess.run(
["docker", "image", "inspect", ref],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
).returncode == 0
def _force_remove_container(name: str) -> None:
subprocess.run(
["docker", "rm", "-f", name],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
def _docker_exec(name: str, argv: list[str]) -> None:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", name, *argv], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"docker exec in {name} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}")
def _docker_cp(host_path: str, dest: str) -> None:
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "cp", host_path, dest], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(f"docker cp {host_path} -> {dest} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}")
@@ -15,3 +15,11 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE=8
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=10.243.0.0
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=bbfc
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=bot_bottle_fc
# The orchestrator/gateway VM's own TAP — a dedicated link OUTSIDE the
# bbfc* agent pool. Unlike agent VMs (which reach only their gateway),
# the orchestrator is trusted infra that needs real NAT'd internet
# egress: to FROM-pull + apt/npm during in-VM agent-image builds
# (buildah) and to forward agent egress upstream (Stage B gateway). Its
# /31 is the top of the IP_BASE /16 (host x.y.255.0, guest x.y.255.1),
# clear of the pool near the bottom of the block.
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE=bborch0
+28 -3
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Topology (per slot i):
* a /31 host<->guest link: host = base + 2i (the gateway the VM
routes through), guest = base + 2i + 1 (the VM's address).
* isolation via ``table inet bot_bottle_fc``: a VM reaches only its
own sidecar (DNAT'd from the host TAP IP) and nothing else.
own gateway (DNAT'd from the host TAP IP) and nothing else.
The default IP block is ``10.243.0.0/16`` an intentionally obscure
corner of RFC-1918 private space. RFC-1918 is the range *designated*
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ def _cfg(key: str) -> str:
IFACE_PREFIX = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX")
NFT_TABLE = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE")
# The orchestrator/gateway VM's dedicated TAP — outside the bbfc* agent
# pool and, unlike it, NAT'd to the internet (see `orch_slot`). The
# orchestrator is trusted infra: it builds agent images in-VM (buildah
# needs to FROM-pull + apt/npm) and forwards agent egress upstream.
ORCH_IFACE = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE")
def pool_size() -> int:
return int(_cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"))
@@ -88,10 +94,10 @@ def ip_base() -> str:
return _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE")
# Sidecar ports the VM reaches at its host-side TAP IP. Kept in sync
# Gateway ports the VM reaches at its host-side TAP IP. Kept in sync
# with the backend constants (egress 9099, supervise 9100, git-http
# 9420); rendered into the setup output for operator visibility.
SIDECAR_PORTS = (9099, 9100, 9420)
GATEWAY_PORTS = (9099, 9100, 9420)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -123,6 +129,25 @@ def all_slots() -> list[Slot]:
return [slot(i) for i in range(pool_size())]
def orch_slot() -> Slot:
"""The orchestrator/gateway VM's dedicated link — its own TAP
(`ORCH_IFACE`) on a /31 at the TOP of the IP_BASE /16 (host
x.y.255.0, guest x.y.255.1), well clear of the agent pool near the
bottom of the block. Unlike a pool `Slot`, this link is NAT'd out to
the internet by the setup (the orchestrator is trusted infra), so it
is deliberately *not* one of the isolated `bbfc*` slots.
`index` is -1 (sentinel: not a pool index)."""
base16 = int(ipaddress.IPv4Address(ip_base())) & 0xFFFF0000
host = base16 + 0xFF00
return Slot(
index=-1,
iface=ORCH_IFACE,
host_ip=str(ipaddress.IPv4Address(host)),
guest_ip=str(ipaddress.IPv4Address(host + 1)),
)
# --- fail-closed verification ---------------------------------------
def _run_ok(argv: list[str]) -> bool:
+17 -8
View File
@@ -159,15 +159,22 @@ def docker_image_id(ref: str) -> str:
return result.stdout.strip().replace("sha256:", "")[:16]
def build_base_rootfs_dir(image_ref: str) -> Path:
"""Export the agent image's filesystem and inject the guest init +
static dropbear. Cached by image digest the per-bottle bits
def build_base_rootfs_dir(
image_ref: str, *, variant: str = "", init_script: str | None = None,
) -> Path:
"""Export the image's filesystem and inject the guest init + static
dropbear. Cached by image digest the per-bottle bits
(authorized_keys, IP) are passed at boot via the kernel cmdline, so
this tree carries nothing bottle-specific and is safely shared.
`variant` suffixes the cache key so the same image can be prepared
with a different `init_script` (e.g. the infra VM boots the same
orchestrator image as the builder but runs the control plane as
PID 1, not the SSH-only agent init) without a cache collision.
Returns the prepared directory (read as the `mke2fs -d` source)."""
digest = docker_image_id(image_ref)
base = cache_dir() / "rootfs" / digest
base = cache_dir() / "rootfs" / f"{digest}{variant}"
ready = base / ".bb-ready"
if ready.is_file():
return base
@@ -200,17 +207,19 @@ def build_base_rootfs_dir(image_ref: str) -> Path:
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
_inject_guest_boot(base)
inject_guest_boot(base, init_script=init_script)
ready.write_text("ok\n")
return base
def _inject_guest_boot(rootfs: Path) -> None:
"""Drop the static dropbear and the PID-1 init into the rootfs."""
def inject_guest_boot(rootfs: Path, init_script: str | None = None) -> None:
"""Drop the static dropbear and the PID-1 init into the rootfs.
`init_script` defaults to the SSH-only agent init; the infra VM
passes its own (control plane + gateway) init."""
shutil.copy2(dropbear_path(), rootfs / "bb-dropbear")
os.chmod(rootfs / "bb-dropbear", 0o755)
init = rootfs / "bb-init"
init.write_text(_GUEST_INIT)
init.write_text(init_script or _GUEST_INIT)
os.chmod(init, 0o755)
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Selectable via `BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=macos-container`. This package owns
the Apple `container` CLI integration; launch remains gated until the
sidecar network enforcement shape is implemented.
gateway network enforcement shape is implemented.
"""
from .backend import MacosContainerBottleBackend
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ from . import util as container_mod
from .bottle_cleanup_plan import MacosContainerBottleCleanupPlan
_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-"
_BUNDLE_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-sidecars-"
def _list_prefixed_containers() -> list[str]:
@@ -24,7 +23,7 @@ def _list_prefixed_containers() -> list[str]:
return []
return sorted(
name for name in (line.strip() for line in result.stdout.splitlines())
if name.startswith(_PREFIX) or name.startswith(_BUNDLE_PREFIX)
if name.startswith(_PREFIX)
)
@@ -1,36 +1,24 @@
"""Host-side egress apply for the macos-container backend.
"""Host-side egress route-apply for the macos-container backend.
Uses `container kill --signal HUP` (Apple Container framework) instead
of `docker kill` to signal the sidecar bundle.
The per-bottle companion container this used to signal (`container kill
--signal HUP <container>`) was removed in the companion-container removal (#385),
along with the disabled macOS launch path. Fails closed until the macOS
backend grows the consolidated gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
from ...log import warn
from ..egress_apply import EgressApplicator, EgressApplyError
from .launch import sidecar_container_name
class MacOSContainerEgressApplicator(EgressApplicator):
def _signal_bundle_reload(self, slug: str) -> None:
container = sidecar_container_name(slug)
result = subprocess.run(
["container", "kill", "--signal", "HUP", container],
capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, env=os.environ,
del slug
raise EgressApplyError(
"live egress route-apply was removed with the per-bottle "
"companion container (#385); the macos-container backend is "
"disabled until it uses the consolidated gateway."
)
if result.returncode != 0:
last_error = (result.stderr or "").strip() or (result.stdout or "").strip()
warn(
f"egress: routes updated on disk for {slug}, but bundle reload failed: "
f"{last_error or 'container kill failed'}"
)
raise EgressApplyError(
f"could not reload egress bundle {container}: "
f"{last_error or 'container kill failed'}"
)
applicator = MacOSContainerEgressApplicator()
@@ -1,40 +1,14 @@
"""Active-agent enumeration for the macOS Apple Container backend."""
"""Active-agent enumeration for the macOS Apple Container backend.
The backend is disabled during the companion-container removal (#385) — it can't
launch bottles, so there are none to enumerate. Enumeration returns when
the backend grows the consolidated gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from ...bottle_state import read_metadata
from .. import ActiveAgent
_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-"
_SIDECAR_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-sidecars-"
def enumerate_active() -> list[ActiveAgent]:
result = subprocess.run(
["container", "list", "--quiet"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
return []
out: list[ActiveAgent] = []
for name in sorted(line.strip() for line in result.stdout.splitlines()):
if not name.startswith(_PREFIX):
continue
if name.startswith(_SIDECAR_PREFIX):
continue
slug = name[len(_PREFIX):]
metadata = read_metadata(slug)
out.append(ActiveAgent(
backend_name="macos-container",
slug=slug,
agent_name=metadata.agent_name if metadata else "?",
started_at=metadata.started_at if metadata else "",
services=(),
label=metadata.label if metadata else "",
color=metadata.color if metadata else "",
))
return out
return []
+21 -440
View File
@@ -1,458 +1,39 @@
"""Launch flow for the macOS Apple Container backend.
"""Launch flow for the macOS Apple Container backend — disabled (#385).
This backend keeps the explicit proxy-env enforcement model for v1:
the agent container is attached only to a host-only Apple Container
network, while the sidecar bundle is attached to a NAT network first
and the host-only network second. The sidecar's host-only IP is
discovered from `container inspect` and stamped into the agent's
HTTP_PROXY / HTTPS_PROXY env vars.
This backend launched a per-bottle companion container (the egress /
git-gate / supervise data plane) alongside the agent container, with the
agent's proxy env pointed at the companion's host-only IP. That
per-bottle-companion architecture was removed in the companion-container removal;
the macOS backend will be re-enabled once it grows the consolidated
per-host gateway the docker backend already uses.
Until then, launching a macOS bottle fails closed. `prepare` / `status`
/ cleanup still work.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import dataclasses
import os
import subprocess
from contextlib import ExitStack, contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from contextlib import contextmanager
from typing import Callable, Generator
from ...bottle_state import (
egress_state_dir,
git_gate_state_dir,
read_committed_image,
)
from ...egress import (
EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
egress_agent_env_entries,
egress_resolve_token_values,
egress_sidecar_env_entries,
)
from ...git_gate import (
provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys,
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys,
)
from ...log import die, info, warn
from ...supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
from ...util import expand_tilde
from ..docker.egress import EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, EGRESS_PORT
from ..docker.git_gate import (
GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER,
GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER,
)
from ..docker.sidecar_bundle import (
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
)
from ..docker.egress import egress_tls_init
from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
from . import util as container_mod
from ...log import die
from .bottle import MacosContainerBottle
from .bottle_plan import MacosContainerBottlePlan
_REPO_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent.parent)
_AGENT_SLEEP_SECONDS = "2147483647"
_GIT_HTTP_PORT = 9420
_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE = "/run/git-gate/ready"
def internal_network_name(slug: str) -> str:
return f"bot-bottle-net-{slug}"
def egress_network_name(slug: str) -> str:
return f"bot-bottle-egress-{slug}"
def sidecar_container_name(slug: str) -> str:
return f"bot-bottle-sidecars-{slug}"
@contextmanager
def launch(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
*,
provision: Callable[[MacosContainerBottlePlan, "MacosContainerBottle"], str | None],
) -> Generator[MacosContainerBottle, None, None]:
"""Build, run, provision, and yield an Apple Container bottle."""
stack = ExitStack()
bottle_for_revoke = plan.manifest.bottle
git_gate_dir_for_revoke = git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug)
def teardown() -> None:
teardown_exc: BaseException | None = None
try:
stack.close()
except BaseException as exc: # noqa: W0718 - teardown must continue
teardown_exc = exc
warn(f"macos-container teardown failed: {exc!r}")
revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys(bottle_for_revoke, git_gate_dir_for_revoke)
if teardown_exc is not None:
raise teardown_exc
try:
plan = _mint_certs(plan)
plan = _build_images(plan)
internal_network = internal_network_name(plan.slug)
egress_network = egress_network_name(plan.slug)
_create_networks(internal_network, egress_network, stack)
plan = _provision_git_gate_keys(plan)
sidecar_name = sidecar_container_name(plan.slug)
container_mod.force_remove_container(sidecar_name)
_start_sidecar_bundle(plan, sidecar_name, internal_network, egress_network)
stack.callback(container_mod.force_remove_container, sidecar_name)
_stage_git_gate(plan, sidecar_name)
sidecar_ip = container_mod.container_ipv4_on_network(
sidecar_name, internal_network,
)
plan = _stamp_agent_urls(plan, sidecar_ip)
container_mod.force_remove_container(plan.container_name)
_start_agent(plan, internal_network, sidecar_ip)
stack.callback(container_mod.force_remove_container, plan.container_name)
bottle = MacosContainerBottle(
plan.container_name,
teardown,
None,
agent_command=plan.agent_command,
agent_prompt_mode=plan.agent_prompt_mode,
agent_provider_template=plan.agent_provider_template,
terminal_title=f"{plan.spec.label} ({plan.spec.agent_name})" if plan.spec.label else plan.spec.agent_name,
terminal_color=plan.spec.color,
agent_workdir=plan.workspace_plan.workdir,
)
bottle.prompt_path = provision(plan, bottle)
yield bottle
finally:
teardown()
def _mint_certs(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
egress_ca_host, egress_ca_cert_only = egress_tls_init(
egress_state_dir(plan.slug),
"""Fail closed: the macOS backend is disabled until it grows the
consolidated per-host gateway (the companion-container path it used
was removed in #385)."""
del plan, provision
die(
"the macos-container backend is temporarily disabled during the "
"companion-container removal (#385); it will return once it uses "
"the consolidated gateway. Use --backend=docker for now."
)
egress_plan = dataclasses.replace(
plan.egress_plan,
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=egress_ca_host,
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_cert_only,
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, egress_plan=egress_plan)
def _build_images(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
container_mod.build_image(
SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE,
_REPO_DIR,
dockerfile=SIDECAR_BUNDLE_DOCKERFILE,
)
committed = read_committed_image(plan.slug)
if committed and container_mod.image_exists(committed):
info(f"using committed image {committed!r}")
return dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_provision=dataclasses.replace(
plan.agent_provision,
image=committed,
),
)
container_mod.build_image(
plan.image,
_REPO_DIR,
dockerfile=plan.dockerfile_path,
)
return plan
def _create_networks(
internal_network: str,
egress_network: str,
stack: ExitStack,
) -> None:
container_mod.create_network(internal_network, internal=True)
stack.callback(container_mod.remove_network, internal_network)
container_mod.create_network(egress_network)
stack.callback(container_mod.remove_network, egress_network)
def _start_sidecar_bundle(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
sidecar_name: str,
internal_network: str,
egress_network: str,
) -> None:
argv = _sidecar_run_argv(plan, sidecar_name, internal_network, egress_network)
effective_env = {**dict(os.environ), **plan.agent_provision.provisioned_env}
token_values = egress_resolve_token_values(
plan.egress_plan.token_env_map, effective_env,
)
env = {**os.environ, **token_values}
info(f"container run sidecar bundle {sidecar_name}")
result = subprocess.run(
argv, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(
f"container run for sidecar bundle {sidecar_name} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}"
)
def _start_agent(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
internal_network: str,
sidecar_ip: str,
) -> None:
argv = _agent_run_argv(plan, internal_network, sidecar_ip)
env = {
**os.environ,
**plan.forwarded_env,
}
info(f"container run agent {plan.container_name}")
result = subprocess.run(
argv, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env, check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
die(
f"container run for agent {plan.container_name} failed: "
f"{(result.stderr or '').strip() or '<no stderr>'}"
)
def _stamp_agent_urls(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
sidecar_ip: str,
) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
proxy_url = f"http://{sidecar_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
supervise_url = ""
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
supervise_url = f"http://{sidecar_ip}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
git_gate_url = ""
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
git_gate_url = f"http://{sidecar_ip}:{_GIT_HTTP_PORT}"
return dataclasses.replace(
plan,
agent_proxy_url=proxy_url,
agent_git_gate_url=git_gate_url,
agent_supervise_url=supervise_url,
)
def _provision_git_gate_keys(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
if not plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
return plan
git_gate_plan = provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys(
plan.manifest.bottle,
plan.git_gate_plan,
git_gate_state_dir(plan.slug),
)
return dataclasses.replace(plan, git_gate_plan=git_gate_plan)
def _stage_git_gate(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan, sidecar_name: str) -> None:
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
if not gp.upstreams:
return
container_mod.exec_container(
sidecar_name,
[
"mkdir",
"-p",
str(Path(GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER).parent),
GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER,
"/git",
str(Path(_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE).parent),
],
)
for host_path, container_path in _git_gate_files(plan):
container_mod.copy_into_container(
sidecar_name, host_path, container_path,
)
container_mod.exec_container(
sidecar_name,
[
"sh",
"-c",
"chmod 755 "
f"{GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER} "
f"{GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER} "
f"{GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER} && "
f"chmod 600 {GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/* && "
f"touch {_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}",
],
)
def _git_gate_files(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, str], ...]:
gp = plan.git_gate_plan
files: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
(str(gp.entrypoint_script), GIT_GATE_ENTRYPOINT_IN_CONTAINER),
(str(gp.hook_script), GIT_GATE_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
(str(gp.access_hook_script), GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK_IN_CONTAINER),
]
for upstream in gp.upstreams:
files.append((
expand_tilde(upstream.identity_file),
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{upstream.name}-key",
))
if upstream.known_hosts_file:
files.append((
str(upstream.known_hosts_file),
f"{GIT_GATE_CREDS_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}/{upstream.name}-known_hosts",
))
return tuple(files)
def _sidecar_run_argv(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
sidecar_name: str,
internal_network: str,
egress_network: str,
) -> list[str]:
argv = [
"container", "run",
"--name", sidecar_name,
"--detach",
"--rm",
"--network", egress_network,
"--network", internal_network,
"--dns", _sidecar_dns(),
"--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS={','.join(_sidecar_daemons(plan))}",
]
for entry in _sidecar_env_entries(plan):
argv += ["--env", entry]
for host_path, container_path, read_only in _sidecar_mounts(plan):
argv += ["--mount", _mount_spec(host_path, container_path, read_only)]
argv.append(SIDECAR_BUNDLE_IMAGE)
return argv
def _agent_run_argv(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
internal_network: str,
sidecar_ip: str,
) -> list[str]:
argv = [
"container", "run",
"--name", plan.container_name,
"--detach",
"--network", internal_network,
]
for entry in _agent_env_entries(plan, sidecar_ip):
argv += ["--env", entry]
argv += [plan.image, "sleep", _AGENT_SLEEP_SECONDS]
return argv
def _sidecar_dns() -> str:
return container_mod.dns_server()
def _sidecar_daemons(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
daemons = ["egress"]
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
daemons += ["git-gate", "git-http"]
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
daemons.append("supervise")
return tuple(daemons)
def _sidecar_env_entries(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
env: list[str] = list(egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE={_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}")
if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
env += [
f"SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG={plan.slug}",
f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
f"SUPERVISE_PORT={SUPERVISE_PORT}",
]
return tuple(env)
def _sidecar_mounts(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
) -> tuple[tuple[str, str, bool], ...]:
mounts: list[tuple[str, str, bool]] = []
ep = plan.egress_plan
mounts.append((
str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path.parent),
str(Path(EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER).parent),
False,
))
if ep.routes:
mounts.append((
str(ep.routes_path.parent),
str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent),
True,
))
sp = plan.supervise_plan
if sp is not None:
# `container run --mount type=bind` only accepts directory
# sources (a file source fails with "is not a directory") —
# mount db_path's dedicated parent dir instead of the file
# itself, same as the CA/routes mounts above.
mounts.append((
str(sp.db_path.parent),
str(Path(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER).parent),
False,
))
return tuple(mounts)
def _mount_spec(host_path: str, container_path: str, read_only: bool) -> str:
spec = f"type=bind,source={host_path},target={container_path}"
if read_only:
spec += ",readonly"
return spec
def _agent_env_entries(
plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan,
sidecar_ip: str,
) -> tuple[str, ...]:
proxy_url = f"http://{sidecar_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
no_proxy = _agent_no_proxy(plan, sidecar_ip)
env = [
f"HTTPS_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"HTTP_PROXY={proxy_url}",
f"https_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"http_proxy={proxy_url}",
f"NO_PROXY={no_proxy}",
f"no_proxy={no_proxy}",
f"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS={AGENT_CA_PATH}",
f"SSL_CERT_FILE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
f"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE={AGENT_CA_BUNDLE}",
]
if plan.agent_git_gate_url:
env.append(f"GIT_GATE_URL={plan.agent_git_gate_url}")
if plan.agent_supervise_url:
env.append(f"MCP_SUPERVISE_URL={plan.agent_supervise_url}")
for name, value in sorted(plan.agent_provision.guest_env.items()):
env.append(f"{name}={value}")
for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
env.append(name)
env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
return tuple(env)
def _agent_no_proxy(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan, sidecar_ip: str) -> str:
hosts = ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", sidecar_ip]
return ",".join(hosts)
yield # unreachable — `die` raises; keeps this a generator/contextmanager
+31 -1
View File
@@ -60,13 +60,21 @@ def dns_server() -> str:
def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
"""Build an OCI image with Apple's BuildKit-backed `container build`."""
"""Build an OCI image with Apple's BuildKit-backed `container build`.
Set `BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE=1` (the `start --no-cache` flag) to force
`--no-cache`. The npm/curl installers some provider Dockerfiles
shell out to can silently no-op on a transient network failure
e.g. an `optionalDependencies` fetch for a platform-native binary
and the builder will then cache that broken layer indefinitely."""
info(
f"building image {ref} from {context} with Apple Container "
"(layer cache keeps repeat builds fast)"
)
_ensure_builder_dns()
args = [_CONTAINER, "build", "-t", ref, "--dns", dns_server()]
if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE") == "1":
args.append("--no-cache")
if dockerfile:
# `container build` resolves -f relative to the current working
# directory, not the build context. Anchor a relative Dockerfile to
@@ -78,6 +86,28 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
subprocess.run(args, check=True)
def verify_agent_image(image: str, argv: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
"""Run `argv` inside a throwaway container of a freshly built agent
image and die loudly if it fails, instead of shipping an image
whose CLI only breaks at first real use. No-op when the provider
hasn't declared a smoke test (`AgentProviderRuntime.smoke_test`)."""
if not argv:
return
result = subprocess.run(
[_CONTAINER, "run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", argv[0], image, *argv[1:]],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
die(
f"agent image {image!r} failed its post-build smoke test "
f"({' '.join(argv)}): {detail}\n"
f"Try rebuilding from scratch: bot-bottle start --no-cache"
)
def commit_container(container_name: str, image_tag: str) -> None:
"""Snapshot a running Apple Container as a local image.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ def prepare_egress(
def prepare_supervise(bottle: ManifestBottle, slug: str) -> SupervisePlan | None:
"""Prepare the supervise sidecar state dir. Returns None when
"""Prepare the supervise daemon state dir. Returns None when
bottle.supervise is falsy."""
if not bottle.supervise:
return None
+9 -9
View File
@@ -44,16 +44,16 @@ _STATE_SUBDIR = "state"
_PER_BOTTLE_DOCKERFILE_NAME = "Dockerfile"
_COMMITTED_IMAGE_NAME = "committed-image"
_TRANSCRIPT_SUBDIR = "transcript"
# Per-sidecar scratch subdirs. PRD 0018 chunk 2: bind-mount sources
# Per-daemon scratch subdirs. PRD 0018 chunk 2: bind-mount sources
# live here so chunk 3's `docker compose up` can find them at stable
# paths. Each sidecar's `prepare()` writes config + CAs into its own
# paths. Each daemon's `prepare()` writes config + CAs into its own
# subdir; the launch step is unchanged today (still `docker cp`).
_EGRESS_SUBDIR = "egress"
_GIT_GATE_SUBDIR = "git-gate"
_SUPERVISE_SUBDIR = "supervise"
_AGENT_SUBDIR = "agent"
_METADATA_NAME = "metadata.json"
# Live-config dir bind-mounted into the supervise sidecar (read-only).
# Live-config dir bind-mounted into the supervise daemon (read-only).
# Host's apply paths keep these files fresh so supervise's
# `list-egress-routes` MCP tool returns the current state —
# not a snapshot from launch time.
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ def per_bottle_image_tag(identity: str) -> str:
def live_config_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""Per-bottle live-config dir. Bind-mounted read-only into the
supervise sidecar; the host's apply paths refresh the files on
supervise daemon; the host's apply paths refresh the files on
every operator approval so the agent's `list-*` MCP tools always
return current state."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _LIVE_CONFIG_SUBDIR
@@ -260,9 +260,9 @@ def transcript_snapshot_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _TRANSCRIPT_SUBDIR
# --- Per-sidecar scratch subdirs (PRD 0018 chunk 2) ------------------------
# --- Per-daemon scratch subdirs (PRD 0018 chunk 2) ------------------------
#
# Each sidecar gets its own subdir under the bottle's state dir for
# Each daemon gets its own subdir under the bottle's state dir for
# bind-mount sources (config, CAs, hooks, etc.). Prepare-time writes
# land here; the state dir's normal cleanup (`cleanup_state`) reaps
# them along with everything else when the bottle session ends and
@@ -270,20 +270,20 @@ def transcript_snapshot_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
def egress_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the egress sidecar: routes.yaml + the
"""State subdir for the egress daemon: routes.yaml + the
per-bottle mitmproxy CA. Bind-mount source from chunk 3 onward."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _EGRESS_SUBDIR
def git_gate_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir for the git-gate sidecar: entrypoint + hooks +
"""State subdir for the git-gate daemon: entrypoint + hooks +
per-upstream known_hosts. Bind-mount source from chunk 3
onward."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _GIT_GATE_SUBDIR
def supervise_state_dir(identity: str) -> Path:
"""State subdir reserved for supervise sidecar bind-mount sources.
"""State subdir reserved for supervise daemon bind-mount sources.
Runtime queue/audit rows live in the host-level bot-bottle SQLite
database, so they survive state-dir cleanup."""
return bottle_state_dir(identity) / _SUPERVISE_SUBDIR
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
Walks every registered backend (docker, firecracker, macos-container)
so a single `./cli.py cleanup` reaps every backend's leftovers — a
firecracker bottle's sidecars won't survive a docker-only cleanup pass
(issue addressed alongside #77).
firecracker bottle's VM processes and run dirs won't survive a
docker-only cleanup pass (issue addressed alongside #77).
Each backend's `prepare_cleanup` enumerates its own resources;
docker's `_list_orphan_state_dirs` consults
+16
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} start", add_help=True)
parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
parser.add_argument("--cwd", action="store_true", help="copy host cwd into the running bottle")
parser.add_argument(
"--no-cache",
action="store_true",
help=(
"rebuild agent/sidecar images from scratch, bypassing the "
"build layer cache. Use when an image looks broken after a "
"dependency bump — e.g. an installer's optionalDependencies "
"fetch silently no-op'd on a transient failure and got baked "
"into a cached layer."
),
)
parser.add_argument(
"--backend",
choices=known_backend_names(),
@@ -97,6 +108,11 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
dry_run = args.dry_run or os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_DRY_RUN") == "1"
if args.no_cache or os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE") == "1":
# Read by build_image() in each backend's util module — set here
# so both the interactive and --headless paths pick it up without
# threading a no_cache field through every backend's plan dataclass.
os.environ["BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"] = "1"
manifest = ManifestIndex.resolve(USER_CWD)
backend_name: str | None = args.backend
+46 -80
View File
@@ -20,32 +20,19 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from ..paths import bot_bottle_root
from ..bottle_state import read_metadata
from ..backend.docker.egress_apply import (
EgressApplyError,
applicator as _docker_applicator,
)
from ..backend.macos_container.egress_apply import (
applicator as _macos_applicator,
)
from ..log import Die, error, info
from ..orchestrator.client import (
OrchestratorClient,
OrchestratorClientError,
discover_orchestrator_url,
)
from ..supervise import (
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
AuditEntry,
Proposal,
Response,
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
list_all_pending_proposals,
render_diff,
write_audit_entry,
write_response,
)
from ._common import PROG
@@ -65,25 +52,31 @@ class QueuedProposal:
proposal: Proposal
# Errors any remediation engine may raise. Caught by the TUI key
# handlers and surfaced in the status line so a failed apply keeps
# the proposal pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (EgressApplyError,)
# A failed operator action (orchestrator unreachable, bottle torn down,
# 409) is caught by the TUI key handlers and surfaced in the status line so
# the proposal stays pending rather than crashing curses.
ApplyError = (OrchestratorClientError,)
def apply_routes_change(slug: str, content: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
meta = read_metadata(slug)
backend = meta.backend if meta is not None else ""
if backend == "macos-container":
return _macos_applicator.apply_routes_change(slug, content)
return _docker_applicator.apply_routes_change(slug, content)
# The one per-host orchestrator, discovered lazily on first use. Every
# operator action — list, approve, reject — goes through its HTTP control
# plane (the orchestrator owns the single DB + live policy); there is no
# direct-DB path and no backend branching here.
_client_instance: OrchestratorClient | None = None
def _client() -> OrchestratorClient:
global _client_instance # noqa: PLW0603 — CLI-session singleton
if _client_instance is None:
_client_instance = OrchestratorClient(discover_orchestrator_url())
return _client_instance
def discover_pending() -> list[QueuedProposal]:
"""Collect pending proposals across bottles."""
"""Collect pending proposals across bottles from the orchestrator."""
out = [
QueuedProposal(proposal=proposal)
for proposal in list_all_pending_proposals()
QueuedProposal(proposal=Proposal.from_dict(d))
for d in _client().supervise_pending()
]
out.sort(key=lambda q: q.proposal.arrival_timestamp)
return out
@@ -136,39 +129,27 @@ def approve(
notes: str = "",
final_file: str | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Apply the proposal, write the waiting response, and audit it."""
status = STATUS_MODIFIED if final_file is not None else STATUS_APPROVED
file_to_apply = final_file if final_file is not None else qp.proposal.proposed_file
diff_before, diff_after = "", ""
if qp.proposal.tool in (TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
diff_before, diff_after = apply_routes_change(
qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
file_to_apply,
)
response = Response(
proposal_id=qp.proposal.id,
status=status,
"""Approve (or, with `final_file`, modify-then-approve) via the
orchestrator: it applies the route change to the bottle's live policy,
writes the response that unblocks the agent, and audits it one atomic
server-side op. Raises `OrchestratorClientError` on failure."""
_client().supervise_respond(
qp.proposal.id,
bottle_slug=qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
decision="modify" if final_file is not None else "approve",
notes=notes,
final_file=final_file,
)
write_response(qp.proposal.bottle_slug, response)
_write_audit(
qp, action=status, notes=notes,
diff_before=diff_before, diff_after=diff_after,
)
def reject(qp: QueuedProposal, *, reason: str) -> None:
"""Write a rejection response and an audit entry."""
response = Response(
proposal_id=qp.proposal.id,
status=STATUS_REJECTED,
"""Reject via the orchestrator (writes the response + audit)."""
_client().supervise_respond(
qp.proposal.id,
bottle_slug=qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
decision="reject",
notes=reason,
final_file=None,
)
write_response(qp.proposal.bottle_slug, response)
_write_audit(qp, action=STATUS_REJECTED, notes=reason, diff_before="", diff_after="")
def _approve_from_tui(
@@ -188,29 +169,6 @@ def _approve_from_tui(
return _approval_status(qp, verb)
def _write_audit(
qp: QueuedProposal,
*,
action: str,
notes: str,
diff_before: str,
diff_after: str,
) -> None:
"""Audit log for egress tool."""
component = COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL.get(qp.proposal.tool)
if component is None:
return
write_audit_entry(AuditEntry(
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
bottle_slug=qp.proposal.bottle_slug,
component=component,
operator_action=action,
operator_notes=notes,
justification=qp.proposal.justification,
diff=render_diff(diff_before, diff_after, label=component),
))
# --- $EDITOR integration --------------------------------------------------
@@ -245,6 +203,14 @@ def cmd_supervise(argv: list[str]) -> int:
)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
# Establish the orchestrator connection up front so a missing control
# plane is a clean one-line error, not a curses crash mid-loop.
try:
_client()
except OrchestratorClientError as e:
error(str(e))
return 1
if args.once:
return _list_once()
try:
+12 -3
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ The Claude-specific behavior previously inlined under
`agent_provider.agent_provision_plan` (claude.json trust marker,
api.anthropic.com egress route, OAuth-token placeholder), plus
the `claude mcp add` invocation that registers the supervise
sidecar in claude-code's user config (PRD 0013)."""
gateway in claude-code's user config (PRD 0013)."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
# App-layer identity token header (mirrors egress_addon / git_http_backend).
_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
def _skills_dir(guest_home: str) -> str:
@@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
smoke_test=("claude", "--version"),
)
@@ -293,16 +296,22 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Run `claude mcp add` inside the agent guest to register the
supervise sidecar in claude-code's user config (~/.claude.json).
supervise daemon in claude-code's user config (~/.claude.json).
Failure is logged but not fatal the bottle still works without
the entry; the operator can register it manually."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent claude config → {supervise_url}")
# Deliver the identity token as an MCP request header — the supervise
# daemon requires it (mandatory (source_ip, token) attribution).
token = getattr(plan, "identity_token", "")
header = (
f" --header {shlex.quote(f'{_IDENTITY_HEADER}: {token}')}" if token else ""
)
r = bottle.exec(
f"claude mcp add --scope user --transport http "
f"{_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME} {supervise_url}",
f"{_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME} {supervise_url}{header}",
user="node",
)
if r.returncode != 0:
+68 -15
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,12 @@ The Codex-specific behavior previously inlined under
`agent_provider.agent_provision_plan` (config.toml trust marker,
chatgpt.com / api.openai.com egress routes, optional host-credential
forwarding with dummy-auth.json + verify), plus the `codex mcp add`
invocation that registers the supervise sidecar in Codex's
invocation that registers the supervise daemon in Codex's
~/.codex/config.toml (PRD 0050)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import os
import shlex
from pathlib import Path
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
)
from .codex_auth import codex_host_access_token, write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from ...egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
from ...log import die, info, warn
from ...log import die, info
if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME = "supervise"
# App-layer identity token header (mirrors egress_addon / git_http_backend).
_IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
_CODEX_CLI = "/home/node/.codex/packages/standalone/current/bin/codex"
_CODEX_CLI_PATH = (
"/home/node/.local/bin:"
@@ -42,6 +45,41 @@ _CODEX_CLI_PATH = (
)
def _toml_basic_string(value: str) -> str:
"""Quote `value` as a TOML basic (double-quoted) string."""
escaped = (
value.replace("\\", "\\\\")
.replace('"', '\\"')
.replace("\n", "\\n")
.replace("\t", "\\t")
)
return f'"{escaped}"'
def _supervise_mcp_config_toml(supervise_url: str, token: str) -> str:
"""Render the `[mcp_servers.supervise]` streamable-HTTP entry for
Codex's `config.toml`.
The Codex CLI has no `mcp add --header` flag; a static request
header on an HTTP MCP server is only expressible via the
`http_headers` config key (see `RawMcpServerConfig` /
`McpServerTransportConfig::StreamableHttp`). We deliver the
mandatory identity token (source_ip, token attribution) that way.
Only Codex-supported streamable-HTTP keys (`url`, `http_headers`)
are emitted."""
lines = [
"",
f"[mcp_servers.{_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME}]",
f"url = {_toml_basic_string(supervise_url)}",
]
if token:
key = _toml_basic_string(_IDENTITY_HEADER)
val = _toml_basic_string(token)
lines.append(f"http_headers = {{ {key} = {val} }}")
lines.append("")
return "\n".join(lines)
def _skills_dir(guest_home: str) -> str:
# Codex agents still read skills from the claude-code convention
# (~/.claude/skills/) — the bot-bottle-codex image follows the
@@ -61,6 +99,7 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
smoke_test=(_CODEX_CLI, "--version"),
)
@@ -265,25 +304,39 @@ class CodexAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
bottle: "Bottle",
supervise_url: str,
) -> None:
"""Run `codex mcp add` inside the agent guest to register the
supervise sidecar in Codex's user config (~/.codex/config.toml).
"""Register the supervise daemon as a streamable-HTTP MCP
server in Codex's user config (`~/.codex/config.toml`).
Mirrors the Claude provider's `claude mcp add` flow — failure
is logged but not fatal."""
We write the `[mcp_servers.supervise]` entry directly rather
than shelling out to `codex mcp add`: the CLI's `add` has no
way to attach a static request header, and the identity token
(mandatory (source_ip, token) attribution) MUST ride on the
MCP request as `http_headers`. Failure is FATAL when supervise
is enabled a silently-unregistered server leaves the agent
with no supervise access and, under mandatory attribution, no
way to recover from inside the bottle."""
if plan.supervise_plan is None:
return
info(f"registering supervise MCP server in agent codex config → {supervise_url}")
r = bottle.exec(
f"{shlex.quote(_CODEX_CLI)} mcp add {_SUPERVISE_MCP_NAME} --url "
f"{shlex.quote(supervise_url)}",
user="node",
token = getattr(plan, "identity_token", "")
block = _supervise_mcp_config_toml(supervise_url, token)
auth_dir = plan.agent_provision.guest_env.get("CODEX_HOME") \
or f"{plan.guest_home}/.codex"
config_path = f"{auth_dir}/config.toml"
# Append via base64 so the TOML payload never has to survive a
# shell-quoting round trip. node owns the config file, so append
# as node to preserve ownership/mode.
payload = base64.b64encode(block.encode()).decode()
script = (
f"printf %s {shlex.quote(payload)} | base64 -d "
f">> {shlex.quote(config_path)}"
)
r = bottle.exec(script, user="node")
if r.returncode != 0:
warn(
f"`codex mcp add supervise` failed (exit {r.returncode}): "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}. Inside the bottle, "
f"register manually with: "
f"codex mcp add supervise --url {shlex.quote(supervise_url)}"
die(
"agent provider provisioning: could not register supervise "
f"MCP server in {config_path}: "
f"{(r.stderr or r.stdout or '').strip()}"
)
def headless_prompt(self, prompt: str) -> list[str]:
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Pure Python, no mitmproxy dependency. Each detector is a module-level
function returning `ScanResult | None`.
Ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside
Ships flat into the gateway image alongside
`egress_addon_core.py` both this file and the package source use
the same try/except import shim pattern.
"""
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
"""Lean, framework-free `docker` subprocess primitive.
Deliberately a top-level module with a single stdlib import so it can be
reused from anywhere without cost. It is intentionally *not* placed in
`backend.docker.util`: importing that module runs `backend/__init__.py`,
which eagerly loads all three bottle backends (docker + firecracker +
macos) plus the manifest/egress/git-gate/supervise framework ~76 modules
which would drag the whole backend layer into the deliberately-lean
orchestrator. This primitive stays free of that so both the orchestrator's
docker components and (in time) `backend.docker.util` can share it."""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
def run_docker(argv: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
"""Run a `docker` command, capturing stdout/stderr as text. Never raises
on a non-zero exit callers inspect `returncode` / `stderr` so they can
stay fail-closed or tolerate idempotent no-ops (e.g. removing an
already-absent container)."""
return subprocess.run(
argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False,
)
__all__ = ["run_docker"]
+6 -6
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
This module defines the abstract proxy (`Egress`), its plan
dataclass (`EgressPlan`), and the resolved per-route shape
(`EgressRoute`). The sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-
(`EgressRoute`). The gateway's start/stop lifecycle is backend-
specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/egress.py`).
"""
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ def _random_canary_env() -> str:
return f"{first}_{second}_SECRET"
def egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Return sidecar env entries needed by egress across all backends."""
def egress_gateway_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Return gateway env entries needed by egress across all backends."""
env: list[str] = []
if plan.routes:
env.extend(sorted(plan.token_env_map.keys()))
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ class EgressRoute(Route):
Inherits `host`, `matches`, `auth_scheme`, and `token_env`
from `egress_addon_core.Route` those are the fields that cross the
YAML wire into the sidecar. The fields below are host-only and
YAML wire into the gateway. The fields below are host-only and
are never serialised to the addon.
`token_ref` is the host env var the CLI reads at launch and forwards
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ class Egress(ABC):
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes, log=log))
routes_path.chmod(0o600)
# Generate a per-session fake secret under a plausible random env name.
# The sidecar marks that exact env name as sensitive for known-secret
# The gateway marks that exact env name as sensitive for known-secret
# scanning; the agent receives the same name/value as exfil bait.
canary = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
return EgressPlan(
@@ -412,6 +412,6 @@ __all__ = [
"egress_resolve_token_values",
"egress_routes_for_bottle",
"egress_agent_env_entries",
"egress_sidecar_env_entries",
"egress_gateway_env_entries",
"egress_token_env_map",
]
+175 -41
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress gateway (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_addon.py` inside the
egress container."""
@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ egress container."""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import binascii
import json
import os
import signal
import sys
import typing
from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error
@@ -32,6 +35,7 @@ from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: dis
is_git_push_request,
load_config,
match_route,
resolve_client_context,
outbound_scan_headers,
route_to_yaml_dict,
scan_inbound,
@@ -51,11 +55,44 @@ try:
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle import supervise as _sv # type: ignore[import-not-found]
try:
from policy_resolver import PolicyResolver # type: ignore[import-not-found]
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolver
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
# Consolidated (multi-tenant) mode: when this points at the per-host
# orchestrator's control plane, the addon resolves each client's Config by
# source IP per request instead of using a single static routes file. Unset
# → legacy per-bottle single-tenant mode (unchanged).
ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL"
# App-layer identity token. Delivered as proxy credentials
# (`HTTPS_PROXY=http://<bottle_id>:<token>@gw`): clients honor it as part of
# the proxy protocol without app changes, and the addon reads + strips it so
# it never leaks upstream. The legacy `x-bot-bottle-identity` request header
# is still stripped defensively (git-http uses that header on its own port).
IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
def _token_from_proxy_auth(header: str) -> str:
"""Extract the identity token (the password) from a `Proxy-Authorization:
Basic base64(<bottle_id>:<token>)` header. Empty on any malformed value
the mandatory `/resolve` then fail-closes on the empty token."""
scheme, _, encoded = header.partition(" ")
if scheme.lower() != "basic" or not encoded:
return ""
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True).decode("utf-8")
except (binascii.Error, ValueError, UnicodeDecodeError):
return ""
_, _, password = decoded.partition(":")
return password
# Seconds the egress proxy holds a token-blocked request open waiting for the
# operator's supervisor decision (PRD 0062), overridable via env.
DEFAULT_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300.0
@@ -72,20 +109,48 @@ _TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION = (
class EgressAddon:
# Class default so addons built via __new__ (e.g. in tests) default to
# single-tenant; __init__ sets the instance attribute for real runs.
_resolver: "PolicyResolver | None" = None
# Class default so __new__-built addons have it (real runs get a fresh
# per-instance dict in __init__; only http_connect mutates it, which the
# request-flow tests don't exercise).
_conn_tokens: "dict[str, str]" = {}
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.config: Config = Config(routes=())
# Tokens the operator has approved this session (PRD 0062). In-memory
# only — a restart re-prompts. Mutated only from the asyncio loop that
# runs the addon hooks, so no lock is needed.
self.safe_tokens: set[str] = set()
# Consolidated mode: resolve per-client Config from the orchestrator.
# Absent → single-tenant (static routes file); behaviour unchanged.
orch_url = os.environ.get(ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV, "").strip()
self._resolver = PolicyResolver(orch_url) if orch_url else None
# Tokens the operator has approved this session (PRD 0062), keyed by
# bottle so the shared gateway keeps each bottle's safelist separate —
# a global set would let bottle A's approved secret pass bottle B's DLP
# scan. In-memory only (a restart re-prompts); mutated only from the
# asyncio loop that runs the addon hooks, so no lock is needed.
self._safe_tokens: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
# Per-client-connection identity token captured from the CONNECT's
# `Proxy-Authorization` (HTTPS tunnels don't repeat it on the bumped
# inner requests). Keyed by client_conn.id; cleared on disconnect.
self._conn_tokens: dict[str, str] = {}
self._supervise_slug = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", "").strip()
self._token_allow_timeout = _token_allow_timeout_from_env(os.environ)
self._reload(initial=True)
self._install_sighup()
def _supervise_available(self) -> bool:
return bool(self._supervise_slug)
@staticmethod
def _supervise_available(slug: str) -> bool:
"""Supervise is reachable for this request iff we resolved a bottle to
attribute its proposals to (single-tenant env slug, or a source-IP
-attributed bottle id). Empty fail closed (no queue to write to)."""
return bool(slug)
def _safe_tokens_for(self, slug: str) -> set[str]:
"""This bottle's operator-approved DLP safelist (PRD 0062), created on
first use. Keyed by bottle so the shared gateway never leaks one
bottle's approved token into another's scan."""
return self._safe_tokens.setdefault(slug, set())
def _reload(self, *, initial: bool = False) -> None:
try:
@@ -194,6 +259,58 @@ class EgressAddon:
+ "\n"
)
def _resolve_flow(
self, flow: http.HTTPFlow,
) -> "tuple[Config, str, typing.Mapping[str, str]]":
"""The `(Config, supervise slug, env)` to apply to this request.
Single-tenant the static `self.config`, the env slug, and the process
env. Consolidated the calling bottle's Config + bottle id + auth
tokens, resolved by source IP in one round-trip (fail-closed to deny-all
+ empty slug if unattributed); `env` is the process env overlaid with
the bottle's tokens, so upstream-auth injection (and DLP) use *this*
bottle's credentials — exactly what the per-bottle gateway daemon's env did.
The identity token, if the agent injected one, is read then stripped so
it never leaks upstream."""
if self._resolver is None:
return self.config, self._supervise_slug, os.environ
conn = flow.client_conn
client_ip = conn.peername[0] if conn and conn.peername else ""
token = self._request_token(flow)
config, slug, tokens = resolve_client_context(self._resolver, client_ip, token)
env = {**os.environ, **tokens} if tokens else os.environ
return config, slug, env
def _request_token(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> str:
"""The per-bottle identity token for this request, from the proxy
credentials the delivery mechanism (`HTTPS_PROXY=http://id:token@gw`)
that clients honor without app changes. Plain-HTTP requests carry
`Proxy-Authorization` directly; HTTPS bumped requests inherit the token
captured from their tunnel's CONNECT. Read then stripped so it never
leaks upstream (also strips the legacy header, if present)."""
token = _token_from_proxy_auth(
flow.request.headers.get("Proxy-Authorization", ""))
flow.request.headers.pop("Proxy-Authorization", None)
flow.request.headers.pop(IDENTITY_HEADER, None)
conn = flow.client_conn
if not token and conn is not None:
token = self._conn_tokens.get(getattr(conn, "id", ""), "")
return token
def http_connect(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""Capture the identity token from an HTTPS tunnel's CONNECT (the inner
bumped requests won't carry `Proxy-Authorization`), keyed by client
connection, and strip it so it never reaches upstream."""
token = _token_from_proxy_auth(
flow.request.headers.get("Proxy-Authorization", ""))
flow.request.headers.pop("Proxy-Authorization", None)
conn = flow.client_conn
if conn is not None and getattr(conn, "id", ""):
self._conn_tokens[conn.id] = token
def client_disconnected(self, client: typing.Any) -> None:
"""Drop the per-connection token when the client goes away."""
self._conn_tokens.pop(getattr(client, "id", ""), None)
async def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
@@ -201,12 +318,14 @@ class EgressAddon:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
config, slug, env = self._resolve_flow(flow)
# DLP outbound scan BEFORE stripping auth — catches tokens the
# agent tried to smuggle in any header, path, query param, or body.
# Hostname is included to catch DNS-tunnelling exfiltration attempts.
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
route = match_route(config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
if not await self._handle_outbound_dlp(flow, route):
if not await self._handle_outbound_dlp(flow, route, slug, env):
return
# The redact policy may have rewritten the request line; recompute
# the path/query the git checks below rely on.
@@ -224,7 +343,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
if is_git_fetch_request(request_path, query):
git_decision = decide_git_fetch(
self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host,
config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host,
)
if git_decision.action == "block":
self._block(
@@ -235,17 +354,17 @@ class EgressAddon:
return
# Strip agent-set Authorization after DLP scan so smuggled tokens
# are caught above; the route may inject sidecar-owned auth below.
# are caught above; the route may inject gateway-owned auth below.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Build headers mapping for match evaluation
req_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()}
decision = decide(
self.config.routes,
config.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
env,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
)
@@ -257,7 +376,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
if self.config.log >= LOG_FULL:
if config.log >= LOG_FULL:
self._log_request(flow)
def _block_dlp(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, result: ScanResult) -> None:
@@ -270,10 +389,13 @@ class EgressAddon:
self,
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
route: Route,
slug: str,
env: "typing.Mapping[str, str]",
) -> bool:
"""Scan the outbound request and apply the route's on-match policy
(PRD 0062). Returns True if the request may be forwarded, False if a
403 response has been written to `flow`.
(PRD 0062). `env` is the per-bottle env overlay (process env + this
bottle's tokens) used for DLP detection. Returns True if the request may
be forwarded, False if a 403 response has been written to `flow`.
Loops so the supervise policy can re-scan after each approval a
second, un-approved token in the same request is still caught."""
@@ -290,8 +412,8 @@ class EgressAddon:
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, "",
)
result = scan_outbound(
route, scan_text, os.environ,
safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens, crlf_text=crlf_text,
route, scan_text, env,
safe_tokens=self._safe_tokens_for(slug), crlf_text=crlf_text,
)
if result is None or result.severity != "block":
return True
@@ -301,7 +423,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
# redact scrubs every detection (tokens and structural CRLF) and
# forwards; it fails closed only if a match survives the scrub.
if policy == ON_MATCH_REDACT:
if self._redact_outbound(flow, route):
if self._redact_outbound(flow, route, env):
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_redacted",
@@ -326,32 +448,34 @@ class EgressAddon:
# supervise (default): hold the request for operator approval.
# Fall back to a hard 403 when supervise isn't wired for the bottle.
if not self._supervise_available():
if not self._supervise_available(slug):
self._block_dlp(flow, result)
return False
approved = await self._supervise_token_block(flow, request_path, result)
approved = await self._supervise_token_block(flow, request_path, result, slug, env)
if not approved:
return False # _supervise_token_block wrote the 403 response
# loop: the approved value is now in safe_tokens; re-scan.
def _redact_outbound(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, route: Route) -> bool:
def _redact_outbound(
self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, route: Route, env: "typing.Mapping[str, str]",
) -> bool:
"""Scrub detected tokens (and CRLF injection sequences) from the mutable
request surfaces (body, headers, path/query) and re-scan. Returns True
if the request is now clean; False if a block-severity match remains on
a surface redaction cannot rewrite (the hostname) so the caller fails
closed."""
request surfaces (body, headers, path/query) and re-scan. `env` is the
per-bottle env overlay. Returns True if the request is now clean; False
if a block-severity match remains on a surface redaction cannot rewrite
(the hostname) so the caller fails closed."""
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False)
if body:
redacted_body = redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)
redacted_body = redact_tokens(body, env=env)
if redacted_body != body:
flow.request.text = redacted_body
for name, value in list(flow.request.headers.items()):
if name.lower() == "host":
continue # routing-critical; never a legitimate token
redacted = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ))
redacted = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(value, env=env))
if redacted != value:
flow.request.headers[name] = redacted
redacted_path = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ))
redacted_path = strip_crlf(redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=env))
if redacted_path != flow.request.path:
flow.request.path = redacted_path
@@ -364,7 +488,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
crlf_text = build_outbound_scan_text(
flow.request.pretty_host, request_path, query, headers, "",
)
result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ, crlf_text=crlf_text)
result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, env, crlf_text=crlf_text)
return result is None or result.severity != "block"
async def _supervise_token_block(
@@ -372,21 +496,27 @@ class EgressAddon:
flow: http.HTTPFlow,
request_path: str,
result: ScanResult,
slug: str,
env: "typing.Mapping[str, str]",
) -> bool:
"""Route a token DLP block to the operator's supervisor queue and wait.
Returns True if the operator approved (the matched value is added to
`self.safe_tokens` and the caller re-scans); False if the request must
be blocked (a 403 response has been written to `flow`)."""
`slug` attributes the proposal to the calling bottle (its own queue +
safelist) in the shared gateway this is what keeps one bottle's
approval from unblocking another's request. `env` is the per-bottle env
overlay used to redact secrets from the proposal text. Returns True if
the operator approved (the matched value is added to that bottle's
safelist and the caller re-scans); False if the request must be blocked
(a 403 response has been written to `flow`)."""
host = flow.request.pretty_host
payload = build_token_allow_payload(
redact_tokens(host, env=os.environ),
redact_tokens(host, env=env),
flow.request.method,
redact_tokens(request_path, env=os.environ),
redact_tokens(request_path, env=env),
result,
)
proposal = _sv.Proposal.new(
bottle_slug=self._supervise_slug,
bottle_slug=slug,
tool=_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
proposed_file=payload,
justification=_TOKEN_ALLOW_JUSTIFICATION,
@@ -409,13 +539,13 @@ class EgressAddon:
**self._req_ctx(flow),
}) + "\n")
response = await self._await_token_response(proposal.id)
_sv.archive_proposal(self._supervise_slug, proposal.id)
response = await self._await_token_response(proposal.id, slug)
_sv.archive_proposal(slug, proposal.id)
if response is not None and response.status in (
_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, _sv.STATUS_MODIFIED,
):
self.safe_tokens.add(result.matched)
self._safe_tokens_for(slug).add(result.matched)
if self.config.log >= LOG_BLOCKS:
sys.stderr.write(json.dumps({
"event": "egress_token_allowed",
@@ -438,6 +568,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
async def _await_token_response(
self,
proposal_id: str,
slug: str,
) -> "_sv.Response | None":
"""Poll the DB for the operator's response without blocking the
proxy event loop. Returns the Response, or None on timeout."""
@@ -445,7 +576,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
deadline = loop.time() + self._token_allow_timeout
while True:
try:
return _sv.read_response(self._supervise_slug, proposal_id)
return _sv.read_response(slug, proposal_id)
except (OSError, ValueError, KeyError):
# Not written yet, or a partial/malformed write — retry until
# the deadline, then fail closed.
@@ -499,6 +630,9 @@ class EgressAddon:
"""
if flow.websocket is None: # type: ignore[union-attr]
return
# WebSocket DLP runs against the static config only (single-tenant); in
# the consolidated gateway self.config has no routes, so this is inert
# until websocket routing is made source-IP-aware (a separate slice).
route = match_route(self.config.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
@@ -509,7 +643,7 @@ class EgressAddon:
# not an injection vector here — scan only for credential leakage.
result = scan_outbound(
route, content, os.environ,
safe_tokens=self.safe_tokens, crlf_text="",
safe_tokens=self._safe_tokens_for(self._supervise_slug), crlf_text="",
)
if result is not None and result.severity == "block":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP: {result.reason}\n")
+75 -7
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,12 @@
Split out of `egress_addon.py` so the host's unit tests can
exercise the parse + decision functions without depending on the
`mitmproxy` package. The companion module wraps these with the
`mitmproxy.http.HTTPFlow` API and is loaded inside the sidecar
`mitmproxy.http.HTTPFlow` API and is loaded inside the gateway
container.
Imports: stdlib + `yaml_subset` (which is itself stdlib-only and
ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside this file
see `Dockerfile.sidecars`)."""
ships flat into the gateway image alongside this file
see `Dockerfile.gateway`)."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from .yaml_subset import YamlSubsetError, parse_yaml_subset
# DLP detector-config parsing lives in a sibling module (also flat-bundled
# into the sidecar — see Dockerfile.sidecars). Re-exported below so existing
# into the gateway — see Dockerfile.gateway). Re-exported below so existing
# `from egress_addon_core import ON_MATCH_*` callers keep working.
try:
from egress_dlp_config import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ class ScanResult:
reason: str
location: str = "" # where the match was found, e.g. "body", "authorization header"
context: str = "" # surrounding text with the match replaced by REDACT
# Raw substring the detector matched. Used inside the sidecar to key the
# Raw substring the detector matched. Used inside the gateway to key the
# supervisor-approved "safe tokens" set (PRD 0062); never logged or written
# to a proposal file. Empty for structural detectors (CRLF) that carry no
# safelist-able value.
@@ -413,6 +413,70 @@ def load_config(text: str) -> "Config":
return parse_config(payload)
class PolicyResolverLike(typing.Protocol):
"""The bit of `policy_resolver.PolicyResolver` this module needs — kept a
Protocol so egress_addon_core stays free of that import."""
def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = ...) -> "str | None":
...
def _config_from_policy(policy: "str | None") -> "Config":
"""Parse a resolved policy blob into a Config, fail-closed: None / empty /
unparseable all become a deny-all Config (no routes every request
blocked)."""
if not policy:
return Config(routes=()) # unattributed or empty → deny-all
try:
return load_config(policy)
except ValueError:
return Config(routes=()) # unparseable policy → deny
def resolve_client_config(
resolver: PolicyResolverLike, client_ip: str, identity_token: str = ""
) -> "Config":
"""The calling client's egress Config, resolved from the orchestrator via
`resolver` and parsed **fail-closed**. An unattributed client (None), a
resolver error, or an unparseable policy all yield a deny-all Config (no
routes every request blocked). A compromised, absent, or confused
orchestrator must never *widen* a bottle's egress."""
try:
policy = resolver.resolve(client_ip, identity_token)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
return Config(routes=()) # orchestrator unreachable/errored → deny
return _config_from_policy(policy)
class ContextResolverLike(typing.Protocol):
"""The bit of `policy_resolver.PolicyResolver` `resolve_client_context`
needs one round-trip returning policy, bottle id, and auth tokens."""
def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = ...,
) -> "tuple[str | None, str | None, dict[str, str]]":
...
def resolve_client_context(
resolver: ContextResolverLike, client_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
) -> "tuple[Config, str, dict[str, str]]":
"""The calling client's `(Config, bottle_id, tokens)` in one round-trip —
**fail-closed**. The Config follows `resolve_client_config`'s deny-all
rules; the bottle id is `""` whenever unattributed or the orchestrator
errored (caller treats as "supervise unavailable", never another bottle's
queue); `tokens` are the per-bottle upstream auth values the addon injects.
One `/resolve` keys the egress policy, the supervise queue + safelist, and
auth injection."""
try:
policy, bottle_id, tokens = resolver.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
client_ip, identity_token,
)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 # pylint: disable=broad-exception-caught
return Config(routes=()), "", {} # orchestrator unreachable/errored → deny
return _config_from_policy(policy), (bottle_id or ""), tokens
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Match evaluation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -613,7 +677,7 @@ def outbound_scan_headers(
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Return request headers that should be included in outbound DLP.
Routes that inject sidecar-owned auth always strip the agent's
Routes that inject gateway-owned auth always strip the agent's
Authorization header before forwarding. Scanning that header first
creates false positives for provider clients that insist on sending
their own bearer-shaped placeholder, while still not changing what
@@ -664,7 +728,7 @@ def scan_outbound(
crlf_text: str | None = None,
) -> ScanResult | None:
# Lazy import to avoid circular deps and keep dlp_detectors optional
# at import time (the sidecar copies it flat alongside this file).
# at import time (the gateway copies it flat alongside this file).
try:
from dlp_detectors import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
scan_crlf_injection,
@@ -804,6 +868,10 @@ __all__ = [
"is_git_push_request",
"is_git_fetch_request",
"load_config",
"resolve_client_config",
"resolve_client_context",
"PolicyResolverLike",
"ContextResolverLike",
"match_route",
"outbound_scan_headers",
"parse_config",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ and what the proxy does when an outbound detector matches a token
kept apart from the request-time scan/decision flow in `egress_addon_core`
so each half reads top-to-bottom without scrolling past the other.
Stdlib-only; ships flat into the sidecar bundle image alongside
`egress_addon_core.py` see `Dockerfile.sidecars`."""
Stdlib-only; ships flat into the gateway image alongside
`egress_addon_core.py` see `Dockerfile.gateway`."""
from __future__ import annotations
+3 -3
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/sh
# Egress daemon entrypoint inside the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024).
# Egress daemon entrypoint inside the gateway (PRD 0024).
#
# Extracted verbatim from Dockerfile.egress's prior inline `sh -c`
# ENTRYPOINT so the supervisor in bot_bottle/sidecar_init.py can
# ENTRYPOINT so the supervisor in bot_bottle/gateway_init.py can
# call it as a normal child. Behavior is unchanged:
#
# * Upstream proxy: when EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY is set, switch
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ set -e
# Pin mitmproxy's config dir to the bind-mount location of its CA
# regardless of which user mitmdump runs as. In the legacy
# four-sidecar setup (Dockerfile.egress, USER mitmproxy) this
# four-daemon setup (Dockerfile.egress, USER mitmproxy) this
# resolved naturally to `~mitmproxy/.mitmproxy`. In the PRD 0024
# bundle (USER root) `~root/.mitmproxy` is empty, so without this
# flag mitmdump would generate a fresh CA on the wrong path and
@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
"""Per-bottle sidecar supervisor (PRD 0024 chunk 1).
"""Gateway data-plane supervisor (PRD 0070; PRD 0024 bundle shape).
PID 1 inside the `bot-bottle-sidecars` bundle image. Spawns
PID 1 inside the `bot-bottle-gateway` data-plane image. Spawns
the configured daemons (egress, git-gate, supervise),
forwards SIGTERM/SIGINT to each child, and propagates per-daemon
stdout+stderr to the container log with a `[name] ` prefix.
Failure policy (interim): when a child dies unexpectedly, the
supervisor logs the death and leaves the surviving children
running. The bundle stays up; whatever the dead daemon served
running. The gateway stays up; whatever the dead daemon served
will start failing, surfacing in the agent's own error path.
The supervisor itself exits only when (a) the operator/compose
sends SIGTERM/SIGINT, or (b) every child has died.
The supervisor itself exits only when (a) the operator sends
SIGTERM/SIGINT, or (b) every child has died.
Failure policy (eventual): on unexpected death, the supervisor
restarts the daemon and emits a notification to the supervise
sidecar so the operator sees the event. That lands in a later
PR; the interim policy is "don't take the bundle down for one
daemon so the operator sees the event. That lands in a later
PR; the interim policy is "don't take the gateway down for one
sick daemon."
Daemon subset is env-driven. The compose renderer narrows it via
`BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=egress` for bottles that
don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all daemons.
Daemon subset is env-driven via `BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=egress`
for callers that don't use git-gate or supervise. Default: all
daemons.
Stdlib-only by design adding supervisord/s6/runit for four
daemons is heavier than this script.
@@ -103,8 +103,8 @@ def _selected_daemons(
env: dict[str, str],
all_daemons: Sequence[_DaemonSpec] | None = None,
) -> tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...]:
"""Filter the daemon set by the BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS env
var. Unknown names in the list are ignored the renderer is the
"""Filter the daemon set by the BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS env
var. Unknown names in the list are ignored the caller is the
source of truth for which daemons are wired.
`all_daemons` defaults to `_DAEMONS` resolved at call time (not
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ def _selected_daemons(
`_DAEMONS` and have the new value take effect."""
if all_daemons is None:
all_daemons = _DAEMONS
raw = env.get("BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS", "").strip()
raw = env.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS", "").strip()
if not raw:
return tuple(all_daemons)
wanted = {n.strip() for n in raw.split(",") if n.strip()}
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ def _selected_daemons(
def _log(msg: str) -> None:
sys.stdout.write(f"sidecar-init: {msg}\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"gateway-init: {msg}\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
+6 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
"""Per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008).
A third per-agent sidecar that fronts the bottle's declared git
A third per-agent daemon that fronts the bottle's declared git
upstreams as a transparent mirror. Each `bottle.git` entry maps to
a bare repo on the gate; `git daemon` serves the bare repos over
`git://<gate>/<name>.git`. Two hooks make the mirror bidirectional:
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ a bare repo on the gate; `git daemon` serves the bare repos over
The agent never sees the upstream credential under either path.
Why a separate sidecar (not folded into egress or ssh-gate): the
Why a separate daemon (not folded into egress or ssh-gate): the
gate is the only one of the three that holds upstream push
credentials. Mixing it with egress would put push creds in the
same blast radius as internet-facing TLS interception; mixing it
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ with ssh-gate would force ssh-gate above L4 and into git-protocol
land. See `docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md`.
This module defines the abstract gate (`GitGate`) and its plan
dataclass (`GitGatePlan`). The sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is
dataclass (`GitGatePlan`). The gateway's start/stop lifecycle is
backend-specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
`bot_bottle/backend/docker/git_gate.py`)."""
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ from .git_gate_render import (
git_gate_known_hosts_line,
git_gate_render_access_hook,
git_gate_render_entrypoint,
git_gate_render_provision,
git_gate_render_gitconfig,
git_gate_render_hook,
git_gate_upstreams_for_bottle,
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ class GitGatePlan:
class GitGate(ABC):
"""The per-agent git-gate. Encapsulates the host-side prepare
(upstream lift + entrypoint/hook render); the sidecar's
(upstream lift + entrypoint/hook render); the gateway's
start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on concrete
subclasses."""
@@ -155,6 +156,7 @@ __all__ = [
"git_gate_render_gitconfig",
"git_gate_known_hosts_line",
"git_gate_render_entrypoint",
"git_gate_render_provision",
"git_gate_render_hook",
"git_gate_render_access_hook",
"provision_git_gate_dynamic_keys",
+73 -24
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
"""Pure host-side rendering for the per-agent git-gate (PRD 0008).
Builds the agent's `.gitconfig` insteadOf rewrites, the known_hosts
line, and the entrypoint / pre-receive / access-hook scripts the sidecar
line, and the entrypoint / pre-receive / access-hook scripts the gateway
runs. No docker or forge calls exposed for tests and reuse across
backends. Split out of `git_gate.py` so the control surface (`GitGate`)
and the deploy-key lifecycle (`git_gate_provision`) each read on their
@@ -9,15 +9,19 @@ own; `git_gate` re-exports these names for API stability."""
from __future__ import annotations
import re
import shlex
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitEntry
# Short network alias for git-gate inside the sidecar bundle. The
# Short network alias for git-gate inside the gateway. The
# agent's `.gitconfig` insteadOf rewrites resolve through this name.
GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"
# App-layer identity token header the agent's git sends to git-http and the
# gateway validates (mirrors egress_addon / git_http_backend IDENTITY_HEADER).
IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
# Shared timeout (seconds) for all git-gate subprocess and CGI calls:
# git daemon (--timeout/--init-timeout), the access-hook subprocess in
# git_http_backend, and the git http-backend CGI subprocess.
@@ -37,7 +41,7 @@ class GitGateUpstream:
KnownHostKey string from the manifest; the gate's start step
materialises it into a known_hosts file if non-empty.
the gate credential paths inside the running sidecar."""
the gate credential paths inside the running gateway."""
name: str
upstream_url: str
@@ -74,6 +78,7 @@ def _gitconfig_validate_value(field: str, value: str) -> None:
def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
entries: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
identity_token: str = "",
) -> str:
"""Render the agent's ~/.gitconfig content for git-gate
`insteadOf` rewrites. Pure host-side, no docker / VM;
@@ -95,6 +100,15 @@ def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
"# the upstream bidirectionally (gitleaks-scanned push;\n",
"# fetch-from-upstream-before-every-upload-pack via access-hook).\n",
]
# Over the smart-HTTP transport (VM backends), attach the per-bottle
# identity token as a request header on requests to the gate, scoped to
# its URL so it never goes to any other remote. git-http requires it (the
# gateway's mandatory (source_ip, token) attribution). git:// (single-tenant
# docker) carries no header — attribution there is the network alias.
if identity_token and scheme == "http":
_gitconfig_validate_value("identity_token", identity_token)
out.append(f'[http "http://{gate_host}/"]\n')
out.append(f"\textraHeader = {IDENTITY_HEADER}: {identity_token}\n")
for entry in entries:
_gitconfig_validate_value(f"repos[{entry.Name!r}].url", entry.Upstream)
out.append(f'[url "{scheme}://{gate_host}/{entry.Name}.git"]\n')
@@ -125,22 +139,18 @@ def git_gate_known_hosts_line(host: str, port: str, key: str) -> str:
return f"{target} {key}\n"
def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
"""Posix-sh entrypoint. One `init_repo` call per upstream, then
`exec git daemon`. The function reads
`/git-gate/creds/<name>-{key,known_hosts}` (bind-mounted into
the bundle by the renderer) and wires them into each bare repo's
config; the access-hook + pre-receive hook pick those paths up
at fetch / push time."""
lines = [
"#!/bin/sh",
"set -eu",
"",
def _git_gate_init_repo_fn(repo_root: str, creds_dir: str) -> list[str]:
"""The `init_repo` shell function, parameterized by the bare-repo root
and the per-bottle creds dir. Single source of the credential-wiring
logic, shared by the single-tenant daemon entrypoint (`/git`,
`/git-gate/creds`) and the consolidated per-bottle provisioning
(`/git/<bottle_id>`, `/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>`)."""
return [
"init_repo() {",
" name=$1",
" upstream_url=$2",
" keyfile=/git-gate/creds/${name}-key",
" hostsfile=/git-gate/creds/${name}-known_hosts",
f" keyfile={creds_dir}/${{name}}-key",
f" hostsfile={creds_dir}/${{name}}-known_hosts",
"",
# `|| true`: PRD 0018 chunk 3+ bind-mounts these RO from the
# host, so chmod-syscalls fail with EROFS. The files already
@@ -153,14 +163,14 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
" chmod 600 \"$hostsfile\" 2>/dev/null || true",
" fi",
"",
" repo=/git/${name}.git",
f" repo={repo_root}/${{name}}.git",
" if [ ! -d \"$repo\" ]; then",
" git init --bare \"$repo\" >/dev/null",
# --mirror=fetch sets remote.origin.fetch = +refs/*:refs/* so",
# a later `git fetch origin` mirrors the upstream's full ref",
# graph (heads, tags, notes) into the bare repo at canonical",
# paths. It does NOT set remote.origin.mirror=true, so an",
# explicit `git push origin <ref>:<ref>` still pushes one ref.",
# --mirror=fetch sets remote.origin.fetch = +refs/*:refs/* so a later
# `git fetch origin` mirrors the upstream's full ref graph (heads,
# tags, notes) into the bare repo at canonical paths. It does NOT set
# remote.origin.mirror=true, so an explicit `git push origin
# <ref>:<ref>` still pushes one ref.
" git -C \"$repo\" remote add --mirror=fetch origin \"$upstream_url\"",
" fi",
" git -C \"$repo\" config git-gate.identityFile \"$keyfile\"",
@@ -170,9 +180,19 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
" git -C \"$repo\" config http.receivepack true",
" install -m 755 /etc/git-gate/pre-receive \"$repo/hooks/pre-receive\"",
"}",
"",
"mkdir -p /git",
]
def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
"""Posix-sh entrypoint. One `init_repo` call per upstream, then
`exec git daemon`. The function reads
`/git-gate/creds/<name>-{key,known_hosts}` (bind-mounted into
the bundle by the renderer) and wires them into each bare repo's
config; the access-hook + pre-receive hook pick those paths up
at fetch / push time."""
lines = ["#!/bin/sh", "set -eu", ""]
lines += _git_gate_init_repo_fn("/git", "/git-gate/creds")
lines += ["", "mkdir -p /git"]
for u in upstreams:
lines.append(f"init_repo {shlex.quote(u.name)} {shlex.quote(u.upstream_url)}")
lines.extend([
@@ -190,6 +210,35 @@ def git_gate_render_entrypoint(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...]) -> str:
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
# A bottle id namespaces the consolidated gateway's repo + creds dirs; it is
# embedded unquoted in the provisioning script, so restrict it to a shell- and
# path-safe alphabet (registry ids are token_hex — this is defense in depth).
_SAFE_BOTTLE_ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]+")
def git_gate_render_provision(
bottle_id: str, upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...],
) -> str:
"""Posix-sh script that provisions ONE bottle's bare repos into the
consolidated gateway (PRD 0070), under `/git/<bottle_id>/` with creds
read from `/git-gate/creds/<bottle_id>/`. Init-only no `git daemon`,
since the shared gateway already serves every bottle; run inside the
running gateway when the bottle is registered.
Isolating each bottle's repo root and creds dir by id is what keeps one
bottle's push credentials out of another's repos on the shared gateway."""
if not _SAFE_BOTTLE_ID.fullmatch(bottle_id):
raise ValueError(f"git-gate: unsafe bottle id {bottle_id!r}")
repo_root = f"/git/{bottle_id}"
creds_dir = f"/git-gate/creds/{bottle_id}"
lines = ["#!/bin/sh", "set -eu", ""]
lines += _git_gate_init_repo_fn(repo_root, creds_dir)
lines += ["", f"mkdir -p {shlex.quote(repo_root)}"]
for u in upstreams:
lines.append(f"init_repo {shlex.quote(u.name)} {shlex.quote(u.upstream_url)}")
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
def git_gate_render_hook() -> str:
"""The shared pre-receive hook: gitleaks-scan all incoming refs,
then forward each accepted ref to the real upstream (`origin`)
+119 -8
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,19 @@
Used where `git://` push traffic over a host-published Docker port can
hang before receive-pack reaches hooks (e.g. the firecracker backend,
where the guest reaches the sidecar over the point-to-point TAP). The
where the guest reaches the gateway over the point-to-point TAP). The
wrapper serves the same `/git/*.git` bare repos through
`git http-backend`, so pre-receive and upstream forwarding remain the
git-gate enforcement point.
Consolidated (PRD 0070): when `BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL` is set, one
shared gateway serves every bottle, and each request is served from the
calling bottle's repo namespace (`<root>/<bottle_id>`), attributed from
the unspoofable source IP via the orchestrator. Per-repo credentials +
hooks scope by repo directory, so isolating the *root* per bottle isolates
its creds too. Unattributed clients fail closed (404). Unset the legacy
per-bottle single-tenant flat root, unchanged a transitional path that
gets stripped out once every backend runs the consolidated gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -13,16 +22,89 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import typing
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
# policy_resolver ships flat alongside this file in the gateway
# image (see Dockerfile.gateway); the bot_bottle.* fallback is the
# host-side / test path. Mirrors egress_addon's import shape.
try:
from policy_resolver import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
PolicyResolveError,
PolicyResolver,
)
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - host-side path
from bot_bottle.policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
DEFAULT_PORT = 9420
# Consolidated (multi-tenant) mode: when this points at the per-host
# orchestrator's control plane, the backend serves each request from the
# *calling* bottle's repo namespace, selected by source IP, instead of a
# single flat repo root. Unset → legacy per-bottle single-tenant mode
# (unchanged). Same env the egress addon reads, so one orchestrator setting
# flips the whole shared gateway multi-tenant.
ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL"
# App-layer identity token (defense-in-depth over the source-IP invariant);
# the agent injects it, the backend reads it for attribution and never
# forwards it to `git http-backend`. Mirrors egress_addon.IDENTITY_HEADER
# (duplicated, not imported: egress_addon pulls in mitmproxy).
IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
# Default flat repo root (single-tenant, and the base under which
# consolidated mode nests each sandbox's namespace).
DEFAULT_REPO_ROOT = "/git"
class ResolverLike(typing.Protocol):
"""Structural type for the resolver `resolve_sandbox_root` needs — just
`resolve_bottle_id`. A Protocol so tests can pass a fake without
importing PolicyResolver (mirrors egress_addon_core.PolicyResolverLike)."""
def resolve_bottle_id(
self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = ...,
) -> "str | None": ...
def resolve_sandbox_root(
resolver: "ResolverLike | None",
base_root: Path,
source_ip: str,
identity_token: str = "",
) -> Path | None:
"""The per-sandbox repo root to serve this request from, or None to
deny (404).
Single-tenant (`resolver is None`): the flat `base_root`, unchanged.
NOTE: this legacy per-bottle single-tenant path is transitional it
will be stripped out once every backend runs the consolidated gateway
(PRD 0070), leaving only the source-IP-attributed path below.
Consolidated: `base_root/<bottle_id>`, where the sandbox is attributed
from the source IP via the orchestrator. Fail-closed an unattributed
client, a resolver error, or a namespace that would escape `base_root`
all deny, so one sandbox can never reach another's repos."""
if resolver is None:
return base_root
try:
bottle_id = resolver.resolve_bottle_id(source_ip, identity_token)
except PolicyResolveError:
return None # orchestrator unreachable/errored → deny
if not bottle_id:
return None # unattributed → deny
base = base_root.resolve()
namespace = (base / bottle_id).resolve()
if base not in namespace.parents:
return None # bottle_id tried to escape the root → deny
return namespace
# Mirrors git_gate_render.GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS. Duplicated rather than
# imported: this module ships as a flat top-level sibling in the sidecar
# bundle image (see Dockerfile.sidecars), not as part of the bot_bottle
# imported: this module ships as a flat top-level sibling in the gateway
# bundle image (see Dockerfile.gateway), not as part of the bot_bottle
# package, so `bot_bottle.git_gate` and its dependency chain aren't
# available at runtime.
GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS = 15
@@ -40,10 +122,25 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self) -> None:
self._run_backend()
def _sandbox_root(self) -> Path | None:
"""This request's per-sandbox repo root, or None to deny. Single-tenant
unless the server was started with a resolver (consolidated mode), in
which case the root is the calling sandbox's source-IP-selected
namespace. `GIT_PROJECT_ROOT` keeps git's own env-var name."""
base = Path(os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", DEFAULT_REPO_ROOT))
resolver = getattr(self.server, "policy_resolver", None)
token = self.headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "")
return resolve_sandbox_root(resolver, base, self.client_address[0], token)
def _run_backend(self) -> None:
sandbox_root = self._sandbox_root()
if sandbox_root is None:
# Unattributed / resolver error: deny before touching any repo.
self.send_error(404)
return
parsed = urlsplit(self.path)
if self._is_upload_pack(parsed.path, parsed.query):
repo_dir = self._repo_dir(parsed.path)
repo_dir = self._repo_dir(sandbox_root, parsed.path)
if repo_dir is None:
self.send_error(404)
return
@@ -77,7 +174,7 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
return
env = os.environ.copy()
env.update({
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT": os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", "/git"),
"GIT_PROJECT_ROOT": str(sandbox_root),
"GIT_HTTP_EXPORT_ALL": "1",
"REQUEST_METHOD": self.command,
"PATH_INFO": parsed.path,
@@ -91,6 +188,14 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"SERVER_PORT": str(self.server.server_port), # type: ignore
"SERVER_PROTOCOL": self.request_version,
})
# Consolidated mode: attribute the gitleaks-allow supervise proposal
# (written by receive-pack's pre-receive hook, a child of the CGI we
# spawn below) to the calling bottle. The namespaced root is
# `<base>/<bottle_id>`, so its final component is the bottle id — the
# same per-bottle key egress uses. Single-tenant leaves the hook's
# container-stamped SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG untouched.
if getattr(self.server, "policy_resolver", None) is not None:
env["SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG"] = sandbox_root.name
for header, variable in (
("accept", "HTTP_ACCEPT"),
("content-encoding", "HTTP_CONTENT_ENCODING"),
@@ -123,8 +228,8 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
)
self._write_cgi_response(proc.stdout)
def _repo_dir(self, path: str) -> Path | None:
root = Path(os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT", "/git")).resolve()
def _repo_dir(self, sandbox_root: Path, path: str) -> Path | None:
root = sandbox_root.resolve()
relative = path.lstrip("/").split(".git", 1)[0] + ".git"
candidate = (root / relative).resolve()
if root not in (candidate, *candidate.parents):
@@ -181,7 +286,13 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def main() -> int:
port = int(os.environ.get("GIT_HTTP_PORT", str(DEFAULT_PORT)))
server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", port), GitHttpHandler)
sys.stdout.write(f"git-http listening on 0.0.0.0:{port}\n")
orch_url = os.environ.get(ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV, "").strip()
# Consolidated mode: resolve each request's sandbox namespace by source
# IP. Absent → single-tenant (flat repo root); behaviour unchanged.
resolver = PolicyResolver(orch_url) if orch_url else None
server.policy_resolver = resolver # type: ignore[attr-defined]
mode = "multi-tenant" if orch_url else "single-tenant"
sys.stdout.write(f"git-http listening on 0.0.0.0:{port} ({mode})\n")
sys.stdout.flush()
server.serve_forever()
return 0
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
`template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
optionally points at a custom agent-image Dockerfile while leaving
bot-bottle's sidecar infrastructure intact.
bot-bottle's gateway infrastructure intact.
`auth_token` names the host env var that holds the provider's OAuth
token (Claude only). The provisioner injects a provider-owned egress
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
so the Claude Code CLI starts.
`forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
the egress sidecar (Codex only).
the egress daemon (Codex only).
"""
template: str = "claude"
+4 -4
View File
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@ class ManifestBottle:
# identity without any git-gate.repos upstreams, and vice versa.
git_user: ManifestGitUser = field(default_factory=ManifestGitUser)
egress: ManifestEgressConfig = field(default_factory=ManifestEgressConfig)
# Per-bottle stuck-recovery sidecar (PRD 0013). When true (the
# Per-bottle stuck-recovery daemon (PRD 0013). When true (the
# default, issue #249), the launch step brings up a supervise
# sidecar that exposes egress MCP tools to the agent. Set
# `supervise: false` to skip the sidecar.
# daemon that exposes egress MCP tools to the agent. Set
# `supervise: false` to skip the gateway.
supervise: bool = True
@classmethod
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ class ManifestBottle:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{name}' has an 'ssh' field, which has been removed "
f"(PRD 0009). Declare upstreams under 'git-gate.repos' with "
f"url + identity + host_key; the git-gate sidecar (PRD 0008) "
f"url + identity + host_key; the git-gate daemon (PRD 0008) "
f"holds the credential and gitleaks-scans pushes."
)
+12 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
"""Per-host orchestrator service (PRD 0070).
A single persistent per-host service that will run the sidecar functions
A single persistent per-host service that will run the gateway functions
(egress / git-gate / supervise), coordinate with the console, and broker
agent launches. This package is being built bottom-up, starting with the
backend-neutral "consolidation core" that needs no VM packaging:
@@ -10,10 +10,15 @@ backend-neutral "consolidation core" that needs no VM packaging:
* `broker` the signed, structured launch-request contract + a
`LaunchBroker` (stub for the harness) that verifies
provenance before acting.
* `gateway` the consolidated per-host gateway: a `Gateway`
lifecycle contract (idempotent singleton) + a
`DockerGateway` impl. One gateway shared by all
bottles instead of one per bottle.
* `service` the `Orchestrator`: owns the registry, brokers the
launch lifecycle (launch/teardown), attributes.
launch lifecycle (launch/teardown), manages the
shared gateway, attributes.
* `control_plane` the HTTP control-plane RPC (launch / teardown /
list / attribute / health).
list / attribute / gateway / health).
The actual backend-native launch (a real docker/firecracker broker) and
the egress/git/supervise data plane land in later slices once this core is
@@ -33,6 +38,7 @@ from .broker import (
verify_request,
)
from .docker_broker import DockerBroker, DockerBrokerError
from .gateway import DockerGateway, Gateway, GatewayError
from .service import Orchestrator
from .control_plane import ControlPlaneServer, dispatch, make_server
@@ -46,6 +52,9 @@ __all__ = [
"StubBroker",
"DockerBroker",
"DockerBrokerError",
"Gateway",
"DockerGateway",
"GatewayError",
"sign_request",
"verify_request",
"Orchestrator",
+25 -1
View File
@@ -16,11 +16,13 @@ import secrets
from pathlib import Path
from .. import log
from ..store_manager import StoreManager
from .broker import LaunchBroker, StubBroker
from .control_plane import make_server
from .docker_broker import DockerBroker
from .registry import RegistryStore, default_db_path
from .service import Orchestrator
from .gateway import DockerGateway, Gateway
def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
@@ -36,17 +38,39 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
"--broker", choices=("stub", "docker"), default="stub",
help="launch broker: 'stub' records requests; 'docker' runs containers",
)
parser.add_argument(
"--gateway", action="store_true",
help="run one consolidated per-host gateway (build-if-missing)",
)
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
registry = RegistryStore(args.db)
registry.migrate()
# One DB per host: the supervise queue + audit tables live in the SAME
# SQLite file the registry owns, so the control plane is the single
# source of truth. The in-VM supervise daemon writes here; the host
# operator reaches it over HTTP (never a second, disconnected DB).
StoreManager(registry.db_path).migrate()
# An ephemeral signing secret ties the orchestrator (signer) to its
# broker (verifier). 'stub' records launches instead of starting
# anything; 'docker' runs real containers (firecracker drops in later).
secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
broker: LaunchBroker = DockerBroker(secret) if args.broker == "docker" else StubBroker(secret)
orchestrator = Orchestrator(registry, broker, secret)
# Standalone `--gateway` (not the consolidated flow, where the host
# lifecycle runs the gateway). The gateway resolves against this same
# process; the URL is only reachable when they share a docker network.
gateway: Gateway | None = (
DockerGateway(orchestrator_url=f"http://{args.host}:{args.port}")
if args.gateway else None
)
orchestrator = Orchestrator(registry, broker, secret, gateway)
# One persistent per-host gateway, shared by every bottle: build the
# bundle image if missing, then bring the singleton up (idempotent).
if gateway is not None:
orchestrator.ensure_gateway()
log.info("consolidated gateway ensured", context={"name": gateway.name})
server = make_server(orchestrator, host=args.host, port=args.port)
bound_host, bound_port = server.server_address[0], server.server_address[1]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ The request it sends is:
request can't be coerced into launching an arbitrary payload; and
* **signed** wrapped as a compact JWS/JWT the broker verifies before
acting, so a *compromised co-located component* (an agent-facing
sidecar, say) can't forge a launch. This is the concrete form of the
gateway, say) can't forge a launch. This is the concrete form of the
"structured requests only" rule in the PRD security review.
Signing is **HS256** over a secret shared by the orchestrator (signer) and
+205
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
"""Host-side control-plane client (PRD 0070).
The launch path talks to the orchestrator over its HTTP control plane to
register, re-policy, and tear down bottles the counterpart to the
gateway-side `PolicyResolver` (which only reads `/resolve`). Where
`PolicyResolver` is fail-closed and lives in the untrusted data plane, this
is the trusted control-plane caller: a non-success response is an error the
launch path must surface, not silently swallow.
Stdlib-only, so the CLI can drive the orchestrator without any dependency.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
class OrchestratorClientError(RuntimeError):
"""A control-plane call failed (unreachable, or an unexpected status)."""
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RegisteredBottle:
"""What `POST /bottles` returns: the minted bottle id and the per-bottle
identity token the agent presents for app-layer attribution."""
bottle_id: str
identity_token: str
class OrchestratorClient:
"""Trusted host-side client for the orchestrator control plane."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
self._timeout = timeout
def _request(
self, method: str, path: str, body: dict[str, object] | None = None,
) -> tuple[int, dict[str, object]]:
"""Send one request; return `(status, payload)`. Raises
`OrchestratorClientError` only when the orchestrator can't be reached
or returns malformed data HTTP *status* codes are returned so
callers can treat 404 as a meaningful "no such bottle"."""
data = json.dumps(body).encode() if body is not None else None
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"} if data is not None else {}
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{self._base}{path}", data=data, method=method, headers=headers,
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
raw = resp.read()
payload = json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
return resp.status, payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
# A structured error response still carries a usable status.
try:
payload = json.loads(e.read() or b"{}")
except (ValueError, OSError):
payload = {}
return e.code, payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
raise OrchestratorClientError(f"{method} {path}: {e}") from e
def _ok(self, method: str, path: str, body: dict[str, object] | None = None) -> dict[str, object]:
"""`_request` that requires a 2xx, raising otherwise."""
status, payload = self._request(method, path, body)
if not 200 <= status < 300:
detail = payload.get("error", "")
raise OrchestratorClientError(f"{method} {path}: HTTP {status} {detail}".rstrip())
return payload
def health(self) -> bool:
"""True iff the control plane answers `GET /health` with 200."""
try:
status, _ = self._request("GET", "/health")
except OrchestratorClientError:
return False
return status == 200
def register_bottle(
self,
source_ip: str,
*,
image_ref: str = "",
metadata: str = "",
policy: str = "",
tokens: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> RegisteredBottle:
"""Register a bottle and broker its launch (`POST /bottles`). `tokens`
are the per-bottle egress auth values (env_name -> value) the
orchestrator holds in memory for the gateway to inject. Returns the
minted id + identity token."""
payload = self._ok("POST", "/bottles", {
"source_ip": source_ip,
"image_ref": image_ref,
"metadata": metadata,
"policy": policy,
"tokens": tokens or {},
})
bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
token = payload.get("identity_token")
if not isinstance(bottle_id, str) or not isinstance(token, str):
raise OrchestratorClientError("register: response missing bottle_id/identity_token")
return RegisteredBottle(bottle_id=bottle_id, identity_token=token)
def teardown_bottle(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
"""Tear a bottle down (`DELETE /bottles/<id>`). False if the
orchestrator didn't know it (404) — idempotent for cleanup paths."""
status, _ = self._request("DELETE", f"/bottles/{bottle_id}")
if status == 404:
return False
if not 200 <= status < 300:
raise OrchestratorClientError(f"teardown {bottle_id}: HTTP {status}")
return True
def set_policy(self, bottle_id: str, policy: str) -> bool:
"""Live-reload a bottle's policy (`PUT /bottles/<id>/policy`). False on
404 (unknown bottle)."""
status, _ = self._request("PUT", f"/bottles/{bottle_id}/policy", {"policy": policy})
if status == 404:
return False
if not 200 <= status < 300:
raise OrchestratorClientError(f"set_policy {bottle_id}: HTTP {status}")
return True
def list_bottles(self) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
"""Every registered bottle's redacted record (`GET /bottles`)."""
payload = self._ok("GET", "/bottles")
bottles = payload.get("bottles")
return bottles if isinstance(bottles, list) else []
# --- supervise queue (operator TUI) ------------------------------------
def supervise_pending(self) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
"""Pending supervise proposals across all bottles
(`GET /supervise/proposals`)."""
payload = self._ok("GET", "/supervise/proposals")
proposals = payload.get("proposals")
return proposals if isinstance(proposals, list) else []
def supervise_respond(
self,
proposal_id: str,
*,
bottle_slug: str,
decision: str,
notes: str = "",
final_file: str | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Record an operator decision (`POST /supervise/respond`). `decision`
is approve/modify/reject. Raises `OrchestratorClientError` if the
proposal is gone or the bottle can no longer be applied to (409)."""
body: dict[str, object] = {
"proposal_id": proposal_id,
"bottle_slug": bottle_slug,
"decision": decision,
"notes": notes,
}
if final_file is not None:
body["final_file"] = final_file
self._ok("POST", "/supervise/respond", body)
def discover_orchestrator_url(*, timeout: float = 2.0) -> str:
"""The URL of the one running per-host orchestrator control plane, probing
the backends' well-known control-plane addresses (both on port 8099):
docker publishes it on loopback; the firecracker infra VM serves it on the
orchestrator TAP. Returns the first that answers `/health`; raises if none
do (no orchestrator up launch a bottle first)."""
candidates: list[str] = []
try: # docker: loopback-published control plane
from .lifecycle import DEFAULT_PORT as _DOCKER_PORT
candidates.append(f"http://127.0.0.1:{_DOCKER_PORT}")
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — backend optional
candidates.append("http://127.0.0.1:8099")
try: # firecracker: infra VM control plane on the orchestrator TAP
from ..backend.firecracker import netpool
from ..backend.firecracker.infra_vm import CONTROL_PLANE_PORT
candidates.append(
f"http://{netpool.orch_slot().guest_ip}:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT}")
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — backend optional / not firecracker
pass
for url in candidates:
if OrchestratorClient(url, timeout=timeout).health():
return url
raise OrchestratorClientError(
"no running orchestrator control plane found (tried "
+ ", ".join(candidates)
+ "); launch a bottle first"
)
__all__ = [
"OrchestratorClient",
"OrchestratorClientError",
"RegisteredBottle",
"DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
"discover_orchestrator_url",
]
+111 -10
View File
@@ -4,13 +4,22 @@ The backend-agnostic control-plane RPC (CLI / console -> orchestrator) over
**HTTP** the universal transport chosen in 0070 (works on every host; no
vsock / unix-socket portability caveats):
GET /health -> 200 {"status": "ok"}
GET /bottles -> 200 {"bottles": [ <redacted record>, ... ]}
POST /bottles -> 201 {"bottle_id", "identity_token"} (launch)
body: {"source_ip", ["image_ref"], ["metadata"]}
DELETE /bottles/<bottle_id> -> 200 {"torn_down": true} | 404 (teardown)
POST /attribute -> 200 {"bottle_id"} | 403
body: {"source_ip", "identity_token"}
GET /health -> 200 {"status": "ok"}
GET /gateway -> 200 {"configured", ["name","running"]}
GET /bottles -> 200 {"bottles": [ <redacted record>, ...]}
POST /bottles -> 201 {"bottle_id","identity_token"} (launch)
body: {"source_ip", ["image_ref"],
["metadata"], ["policy"]}
PUT /bottles/<bottle_id>/policy -> 200 {"updated": true} | 404 (live reload)
body: {"policy"}
DELETE /bottles/<bottle_id> -> 200 {"torn_down": true} | 404 (teardown)
POST /attribute -> 200 {"bottle_id"} | 403
POST /resolve -> 200 {"bottle_id","policy"} | 403
body: {"source_ip","identity_token"}
GET /supervise/proposals -> 200 {"proposals": [ <proposal>, ...]}
POST /supervise/respond -> 200 {"responded": true} | 409 (operator)
body: {"proposal_id","bottle_slug",
"decision", ["notes"],["final_file"]}
`POST /bottles` / `DELETE` drive the full launch lifecycle: they mint (or
tear down) the bottle in the registry AND broker the backend-native launch
@@ -29,6 +38,7 @@ import http.server
import json
import os
import socketserver
import sys
import typing
from urllib.parse import urlsplit
@@ -48,7 +58,7 @@ def _parse_json_object(body: bytes) -> Json:
return obj
def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements,too-many-branches
orch: Orchestrator, method: str, path: str, body: bytes
) -> tuple[int, Json]:
"""Route one control-plane request to a (status, payload) pair. Pure —
@@ -58,6 +68,9 @@ def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
if method == "GET" and route == "/health":
return 200, {"status": "ok"}
if method == "GET" and route == "/gateway":
return 200, orch.gateway_status()
if method == "GET" and route == "/bottles":
return 200, {"bottles": [r.redacted() for r in orch.registry.all()]}
@@ -71,13 +84,33 @@ def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
return 400, {"error": "source_ip (string) is required"}
image_ref = data.get("image_ref")
metadata = data.get("metadata")
policy = data.get("policy")
raw_tokens = data.get("tokens")
tokens = {
k: v for k, v in raw_tokens.items() if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, str)
} if isinstance(raw_tokens, dict) else {}
rec = orch.launch_bottle(
source_ip,
image_ref=image_ref if isinstance(image_ref, str) else "",
metadata=metadata if isinstance(metadata, str) else "",
policy=policy if isinstance(policy, str) else "",
tokens=tokens,
)
return 201, {"bottle_id": rec.bottle_id, "identity_token": rec.identity_token}
if method == "PUT" and route.startswith("/bottles/") and route.endswith("/policy"):
bottle_id = route[len("/bottles/"):-len("/policy")]
try:
data = _parse_json_object(body)
except ValueError as e:
return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
policy = data.get("policy")
if not isinstance(policy, str):
return 400, {"error": "policy (string) is required"}
if orch.set_policy(bottle_id, policy):
return 200, {"updated": True}
return 404, {"error": "no such bottle"}
if method == "DELETE" and route.startswith("/bottles/"):
bottle_id = route[len("/bottles/"):]
if orch.teardown_bottle(bottle_id):
@@ -98,6 +131,63 @@ def dispatch( # pylint: disable=too-many-return-statements
return 403, {"error": "unattributed"}
return 200, {"bottle_id": rec.bottle_id}
if method == "GET" and route == "/supervise/proposals":
# Operator TUI: pending supervise proposals across all bottles.
return 200, {"proposals": orch.supervise_pending()}
if method == "POST" and route == "/supervise/respond":
# Operator decision: apply (approve/modify rewrites egress policy),
# write the queued response, audit — all server-side on the one DB.
try:
data = _parse_json_object(body)
except ValueError as e:
return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
proposal_id = data.get("proposal_id")
bottle_slug = data.get("bottle_slug")
decision = data.get("decision")
if not (isinstance(proposal_id, str) and proposal_id):
return 400, {"error": "proposal_id (string) is required"}
if not (isinstance(bottle_slug, str) and bottle_slug):
return 400, {"error": "bottle_slug (string) is required"}
if not (isinstance(decision, str) and decision):
return 400, {"error": "decision (string) is required"}
notes = data.get("notes")
final_file = data.get("final_file")
ok, err = orch.supervise_respond(
proposal_id,
bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
decision=decision,
notes=notes if isinstance(notes, str) else "",
final_file=final_file if isinstance(final_file, str) else None,
)
if ok:
return 200, {"responded": True}
return 409, {"error": err}
if method == "POST" and route == "/resolve":
# The per-request lookup the multi-tenant gateway makes: returns the
# bottle's policy. Requires a matching (source_ip, identity_token)
# pair — a missing/empty/mismatched token fail-closes (403), no
# source-IP-only fallback.
try:
data = _parse_json_object(body)
except ValueError as e:
return 400, {"error": f"invalid JSON: {e}"}
source_ip = data.get("source_ip")
token = data.get("identity_token")
if not isinstance(source_ip, str) or not source_ip:
return 400, {"error": "source_ip (string) is required"}
rec = orch.resolve(source_ip, token if isinstance(token, str) else "")
if rec is None:
return 403, {"error": "unattributed"}
# tokens are the in-memory per-bottle egress auth values the gateway
# injects; served here, never persisted.
return 200, {
"bottle_id": rec.bottle_id,
"policy": rec.policy,
"tokens": orch.tokens_for(rec.bottle_id),
}
return 404, {"error": "not found"}
@@ -111,12 +201,20 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
super().log_message(format, *args)
def _serve(self, method: str) -> None:
"""Read the request body, dispatch it, and write the JSON reply."""
"""Read the request body, dispatch it, and write the JSON reply. A
dispatch failure (e.g. a broker error) returns a 500 rather than
crashing the connection, so one bad request can't take the control
plane down for the caller."""
server = self.server
assert isinstance(server, ControlPlaneServer)
length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
body = self.rfile.read(length) if length > 0 else b""
status, payload = dispatch(server.orchestrator, method, self.path, body)
try:
status, payload = dispatch(server.orchestrator, method, self.path, body)
except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — the control plane must stay up
sys.stderr.write(f"orchestrator: {method} {self.path} failed: {e!r}\n")
sys.stderr.flush()
status, payload = 500, {"error": f"internal error: {e}"}
data = json.dumps(payload).encode()
self.send_response(status)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
@@ -130,6 +228,9 @@ class Handler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_POST(self) -> None:
self._serve("POST")
def do_PUT(self) -> None:
self._serve("PUT")
def do_DELETE(self) -> None:
self._serve("DELETE")
+4 -6
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
On a verified launch request it starts a Docker container; on teardown it
removes it. This proves the orchestrator -> backend seam on the cheapest
backend (the sidecar bundle is already containers). Only the request's
backend (the gateway is already containers). Only the request's
static ids/flags reach `docker`, so nothing free-form crosses the boundary.
Slice 3 launches a single container from the request's `image_ref`, named
after the bottle id and labelled for cleanup. Wiring the full agent +
sidecar bundle (networks, mounts, the consolidated sidecar) is a later
gateway (networks, mounts, the consolidated gateway) is a later
slice this is the seam, not the finished launcher.
"""
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
from .broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest
CONTAINER_PREFIX = "bot-bottle-orch-"
@@ -51,10 +52,7 @@ class DockerBroker(LaunchBroker):
Provenance + schema verification are inherited from `LaunchBroker`."""
def _docker(self, argv: list[str]) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
return subprocess.run(
argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True, check=False,
)
return run_docker(argv)
def _launch(self, req: LaunchRequest) -> None:
if not req.image_ref:
+255
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
"""The consolidated per-host gateway (PRD 0070).
The core consolidation win: **one** persistent gateway per host, shared by
every bottle, instead of a gateway per bottle. It's safe to share
because the attribution invariant (source IP + identity token, see
`registry`) lets the gateway attribute each request to the right bottle
so per-bottle policy lives in one long-lived process keyed on who's calling.
`Gateway` is the backend-neutral lifecycle contract (mirrors `LaunchBroker`):
ensure the single instance is up, report it, tear it down. `DockerGateway`
is the docker implementation; a firecracker gateway VM slots in later.
The defining behaviour is **idempotent singleton**: `ensure_running` starts
the instance if absent and is a no-op if it's already up, so N bottle
launches never spawn N gateways.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import abc
import os
import time
from pathlib import Path
from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
from ..paths import host_db_path
from ..supervise import DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER
# The host DB dir is bind-mounted here so the gateway's supervise daemon
# writes its queued proposals into the ONE host DB (the same file the
# orchestrator container opens and the operator reaches over HTTP).
_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER = os.path.dirname(DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER)
# The gateway's mitmproxy writes its CA a beat after the container starts, so
# reads poll for it rather than assuming it's there on a fresh launch.
_CA_POLL_SECONDS = 0.5
DEFAULT_CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
GATEWAY_NAME = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway"
GATEWAY_LABEL = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway=1"
# The single user-defined network the gateway and every agent bottle share.
# Agents attach here with a pinned IP and reach the gateway's egress /
# git-http / supervise ports by its address — no host port publishing, and
# the source IP the gateway attributes by is the address on this network.
GATEWAY_NETWORK = "bot-bottle-gateway"
# mitmproxy's CA dir in the bundle. A persistent named volume here keeps the
# gateway's self-generated CA STABLE across container recreation — every agent
# installs this one CA to trust the shared gateway's TLS interception, so it
# must not rotate when the gateway restarts.
MITMPROXY_HOME = "/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy"
GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME = "bot-bottle-gateway-mitmproxy"
GATEWAY_CA_CERT = f"{MITMPROXY_HOME}/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem"
# The gateway data-plane image + its Dockerfile. Kept as a local constant
# rather than imported from the backend layer, which would drag
# the whole backend layer into the lean orchestrator (see #359); unify when
# that lands. Env override matches the backend's BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_IMAGE.
GATEWAY_IMAGE = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_IMAGE", "bot-bottle-gateway:latest")
GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.gateway"
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
def _host_db_dir() -> str:
"""The host DB directory (created if missing), for the gateway's
supervise-DB bind-mount."""
db_dir = host_db_path().parent
db_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return str(db_dir)
class GatewayError(Exception):
"""The shared gateway failed to build/start/stop (non-zero `docker` exit)."""
class Gateway(abc.ABC):
"""Lifecycle of the single per-host gateway. Backend-neutral."""
name: str
def ensure_built(self) -> None:
"""Ensure the gateway's image / rootfs exists, building it if needed.
Default: nothing to build (e.g. a stub or a pre-pulled image)."""
return
@abc.abstractmethod
def ensure_running(self) -> None:
"""Start the gateway if it isn't already up. Idempotent: a no-op
when it's already running (that's the whole point one per host).
Assumes the image exists call `ensure_built()` first."""
@abc.abstractmethod
def is_running(self) -> bool:
"""True iff the gateway instance is currently up."""
@abc.abstractmethod
def stop(self) -> None:
"""Remove the gateway. Idempotent — absent is success."""
class DockerGateway(Gateway):
"""The consolidated gateway as a single, fixed-name Docker container.
`image_ref` defaults to the gateway data-plane image; `ensure_built`
builds it from `Dockerfile.gateway` when it's missing. (Note: slice 5
builds + launches the bundle container; wiring its per-bottle,
source-IP-keyed config is a later slice see PRD 0070.)"""
def __init__(
self,
image_ref: str = GATEWAY_IMAGE,
*,
name: str = GATEWAY_NAME,
network: str = GATEWAY_NETWORK,
orchestrator_url: str = "",
build_context: Path | None = None,
dockerfile: str | None = GATEWAY_DOCKERFILE,
host_port_bindings: tuple[int, ...] = (),
) -> None:
self.image_ref = image_ref
self.name = name
self.network = network
# The control-plane URL the gateway's data plane resolves per bottle
# against — reached by container name over docker DNS on the shared
# network (container↔container, no host firewall). Empty → single-tenant.
self._orchestrator_url = orchestrator_url
self._build_context = build_context or _REPO_ROOT
self._dockerfile = dockerfile
# Ports published on the host (0.0.0.0). Used by the Firecracker
# backend's dev-harness gateway so VMs can reach it via their TAP link;
# Docker's DNAT + the nft `ct status dnat accept` rule handle the rest.
self._host_port_bindings = host_port_bindings
def image_exists(self) -> bool:
return run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", self.image_ref]).returncode == 0
def ensure_built(self) -> None:
"""Build the bundle image from its Dockerfile, **cache-aware** — cheap
(a cache check) when nothing changed, a real rebuild when the flat
sources (egress addon / git-http / policy_resolver / supervise) moved.
This deliberately builds every time rather than build-if-missing: the
per-bottle model kept the image fresh via compose's `build:` on up, and
a stale image silently runs the OLD single-tenant daemons. No-op only
when no dockerfile is configured (a pre-pulled image). BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE
forces a full rebuild (parity with `start --no-cache`)."""
if self._dockerfile is None:
return
argv = ["docker", "build", "-t", self.image_ref,
"-f", str(self._build_context / self._dockerfile),
str(self._build_context)]
if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"):
argv.insert(2, "--no-cache")
proc = run_docker(argv)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway image build failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
def is_running(self) -> bool:
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "ps",
"--filter", f"name=^{self.name}$",
"--filter", "status=running",
"--format", "{{.Names}}",
])
return self.name in proc.stdout.split()
def _running_image_is_current(self) -> bool:
"""True iff the running gateway was created from the *current*
`image_ref`. When `ensure_built` rebuilds the image (a source change),
the running container is still the OLD image running the OLD flat
daemons so this is how a rebuild actually takes effect: a mismatch
means recreate."""
running = run_docker(["docker", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Image}}", self.name])
current = run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", "--format", "{{.Id}}", self.image_ref])
if running.returncode != 0 or current.returncode != 0:
return True # can't compare → don't churn a working container
return running.stdout.strip() == current.stdout.strip()
def _ensure_network(self) -> None:
"""Create the shared gateway network if it doesn't exist. Idempotent —
a concurrent create loses harmlessly (the loser sees 'already exists').
Docker picks the subnet; the launcher reads it back to allocate IPs."""
if run_docker(["docker", "network", "inspect", self.network]).returncode == 0:
return
proc = run_docker(["docker", "network", "create", self.network])
if proc.returncode != 0 and "already exists" not in proc.stderr:
raise GatewayError(
f"gateway network {self.network} failed to create: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def ensure_running(self) -> None:
# Recreate when the running container's image is stale (a rebuild),
# so source changes to the gateway's flat daemons take effect — not
# just when the container is absent.
if self.is_running() and self._running_image_is_current():
return
self._ensure_network()
# Clear any stale (stopped OR outdated-image) container holding the
# fixed name, then start fresh. `rm --force` on an absent name is a
# tolerated no-op.
run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self.name])
argv = [
"docker", "run", "--detach",
"--name", self.name,
"--label", GATEWAY_LABEL,
"--network", self.network,
# Persist the self-generated CA so it survives restarts (agents
# trust it) — see GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME.
"--volume", f"{GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME}:{MITMPROXY_HOME}",
# Share the one host DB: the supervise daemon queues proposals
# into the same file the orchestrator (and the operator, over
# HTTP) reads — no second, disconnected DB in the container.
"--volume", f"{_host_db_dir()}:{_SUPERVISE_DB_DIR_IN_CONTAINER}",
"--env", f"SUPERVISE_DB_PATH={DB_PATH_IN_CONTAINER}",
]
for port in self._host_port_bindings:
argv += ["--publish", f"0.0.0.0:{port}:{port}"]
if self._orchestrator_url:
# Makes the gateway's egress / git / supervise daemons multi-tenant:
# each request resolves source-IP -> policy against the control plane.
argv += ["--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL={self._orchestrator_url}"]
argv.append(self.image_ref)
proc = run_docker(argv)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway failed to start: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
def ca_cert_pem(self, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_CA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> str:
"""The gateway's CA certificate (PEM) that agents install to trust its
TLS interception. mitmproxy generates it a moment after the container
starts, so this **polls** for it (up to `timeout`) rather than assuming
it's already there on a fresh gateway — raising only if it never
appears."""
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout
while True:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "exec", self.name, "cat", GATEWAY_CA_CERT])
if proc.returncode == 0 and proc.stdout.strip():
return proc.stdout
if time.monotonic() >= deadline:
raise GatewayError(
f"gateway CA cert not available after {timeout:g}s: "
f"{proc.stderr.strip() or 'empty'}"
)
time.sleep(_CA_POLL_SECONDS)
def stop(self) -> None:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self.name])
if proc.returncode != 0 and "No such container" not in proc.stderr:
raise GatewayError(f"gateway failed to stop: {proc.stderr.strip()}")
__all__ = [
"Gateway", "DockerGateway", "GatewayError",
"GATEWAY_NAME", "GATEWAY_LABEL", "GATEWAY_IMAGE", "GATEWAY_NETWORK",
"GATEWAY_CA_VOLUME", "GATEWAY_CA_CERT",
]
+261
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
"""Orchestrator + gateway lifecycle (PRD 0070, docker slice).
Runs the orchestrator control plane **as a container** on the shared gateway
network, alongside the gateway container. This is the PRD's "virtualize the
orchestrator": container↔container between the gateway and the orchestrator
avoids the host firewall (which drops containerhost traffic), and the gateway
reaches the control plane by container name over docker DNS. The host CLI
reaches it via a published loopback port.
The orchestrator runs with the **register-only broker** the *backend*
launches agent containers (compose), so the orchestrator needs no docker
socket. That keeps this control-plane container unprivileged; the host manages
both containers. `ensure_running` is an idempotent singleton (fixed container
names + the published port).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import os
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from .. import log
from ..docker_cmd import run_docker
from ..paths import bot_bottle_root
from .gateway import GATEWAY_IMAGE, GATEWAY_NETWORK, DockerGateway, GatewayError
DEFAULT_PORT = 8099
ORCHESTRATOR_NAME = "bot-bottle-orchestrator"
ORCHESTRATOR_LABEL = "bot-bottle-orchestrator=1"
# The control-plane's own runtime image — lean (python + the stdlib-only
# `bot_bottle` package, bind-mounted at run time), distinct from the heavy
# gateway data-plane image it used to borrow (#384). Env override for
# operators pinning a published build.
ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE = os.environ.get(
"BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE", "bot-bottle-orchestrator:latest"
)
ORCHESTRATOR_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.orchestrator"
# Baked onto the container as a label so `ensure_running` can tell whether the
# running process is executing the *current* bind-mounted source — see
# `_source_hash`.
ORCHESTRATOR_SOURCE_HASH_LABEL = "bot-bottle-orchestrator-source-hash"
# The repo root is bind-mounted into the control-plane container so
# `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator` resolves the package (the orchestrator
# is stdlib-only, so the lean orchestrator image's python is enough).
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
_APP_DIR = "/app"
_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER = "/bot-bottle-root"
_HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS = 0.25
DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 45.0
_HEALTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 1.0
class OrchestratorStartError(RuntimeError):
"""The orchestrator container did not become healthy within the timeout."""
def _source_hash(repo_root: Path) -> str:
"""Content hash of the orchestrator's bind-mounted Python source (the
`bot_bottle` package the control-plane process imports). This only
changes when the code that would actually run inside the container
changes `ensure_running` recreates the container on a mismatch and
otherwise leaves a healthy one alone, so a bottle launch that isn't
accompanied by a code change doesn't restart the process and drop every
*other* active bottle's in-memory egress tokens (`Orchestrator._tokens`
in `service.py`, never persisted to disk by design)."""
h = hashlib.sha256()
for path in sorted((repo_root / "bot_bottle").rglob("*.py")):
h.update(str(path.relative_to(repo_root)).encode())
h.update(path.read_bytes())
return h.hexdigest()
class OrchestratorService:
"""Manages the orchestrator control-plane container + the shared gateway.
Callers only need `ensure_running()` + `url`.
`orchestrator_name` / `orchestrator_label` let backends run independent
orchestrators on the same host without name collisions (e.g. the
Firecracker backend uses `bot-bottle-fc-orchestrator` alongside the Docker
backend's `bot-bottle-orchestrator`). Subclass and override `_gateway()`
to supply a backend-specific gateway variant."""
def __init__(
self,
*,
port: int = DEFAULT_PORT,
network: str = GATEWAY_NETWORK,
image: str = ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE,
gateway_image: str = GATEWAY_IMAGE,
repo_root: Path = _REPO_ROOT,
host_root: Path | None = None,
orchestrator_name: str = ORCHESTRATOR_NAME,
orchestrator_label: str = ORCHESTRATOR_LABEL,
) -> None:
self.port = port
self.network = network
# Two distinct images (#384): `image` is the lean control-plane
# runtime this container runs; `_gateway_image` is the heavy egress /
# git-gate / supervise data plane the gateway container runs. They
# were one conflated image before the split.
self.image = image
self._gateway_image = gateway_image
self._repo_root = repo_root
self._host_root = host_root or bot_bottle_root()
self._orchestrator_name = orchestrator_name
self._orchestrator_label = orchestrator_label
@property
def url(self) -> str:
"""Host-side control-plane URL (published loopback port)."""
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{self.port}"
@property
def internal_url(self) -> str:
"""Control-plane URL as the gateway container reaches it — by name over
docker DNS on the shared network. This is the gateway's
BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL."""
return f"http://{self._orchestrator_name}:{self.port}"
def is_healthy(self, *, timeout: float = _HEALTH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> bool:
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{self.url}/health", timeout=timeout) as resp:
return resp.status == 200
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError):
return False
def _container_running(self, name: str) -> bool:
proc = run_docker(["docker", "ps", "--filter", f"name=^/{name}$", "--format", "{{.Names}}"])
return name in proc.stdout.split()
def _run_orchestrator_container(self, source_hash: str) -> None:
"""Start the control-plane container (idempotent: clears a stale
fixed-name container first). Register-only broker no docker socket.
Labels the container with `source_hash` so a later `ensure_running`
can detect a real code change (see `_source_hash`)."""
run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self._orchestrator_name])
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "run", "--detach",
"--name", self._orchestrator_name,
"--label", self._orchestrator_label,
"--label", f"{ORCHESTRATOR_SOURCE_HASH_LABEL}={source_hash}",
"--network", self.network,
# Host CLI reaches the control plane here; bound to loopback so it
# is not exposed on the host's external interfaces.
"--publish", f"127.0.0.1:{self.port}:{self.port}",
"--volume", f"{self._repo_root}:{_APP_DIR}:ro",
"--workdir", _APP_DIR,
# Persist the registry DB on the host (sole-owner: only the
# orchestrator opens bot-bottle.db).
"--volume", f"{self._host_root}:{_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER}",
"--env", f"BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT={_ROOT_IN_CONTAINER}",
"--entrypoint", "python3",
self.image,
"-m", "bot_bottle.orchestrator",
"--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", str(self.port), "--broker", "stub",
])
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise OrchestratorStartError(
f"orchestrator container failed to start: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def _gateway(self) -> DockerGateway:
return DockerGateway(
self._gateway_image, network=self.network, orchestrator_url=self.internal_url
)
def _ensure_orchestrator_image(self) -> None:
"""Build the lean control-plane image from `Dockerfile.orchestrator`
when it's missing (#384). Cheap — a `FROM python:*-slim` base with no
deps to install, so the layer cache makes rebuilds a no-op. Unlike the
gateway image this is build-if-missing, not build-every-time: the
control plane bind-mounts its source, so a code change is caught by the
source-hash recreate (below), not by an image rebuild."""
if run_docker(["docker", "image", "inspect", self.image]).returncode == 0:
return
argv = ["docker", "build", "-t", self.image,
"-f", str(self._repo_root / ORCHESTRATOR_DOCKERFILE),
str(self._repo_root)]
if os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_NO_CACHE"):
argv.insert(2, "--no-cache")
proc = run_docker(argv)
if proc.returncode != 0:
raise GatewayError(
f"orchestrator image build failed: {proc.stderr.strip()}"
)
def _orchestrator_source_current(self, current_hash: str) -> bool:
"""True iff the running orchestrator container was created from the
*current* bind-mounted source. Mirrors `DockerGateway`'s
image-staleness check, but by content hash rather than image id since
the orchestrator runs bind-mounted source, not a built image."""
if not self._container_running(self._orchestrator_name):
return False
proc = run_docker([
"docker", "inspect", "--format",
"{{ index .Config.Labels \"" + ORCHESTRATOR_SOURCE_HASH_LABEL + "\" }}",
self._orchestrator_name,
])
if proc.returncode != 0:
return True # can't compare -> don't churn a working container
return proc.stdout.strip() == current_hash
def ensure_running(
self, *, startup_timeout: float = DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
) -> str:
"""Ensure the control plane + shared gateway are up; return the host
control-plane URL. Idempotent a healthy control plane running
current code and a running gateway are left untouched. Raises
`OrchestratorStartError` on timeout."""
gateway = self._gateway()
gateway.ensure_built() # rebuild the bundle image on a source change
gateway.ensure_running() # creates the shared network + (re)starts gateway
# Recreate the orchestrator container only when its bind-mounted
# source has actually changed since it started — its Python process
# loaded that code at startup and won't reload, so a stale container
# would keep running OLD control-plane code. Recreating on *every*
# launch (the prior behaviour) would drop every other active
# bottle's in-memory egress tokens each time a new bottle starts,
# since the orchestrator process holds them only in memory (#381).
current_hash = _source_hash(self._repo_root)
if self.is_healthy() and self._orchestrator_source_current(current_hash):
return self.url
self._ensure_orchestrator_image()
log.info(
"starting orchestrator container",
context={"name": self._orchestrator_name},
)
self._run_orchestrator_container(current_hash)
deadline = time.monotonic() + startup_timeout
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if self.is_healthy():
log.info("orchestrator healthy", context={"url": self.url})
return self.url
time.sleep(_HEALTH_POLL_SECONDS)
raise OrchestratorStartError(
f"orchestrator at {self.url} did not become healthy within {startup_timeout:g}s"
)
def stop(self) -> None:
"""Remove the orchestrator + gateway containers (idempotent)."""
run_docker(["docker", "rm", "--force", self._orchestrator_name])
self._gateway().stop()
__all__ = [
"OrchestratorService",
"OrchestratorStartError",
"ORCHESTRATOR_NAME",
"ORCHESTRATOR_IMAGE",
"DEFAULT_PORT",
"DEFAULT_STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS",
]
+57
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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
"""Consolidated registration inputs (PRD 0070, docker slice).
Bridges the existing per-bottle `prepare` output to the consolidated
registry: turns a prepared bottle's egress plan into the backend-neutral
inputs `Orchestrator.launch_bottle` takes the egress **policy** blob and
launch **metadata**.
The policy blob is the exact routes YAML the per-bottle egress daemon used
to read from a file; in the consolidated model the multi-tenant gateway's
`PolicyResolver` fetches it from the registry per request (keyed by source
IP) instead. Same render, so consolidated and single-tenant egress apply
byte-identical policy a bottle's allow-list doesn't change when it moves
onto the shared gateway.
Host-side glue (imports `bot_bottle.egress`), used by the launch path not
by the lean orchestrator control-plane process itself.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from dataclasses import dataclass
from ..egress import EgressPlan, egress_render_routes
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RegistrationInputs:
"""What `Orchestrator.launch_bottle` needs to register a bottle, derived
from its prepared plan. `policy` is served verbatim by the gateway's
`/resolve`; `metadata` is opaque forward-compat state it carries the
human slug so the console / supervise can show a name, not just the
minted bottle id."""
policy: str
metadata: str
def egress_policy(plan: EgressPlan) -> str:
"""The bottle's egress policy blob: the routes YAML the gateway serves
and the addon parses with `load_config`. Identical to the per-bottle
`routes.yaml` render, so the consolidated path applies the same
allow-list."""
return egress_render_routes(plan.routes, log=plan.log)
def registration_inputs(plan: EgressPlan) -> RegistrationInputs:
"""Assemble the orchestrator registration inputs from a prepared egress
plan. `metadata` records the slug so the shared registry can map a minted
bottle id back to its human name."""
return RegistrationInputs(
policy=egress_policy(plan),
metadata=json.dumps({"slug": plan.slug}),
)
__all__ = ["RegistrationInputs", "egress_policy", "registration_inputs"]
+60 -14
View File
@@ -64,9 +64,13 @@ class BottleRecord:
identity_token: str
state: str = "active"
created_at: float = 0.0
# Opaque JSON blob for forward-compat (policy refs, pool slot, ...) —
# the registry doesn't interpret it, so new fields need no migration.
# Opaque JSON blob for forward-compat (pool slot, ...) — the registry
# doesn't interpret it, so new fields need no migration.
metadata: str = ""
# The bottle's gateway policy (opaque JSON — egress allowlist / routes /
# git config). The registry stores and serves it verbatim, keyed by
# source IP; the multi-tenant gateway interprets it.
policy: str = ""
def redacted(self) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Public view for listing — never exposes the identity token."""
@@ -76,6 +80,7 @@ class BottleRecord:
"state": self.state,
"created_at": self.created_at,
"metadata": self.metadata,
"policy": self.policy,
}
@@ -97,6 +102,10 @@ _MIGRATIONS = TableMigrations(
# the "one active bottle per source IP" check cheap.
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_orchestrator_bottles_source_ip "
"ON orchestrator_bottles (source_ip)",
# v3 — per-bottle policy (opaque JSON the gateway interprets): the
# egress allowlist / routes / git config selected by source IP. The
# multi-tenant gateway resolves it per request via `attribute`.
"ALTER TABLE orchestrator_bottles ADD COLUMN policy TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT ''",
],
)
@@ -110,6 +119,7 @@ def _row_to_record(row: sqlite3.Row) -> BottleRecord:
state=row["state"],
created_at=row["created_at"],
metadata=row["metadata"],
policy=row["policy"],
)
@@ -136,9 +146,18 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
bottle_id: str | None = None,
identity_token: str | None = None,
metadata: str = "",
policy: str = "",
) -> BottleRecord:
"""Register (or replace) a bottle. Mints a bottle_id / identity token
when not supplied. Live this is the control-plane reload path."""
when not supplied. Live this is the control-plane reload path.
Supersedes any *other* active bottle at the same source IP first:
`by_source_ip` fail-closes on ambiguity (>1 active row None), so a
leftover row at a reused IP from an untorn-down bottle, crash
recovery, or a persisted DB would otherwise *brick* the new bottle's
attribution. The new registration is authoritative for its IP; the
stale rows go. INSERT OR REPLACE handles a same-`bottle_id` reload in
place (its own row is exempt from the sweep)."""
rec = BottleRecord(
bottle_id=bottle_id or secrets.token_hex(8),
source_ip=source_ip,
@@ -146,12 +165,18 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
state="active",
created_at=time.time(),
metadata=metadata,
policy=policy,
)
with self._connect() as conn:
conn.execute(
"DELETE FROM orchestrator_bottles "
"WHERE source_ip = ? AND state = 'active' AND bottle_id != ?",
(rec.source_ip, rec.bottle_id),
)
conn.execute(
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO orchestrator_bottles "
"(bottle_id, source_ip, identity_token, state, created_at, metadata) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
"(bottle_id, source_ip, identity_token, state, created_at, metadata, policy) "
"VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
(
rec.bottle_id,
rec.source_ip,
@@ -159,11 +184,23 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
rec.state,
rec.created_at,
rec.metadata,
rec.policy,
),
)
self._chmod()
return rec
def set_policy(self, bottle_id: str, policy: str) -> bool:
"""Update a bottle's policy in place (live reload). Returns True if
the bottle exists."""
with self._connect() as conn:
cur = conn.execute(
"UPDATE orchestrator_bottles SET policy = ? WHERE bottle_id = ?",
(policy, bottle_id),
)
self._chmod()
return cur.rowcount > 0
def deregister(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
"""Remove a bottle. Returns True if a row was deleted."""
with self._connect() as conn:
@@ -188,14 +225,13 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
).fetchall()
return [_row_to_record(r) for r in rows]
def attribute(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Fail-closed attribution. Returns the bottle only when exactly one
active record has this source IP AND its identity token matches
(constant-time). Either signal alone is insufficient: an unknown IP,
an ambiguous IP (more than one active bottle a misconfiguration),
an empty token, or a token mismatch all deny."""
if not identity_token:
return None
def by_source_ip(self, source_ip: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Network-layer attribution: the single active bottle at this source
IP, or None if unknown or ambiguous (more than one a
misconfiguration). Safe as the *sole* attributor only where the
source IP is unspoofable (Firecracker `/31` + nft) and the control
plane is reachable only by the trusted gateway; pair with the
identity token (`attribute`) elsewhere."""
with self._connect() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"SELECT * FROM orchestrator_bottles "
@@ -204,7 +240,17 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
).fetchall()
if len(rows) != 1:
return None
rec = _row_to_record(rows[0])
return _row_to_record(rows[0])
def attribute(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Fail-closed attribution: `by_source_ip` AND a matching identity
token (constant-time). Either signal alone is insufficient here an
unknown/ambiguous IP, an empty token, or a token mismatch all deny."""
if not identity_token:
return None
rec = self.by_source_ip(source_ip)
if rec is None:
return None
if not hmac.compare_digest(rec.identity_token, identity_token):
return None
return rec
+174 -5
View File
@@ -17,19 +17,61 @@ Launch lifecycle:
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from .broker import LaunchBroker, LaunchRequest, sign_request
from .registry import BottleRecord, RegistryStore
from .gateway import Gateway
from ..supervise import (
AuditEntry,
COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL,
Response,
STATUS_APPROVED,
STATUS_MODIFIED,
STATUS_REJECTED,
TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
list_all_pending_proposals,
read_proposal,
render_diff,
write_audit_entry,
write_response,
)
# Operator decision → Response.status. The apply half (egress tools) runs
# for approve/modify only.
_RESPOND_STATUS = {
"approve": STATUS_APPROVED,
"modify": STATUS_MODIFIED,
"reject": STATUS_REJECTED,
}
_APPLY_TOOLS = (TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK)
class Orchestrator:
"""Owns the registry + brokers launches. Backend-neutral."""
"""Owns the registry + brokers launches, and manages the single
consolidated per-host gateway. Backend-neutral (broker and gateway
abstract the backend-native pieces)."""
def __init__(
self, registry: RegistryStore, broker: LaunchBroker, sign_secret: bytes
self,
registry: RegistryStore,
broker: LaunchBroker,
sign_secret: bytes,
gateway: Gateway | None = None,
) -> None:
self.registry = registry
self._broker = broker
self._secret = sign_secret
self._gateway = gateway
# Per-bottle egress auth tokens (env_name -> value), keyed by bottle_id.
# Held **in memory only** — never written to the registry DB — so the
# gateway can inject each bottle's upstream credential without secrets
# at rest. Lost on restart (re-launch re-registers them); the future
# SecretProvider (#355) replaces this with per-request minting.
self._tokens: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {}
def launch_bottle(
self,
@@ -38,10 +80,15 @@ class Orchestrator:
image_ref: str = "",
slot: int | None = None,
metadata: str = "",
policy: str = "",
tokens: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> BottleRecord:
"""Register a bottle and broker its launch. Rolls the registry entry
back if the launch doesn't take, so a failure leaves no orphan."""
rec = self.registry.register(source_ip, metadata=metadata)
"""Register a bottle (with its gateway policy + in-memory egress auth
tokens) and broker its launch. Rolls the registry entry back if the
launch doesn't take, so a failure leaves no orphan."""
rec = self.registry.register(source_ip, metadata=metadata, policy=policy)
if tokens:
self._tokens[rec.bottle_id] = dict(tokens)
req = LaunchRequest(
op="launch",
bottle_id=rec.bottle_id,
@@ -56,6 +103,7 @@ class Orchestrator:
finally:
if not launched:
self.registry.deregister(rec.bottle_id)
self._tokens.pop(rec.bottle_id, None)
return rec
def teardown_bottle(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
@@ -66,11 +114,132 @@ class Orchestrator:
req = LaunchRequest(op="teardown", bottle_id=bottle_id, source_ip=rec.source_ip)
self._broker.submit(sign_request(req, self._secret))
self.registry.deregister(bottle_id)
self._tokens.pop(bottle_id, None)
return True
def tokens_for(self, bottle_id: str) -> dict[str, str]:
"""The bottle's in-memory egress auth tokens (env_name -> value), or
empty. The gateway injects these per request; they are never
persisted."""
return dict(self._tokens.get(bottle_id, {}))
def attribute(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Fail-closed attribution (delegates to the registry)."""
return self.registry.attribute(source_ip, identity_token)
def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""Resolve the bottle behind a request — the per-request lookup the
multi-tenant gateway makes; the returned record carries its `policy`.
**Mandatory pair**: requires a matching `(source_ip, identity_token)`
(constant-time). There is no source-IP-only fallback the app-layer
token is delivered on every attributed data plane (egress proxy
credentials, git-gate/supervise headers), so a missing or mismatched
token fail-closes. This keeps a spoofed source IP (which the /31 TAP
alone does not prevent) from selecting another bottle's policy/tokens
without also holding that bottle's unguessable token."""
return self.registry.attribute(source_ip, identity_token)
def set_policy(self, bottle_id: str, policy: str) -> bool:
"""Update a bottle's gateway policy in place (live reload). False if
the bottle is unknown."""
return self.registry.set_policy(bottle_id, policy)
# --- supervise queue (operator approvals) ------------------------------
#
# The orchestrator owns the single DB *and* the live policy, so operator
# decisions are applied here, server-side, and reached over HTTP by the
# host TUI (no direct-DB access, one path for every backend).
def supervise_pending(self) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
"""All pending proposals across bottles, FIFO, as JSON dicts
(`Proposal.to_dict`, round-trippable via `Proposal.from_dict`)."""
return [p.to_dict() for p in list_all_pending_proposals()]
def _record_for_slug(self, slug: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
"""The live registry record whose metadata carries `slug`, or None
(e.g. the bottle was torn down before the operator responded)."""
for rec in self.registry.all():
try:
meta = json.loads(rec.metadata) if rec.metadata else {}
except ValueError:
meta = {}
if isinstance(meta, dict) and meta.get("slug") == slug:
return rec
return None
def supervise_respond(
self,
proposal_id: str,
*,
bottle_slug: str,
decision: str,
notes: str = "",
final_file: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Record an operator decision on a queued proposal, applying it
server-side. `decision` is approve/modify/reject.
Approve/modify on an egress tool rewrites the bottle's policy so the
gateway serves the new routes on its next `/resolve` (the live apply);
then the queued Response is written (unblocking the agent's MCP call)
and an audit entry recorded all against the one DB. Returns
(ok, error): ok=False with a message when the proposal or decision is
unknown, or the bottle is gone so an approval can't be applied."""
status = _RESPOND_STATUS.get(decision)
if status is None:
return False, f"unknown decision {decision!r}"
try:
proposal = read_proposal(bottle_slug, proposal_id)
except FileNotFoundError:
return False, "no such proposal"
diff_before, diff_after = "", ""
if status in (STATUS_APPROVED, STATUS_MODIFIED) and proposal.tool in _APPLY_TOOLS:
new_policy = final_file if final_file is not None else proposal.proposed_file
rec = self._record_for_slug(bottle_slug)
if rec is None:
return False, (
f"bottle {bottle_slug!r} is no longer registered; "
"cannot apply the route change"
)
diff_before, diff_after = rec.policy, new_policy
self.set_policy(rec.bottle_id, new_policy)
write_response(bottle_slug, Response(
proposal_id=proposal_id, status=status, notes=notes, final_file=final_file,
))
component = COMPONENT_FOR_TOOL.get(proposal.tool)
if component is not None:
write_audit_entry(AuditEntry(
timestamp=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
component=component,
operator_action=status,
operator_notes=notes,
justification=proposal.justification,
diff=render_diff(diff_before, diff_after, label=component),
))
return True, ""
# --- consolidated gateway ----------------------------------------------
def ensure_gateway(self) -> None:
"""Ensure the single per-host gateway is built and up (idempotent).
No-op when no gateway is configured."""
if self._gateway is not None:
self._gateway.ensure_built()
self._gateway.ensure_running()
def gateway_status(self) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Report the shared gateway for the control plane / console."""
if self._gateway is None:
return {"configured": False}
return {
"configured": True,
"name": self._gateway.name,
"running": self._gateway.is_running(),
}
__all__ = ["Orchestrator"]
+2 -2
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ suite points it at a throwaway dir instead of monkey-patching the function
override covers them all), and operators can relocate the root if needed.
This module has no bot-bottle imports, so it is safe to import from any
layer (and to COPY flat into the sidecar bundle).
layer (and to COPY flat into the gateway).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ def host_db_path() -> Path:
Kept in its own `db/` subdirectory (not directly under the root) so a
backend that can only bind-mount *directories* can share this one file
with a sidecar without exposing the root's other contents (git-gate
with a gateway without exposing the root's other contents (git-gate
keys, per-bottle state, ...)."""
return bot_bottle_root() / "db" / HOST_DB_FILENAME
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
"""Gateway-side per-client policy resolver (PRD 0070).
The consolidated gateway serves every bottle from one process, so for each
request it must apply the *calling* bottle's policy, selected by the source
IP the attribution invariant makes unspoofable. This resolves that policy
from the orchestrator's control plane (`POST /resolve`), keyed on the
`(source_ip, identity_token)` pair.
**Always fresh no cache.** The resolver is called rarely enough that a
round-trip doesn't matter, and correctness matters more than speed: every
resolve reflects the orchestrator's *current* view, so a revocation, a
policy change, or a bottle teardown the orchestrator knows about is honored
immediately rather than lingering for a cache TTL. (If this ever becomes a
hot path, add caching with orchestrator-driven invalidation not a blind
TTL.)
**Fail-closed:** an unattributed client (the orchestrator answers `403`)
resolves to `None`, and the caller (the egress addon, git-gate) must then
deny exactly as an unknown bottle should be treated. Orchestrator
*errors* (unreachable / unexpected status) raise, so the caller can fail
closed too rather than silently serving stale or empty policy.
The resolved value is the policy blob the orchestrator stores verbatim; the
consumer parses it (e.g. the egress addon's `load_config`). This module is
stdlib-only and free of bot-bottle imports so it can be COPYed flat into
the gateway.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 2.0
class PolicyResolveError(RuntimeError):
"""The orchestrator was unreachable or returned an unexpected status —
distinct from a clean `403` (unattributed), which returns None."""
class PolicyResolver:
"""Resolves each client's policy from the orchestrator, fresh per call."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, *, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS) -> None:
self._base = base_url.rstrip("/")
self._timeout = timeout
def _post_resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str) -> dict[str, object] | None:
"""The orchestrator's `/resolve` payload for this client, or None if
unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` on an
unreachable / unexpected-status / malformed response so every caller
can fail closed. Shared by `resolve` and `resolve_bottle_id`."""
body = json.dumps(
{"source_ip": source_ip, "identity_token": identity_token}
).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"{self._base}/resolve", data=body, method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=self._timeout) as resp:
payload = json.loads(resp.read())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
if e.code == 403:
return None # unattributed → fail closed (caller denies)
raise PolicyResolveError(f"/resolve returned HTTP {e.code}") from e
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError, OSError, ValueError) as e:
raise PolicyResolveError(f"/resolve unreachable or malformed: {e}") from e
return payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
def resolve(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
"""The calling bottle's policy blob, or None if unattributed. Always
fetches from the orchestrator so revocations / changes / teardowns
are honored immediately.
`identity_token` is optional *transitionally* omitting it resolves
by source IP alone (the network-layer attribution, sound by
construction on Firecracker's `/31`+nft, weaker elsewhere). The
consolidated end state makes the token mandatory so the app-layer
defense is always enforced, not silently degraded; that flips at the
`/resolve` boundary once identity-token *delivery* lands (a PRD 0070
open question we can't require what the agent can't yet present).
Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the orchestrator can't be reached."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None
policy = payload.get("policy")
return policy if isinstance(policy, str) else ""
def resolve_bottle_id(self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str | None:
"""The calling bottle's id, or None if unattributed. This is the
source-IP-keyed identity the git-gate uses to select the bottle's
repo namespace (there is no per-bottle policy blob to parse the
bottle *is* the namespace). Same fail-closed contract as `resolve`."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None
bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
return bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None
def resolve_policy_and_bottle_id(
self, source_ip: str, identity_token: str = "",
) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, dict[str, str]]:
"""The policy blob, bottle id, **and per-bottle egress auth tokens** in
a single `/resolve` so the egress addon gets everything it needs
(policy for routing, bottle id for the supervise queue/safelist, tokens
to inject upstream auth) in one round-trip. Returns `(None, None, {})`
when unattributed (a clean `403`). Raises `PolicyResolveError` if the
orchestrator can't be reached, so the caller still fails closed."""
payload = self._post_resolve(source_ip, identity_token)
if payload is None:
return None, None, {}
policy = payload.get("policy")
bottle_id = payload.get("bottle_id")
raw = payload.get("tokens")
tokens = {
k: v for k, v in raw.items() if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, str)
} if isinstance(raw, dict) else {}
return (
policy if isinstance(policy, str) else "",
bottle_id if isinstance(bottle_id, str) and bottle_id else None,
tokens,
)
__all__ = ["PolicyResolver", "PolicyResolveError"]
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
if db_path is not None:
resolved = db_path
else:
# In the sidecar container SUPERVISE_DB_PATH points at the
# In the gateway container SUPERVISE_DB_PATH points at the
# bind-mounted host DB. On the host this env var is never set,
# so we always fall through to host_db_path().
env_path = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_DB_PATH", "").strip()
+14 -14
View File
@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
"""Per-bottle supervise plane (PRD 0013).
The supervise plane is the per-bottle MCP sidecar plus its host-side
queue/audit support. The sidecar (bot_bottle.supervise_server)
The supervise plane is the per-bottle MCP daemon plus its host-side
queue/audit support. The daemon (bot_bottle.supervise_server)
sits on the bottle's internal network and exposes MCP tools the agent
calls when it needs an operator-reviewed egress change:
* egress-block / allow agent proposes a new routes.yaml
Each tool call: the agent passes the full proposed file plus a
justification text. The sidecar validates the proposal syntactically,
justification text. The gateway validates the proposal syntactically,
writes it to the host SQLite queue table, and holds the tool-call
connection open. The operator's supervise TUI
(bot_bottle.cli.supervise) sees the proposal, accepts
approve / modify / reject, and writes a response row. The sidecar sees
approve / modify / reject, and writes a response row. The gateway sees
the response and returns `{status, notes}` to the agent.
This module defines the host-side library: dataclasses for the queue
record shapes, queue read/write helpers, the audit log writer, and the
diff renderer. The in-container sidecar lives in
diff renderer. The in-gateway daemon lives in
bot_bottle/supervise_server.py; the supervise daemon's container
lifecycle is owned by the sidecar bundle (PRD 0024).
lifecycle is owned by the gateway (PRD 0024).
For 0013 the supervisor's approval handlers are deliberately no-ops:
on approval the audit log is written and the response file is
@@ -75,18 +75,18 @@ except ImportError:
try:
from .paths import bot_bottle_root
except ImportError: # flat imports inside the sidecar bundle
except ImportError: # flat imports inside the gateway
from paths import bot_bottle_root # type: ignore[import-not-found,no-redef] # pylint: disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME = "supervise"
SUPERVISE_PORT = 9100
# The supervise sidecar uses these to query egress's
# The supervise daemon uses these to query egress's
# introspection endpoint for the `list-egress-routes` MCP
# tool. The hostname + port match egress's docker network
# listen port (see backend.docker.egress.EGRESS_PORT). The supervise
# daemon runs inside the sidecar bundle alongside egress, so loopback
# daemon runs inside the gateway alongside egress, so loopback
# is the stable address across docker, firecracker, and Apple
# Container backends.
EGRESS_FORWARD_PROXY = "http://127.0.0.1:9099"
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ try:
from .audit_store import AuditStore
from .store_manager import StoreManager
except ImportError:
# Sidecar bundle: files are flat-copied under /app, not a package.
# Gateway: files are flat-copied under /app, not a package.
from queue_store import QueueStore # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
from audit_store import AuditStore # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
from store_manager import StoreManager # type: ignore[import-not-found] # pylint: disable=import-error,no-name-in-module
@@ -222,14 +222,14 @@ def sha256_hex(content: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(content.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
# --- Sidecar plan + abstract lifecycle -------------------------------------
# --- Gateway plan + abstract lifecycle -------------------------------------
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SupervisePlan:
"""Output of Supervise.prepare; consumed by .start.
`db_path` is the host database bind-mounted into the sidecar at
`db_path` is the host database bind-mounted into the gateway at
/run/supervise/bot-bottle.db. `internal_network` is empty at
prepare time; the backend's launch step fills it via
dataclasses.replace before calling .start."""
@@ -240,8 +240,8 @@ class SupervisePlan:
class Supervise(ABC):
"""Per-bottle supervise sidecar. Encapsulates host-side database
staging; the sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific."""
"""Per-bottle supervise daemon. Encapsulates host-side database
staging; the gateway's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific."""
def prepare(
self,
+59 -7
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Supervise sidecar HTTP server (PRD 0013).
"""Supervise daemon HTTP server (PRD 0013).
Per-bottle MCP server exposing tools the agent calls to propose egress
config changes when stuck. The tools are `egress-allow`,
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ The bottle slug arrives via SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env (stamped at
container creation by the backend's start step). SUPERVISE_DB_PATH
points at the bind-mounted host database.
Consolidated (PRD 0070): when BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is set, one
shared server fronts every bottle and attributes each proposal to the
calling bottle by source IP (resolved from the orchestrator) instead of a
fixed slug an unattributed source fails closed. Unset the legacy
per-bottle single-tenant server, unchanged.
Speaks MCP over HTTP+JSON-RPC. Methods handled:
* `initialize` handshake; returns server info + caps.
@@ -40,16 +46,18 @@ import time
import typing
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
from dataclasses import dataclass
from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
try:
# Same-directory imports inside the bundle container; these files are
# COPYed flat under /app by Dockerfile.sidecars.
# COPYed flat under /app by Dockerfile.gateway.
from egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
from policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
import supervise as _sv
except ModuleNotFoundError:
# Package imports for host-side tests and tooling.
from .egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
from .policy_resolver import PolicyResolveError, PolicyResolver
from . import supervise as _sv
@@ -57,6 +65,8 @@ except ModuleNotFoundError:
MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2024-11-05"
# App-layer identity token header (mirrors egress_addon / git_http_backend).
IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
SERVER_NAME = "bot-bottle-supervise"
SERVER_VERSION = "0.1.0"
@@ -73,6 +83,12 @@ DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30.0
MIN_RESPONSE_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 0.05
EGRESS_LIST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 5.0
# Consolidated (multi-tenant) mode: when set, one shared supervise server
# fronts every bottle and attributes each proposal to the calling bottle by
# source IP (resolved from the orchestrator), instead of a single
# SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env. Unset → legacy per-bottle single-tenant.
ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class JsonRpcRequest:
@@ -511,9 +527,35 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
if method == "tools/list":
return handle_tools_list(req.params)
if method == "tools/call":
return handle_tools_call(req.params, config)
# Attribute the proposal to the calling bottle. Single-tenant → the
# env slug on `config`; consolidated → the source-IP-resolved
# bottle id, so one shared server queues each bottle's proposal
# under its own slug.
return handle_tools_call(req.params, self._attributed_config(config))
raise _RpcClientError(ERR_METHOD_NOT_FOUND, f"method not found: {method}")
def _attributed_config(self, config: ServerConfig) -> ServerConfig:
"""The ServerConfig with `bottle_slug` bound to *this request's* bottle.
Single-tenant (no resolver): unchanged. Consolidated: the bottle id
attributed from the source IP **fail-closed**, an unattributed or
unreachable source raises so no proposal is queued under the wrong (or
empty) slug."""
resolver = getattr(self.server, "policy_resolver", None)
if resolver is None:
return config
# The agent's MCP client sends the identity token as a request header
# (provisioned via `mcp add --header`); the orchestrator requires the
# (source_ip, token) pair, so a missing/wrong token fail-closes below.
headers = getattr(self, "headers", None)
token = headers.get(IDENTITY_HEADER, "") if headers is not None else ""
try:
bottle_id = resolver.resolve_bottle_id(self.client_address[0], token)
except PolicyResolveError as e:
raise _RpcInternalError(f"orchestrator unreachable, cannot attribute: {e}") from e
if not bottle_id:
raise _RpcInternalError("request source is not attributed to a bottle")
return replace(config, bottle_slug=bottle_id)
def _write_jsonrpc(self, body: bytes) -> None:
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
@@ -537,6 +579,9 @@ class MCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingMixIn, http.server.HTTPServer):
allow_reuse_address = True
daemon_threads = True
config: ServerConfig = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="")
# None → single-tenant (proposals use config.bottle_slug); set → consolidated
# (each proposal attributed to the source-IP-resolved bottle).
policy_resolver: "PolicyResolver | None" = None
# --- Entry point -----------------------------------------------------------
@@ -548,15 +593,17 @@ def serve(
port: int = _sv.SUPERVISE_PORT,
bind: str = "0.0.0.0",
response_timeout_seconds: float = DEFAULT_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
resolver: "PolicyResolver | None" = None,
) -> typing.NoReturn:
server = MCPServer((bind, port), MCPHandler)
server.config = ServerConfig(
bottle_slug=bottle_slug,
response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
)
server.policy_resolver = resolver
mode = "multi-tenant" if resolver else f"slug={bottle_slug!r}"
sys.stderr.write(
f"supervise listening on {bind}:{port}; "
f"slug={bottle_slug!r}; "
f"supervise listening on {bind}:{port}; {mode}; "
f"tools: {', '.join(t['name'] for t in TOOL_DEFINITIONS)}\n" # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
sys.stderr.flush()
@@ -571,8 +618,12 @@ def serve(
def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
del argv # config is env-only, no CLI flags
orch_url = os.environ.get(ORCHESTRATOR_URL_ENV, "").strip()
resolver = PolicyResolver(orch_url) if orch_url else None
bottle_slug = os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG", "")
if not bottle_slug:
# Consolidated mode resolves the slug per request, so the env slug is
# optional there; single-tenant still requires it.
if not bottle_slug and resolver is None:
sys.stderr.write("supervise: SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env is unset\n")
return 2
port = int(os.environ.get("SUPERVISE_PORT", str(_sv.SUPERVISE_PORT)))
@@ -587,6 +638,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str]) -> int:
port=port,
bind=bind,
response_timeout_seconds=response_timeout_seconds,
resolver=resolver,
)
return 0 # serve() does not return
+1 -1
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class YamlSubsetError(ValueError):
that want fatal-exit semantics (manifest loader, egress-apply,
etc.) catch this at their own boundary and forward to `die`;
callers running outside the bot-bottle CLI process (the
egress sidecar's addon) handle it as a normal exception."""
egress daemon's addon) handle it as a normal exception."""
+1 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ mounted in. That topology breaks two assumptions those tests make:
`http://127.0.0.1:<host_port>` from inside the job time out.
The affected tests (`test_orphan_cleanup.test_create_and_remove`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_image.TestSidecarBundleImage`,
`test_sidecar_bundle_compose.TestSidecarBundleCompose`) still run
`test_gateway_image.TestGatewayImage`) still run
locally where the test process and Docker daemon share a host.
Making them work in CI is a follow-up: either re-write them to
discover container IPs via `docker inspect`, or reconfigure the
+2 -2
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Type "y"
Enter
# Wait for the bottle to launch: networks created, pipelock + git-gate
# sidecars started, agent container started, claude boots.
# companion containers started, agent container started, claude boots.
Sleep 22s
# Probe 1 — warm-up. A reply at all proves api.anthropic.com is
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Type "init /tmp/r, commit AKIAQRJHK7N5ZPM2VXTL to leak.txt, push to ssh://git@up
Enter
Sleep 30s
# Leave claude. The launcher tears down the container, sidecars, and
# Leave claude. The launcher tears down the container, companion containers, and
# networks on session end.
Ctrl+D
Sleep 4s
+20 -20
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
## Summary
Replace the **per-bottle sidecar bundle** with a single **persistent,
per-host orchestrator**: one long-lived service that runs the sidecar
Replace the **per-bottle gateway bundle** with a single **persistent,
per-host orchestrator**: one long-lived service that runs the gateway
functions (egress / git-gate / supervise), coordinates with the console,
and brokers agent launches and teardown. It is **virtualized from the
start** using each backend's native isolation primitive — a Firecracker
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ container on the legacy backend — and is fronted by a single
## Motivation
Today each bottle spins up its own sidecar bundle (egress mitmproxy +
Today each bottle spins up its own gateway bundle (egress mitmproxy +
git-gate + supervise). That costs:
- **Resources.** N bottles → N heavy bundles booting and idling.
- **Operational churn.** Per-launch container/VM lifecycle for the
sidecars, a control path baked at launch and torn down at exit.
- **A blurry contract.** "How a bottle talks to its sidecar" is
gateways, a control path baked at launch and torn down at exit.
- **A blurry contract.** "How a bottle talks to its gateway" is
re-implemented per backend instead of being one agreed interface.
A per-host orchestrator collapses the first two and forces the third to
@@ -52,11 +52,11 @@ weaken, and the weakened ones must be mitigated by design, not hand-waved.
structured, auditable privileged core instead of a fat socket.
- **Attribution is enforced, not assumed.** Making source-IP identity a
first-class contract invariant (below) means each backend must *prove*
it, rather than the sidecar implicitly trusting network position.
it, rather than the gateway implicitly trusting network position.
### What gets weaker, and the mitigation
1. **Secret concentration.** Per-bottle sidecars isolate secrets at the
1. **Secret concentration.** Per-bottle gateways isolate secrets at the
process boundary — each holds only its bottle's tokens/keys. A host
orchestrator concentrates **every bottle's** egress tokens, git deploy
keys, and the console credential in one long-lived process. A single
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ weaken, and the weakened ones must be mitigated by design, not hand-waved.
fleet, plus launch authority, plus the console token.
- *Mitigation:* the orchestrator is itself confined (its own VM/container
with its own fail-closed egress); make it **restartable without killing
running agent VMs** (agents keep running; they briefly lose sidecar
running agent VMs** (agents keep running; they briefly lose gateway
connectivity until it's back); persist state to a host volume so a
restart re-adopts live bottles rather than losing them.
@@ -114,13 +114,13 @@ responsibility** and part of the contract:
- **Apple** — the host-only network.
If a backend can't honor the invariant, source-IP consolidation is not
safe there and that backend keeps per-bottle sidecars. The invariant is a
safe there and that backend keeps per-bottle gateways. The invariant is a
hard precondition, not an aspiration.
**Defense-in-depth — a per-bottle identity token.** On top of the
network-layer invariant, inject a per-bottle secret token into every
request the agent makes to the orchestrator (the agent already egresses
through the sidecar proxy, so this is cheap to add). It gives an
through the gateway proxy, so this is cheap to add). It gives an
**application-layer** proof of identity independent of the network layer:
- On **Firecracker** the `/31` + nft already make source IP unspoofable
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ Requirements: the token is **per-bottle, unguessable, and
non-cross-leakable** — a bottle can only ever prove it is *itself* (it
can't learn another bottle's token, given bottle isolation), so a hostile
agent gains nothing by presenting it. The orchestrator provisions the
token at launch and the sidecar requires it to attribute + authorize.
token at launch and the gateway requires it to attribute + authorize.
Note this hardens *attribution*, not *secret exposure*: it's app-layer, so
a compromised orchestrator still sees every token (that's the
concentration problem, addressed separately under Secret handling).
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ manifest anywhere a raw token value is accepted, discovered from
`AgentProvider`s are — because maintaining every forge/cloud/OAuth
provider in-tree is untenable. The orchestrator's vault mints via these
providers; but the abstraction is shippable independently and today's
per-bottle sidecars can use it too.
per-bottle gateways can use it too.
## Design
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ Three surfaces; only one is per-backend.
every host (no vsock/unix-socket portability caveats); a local unix
socket is a fine optimization, but HTTP is the wire contract.
2. **Data plane (agent → orchestrator)** — the egress / git / supervise
endpoints. Already agnostic today (agents dial `http://sidecar:9099`);
endpoints. Already agnostic today (agents dial `http://gateway:9099`);
only the *address* and *how packets get there* are per-backend.
3. **Launch / wire (orchestrator → backend)** — the irreducibly
backend-specific part; lives on `BottleBackend`.
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ forged one from a compromised co-located component. The orchestrator signs;
the broker verifies with the orchestrator's public key (provisioned at
broker install). This is the concrete form of security #3's "structured
requests only." Same JSON-with-ids + JWT shape for all
orchestrator↔broker/sidecar communication; cases that don't fit get
orchestrator↔broker/gateway communication; cases that don't fit get
handled as they arise, with this as the default.
If `BottleBackend` bloats, the pressure valve is composition one level
@@ -299,10 +299,10 @@ and integrate a console against.
the data plane and the console reach state through the control-plane RPC,
never a direct file handle.** No agent-facing component gets the file, so
none can forge attribution. (This supersedes the earlier `ro`-mount idea.)
- *Transitional caveat:* today the per-bottle **supervise sidecar
- *Transitional caveat:* today the per-bottle **supervise gateway
rw-bind-mounts `bot-bottle.db`** to write proposals — exactly the
pattern the orchestrator removes (supervise consolidates into the
orchestrator; sidecar writes become RPC calls). Until that lands, don't
orchestrator; gateway writes become RPC calls). Until that lands, don't
put the attribution registry behind a data-plane-writable mount.
Implementation note for the VM slices: SQLite **WAL** over a guest share
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ orchestrator becomes a VM. Decouple the two risks instead:
Backend order (cheapest proof → hardest → last):
1. **Docker orchestrator** — nearly free (the sidecar bundle is already
1. **Docker orchestrator** — nearly free (the gateway bundle is already
containers; collapse N bundles into one persistent container). Proves
consolidation + the `BottleBackend` seam with the least moving parts.
2. **Firecracker orchestrator** — the real work: the shim + VM-to-VM
@@ -336,13 +336,13 @@ Backend order (cheapest proof → hardest → last):
the dev-harness so the app logic is already proven.
3. **macOS (Apple container)** — last (container-to-container networking).
Keep the sidecar **service one shared thing** throughout.
Keep the gateway **service one shared thing** throughout.
## Non-goals
- Removing OCI/Dockerfile support for agent images (0069's concern).
- A single database for *all* config (see the three-tier table).
- Changing the per-bottle isolation of agent workloads — only the sidecar
- Changing the per-bottle isolation of agent workloads — only the gateway
is consolidated; agents stay one-VM/container-each.
## Relationship to other work
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ Keep the sidecar **service one shared thing** throughout.
`BottleBackend.wire()` (DNAT+forward for fc, shared-net for
docker/apple), not orchestrator logic. **Not a blocker** — resolvable at
implementation time (may require a bit of host modification, as the pool
setup already does on NixOS); an earlier "sidecars in VMs" spike showed
setup already does on NixOS); an earlier "gateways in VMs" spike showed
it's feasible.
- **Live-reload protocol** for per-bottle policy over the HTTP control
plane (add/remove routes/keys/proposals without a restart).
@@ -15,6 +15,25 @@ the biggest credential risk).
## Summary
> **Status — implemented (2026-07-14).** This note's recommendation
> shipped, so the "today" / "in-flight" tenses below are now historical
> (kept as the reasoning that led here). Current reality: bot-bottle no
> longer injects raw provider tokens into the agent. The agent's environ
> carries only a **placeholder** (e.g.
> `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder`); the real token is held
> in the egress sidecar and injected as the upstream `Authorization`
> header. Rather than adding a *separate* in-container reverse proxy (as
> proposed below), credential injection was folded into the **existing
> pipelock/mitmproxy egress firewall**: an `EgressRoute` carries
> `auth_scheme` + `token_ref`, the host token is forwarded into the
> sidecar addon under an `EGRESS_TOKEN_N` slot, and the addon rewrites
> `Authorization` on matching routes — **one MITM, not two** (this
> resolves the Infisical-doubling concern noted later). The same
> mechanism now covers Codex and Pi provider tokens and git-host PATs.
> A `printenv` inside the bottle yields the placeholder, not the secret.
> For current wiring see `bot_bottle/egress.py` and
> `bot_bottle/contrib/*/agent_provider.py`.
Today every bot-bottle agent gets `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (and
any `bottle.env` secrets like a Gitea PAT) injected as env vars,
which means the agent process can read them with `printenv` or
@@ -36,6 +55,24 @@ small bot-bottle-specific reverse proxy modeled on the
phantom-token shape is probably the right call. For Gitea / GitHub /
GitLab, the same proxy generalizes by config.
**Updated 2026-07-14:** OneCLI ([onecli.sh](https://onecli.sh/)) —
already listed below — has matured into a GA, YC-backed Rust
credential gateway ("The Identity Gateway for AI Agents", ~2.5k⭐,
300k+ downloads) that implements the **same phantom-token pattern**
this note recommends: the agent holds a placeholder token, the
gateway swaps it for the real (AES-256-GCM-encrypted) credential at
request time. It's now the most mature open-source realization of the
exact design proposed here — a production-ready alternative to
alpha-stage nono — at the cost of being a broader product (built-in
vault + management dashboard + hosted cloud tier + 50+ app
integrations) rather than a minimal proxy. Its managed/cloud tier and
per-agent dashboard also overlap bot-bottle's own planned paid control
plane (bot-bottle-console, issue #327), so it's worth tracking as both
a build-vs-adopt option *and* a product-level competitor. The
build-first recommendation still stands (see synthesis below), but
adopting OneCLI's OSS core is now a credible alternative where nono was
too green.
## The shared problem
Linux has no per-env-var ACL. Once a var is in a process's
@@ -77,7 +114,9 @@ The remaining credible designs reduce to three:
### Anthropic / Claude Code
**Today's wiring** (`bot_bottle/cli/start.py`): the host's
**Original wiring** (pre-gateway; **superseded 2026-07-14** — see the
Status note in the Summary; the token now lives in the egress sidecar
and the agent gets a placeholder): the host's
`BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is forwarded into the bottle as
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` via `docker run -e CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
(no `=value`, so the value never lands on argv — good). Inside the
@@ -223,7 +262,7 @@ Two categories:
| **Infisical Agent Vault** | B | MIT (EE carve-out) | In-process HTTPS_PROXY forward proxy | TLS MITM, dummy-to-real swap | No — HTTPS_PROXY model | Service-level | Active; v0.19.0 May 2026, ~1k⭐ |
| **nono** | B | Apache-2.0 | In-process reverse proxy | Phantom token, explicit URL routing | **Yes**`BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:PORT/…` | Host + endpoint | Early alpha; v0.53.0 May 2026, 2.4k⭐ |
| **Aegis** | B | Apache-2.0 | In-process reverse proxy | Path routing (`localhost:3100/{svc}/…`) | Configurable, undocumented for Anthropic | Method/path/rate/time | Very new, 10⭐ |
| **OneCLI** | B | Apache-2.0 | Reverse proxy + management UI | Host/path matching, Bitwarden integration | Configurable | Per-agent scoping | Active; v1.23.0 May 2026, 2.1k⭐ |
| **OneCLI** | B | Apache-2.0 | Reverse proxy + built-in vault + dashboard | **Phantom token** (placeholder→real swap at request time), AES-256-GCM vault | Yes (host match) | Per-agent + endpoint/method + rate limits | GA; Rust; YC-backed; ~2.5k⭐, 300k+ downloads (Jul 2026) |
| **Aembit** | B | Proprietary | Sidecar + cloud control plane | TLS intercept, SPIFFE, JIT creds | No — intercepts by destination | Policy-based | GA (Apr 2026) |
| **LiteLLM Proxy** | A | MIT | Reverse proxy | Virtual key → upstream key | Yes — set base URL to LiteLLM | Route-level | 45k⭐; **CVE-2026-42208 exploited Apr 2026**, patch v1.83.7 |
| **Portkey Gateway** | A | MIT (OSS core) | Reverse proxy | Virtual key vault (cloud or Enterprise self-host) | Yes — documented for Claude Code | Config-based | Production; virtual-key vault needs Enterprise for self-host |
@@ -242,6 +281,18 @@ Two categories:
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`. **Blocker:** nono is explicitly
"early alpha, not security audited."
**Update (2026-07-14):** OneCLI ([onecli.sh](https://onecli.sh/))
ships the same phantom-token shape but is GA and YC-backed (Rust,
~2.5k⭐, 300k+ downloads) — the maturity nono lacks. Trade-offs: it's
a full identity-gateway *product* (encrypted vault, management
dashboard, 50+ one-click app integrations, hosted cloud tier), much
heavier than the ~100-line proxy proposed below, and its hosted tier
is a third-party credential custodian — precisely the trust
dependency bot-bottle's isolation model exists to avoid. So: its
Apache-2.0 OSS core is a credible *adopt* candidate for the
phantom-token slice; its managed offering is a *competitor*, not a
dependency to lean on.
- **TLS-MITM forward proxies** (Infisical Agent Vault, Cloudflare
Sandbox Auth, Aembit, the existing pipelock) all double up on
the CA-trust machinery PRD 0006 already built for pipelock.
@@ -273,6 +324,15 @@ routing matches the design recommended here exactly; zero TLS
work. But "not security audited" + "early alpha" means adopting it
is a bet on the project rather than a buy-vs-build win.
**Mature phantom-token option (added 2026-07-14):** OneCLI — same
architecture as nono, but GA, Rust, and YC-backed. Its Apache-2.0 OSS
core is now the strongest *adopt* candidate for the phantom-token slice
if building is undesirable; the caveats are product surface you don't
need (bundled vault + dashboard) and that its hosted tier is a
competitor rather than a dependency. Doesn't change the build-first
recommendation for the narrow Anthropic-token slice, but it does mean
"is there a mature drop-in?" now has a real answer.
**Most mature OSS purpose-built:** Infisical Agent Vault. MIT,
v0.19.0 active, v0.17.0 added a containerized agent mode that
maps directly to bot-bottle. Friction is the TLS-MITM topology
@@ -293,6 +353,12 @@ exposed.
## Recommended path forward
> **Mostly implemented (2026-07-14).** Steps 13 shipped — the token
> injection moved into the egress sidecar (folded into pipelock rather
> than a standalone reverse proxy) and generalized to Codex/Pi/git-host
> tokens. Steps 45 (issuance-side scope narrowing, per-route allowlists)
> remain good hygiene. See the Status note in the Summary.
In priority order:
1. **In-container reverse proxy holding `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`.**
@@ -376,6 +442,9 @@ already gives us for upstream push credentials.
- [nono — phantom token blog](https://nono.sh/blog/blog-credential-injection)
- [Aegis — GitHub](https://github.com/getaegis/aegis)
- [OneCLI — GitHub](https://github.com/onecli/onecli)
- [OneCLI — homepage](https://onecli.sh/)
- [OneCLI — Y Combinator company page](https://www.ycombinator.com/companies/onecli)
- [Show HN: OneCLI Vault for AI Agents in Rust](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47353558)
- [Sandbox0 — GitHub](https://github.com/sandbox0-ai/sandbox0)
- [Buildkite Cleanroom — GitHub](https://github.com/buildkite/cleanroom)
- [Aembit IAM for Agentic AI — GA](https://aembit.io/blog/aembit-iam-for-agentic-ai-is-now-generally-available/)
@@ -71,6 +71,56 @@ manifest merge.
network egress is logged by pipelock/mitmproxy, and per-run op-log/audit state
is persisted to SQLite.
- **OneCLI** ([onecli.sh](https://onecli.sh/)) — YC-backed, GA, open-source
(Apache-2.0, Rust) "identity gateway for AI agents": a credential/secret
broker that holds API keys and OAuth tokens out of the agent's reach and
injects them at the network layer (phantom-token — the agent sees a
placeholder, the gateway swaps in the real, AES-256-GCM-encrypted credential
at request time). Framework-agnostic and drop-in for any HTTP-calling agent,
50+ app integrations, plus a hosted cloud tier with a per-agent dashboard and
audit logs. Full technical breakdown in
[`agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md`](agent-credential-proxy-landscape.md).
**How close a competitor:** near-exact on the *single axis of agent secret
custody* — the exact thing bot-bottle sells as "the agent never sees real
credentials, even via `printenv`." OneCLI does that one job well, is mature
and funded, and is *more portable* (it sits in front of anything; bot-bottle
only helps agents launched through bot-bottle). Takeaway: bot-bottle should
stop treating secret custody as a *unique* differentiator. But OneCLI is
**not** a competitor to bot-bottle's actual product — it does no agent
sandboxing (containers/microVMs), no fleet/manifest layer, no named agents /
skills / per-agent system prompts, no multi-provider launching, no egress
firewall.
**Our edge:** (1) *Isolation is the product, not a proxy.* OneCLI keeps the
key out of reach at the network layer, but the agent itself still runs
unsandboxed — a hijacked agent behind OneCLI has full run of its host and can
exfil captured data through any allowed host. bot-bottle runs the agent inside
a kernel/VM-enforced sandbox, injects credentials across that same
out-of-process boundary, *and* clamps egress with pipelock — defense in depth
vs. a single network layer. (2) *Fleet + manifest model* with named agents,
skills, per-agent system prompts, multi-provider and multi-backend — OneCLI
has no equivalent. (3) *Trust posture:* OneCLI's managed tier reintroduces a
third-party credential custodian, whereas bot-bottle's OSS-runtime +
paid-control-plane split keeps custody inside the operator's own boundary —
the stronger story for the security-minded self-hoster. (4) *Runs inside your
network boundary — local/internal reach.* Because bot-bottle executes the
agent on your own host (homelab, corporate LAN, a Tailnet) and egress is a
manifest field, giving an agent *scoped* access to **internal** resources — a
private Gitea, a LAN database, a Tailscale node — is just another egress-route
line, not a networking project (the same move an operator already makes to
reach their Tailscale services). OneCLI's OSS core can self-host too, but it's
a credential *broker* for outbound API calls, not an agent runtime, and its
managed tier + 50+ integrations are oriented at public SaaS — it doesn't put
the agent behind your firewall for you. This is a reach advantage, distinct
from the isolation ones above, and it's a wedge cloud-first agent products
(Devin, Copilot Workspace, OneCLI Cloud) structurally can't match. **Tactical
read:**
adopt OneCLI's OSS core for the credential slice if building is undesirable
(it's mature now); don't build atop its managed tier (competitor, not
dependency); re-position bot-bottle on isolation + fleet + self-hosted custody
rather than "we hide your secrets."
## What no found project does
None combine:
+23 -6
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#
# The one-time privileged setup the Firecracker backend needs: a pool of
# user- (or group-) owned point-to-point TAP devices plus a fail-closed
# nftables table that confines every microVM to its own sidecar.
# nftables table that confines every microVM to its own gateway.
#
# NON-INVASIVE BY DESIGN. It does NOT flip `networking.nftables.enable`
# (which would switch your whole host firewall backend) or
@@ -49,10 +49,12 @@ let
# /31 alignment == an even final octet (only bit 0 matters for base+2i).
lastOctet = lib.toInt (lib.last (lib.splitString "." cfg.ipBase));
# The script needs ip/nft/sysctl + the usual coreutils. It gets every
# pool value via the unit's Environment=, so it never reads the shared
# defaults file (which isn't beside it once copied to the store).
runtimePath = with pkgs; [ iproute2 nftables procps coreutils gnused ];
# The script needs ip/nft/sysctl + the usual coreutils, plus iptables
# for the orchestrator link's DOCKER-USER accept (best-effort; skipped
# when Docker is absent). It gets every pool value via the unit's
# Environment=, so it never reads the shared defaults file (which isn't
# beside it once copied to the store).
runtimePath = with pkgs; [ iproute2 nftables iptables procps coreutils gnused ];
ownEnv =
if cfg.group != null
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ let
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE = cfg.ipBase;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX = cfg.ifacePrefix;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE = cfg.tableName;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE = cfg.orchIface;
} // ownEnv;
in
{
@@ -127,6 +130,19 @@ in
description = "nftables table name for the isolation boundary. Must match netpool.NFT_TABLE.";
};
orchIface = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE;
defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
description = ''
TAP name for the orchestrator/gateway VM's dedicated link. Unlike
the isolated bbfc* agent pool, this link is NAT'd to the internet
(the orchestrator is trusted infra that builds agent images in-VM
and forwards agent egress upstream). Must match
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE / netpool.ORCH_IFACE.
'';
};
writeEnvFile = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.bool;
default = false;
@@ -150,7 +166,7 @@ in
}
];
# VM->sidecar traffic is DNAT'd and forwarded, so forwarding must be on.
# VM->gateway traffic is DNAT'd and forwarded, so forwarding must be on.
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
# One oneshot brings up the whole pool (TAPs + independent nft table)
@@ -176,6 +192,7 @@ in
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=${cfg.ipBase}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=${cfg.ifacePrefix}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=${cfg.tableName}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE=${cfg.orchIface}
'';
};
};
+134 -9
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# Creates a pool of point-to-point TAP devices (owned by the invoking
# user so the backend can open them without root at launch) and a
# dedicated nftables table that isolates every VM: a bottle VM can
# reach only its own sidecar (published on the host-side TAP IP) and
# reach only its own gateway (published on the host-side TAP IP) and
# nothing else on the host or network.
#
# Why a pool + one-time setup: creating a TAP and assigning it an IP
@@ -63,18 +63,19 @@ POOL_SIZE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE)}"
IP_BASE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE)}"
PREFIX="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX)}"
TABLE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE)}"
ORCH_IFACE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE)}"
OWNER="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}"
GROUP="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP:-}"
# Fail loudly rather than provisioning a half/empty range if a value
# resolved to nothing (env unset AND the shared file unreadable).
for _v in POOL_SIZE IP_BASE PREFIX TABLE; do
for _v in POOL_SIZE IP_BASE PREFIX TABLE ORCH_IFACE; do
[ -n "${!_v}" ] || { echo "error: $_v unresolved (set BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* or fix $_DEFAULTS)" >&2; exit 1; }
done
# Sidecar ports (must match the backend). egress=9099, supervise=9100,
# Gateway ports (must match the backend). egress=9099, supervise=9100,
# git-http=9420. Reached by the VM at its host-side TAP IP.
SIDECAR_PORTS="9099,9100,9420"
GATEWAY_PORTS="9099,9100,9420"
# --- IP math ---------------------------------------------------------
# Slot i occupies the /31 {base+2i, base+2i+1}: host = base+2i (the
@@ -89,6 +90,13 @@ host_ip() { _int_to_ip $(( $(_ip_to_int "$IP_BASE") + 2*$1 )); }
guest_ip() { _int_to_ip $(( $(_ip_to_int "$IP_BASE") + 2*$1 + 1 )); }
iface() { echo "${PREFIX}$1"; }
# Orchestrator/gateway VM link: a /31 at the TOP of the IP_BASE /16
# (host x.y.255.0, guest x.y.255.1), well clear of the agent pool near
# the bottom of the block. Must match netpool.py:orch_slot().
_orch_base() { echo $(( ($(_ip_to_int "$IP_BASE") & 0xFFFF0000) + 0xFF00 )); }
orch_host() { _int_to_ip "$(_orch_base)"; }
orch_guest() { _int_to_ip $(( $(_orch_base) + 1 )); }
require_root() {
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
echo "error: '$1' needs root (run under sudo)" >&2
@@ -107,7 +115,7 @@ cmd_up() {
fi
echo "firecracker net pool: $POOL_SIZE slots, base $IP_BASE, $own_desc"
# VM->sidecar traffic is DNAT'd to the sidecar container and
# VM->gateway traffic is DNAT'd to the gateway container and
# forwarded, so forwarding must be enabled (Docker also sets this).
sysctl -qw net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
@@ -125,8 +133,21 @@ cmd_up() {
echo " $dev host=$host guest=$(guest_ip "$i") $own_desc"
done
# The orchestrator/gateway VM's dedicated link. Same rootless-open
# ownership as the pool, but NAT'd to the internet (below) — it is
# trusted infra, not an isolated agent slot.
ip link show "$ORCH_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| ip tuntap add dev "$ORCH_IFACE" mode tap "${own_args[@]}"
ip addr replace "$(orch_host)/31" dev "$ORCH_IFACE"
ip link set "$ORCH_IFACE" up
echo " $ORCH_IFACE host=$(orch_host) guest=$(orch_guest) (NAT'd egress) $own_desc"
_install_nft
echo "nftables table inet $TABLE installed (fail-closed boundary)"
_install_orch_egress
echo "orchestrator egress installed ($ORCH_IFACE -> NAT out)"
_install_gateway_route
echo "agent->gateway route installed (${PREFIX}* :$GATEWAY_PORTS -> $(orch_guest))"
echo "done."
}
@@ -135,19 +156,37 @@ _install_nft() {
# tool's traffic is affected. Priority -10 runs before Docker's
# filter hooks (priority 0); a drop here is terminal for the packet.
#
# forward: VM egress is DNAT'd to the sidecar (established via
# forward: VM egress is DNAT'd to the gateway (established via
# `ct status dnat`); return traffic via `ct state established`.
# Anything else from a VM is dropped -> no route to the internet
# or the rest of the host except through the sidecar proxy.
# input: a VM never needs host-local delivery (its sidecar is
# or the rest of the host except through the gateway proxy.
# input: a VM never needs host-local delivery (its gateway is
# reached via DNAT->forward), so drop all direct input from VMs
# -> host services bound on 0.0.0.0 are unreachable from the VM.
# Delete-first (create empty, delete, recreate) so a re-applied `up`
# lands identical state instead of appending rules / erroring on the
# existing base chains — the setup is idempotent regardless of history.
# Anti-spoof: bind each TAP to its assigned guest IP. The /31 alone
# does NOT make the source address unspoofable — root in an agent VM
# can source another bottle's guest IP on its own bbfc TAP, and the
# gateway attributes egress/policy/tokens by source IP. So drop any
# packet whose source isn't the guest address assigned to the exact
# TAP it arrived on, before it can be attributed. One rule per slot.
local antispoof="" i
for i in $(seq 0 $((POOL_SIZE-1))); do
antispoof="${antispoof} iifname \"$(iface "$i")\" ip saddr != $(guest_ip "$i") drop
"
done
nft -f - <<EOF
table inet $TABLE {}
delete table inet $TABLE
table inet $TABLE {
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority -10; policy accept;
iifname != "${PREFIX}*" return
ct state established,related accept
${antispoof} ct state established,related accept
ct status dnat accept
drop
}
@@ -161,8 +200,87 @@ table inet $TABLE {
EOF
}
# Give the orchestrator/gateway VM real internet egress (agent VMs get
# none — that's the isolation table above). Three parts, because the
# path must work both during bootstrap (Docker still present) and after
# Docker is removed:
# * masquerade — SNAT the orch guest /31 out the host uplink so its
# RFC-1918 address can reach the internet.
# * nft forward — accept the orch link's forward path (load-bearing
# on a pure-nft host whose FORWARD policy drops; a
# harmless no-op where forwarding is already open).
# It never drops, so it can't weaken the isolation
# table's agent drops.
# * DOCKER-USER — during bootstrap Docker's FORWARD chain policy is
# DROP; its sanctioned DOCKER-USER hook is the only
# place a user ACCEPT survives. Best-effort + guarded
# (skipped once Docker is gone).
_install_orch_egress() {
nft -f - <<EOF
table inet ${TABLE}_nat {}
delete table inet ${TABLE}_nat
table inet ${TABLE}_nat {
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority -10; policy accept;
iifname "$ORCH_IFACE" accept
oifname "$ORCH_IFACE" ct state established,related accept
}
chain postrouting {
type nat hook postrouting priority 100; policy accept;
ip saddr $(orch_guest) oifname != "$ORCH_IFACE" masquerade
}
}
EOF
_docker_user_orch add
}
# Insert (add) or delete (del) the DOCKER-USER ACCEPT rules for the
# orchestrator link, idempotently, only when the chain exists.
_docker_user_orch() {
local op="$1" flag
command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0
iptables -t filter -L DOCKER-USER >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0
for flag in "-i" "-o"; do
if [ "$op" = add ]; then
iptables -C DOCKER-USER "$flag" "$ORCH_IFACE" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null \
|| iptables -I DOCKER-USER "$flag" "$ORCH_IFACE" -j ACCEPT
else
iptables -D DOCKER-USER "$flag" "$ORCH_IFACE" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || true
fi
done
}
# Agent -> gateway VM routing. The shared gateway (egress / supervise /
# git-http) runs in the orchestrator/infra VM at $(orch_guest). Agents keep
# addressing their own host-side TAP IP on the gateway ports; a PREROUTING
# DNAT redirects that to the infra VM, and the isolation table's
# `ct status dnat accept` forward rule lets it through — every other agent
# egress stays dropped. Source IP is deliberately NOT masqueraded: the
# gateway attributes each request to the originating bottle by its (nft +
# /31 unspoofable) guest IP.
_install_gateway_route() {
nft -f - <<EOF
table ip ${TABLE}_gw {}
delete table ip ${TABLE}_gw
table ip ${TABLE}_gw {
chain prerouting {
type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept;
iifname "${PREFIX}*" tcp dport { $GATEWAY_PORTS } dnat to $(orch_guest)
}
}
EOF
}
cmd_down() {
require_root down
_docker_user_orch del
nft delete table ip "${TABLE}_gw" 2>/dev/null || true
nft delete table inet "${TABLE}_nat" 2>/dev/null || true
if ip link show "$ORCH_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ip link set "$ORCH_IFACE" down 2>/dev/null || true
ip tuntap del dev "$ORCH_IFACE" mode tap 2>/dev/null || true
echo " removed $ORCH_IFACE"
fi
nft delete table inet "$TABLE" 2>/dev/null || true
for i in $(seq 0 $((POOL_SIZE-1))); do
local dev ; dev="$(iface "$i")"
@@ -178,6 +296,10 @@ cmd_down() {
cmd_status() {
echo "table inet $TABLE:"
nft list table inet "$TABLE" 2>/dev/null || echo " (absent)"
echo "table inet ${TABLE}_nat (orchestrator egress):"
nft list table inet "${TABLE}_nat" 2>/dev/null || echo " (absent)"
echo "table ip ${TABLE}_gw (agent->gateway route):"
nft list table ip "${TABLE}_gw" 2>/dev/null || echo " (absent)"
echo "taps:"
for i in $(seq 0 $((POOL_SIZE-1))); do
local dev ; dev="$(iface "$i")"
@@ -185,6 +307,9 @@ cmd_status() {
ip -brief addr show "$dev" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
done
if ip -brief addr show "$ORCH_IFACE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ip -brief addr show "$ORCH_IFACE" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
}
case "${1:-}" in
+3 -7
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ tests/
test_manifest_runtime.py
... # many others; see unit/ directory
integration/
test_sidecar_bundle_image.py
test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py
test_gateway_image.py
test_dry_run_plan.py
test_orphan_cleanup.py
...
@@ -48,12 +47,9 @@ Discovery is invoked with `-t .` (top-level dir = repo root) so the
the bottle's runtime, and creates zero Docker resources.
- `test_orphan_cleanup.py``network_remove` is idempotent against
missing resources, so the EXIT trap can call it unconditionally.
- `test_sidecar_bundle_image.py` — builds Dockerfile.sidecars and
- `test_gateway_image.py` — builds Dockerfile.gateway and
probes that gitleaks / mitmdump / supervise are all reachable
inside the bundle.
- `test_sidecar_bundle_compose.py` — end-to-end compose-up of an
agent + bundle pair; verifies the agent reaches the bundle via
the legacy network aliases.
inside the gateway image.
## Canaries
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
"""Integration: Firecracker microVM launch.
End-to-end against a real Firecracker microVM: prepare + launch a bottle
on the firecracker backend and verify the agent execs after provisioning
and that the egress proxy env is wired to the sidecar.
Gated on the `backend status` result for firecracker (0 == the privileged
TAP pool + nft isolation table are provisioned). Skips cleanly with setup
instructions otherwise, so the suite runs on hosts without the pool.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import io
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.backend.firecracker import FirecrackerBottleBackend
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
def _firecracker_status_ok() -> bool:
"""Gate on `./cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker`: a 0 exit
means the pool + nft table are ready. Output is captured so the
decorator stays quiet during collection; any error not ready."""
buf = io.StringIO()
try:
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buf), contextlib.redirect_stderr(buf):
return FirecrackerBottleBackend.status() == 0
except Exception:
return False
_SKIP_MSG = (
"firecracker backend not ready — provision the network pool with "
"`./cli.py backend setup --backend=firecracker`, then confirm with "
"`./cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker`"
)
def _minimal_agent_dockerfile(path: Path) -> None:
path.write_text(
"\n".join((
"FROM node:22-slim",
"RUN apt-get update \\",
" && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \\",
" ca-certificates curl git \\",
" && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*",
"USER node",
"WORKDIR /home/node",
"CMD [\"sleep\", \"infinity\"]",
"",
)),
encoding="utf-8",
)
def _minimal_manifest(dockerfile: Path) -> ManifestIndex:
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"agent_provider": {
"template": "pi",
"dockerfile": str(dockerfile),
"settings": {
"provider": "example",
"base_url": "https://example.com/v1",
"models": ["smoke"],
},
},
"egress": {"routes": [{"host": "example.com"}]},
},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "smoke", "bottle": "dev"},
},
})
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: cannot host Firecracker microVMs",
)
@unittest.skipUnless(_firecracker_status_ok(), _SKIP_MSG)
class TestFirecrackerLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
"""Launch once, reuse the bottle across probes."""
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
cls.stage = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-firecracker-launch."))
cls._launch = None
cls.bottle = None
dockerfile = cls.stage / "Dockerfile.agent-smoke"
_minimal_agent_dockerfile(dockerfile)
os.environ["BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND"] = "firecracker"
try:
backend = get_bottle_backend()
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=_minimal_manifest(dockerfile),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(cls.stage),
)
cls.plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=cls.stage)
cls._launch = backend.launch(cls.plan)
cls.bottle = cls._launch.__enter__()
except BaseException:
if cls._launch is not None:
cls._launch.__exit__(None, None, None)
shutil.rmtree(cls.stage, ignore_errors=True)
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
raise
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls) -> None:
try:
if cls._launch is not None:
cls._launch.__exit__(None, None, None)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(cls.stage, ignore_errors=True)
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
def test_smoke_exec_echo(self) -> None:
r = self.bottle.exec("echo hello-from-firecracker") # type: ignore[union-attr]
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr)
self.assertIn("hello-from-firecracker", r.stdout)
def test_proxy_env_points_at_sidecar(self) -> None:
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"printf '%s\\n' \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" \"$HTTP_PROXY\""
)
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr)
self.assertIn("http", r.stdout.lower())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
"""Integration: PRD 0024 chunk 1 — the sidecar bundle image builds
"""Integration: PRD 0024 chunk 1 — the gateway image builds
and the daemon binaries are present + executable inside it.
This test does NOT exercise the daemons running against real
@@ -6,11 +6,11 @@ config (routes.yaml, etc) — that lands in chunk 2 when the
renderer wires the bundle into compose. What we verify here is
the chunk-1 contract:
- Dockerfile.sidecars builds (multi-stage works, base layers
- Dockerfile.gateway builds (multi-stage works, base layers
pull, COPYs resolve).
- gitleaks, mitmdump are at the documented paths and answer
`--version`.
- The Python init at /app/sidecar_init.py runs and prints the
- The Python init at /app/gateway_init.py runs and prints the
expected "no daemons selected" line when the supervisor is
pointed at an empty daemon set.
@@ -28,18 +28,18 @@ import unittest
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-sidecars-test:chunk1"
_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.sidecars"
_IMAGE = "bot-bottle-gateway-test:chunk1"
_DOCKERFILE = "Dockerfile.gateway"
@skip_unless_docker()
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: multi-stage build pulls a 200+MB "
"mitmproxy base + two upstream sidecar images; runner storage "
"mitmproxy base + two upstream gateway images; runner storage "
"+ time budget make this an interactive-only test",
)
class TestSidecarBundleImage(unittest.TestCase):
class TestGatewayImage(unittest.TestCase):
"""Builds the image once for the class, then runs a few
`docker run` probes against it."""
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ class TestSidecarBundleImage(unittest.TestCase):
# ENTRYPOINT wiring works.
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm",
"-e", "BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=nothing",
"-e", "BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=nothing",
_IMAGE],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
timeout=10.0,
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
"""Integration: macOS Container launch topology.
End-to-end against Apple's real `container` runtime. The smoke launches
a bottle with the experimental macOS Container backend and verifies the
properties that make the explicit-proxy launch acceptable:
- the agent can exec commands after provisioning;
- HTTP(S)_PROXY points at the sidecar's internal-network IP;
- allowlisted HTTPS reaches the egress sidecar;
- direct egress with proxy env removed fails from the internal-only
agent network;
- non-allowlisted proxy traffic is blocked.
Skipped under Gitea Actions and on hosts without Apple's `container`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import platform
import shutil
import subprocess
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.backend.macos_container.util import (
dns_server as _container_dns_server,
is_available as _container_available,
)
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
_AGENT_PROMPT = "You are a launch smoke-test agent. Be brief."
def _minimal_agent_dockerfile(path: Path) -> None:
path.write_text(
"\n".join((
"FROM node:22-slim",
"RUN apt-get update \\",
" && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \\",
" ca-certificates curl git \\",
" && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*",
"USER node",
"WORKDIR /home/node",
"CMD [\"sleep\", \"infinity\"]",
"",
)),
encoding="utf-8",
)
def _minimal_manifest(dockerfile: Path) -> ManifestIndex:
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"agent_provider": {
"template": "pi",
"dockerfile": str(dockerfile),
"settings": {
"provider": "example",
"base_url": "https://example.com/v1",
"models": ["smoke"],
},
},
"egress": {
"routes": [
{"host": "example.com"},
],
},
},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {
"skills": [],
"prompt": _AGENT_PROMPT,
"bottle": "dev",
},
},
})
def _buildkit_dns_available() -> bool:
if platform.system() != "Darwin" or not _container_available():
return False
stage = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-container-buildkit-dns."))
image = "bot-bottle-buildkit-dns-check:latest"
try:
dockerfile = stage / "Dockerfile"
dockerfile.write_text(
"FROM debian:bookworm-slim\n"
"RUN getent hosts deb.debian.org\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
result = subprocess.run(
[
"container", "build",
"--dns", _container_dns_server(),
"-t", image,
"-f", str(dockerfile),
str(stage),
],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=False,
)
return result.returncode == 0
finally:
subprocess.run(
["container", "image", "delete", image],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
check=False,
)
shutil.rmtree(stage, ignore_errors=True)
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: cannot host Apple Container VMs",
)
@unittest.skipUnless(
platform.system() == "Darwin",
"Apple Container is macOS-only",
)
@unittest.skipUnless(
_container_available(),
"Apple Container not on PATH; install from "
"https://github.com/apple/container/releases",
)
@unittest.skipUnless(
_buildkit_dns_available(),
"Apple Container BuildKit cannot resolve deb.debian.org on this host",
)
class TestMacosContainerLaunch(unittest.TestCase):
"""Launch once and reuse the bottle across probes."""
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
cls.stage = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-macos-container-launch."))
cls._launch = None
cls.bottle = None
dockerfile = cls.stage / "Dockerfile.agent-smoke"
_minimal_agent_dockerfile(dockerfile)
os.environ["BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND"] = "macos-container"
try:
backend = get_bottle_backend()
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=_minimal_manifest(dockerfile),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(cls.stage),
)
cls.plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=cls.stage)
cls._launch = backend.launch(cls.plan)
cls.bottle = cls._launch.__enter__()
except BaseException:
if cls._launch is not None:
cls._launch.__exit__(None, None, None)
shutil.rmtree(cls.stage, ignore_errors=True)
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
raise
@classmethod
def tearDownClass(cls) -> None:
try:
if cls._launch is not None:
cls._launch.__exit__(None, None, None)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(cls.stage, ignore_errors=True)
os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
def test_smoke_exec_echo(self):
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"echo hello-from-macos-container"
)
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr)
self.assertIn("hello-from-macos-container", r.stdout)
def test_proxy_env_points_at_sidecar_internal_ip(self):
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"printf '%s\n' \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" \"$HTTP_PROXY\" "
"\"$NO_PROXY\" \"$NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS\""
)
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr)
values = [line.strip() for line in r.stdout.splitlines()]
self.assertEqual(4, len(values), values)
self.assertEqual(values[0], values[1], values)
self.assertRegex(values[0], r"^http://[0-9.]+:9099$")
self.assertNotIn("127.0.0.1", values[0])
sidecar_host = values[0].removeprefix("http://").removesuffix(":9099")
self.assertIn(sidecar_host, values[2])
self.assertEqual(
"/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/bot-bottle-mitm-ca.crt",
values[3],
)
def test_allowlisted_https_reaches_egress_proxy(self):
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"curl -fsS --max-time 20 https://example.com >/dev/null && echo OK"
)
self.assertEqual(0, r.returncode, msg=r.stderr + r.stdout)
self.assertIn("OK", r.stdout)
def test_direct_egress_bypass_without_proxy_fails(self):
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"env -u HTTPS_PROXY -u HTTP_PROXY -u https_proxy -u http_proxy "
"curl -s --show-error --max-time 5 https://example.com 2>&1 || true"
)
self.assertTrue(
"refused" in r.stdout.lower()
or "timed out" in r.stdout.lower()
or "unreachable" in r.stdout.lower()
or "failed" in r.stdout.lower()
or "could not resolve" in r.stdout.lower()
or "connection reset" in r.stdout.lower(),
f"expected direct egress to fail; got: {r.stdout!r}",
)
def test_non_allowlisted_host_fails_through_proxy(self):
r = self.bottle.exec( # type: ignore[union-attr]
"curl -s --show-error --max-time 10 https://iana.org 2>&1 || true"
)
self.assertTrue(
"403" in r.stdout
or "502" in r.stdout
or "blocked" in r.stdout.lower()
or "not allowed" in r.stdout.lower()
or "not in the bottle's egress.routes allowlist" in r.stdout.lower()
or "forbidden" in r.stdout.lower()
or "failed" in r.stdout.lower(),
f"expected non-allowlisted proxy request to fail; got: {r.stdout!r}",
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
"""Integration: two bottles share one gateway; source-IP attribution keeps
their egress tokens *and* allowlists isolated (PRD 0070 multi-tenancy).
The whole premise of the consolidation is one shared gateway for every
bottle, isolated only by the unspoofable source IP. A single-bottle test
can't catch cross-bottle token bleed or an allowlist leak — this brings up
the real orchestrator + gateway and drives two bottles through the one
gateway to prove each gets exactly its own token and its own routes.
Gated on a reachable Docker daemon and builds the bundle image, so it runs
with the other docker integration tests, not in unit CI. Uses the real
fixed gateway/orchestrator names (that's what it's testing), so it can't run
concurrently with a live per-host gateway; it points the orchestrator at a
throwaway BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT for a clean registry and tears everything down.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import subprocess
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.consolidated_launch import (
_network_cidr,
_network_container_ips,
)
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.egress import EGRESS_PORT
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.gateway_net import next_free_ip
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import OrchestratorClient
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import GATEWAY_IMAGE, GATEWAY_NAME, GATEWAY_NETWORK
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.lifecycle import OrchestratorService
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
# One upstream reachable under two names; reflects the Authorization header so
# the probe can see exactly what the gateway injected (or didn't).
_ECHO_NAME = "bot-bottle-mtitest-echo"
_ECHO_ALIASES = ("echo-shared", "echo-bonly")
_ECHO_SRC = (
"from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n"
"class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n"
" def do_GET(s):\n"
" a=s.headers.get('Authorization','NONE'); s.send_response(200); s.end_headers()\n"
" s.wfile.write(('AUTH='+a).encode())\n"
" def log_message(s,*a): pass\n"
"HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',80),H).serve_forever()\n"
)
# A: echo-shared only, authed. B: echo-shared authed + echo-bonly open.
_POLICY_A = (
'routes:\n'
' - host: echo-shared\n'
' auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
' token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_0"\n'
)
_POLICY_B = _POLICY_A + ' - host: echo-bonly\n'
_TOKEN_A = "sk-AAA-alice"
_TOKEN_B = "sk-BBB-bob"
# Client probe: open http://<host>/ through the gateway proxy from a container
# pinned to the bottle's source IP, printing "<status> <body>". Uses only the
# bundle image's python3 — no dependency on the agent image.
_PROBE_SRC = (
"import sys,urllib.request,urllib.error\n"
"op=urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.ProxyHandler({'http':sys.argv[1]}))\n"
"try:\n"
" r=op.open('http://'+sys.argv[2]+'/',timeout=8)\n"
" sys.stdout.write(str(r.status)+' '+r.read().decode())\n"
"except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n"
" sys.stdout.write(str(e.code)+' '+e.read().decode())\n"
)
@skip_unless_docker()
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: the orchestrator container bind-mounts the repo "
"path into a container on the socket-shared host daemon, which can't see the "
"runner's /workspace — same host-bind-mount constraint as the other "
"bottle-bringup integration tests",
)
class TestMultitenantIsolation(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
# Throwaway root → a clean registry DB, independent of the host's.
self.svc = OrchestratorService(host_root=Path(self._tmp.name))
self.addCleanup(self._teardown_docker)
# ensure_running builds the bundle image (slow on a cold cache) and
# brings up the shared network + gateway + orchestrator.
url = self.svc.ensure_running(startup_timeout=300)
self.client = OrchestratorClient(url)
self.gw_ip = self._container_ip(GATEWAY_NAME)
self._run_echo()
def _teardown_docker(self) -> None:
subprocess.run(["docker", "rm", "--force", _ECHO_NAME],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False)
self.svc.stop()
subprocess.run(["docker", "network", "rm", GATEWAY_NETWORK],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False)
# The orchestrator container wrote the registry DB as root into the
# throwaway root; chown it back so the (non-root) tempdir cleanup can
# remove it.
subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm", "-v", f"{self._tmp.name}:/r",
"--entrypoint", "chown", GATEWAY_IMAGE, "-R",
f"{os.getuid()}:{os.getgid()}", "/r"],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False)
@staticmethod
def _container_ip(name: str) -> str:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "inspect", "-f",
'{{(index .NetworkSettings.Networks "' + GATEWAY_NETWORK + '").IPAddress}}', name],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=True,
)
return proc.stdout.strip()
def _run_echo(self) -> None:
argv = ["docker", "run", "--detach", "--name", _ECHO_NAME,
"--network", GATEWAY_NETWORK]
for alias in _ECHO_ALIASES:
argv += ["--network-alias", alias]
argv += ["--entrypoint", "python3", GATEWAY_IMAGE, "-c", _ECHO_SRC]
proc = subprocess.run(argv, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
text=True, check=False)
self.assertEqual(0, proc.returncode, f"echo upstream failed: {proc.stderr}")
def _free_ip(self, extra_taken: list[str]) -> str:
taken = _network_container_ips(GATEWAY_NETWORK) + extra_taken
return next_free_ip(_network_cidr(GATEWAY_NETWORK), taken)
def _probe(self, source_ip: str, host: str) -> str:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "run", "--rm", "--network", GATEWAY_NETWORK, "--ip", source_ip,
"--entrypoint", "python3", GATEWAY_IMAGE, "-c", _PROBE_SRC,
f"http://{self.gw_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}", host],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False, timeout=90,
)
return proc.stdout.strip()
def test_two_bottles_share_gateway_with_isolated_tokens_and_allowlists(self) -> None:
ip_a = self._free_ip([])
ip_b = self._free_ip([ip_a])
self.client.register_bottle(ip_a, policy=_POLICY_A, tokens={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": _TOKEN_A})
self.client.register_bottle(ip_b, policy=_POLICY_B, tokens={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": _TOKEN_B})
# Each bottle gets its OWN token injected on the shared route — no bleed.
self.assertEqual(f"200 AUTH=Bearer {_TOKEN_A}", self._probe(ip_a, "echo-shared"))
self.assertEqual(f"200 AUTH=Bearer {_TOKEN_B}", self._probe(ip_b, "echo-shared"))
# Allowlist is per-bottle: echo-bonly is only in B's policy.
self.assertTrue(self._probe(ip_a, "echo-bonly").startswith("403"), # fail-closed for A
"A reached a host outside its allowlist")
self.assertEqual("200 AUTH=NONE", self._probe(ip_b, "echo-bonly")) # allowed, unauthed for B
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
"""Integration: the consolidated Docker gateway is an idempotent singleton.
Gated on a reachable Docker daemon. Uses a unique name so it never
collides with a real per-host gateway or a leftover from another run.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import secrets
import subprocess
import unittest
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
IMAGE = "busybox"
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestDockerGatewayIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self) -> None:
self.name = "bot-bottle-orch-gateway-itest-" + secrets.token_hex(4)
self.sc = DockerGateway(IMAGE, name=self.name)
self.addCleanup(self.sc.stop)
def _count(self) -> int:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "ps", "-a", "--filter", f"name=^{self.name}$",
"--format", "{{.Names}}"],
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False,
)
return sum(1 for n in proc.stdout.split() if n == self.name)
def test_ensure_is_idempotent_singleton(self) -> None:
self.sc.ensure_running()
self.assertEqual(1, self._count())
# A second ensure must not spawn a second container — one per host.
self.sc.ensure_running()
self.assertEqual(1, self._count())
self.sc.stop()
self.assertEqual(0, self._count())
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
"""Integration: DockerGateway.image_exists reflects real docker state.
Gated on a reachable Docker daemon. Deliberately does NOT build the full
gateway (a heavy, slow image build) it exercises the `image_exists`
primitive that `ensure_built` gates on, against a tiny pulled image and a
name that can't exist.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import unittest
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.gateway import DockerGateway
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
IMAGE = "busybox"
@skip_unless_docker()
class TestDockerGatewayImageExists(unittest.TestCase):
def test_image_exists_true_for_present_false_for_absent(self) -> None:
# Ensure the tiny image is present (build_if_missing is disabled here
# so this never triggers a Dockerfile.gateway build).
subprocess.run(
["docker", "pull", IMAGE],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
)
self.assertTrue(DockerGateway(IMAGE, dockerfile=None).image_exists())
self.assertFalse(
DockerGateway("bot-bottle-nonexistent:doesnotexist", dockerfile=None).image_exists()
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ resources.
The PipelockProxy.stop idempotency case that used to live here was
removed in PRD 0024 chunk 3 when the per-container .stop method
went away sidecar teardown is now compose's responsibility, and
went away gateway teardown is now compose's responsibility, and
`compose down` already no-ops on missing containers."""
import os
+5 -5
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ _DUMMY_HOST_KEY = (
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: egress_tls_init uses a host bind mount "
"the runner container can't see, and the network topology hides "
"sibling-sidecar visibility — same constraint as the other "
"sibling-gateway visibility — same constraint as the other "
"bottle-bringup integration tests",
)
class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
# Docker is always required (the agent + sidecars run under it,
# and VM backends still use it for the sidecar bundle); the
# Docker is always required (the agent + companion containers run under it,
# and VM backends still use it for the gateway); the
# class-level @skip_unless_docker already covers that. Pin
# Docker when BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND is unset to preserve the
# Docker-backed CI path.
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
"egress": {
"routes": [{"host": "api.anthropic.com"}],
},
# git-gate sidecar so attack 5 can push. Upstream
# git-gate daemon so attack 5 can push. Upstream
# is intentionally unreachable — the pre-receive
# gitleaks hook must reject BEFORE git-gate
# attempts the upstream push. A preset `host_key`
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
def _assert_sandbox_block(self, label: str, r: object) -> None: # type: ignore
"""A real sandbox block produces an HTTP 403 with a
recognizable sandbox sidecar marker in the body. ANY
recognizable sandbox gateway marker in the body. ANY
other outcome (200 from upstream, 401/404 from upstream,
non-marker 5xx) means the request escaped the secret
reached the network."""
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
"""Integration: end-to-end smoke for the PRD 0024 bundle shape.
Verifies that flipping `BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE=1` produces a
working bottle: `docker compose up` brings the agent + bundle pair
online, the daemons inside the bundle bind their ports, and the
agent can reach egress + supervise via the bundle's network
aliases (no agent-side config changes between flag positions).
Skipped under GITEA_ACTIONS the bundle image is a multi-stage
build pulling 200+MB of base layers, and the bind-mounts won't
share filesystem with the runner container. Same constraint as
the chunk-1 image-probe test.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import shutil
import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
def _manifest() -> ManifestIndex:
"""Bottle with supervise on so the bundle exercises egress +
supervise. Git is off because a meaningful git-gate test needs
a real upstream and SSH keys out of scope for a bundle smoke."""
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"supervise": True,
},
},
"agents": {
"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"},
},
})
@skip_unless_docker()
@unittest.skipIf(
os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
"skipped under act_runner: multi-stage bundle build pulls 200+MB "
"of base layers and bind-mounts don't share fs with the runner",
)
class TestSidecarBundleCompose(unittest.TestCase):
"""One end-to-end pass with the bundle flag on. Skipping under
act_runner; the local docker daemon does the work."""
def test_bottle_up_with_bundle_flag_on(self):
stage_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb-bundle-smoke."))
try:
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_BUNDLE": "1"}):
backend = get_bottle_backend("docker")
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=_manifest(),
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd=str(stage_dir),
)
plan = backend.prepare(spec, stage_dir=stage_dir)
with backend.launch(plan) as bottle:
# The agent's HTTPS_PROXY URL (resolved at
# renderer-time) should reach egress inside
# the bundle. A bare CONNECT with no upstream
# URL gets rejected with 400 or 405 but proves
# the listener is alive at the alias.
probe = bottle.exec(
"set -eu\n"
"echo HTTPS_PROXY=$HTTPS_PROXY\n"
"PORT=$(echo \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" | sed -E 's|.*:([0-9]+).*|\\1|')\n"
"HOST=$(echo \"$HTTPS_PROXY\" | sed -E 's|http://([^:]+):.*|\\1|')\n"
"echo HOST=$HOST PORT=$PORT\n"
"curl -sS --max-time 5 -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code}\\n' "
" \"http://$HOST:$PORT/\" || true\n"
)
# The supervise URL resolves to the same bundle
# via its supervise alias, on a different port.
supervise_probe = bottle.exec(
"set -eu\n"
"curl -sS --max-time 5 -o /dev/null "
" -w 'http=%{http_code}\\n' "
" \"http://supervise:9100/health\" || true\n"
)
finally:
shutil.rmtree(stage_dir, ignore_errors=True)
self.assertEqual(0, probe.returncode, msg=probe.stderr)
# egress answered SOMETHING — any 4xx is fine, just proves
# the egress daemon is listening at the proxy address.
self.assertIn("http=", probe.stdout,
f"no HTTP response from egress: {probe.stdout!r}")
# supervise's /health endpoint exists (PRD 0013); it should
# answer 200 or similar — anything non-empty proves the
# third daemon's alias resolves to the same bundle.
self.assertEqual(0, supervise_probe.returncode, msg=supervise_probe.stderr)
self.assertIn("http=", supervise_probe.stdout)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ no test ever reads or writes the real ``~/.bot-bottle`` (state, queue,
and audit dirs all derive from ``paths.bot_bottle_root()``
``Path.home()``). Without this, a test that takes a ``flock`` on the
real audit log can **block indefinitely** when a live bottle's supervise
sidecar holds that lock observed as a hung ``coverage run`` at 0% CPU
gateway holds that lock observed as a hung ``coverage run`` at 0% CPU
and unisolated tests otherwise pollute the developer's home dir.
Individual tests that need their own ``HOME`` still override
+160
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
"""Shared in-memory `DockerBottlePlan` fixture for docker-backend tests.
A fully-resolved plan with toggles for the conditional-service matrix
(git-gate / egress / supervise / canary). Consumed by the consolidated
compose tests; kept here (rather than in a test module) so it survives
independent of any one test file.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from bot_bottle.egress import EgressPlan, EgressRoute
from bot_bottle.git_gate import GitGatePlan, GitGateUpstream
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
from bot_bottle.supervise import SupervisePlan
SLUG = "demo-abc12"
STAGE = Path("/tmp/cb-stage")
STATE = Path("/tmp/cb-state")
# Exported to consumers (e.g. test_consolidated_compose); named with a
# leading underscore for the historical fixture convention.
__all__ = ["_plan"]
def _manifest(*, supervise: bool, with_git: bool, with_egress: bool) -> ManifestIndex:
"""Minimal manifest with the toggles the matrix needs. The renderer
only reads from the plan, not the manifest, so this is just here to
back BottleSpec."""
bottle: dict[str, object] = {}
if supervise:
bottle["supervise"] = True
if with_git:
bottle["git-gate"] = {"repos": {
"upstream": {
"url": "ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
"key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/etc/hostname"},
},
}}
if with_egress:
bottle["egress"] = {
"routes": [{
"host": "api.example",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "TOK"},
}],
}
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {"dev": bottle},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
})
def _git_gate_plan(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()) -> GitGatePlan:
return GitGatePlan(
slug=SLUG,
entrypoint_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "entrypoint.sh",
hook_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "pre-receive",
access_hook_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "access-hook",
upstreams=upstreams,
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
)
def _egress_plan(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
*,
canary: bool = False,
) -> EgressPlan:
token_env_map = {
r.token_env: r.token_ref
for r in routes
if r.token_env
}
return EgressPlan(
slug=SLUG,
routes_path=STATE / "egress" / "routes.yaml",
routes=routes,
token_env_map=token_env_map,
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "mitmproxy-ca.pem",
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "ca.pem",
canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
)
def _supervise_plan() -> SupervisePlan:
return SupervisePlan(
slug=SLUG,
db_path=STATE / "bot-bottle.db",
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
)
def _plan(
*,
with_git: bool = False,
with_egress: bool = False,
supervise: bool = False,
canary: bool = False,
) -> DockerBottlePlan:
"""Build a fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan. Toggles cover the
matrix the renderer's conditional-service logic branches on."""
upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()
if with_git:
upstreams = (GitGateUpstream(
name="upstream",
upstream_url="ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
upstream_host="example.com",
upstream_port="22",
identity_file="/etc/hostname",
known_host_key="",
known_hosts_file=STATE / "git-gate" / "upstream-known_hosts",
),)
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
if with_egress:
routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.example",
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_env="EGRESS_TOKEN_0",
token_ref="TOK",
roles=(),
),)
index = _manifest(supervise=supervise, with_git=with_git, with_egress=with_egress)
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=index,
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd="/tmp/x",
)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
manifest=index.load_for_agent("demo"),
stage_dir=STAGE,
slug=SLUG,
forwarded_env={"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN": "x"},
git_gate_plan=_git_gate_plan(upstreams),
egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes, canary=canary),
supervise_plan=_supervise_plan() if supervise else None,
use_runsc=False,
agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
template="claude",
command="claude",
prompt_mode="append_file",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile="",
guest_home="/home/node",
instance_name=f"bot-bottle-{SLUG}",
prompt_file=STAGE / "prompt",
guest_env={},
),
)
+4 -415
View File
@@ -1,434 +1,23 @@
"""Unit: compose-spec renderer (PRD 0018 chunk 1).
"""Unit: docker compose lifecycle helpers (PRD 0018).
Pure-function tests for `bottle_plan_to_compose`. Fixtures build a
fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan in memory; the renderer just
translates it to the compose dict. Conditional-service matrix is
covered via parameterized cases (git on/off × egress on/off ×
supervise on/off).
The compose *spec* is built by `consolidated_compose.py`; these
tests cover the I/O-side helpers in `compose.py` the slug
project mapping and `docker compose ls` enumeration.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import subprocess
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from unittest import mock
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import AgentProvisionPlan
from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.bottle_plan import DockerBottlePlan
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.compose import (
COMPOSE_PROJECT_PREFIX,
bottle_plan_to_compose,
compose_project_name,
list_active_slugs,
list_compose_projects,
slug_from_compose_project,
)
from bot_bottle.egress import (
EgressPlan,
EgressRoute,
)
from bot_bottle.git_gate import GitGatePlan, GitGateUpstream
from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
from bot_bottle.supervise import SupervisePlan
SLUG = "demo-abc12"
STAGE = Path("/tmp/cb-stage")
STATE = Path("/tmp/cb-state")
def _manifest(*, supervise: bool, with_git: bool, with_egress: bool) -> ManifestIndex:
"""Minimal manifest with the toggles the chunk-1 matrix needs.
The renderer only reads from the plan, not the manifest, so this
is just here to back BottleSpec."""
bottle: dict[str, object] = {}
if supervise:
bottle["supervise"] = True
if with_git:
bottle["git-gate"] = {"repos": {
"upstream": {
"url": "ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
"key": {"provider": "static", "path": "/etc/hostname"},
},
}}
if with_egress:
bottle["egress"] = {
"routes": [{
"host": "api.example",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "TOK"},
}],
}
return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {"dev": bottle},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
})
def _git_gate_plan(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()) -> GitGatePlan:
return GitGatePlan(
slug=SLUG,
entrypoint_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "entrypoint.sh",
hook_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "pre-receive",
access_hook_script=STATE / "git-gate" / "access-hook",
upstreams=upstreams,
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
)
def _egress_plan(
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
*,
canary: bool = False,
) -> EgressPlan:
token_env_map = {
r.token_env: r.token_ref
for r in routes
if r.token_env
}
return EgressPlan(
slug=SLUG,
routes_path=STATE / "egress" / "routes.yaml",
routes=routes,
token_env_map=token_env_map,
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
mitmproxy_ca_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "mitmproxy-ca.pem",
mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "ca.pem",
canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
)
def _supervise_plan() -> SupervisePlan:
return SupervisePlan(
slug=SLUG,
db_path=STATE / "bot-bottle.db",
internal_network=f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}",
)
def _plan(
*,
with_git: bool = False,
with_egress: bool = False,
supervise: bool = False,
canary: bool = False,
) -> DockerBottlePlan:
"""Build a fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan. Toggles cover the
matrix the renderer's conditional-service logic branches on."""
upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()
if with_git:
upstreams = (GitGateUpstream(
name="upstream",
upstream_url="ssh://git@example.com:22/x/y.git",
upstream_host="example.com",
upstream_port="22",
identity_file="/etc/hostname",
known_host_key="",
known_hosts_file=STATE / "git-gate" / "upstream-known_hosts",
),)
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
if with_egress:
routes = (EgressRoute(
host="api.example",
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_env="EGRESS_TOKEN_0",
token_ref="TOK",
roles=(),
),)
index = _manifest(supervise=supervise, with_git=with_git, with_egress=with_egress)
spec = BottleSpec(
manifest=index,
agent_name="demo",
copy_cwd=False,
user_cwd="/tmp/x",
)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
manifest=index.load_for_agent("demo"),
stage_dir=STAGE,
slug=SLUG,
forwarded_env={"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN": "x"},
git_gate_plan=_git_gate_plan(upstreams),
egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes, canary=canary),
supervise_plan=_supervise_plan() if supervise else None,
use_runsc=False,
agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
template="claude",
command="claude",
prompt_mode="append_file",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile="",
guest_home="/home/node",
instance_name=f"bot-bottle-{SLUG}",
prompt_file=STAGE / "prompt",
guest_env={},
),
)
class TestProjectAndNetworks(unittest.TestCase):
def test_project_name(self):
spec = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())
self.assertEqual(f"bot-bottle-{SLUG}", spec["name"])
def test_internal_network_is_internal(self):
spec = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())
net = spec["networks"]["internal"]
self.assertEqual(f"bot-bottle-net-{SLUG}", net["name"])
self.assertTrue(net["internal"])
def test_egress_network_is_external_bridge(self):
spec = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())
net = spec["networks"]["egress"]
self.assertEqual(f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}", net["name"])
# No `internal:` key on the egress network — defaults to a
# normal user-defined bridge.
self.assertNotIn("internal", net)
class TestAgentAlwaysPresent(unittest.TestCase):
def test_agent_in_services(self):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())["services"]
self.assertIn("agent", s)
def test_agent_command(self):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual(["sleep", "infinity"], s["command"])
def test_agent_image_uses_runtime_image(self):
plan = _plan()
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual(plan.image, s["image"])
def test_agent_only_on_internal_network(self):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual({"internal"}, set(s["networks"].keys()))
def test_agent_proxy_always_via_egress(self):
for with_egress in (False, True):
with self.subTest(with_egress=with_egress):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(
_plan(with_egress=with_egress)
)["services"]["agent"]
proxy_lines = [e for e in s["environment"] if e.startswith("HTTPS_PROXY=")]
self.assertEqual(1, len(proxy_lines))
self.assertEqual("HTTPS_PROXY=http://egress:9099", proxy_lines[0])
def test_agent_proxy_via_egress_when_egress_present(self):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(with_egress=True))["services"]["agent"]
proxy = [e for e in s["environment"] if e.startswith("HTTPS_PROXY=")][0]
self.assertEqual("HTTPS_PROXY=http://egress:9099", proxy)
def test_agent_no_proxy_adds_supervise_when_enabled(self):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(
_plan(supervise=True)
)["services"]["agent"]
no_proxy = [e for e in s["environment"] if e.startswith("NO_PROXY=")][0]
self.assertIn("supervise", no_proxy)
def test_agent_forwarded_env_uses_bare_names(self):
# Bare NAME → compose inherits value from the up-process env,
# so secret token values stay out of the file.
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan())["services"]["agent"]
self.assertIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", s["environment"])
def test_agent_provider_env_uses_literal_values(self):
plan = _plan()
provision = AgentProvisionPlan(
template="codex",
command="codex",
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
dockerfile="",
guest_home="/home/node",
instance_name=f"bot-bottle-{SLUG}",
prompt_file=STAGE / "prompt",
guest_env={"CODEX_HOME": "/home/node/.codex"},
)
plan = type(plan)(**{**vars(plan), "agent_provision": provision}) # type: ignore
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)["services"]["agent"]
self.assertIn("CODEX_HOME=/home/node/.codex", s["environment"])
def test_agent_runsc_runtime(self):
plan = _plan()
plan = type(plan)(**{**vars(plan), "use_runsc": True}) # type: ignore
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(plan)["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual("runsc", s["runtime"])
def test_agent_depends_only_on_sidecars(self):
# Bundle shape: the init supervisor owns intra-bundle daemon
# ordering, so the agent waits on the bundle container alone.
for kwargs in [{}, {"with_git": True, "with_egress": True, "supervise": True}]:
with self.subTest(**kwargs):
s = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(**kwargs))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual(["sidecars"], s["depends_on"])
def test_agent_has_no_current_config_mount_with_supervise(self):
with_sv = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(supervise=True))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertNotIn("volumes", with_sv)
without_sv = bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(supervise=False))["services"]["agent"]
self.assertNotIn("volumes", without_sv)
class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
"""The compose renderer emits exactly one `sidecars` service in
place of the daemons it owns (egress + git-gate + supervise).
PRD 0024 chunk 5 dropped the legacy four-sidecar shape entirely,
so the bundle is the only thing exercised here."""
def _render(self, **plan_kwargs: object) -> Any: # type: ignore
return bottle_plan_to_compose(_plan(**plan_kwargs)) # type: ignore
def test_emits_two_services_minimal(self):
spec = self._render()
self.assertEqual({"sidecars", "agent"}, set(spec["services"].keys()))
def test_emits_two_services_full_matrix(self):
spec = self._render(with_git=True, with_egress=True, supervise=True)
# Still two services — the bundle absorbs git-gate/egress/supervise.
self.assertEqual({"sidecars", "agent"}, set(spec["services"].keys()))
def test_bundle_uses_bundle_image_and_dockerfile(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
self.assertEqual("bot-bottle-sidecars:latest", sc["image"])
self.assertEqual("Dockerfile.sidecars", sc["build"]["dockerfile"])
def test_bundle_container_name_uses_sidecars_prefix(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
self.assertEqual(f"bot-bottle-sidecars-{SLUG}", sc["container_name"])
def test_bundle_joins_both_networks(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
self.assertEqual({"internal", "egress"}, set(sc["networks"].keys()))
def test_internal_aliases_include_egress_shortname(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
aliases = set(sc["networks"]["internal"]["aliases"])
self.assertIn("egress", aliases)
def test_internal_aliases_omit_inactive_sidecars(self):
# With no git-gate / supervise, those names are NOT aliased
# — keeps the alias list honest about what's actually
# listening inside the bundle.
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
aliases = set(sc["networks"]["internal"]["aliases"])
self.assertNotIn("git-gate", aliases)
self.assertNotIn("supervise", aliases)
def test_internal_aliases_include_active_sidecars(self):
sc = self._render(with_git=True, supervise=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
aliases = set(sc["networks"]["internal"]["aliases"])
self.assertIn("git-gate", aliases)
self.assertIn("supervise", aliases)
def test_daemons_csv_lists_only_active(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
daemons = {
line.split("=", 1)[1]
for line in sc["environment"]
if line.startswith("BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS=")
}
self.assertEqual({"egress"}, daemons)
def test_daemons_csv_expands_with_optional_sidecars(self):
sc = self._render(with_git=True, supervise=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
for line in sc["environment"]:
if line.startswith("BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS="):
csv = line.split("=", 1)[1]
break
else:
self.fail("BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_DAEMONS not in env")
self.assertEqual(
["egress", "git-gate", "supervise"],
csv.split(","),
)
def test_bundle_env_does_not_set_https_proxy(self):
# HTTPS_PROXY at the container level would route git-gate's
# git fetches through the proxy. Scoping it to mitmdump is
# the job of egress_entrypoint.sh; the bundle env must not
# leak it.
sc = self._render(with_egress=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
for line in sc["environment"]:
self.assertFalse(
line.startswith("HTTPS_PROXY=")
or line.startswith("HTTP_PROXY=")
or line.startswith("NO_PROXY="),
f"bundle env must not set {line!r}",
)
def test_egress_token_env_present_when_routes_declared(self):
sc = self._render(with_egress=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertIn("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", env_strings)
def test_egress_token_env_omitted_when_no_routes(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertNotIn("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", env_strings)
def test_canary_env_registered_as_sensitive_in_sidecar(self):
sc = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
self.assertIn(
"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
env_strings,
)
def test_canary_env_visible_to_agent(self):
agent = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["agent"]
env_strings = agent["environment"]
self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
def test_supervise_env_present_when_active(self):
sc = self._render(supervise=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
env_strings = sc["environment"]
self.assertIn(f"SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG={SLUG}", env_strings)
self.assertIn("SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=/run/supervise/bot-bottle.db", env_strings)
self.assertTrue(any(e.startswith("SUPERVISE_PORT=") for e in env_strings))
def test_volumes_always_includes_egress_ca(self):
sc = self._render()["services"]["sidecars"]
targets = {v["target"] for v in sc["volumes"]}
self.assertIn("/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem", targets)
def test_volumes_union_full_matrix(self):
sc = self._render(with_git=True, with_egress=True, supervise=True)[
"services"]["sidecars"]
targets = {v["target"] for v in sc["volumes"]}
self.assertIn("/home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca.pem", targets)
self.assertIn("/etc/egress", targets)
self.assertIn("/git-gate-entrypoint.sh", targets)
self.assertIn("/git-gate/creds/upstream-known_hosts", targets)
self.assertIn("/run/supervise/bot-bottle.db", targets)
def test_extra_hosts_omitted_for_git_upstreams(self):
sc = self._render(with_git=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
self.assertNotIn("extra_hosts", sc)
def test_agent_depends_on_bundle_only(self):
sc = self._render(with_git=True, with_egress=True, supervise=True)[
"services"]["agent"]
self.assertEqual(["sidecars"], sc["depends_on"])
def test_agent_proxy_url_resolves_via_bundle_alias(self):
# With egress active, the agent's HTTPS_PROXY points at
# `egress` shortname; bundle aliases `egress` to itself so
# the URL keeps working without an agent-side change.
spec = self._render(with_egress=True)
sc = spec["services"]["agent"]
proxy = next(e for e in sc["environment"] if e.startswith("HTTPS_PROXY="))
self.assertIn("egress", proxy)
self.assertIn("egress",
spec["services"]["sidecars"]["networks"]["internal"]["aliases"])
class TestProjectNaming(unittest.TestCase):
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"""Unit: agent-only consolidated compose render (PRD 0070)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import unittest
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.consolidated_compose import consolidated_agent_compose
from tests.unit._docker_bottle_plan import _plan
_GW = "172.18.0.2"
_IP = "172.18.0.5"
_NET = "bot-bottle-gateway"
class TestConsolidatedAgentCompose(unittest.TestCase):
def _spec(self, *, runsc: bool = False):
plan = _plan(with_egress=True, supervise=True, with_git=True)
if runsc:
plan = type(plan)(**{**vars(plan), "use_runsc": True}) # type: ignore[arg-type]
return consolidated_agent_compose(plan, gateway_ip=_GW, source_ip=_IP, network=_NET)
def test_only_agent_service_no_companion_container(self) -> None:
# The whole point of consolidation: no per-bottle gateway.
self.assertEqual(["agent"], list(self._spec()["services"]))
def test_agent_pinned_on_external_gateway_network(self) -> None:
spec = self._spec()
self.assertEqual({"external": True}, spec["networks"][_NET])
agent_net = spec["services"]["agent"]["networks"][_NET]
self.assertEqual(_IP, agent_net["ipv4_address"])
def test_proxy_and_ca_point_at_gateway(self) -> None:
env = self._spec()["services"]["agent"]["environment"]
self.assertIn(f"HTTPS_PROXY=http://{_GW}:9099", env)
# git-http + supervise on the gateway must bypass the egress proxy.
self.assertTrue(any(e.startswith("NO_PROXY=") and _GW in e for e in env))
def test_no_companion_container_dependency(self) -> None:
self.assertNotIn("depends_on", self._spec()["services"]["agent"])
def test_runsc_runtime_when_enabled(self) -> None:
self.assertEqual("runsc", self._spec(runsc=True)["services"]["agent"]["runtime"])
def test_forwarded_env_stays_bare_names(self) -> None:
env = self._spec()["services"]["agent"]["environment"]
# forwarded secrets are bare names (value inherited from process env).
self.assertIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", env)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
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"""Unit: consolidated launch sequence — compose the orchestrator primitives (PRD 0070)."""
from __future__ import annotations
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, Mock, patch
from bot_bottle.backend.docker.consolidated_launch import (
launch_consolidated,
teardown_consolidated,
)
from bot_bottle.egress import EgressPlan, EgressRoute
from bot_bottle.git_gate import GitGatePlan
from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import RegisteredBottle
_MOD = "bot_bottle.backend.docker.consolidated_launch"
def _egress_plan() -> EgressPlan:
return EgressPlan(
slug="demo", routes_path=Path("/x"), routes=(EgressRoute(host="api.example.com"),),
token_env_map={},
)
def _git_plan() -> GitGatePlan:
return GitGatePlan(
slug="demo", entrypoint_script=Path(), hook_script=Path(),
access_hook_script=Path(), upstreams=(),
)
def _client(*, bottles: list[dict[str, object]] | None = None) -> Mock:
c = Mock()
c.list_bottles.return_value = bottles or []
c.register_bottle.return_value = RegisteredBottle("b1", "tok")
return c
class TestLaunchConsolidated(unittest.TestCase):
def _run(
self, client: Mock, provision: Mock | None = None,
*, on_network: tuple[str, ...] = ("172.18.0.2",),
):
service = MagicMock()
service.ensure_running.return_value = "http://orch:8080"
with patch(f"{_MOD}._network_cidr", return_value="172.18.0.0/16"), \
patch(f"{_MOD}._container_ip", return_value="172.18.0.2"), \
patch(f"{_MOD}._network_container_ips", return_value=list(on_network)), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.provision_git_gate", provision or Mock()):
return launch_consolidated(_egress_plan(), _git_plan(), service=service)
def test_allocates_ip_registers_and_provisions(self) -> None:
client = _client()
provision = Mock()
ctx = self._run(client, provision)
# .1 is the router, .2 is the gateway → first bottle gets .3.
self.assertEqual("172.18.0.3", ctx.source_ip)
self.assertEqual("172.18.0.2", ctx.gateway_ip)
self.assertEqual("b1", ctx.bottle_id)
self.assertEqual("tok", ctx.identity_token)
self.assertEqual("http://orch:8080", ctx.orchestrator_url)
# Registered with the source IP + the egress policy blob.
kwargs = client.register_bottle.call_args
self.assertEqual("172.18.0.3", kwargs.args[0])
self.assertIn("api.example.com", kwargs.kwargs["policy"])
provision.assert_called_once()
def test_skips_all_addresses_on_the_network(self) -> None:
# Gateway .2 + orchestrator .3 already attached -> agent gets .4.
ctx = self._run(_client(), on_network=("172.18.0.2", "172.18.0.3"))
self.assertEqual("172.18.0.4", ctx.source_ip)
def test_provision_failure_rolls_back_registration(self) -> None:
client = _client()
provision = Mock(side_effect=RuntimeError("provision boom"))
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
self._run(client, provision)
client.teardown_bottle.assert_called_once_with("b1") # no orphan left
class TestTeardownConsolidated(unittest.TestCase):
def test_deregisters_and_deprovisions(self) -> None:
client = Mock()
with patch(f"{_MOD}.OrchestratorClient", return_value=client), \
patch(f"{_MOD}.deprovision_git_gate") as deprov:
teardown_consolidated("b1", orchestrator_url="http://orch:8080")
client.teardown_bottle.assert_called_once_with("b1")
deprov.assert_called_once()
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

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