docs(prd): 0070 secret-handling as a future pattern (SecretProvider, #355)

Add a "Secret handling — FUTURE pattern (not v1)" subsection: vault as a
separate trust domain holding long-lived roots, deriving short-lived
scoped creds where the upstream allows (with the honest limit that a
compromised proxy can still abuse currently-authorized access). The
mechanism is a generic, user-extensible SecretProvider that generalizes
PRD 0048's DeployKeyProvisioner and drops into the manifest wherever a raw
token is accepted — discovered from ~/.bot-bottle/contrib like user
AgentProviders. Marked explicitly as not required for the initial
orchestrator; tracked as #355.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # bot-bottle
 
 [![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
-[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-84%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
+[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-82%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
 [![core coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/core%20coverage-95%25-brightgreen)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md)
 
 **Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Firecracker network-pool defaults — the SINGLE source of these values.
+#
+# Read by every consumer so they can't drift:
+#   * netpool.py  — parses this for the Python defaults (below).
+#   * scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh — falls back to these when the
+#     matching BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env var is unset.
+#   * nix/firecracker-netpool.nix — readFile-parses this for its option
+#     defaults, then passes the resolved values back as Environment=.
+#
+# Plain KEY=VALUE (no quoting, no inline comments, no spaces around `=`)
+# so it is bash-sourceable, systemd EnvironmentFile-compatible, and
+# trivially parseable from Python and Nix. A real BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env
+# var of the same name always overrides the value here.
+BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE=8
+BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=10.243.0.0
+BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=bbfc
+BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=bot_bottle_fc

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.py

@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ config renderers (shell command + NixOS module) shown to operators.
 The Firecracker backend needs a privileged one-time network setup:
 a pool of point-to-point TAP devices (owned by the invoking user, so
 `./cli.py start` never needs root) and a dedicated nftables table that
-isolates every VM. This module is the single source of truth for the
+isolates every VM. The pool parameters live in exactly one place —
-pool parameters — the shell script (`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`),
+`netpool.defaults.env`, a plain KEY=VALUE file next to this module —
-the NixOS module (`nix/firecracker-netpool.nix`), and the backend's
+and every consumer reads *that*: this module (below), the shell script
-fail-closed preflight all derive from these constants so they can't
+(`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`), and the NixOS module
-drift.
+(`nix/firecracker-netpool.nix`). A `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_*` env var of the
+same name always overrides the file, and the backend's fail-closed
+preflight derives from these accessors, so nothing can drift.
 
 Topology (per slot i):
   * TAP  ``bbfc{i}``  — no shared bridge, so no docker0 / virbr0 / cni0
@@ -43,18 +45,47 @@ from typing import IO
 from ...log import die
 
 
+# The pool defaults live in one shared file (see module docstring); the
+# shell script and NixOS module read the same file, so the values can't
+# drift. This is a packaged data file — a missing/broken install is a
+# hard error, surfaced here rather than as confusing empty defaults.
+DEFAULTS_FILE = Path(__file__).with_name("netpool.defaults.env")
+
+
+def _load_defaults() -> dict[str, str]:
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for raw in DEFAULTS_FILE.read_text().splitlines():
+        line = raw.strip()
+        if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+            continue
+        key, _, value = line.partition("=")
+        out[key.strip()] = value.strip()
+    return out
+
+
+_DEFAULTS = _load_defaults()
+
+
+def _cfg(key: str) -> str:
+    """A `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_*` env var overrides the shared-file default."""
+    try:
+        return os.environ.get(key) or _DEFAULTS[key]
+    except KeyError:
+        die(f"{key} is missing from {DEFAULTS_FILE.name} (broken install)")
+
+
 # Interface names are capped at 15 chars (IFNAMSIZ-1); "bbfc" + a small
 # index stays well under that and is distinctive enough to grep for.
-IFACE_PREFIX = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX", "bbfc")
+IFACE_PREFIX = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX")
-NFT_TABLE = "bot_bottle_fc"
+NFT_TABLE = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE")
 
 
 def pool_size() -> int:
-    return int(os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE", "8"))
+    return int(_cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"))
 
 
 def ip_base() -> str:
-    return os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE", "10.243.0.0")
+    return _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE")
 
 
 # Sidecar ports the VM reaches at its host-side TAP IP. Kept in sync

docs/prds/0069-firecracker-native-docker-free.md

@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
 # PRD 0069: Firecracker-native, Docker-free backend
 
-- **Status:** Draft
+- **Status:** Draft (partially superseded)
 - **Author:** Claude
 - **Created:** 2026-07-12
 - **Issue:** #348
 
+> **Superseded in part by [PRD 0070](0070-per-host-orchestrator.md) (#351):**
+> the sidecar-consolidation framing here (Stage 1, per-host sidecar; Stage 4,
+> sidecar-as-VM) is taken over by 0070's per-host orchestrator. This PRD still
+> owns the docker-free **image-building** work — Stage 2 (nix-built fixed
+> images, a dependency of 0070) and Stage 3 (in-VM Dockerfile builder).
+
 ## Summary
 
 Make the Firecracker backend depend on **firecracker + KVM only**, removing

docs/prds/0070-per-host-orchestrator.md

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+# PRD 0070: Per-host orchestrator service
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** Claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-12
+- **Issue:** #351
+- **Supersedes:** the Stage-1 / Stage-4 sidecar-consolidation framing of
+  PRD 0069 (#348). Depends on 0069's nix-built fixed images (Stage 2) for
+  bootstrapping; 0069 still owns the docker-free image-building work.
+
+## Summary
+
+Replace the **per-bottle sidecar bundle** with a single **persistent,
+per-host orchestrator**: one long-lived service that runs the sidecar
+functions (egress / git-gate / supervise), coordinates with the console,
+and brokers agent launches and teardown. It is **virtualized from the
+start** using each backend's native isolation primitive — a Firecracker
+microVM on the Firecracker backend, an Apple container on macOS, a Docker
+container on the legacy backend — and is fronted by a single
+**backend-agnostic contract**. Per-backend variation lives on
+`BottleBackend`, not in the orchestrator.
+
+## Motivation
+
+Today each bottle spins up its own sidecar bundle (egress mitmproxy +
+git-gate + supervise). That costs:
+
+- **Resources.** N bottles → N heavy bundles booting and idling.
+- **Operational churn.** Per-launch container/VM lifecycle for the
+  sidecars, a control path baked at launch and torn down at exit.
+- **A blurry contract.** "How a bottle talks to its sidecar" is
+  re-implemented per backend instead of being one agreed interface.
+
+A per-host orchestrator collapses the first two and forces the third to
+be made explicit. It's also the component that will own per-host runtime
+**state** (slot leases, the approval queue, the bottle registry) — today
+that's ad-hoc `fcntl`-locked files.
+
+## Security review (read this first)
+
+Consolidation is a real change to the trust model. The goal is to **not
+significantly weaken** the posture; some properties strengthen, some
+weaken, and the weakened ones must be mitigated by design, not hand-waved.
+
+### What gets stronger
+
+- **Build/host isolation of untrusted inputs** (with 0069 Stage 3): user
+  Dockerfiles build in a disposable VM instead of on the host.
+- **One audited privileged surface.** Today the launcher runs as the full
+  host user and needs the Docker socket (root-equivalent). The orchestrator
+  model replaces that with a **thin launch broker** (below) — a small,
+  structured, auditable privileged core instead of a fat socket.
+- **Attribution is enforced, not assumed.** Making source-IP identity a
+  first-class contract invariant (below) means each backend must *prove*
+  it, rather than the sidecar implicitly trusting network position.
+
+### What gets weaker, and the mitigation
+
+1. **Secret concentration.** Per-bottle sidecars isolate secrets at the
+   process boundary — each holds only its bottle's tokens/keys. A host
+   orchestrator concentrates **every bottle's** egress tokens, git deploy
+   keys, and the console credential in one long-lived process. A single
+   attribution bug leaks bottle A's token into bottle B's request — a class
+   of bug that *cannot exist* per-bottle.
+   - *Mitigation:* lean on the enforced source-IP invariant for
+     attribution; keep the most secret-dense, least-shareable service
+     (**git-gate**, per-repo deploy keys, no natural source-IP scoping)
+     **per-bottle** unless there's a compelling reason; scope each secret
+     to the bottle in the state DB so a lookup can't return the wrong
+     bottle's secret by construction (key every secret access by the
+     verified source identity, never by ambient state).
+
+2. **Shared fate.** Orchestrator down = no new launches, and running
+   agents lose egress / git / supervise. Compromise = the whole host's
+   fleet, plus launch authority, plus the console token.
+   - *Mitigation:* the orchestrator is itself confined (its own VM/container
+     with its own fail-closed egress); make it **restartable without killing
+     running agent VMs** (agents keep running; they briefly lose sidecar
+     connectivity until it's back); persist state to a host volume so a
+     restart re-adopts live bottles rather than losing them.
+
+3. **The launch broker is the new privileged core.** We don't eliminate
+   host privilege — we shrink and relocate it. If the broker accepts
+   arbitrary paths/commands, the orchestrator VM can escape through it.
+   - *Mitigation:* the broker takes **structured requests only** — "launch
+     bottle from *this* content-addressed, nix-built rootfs on TAP slot
+     *k*", never "run this argv". It validates against a fixed image set,
+     not caller-supplied paths. It is small enough to audit line-by-line.
+
+4. **The egress proxy now parses every bottle's traffic in one process.**
+   Higher blast radius for a mitmproxy/TLS-bump bug.
+   - *Mitigation:* this is the argument for virtualizing the orchestrator
+     from the start (Stage B, not a host daemon) — the code that TLS-bumps
+     and parses agent traffic and holds every token runs **inside its own
+     confined VM**, not as a host process. If egress sharing's blast radius
+     feels too high, egress can stay per-bottle while supervise (near-zero
+     secrets) goes host-level first.
+
+### The attribution invariant
+
+Source-IP attribution is what makes a shared orchestrator safe: one
+process serves every bottle and tells them apart by source address. The
+*mechanism* is identical everywhere (read source IP → look up bottle); the
+**guarantee that the address can't be forged is a per-backend
+responsibility** and part of the contract:
+
+> **Invariant:** a packet's source address, as seen by the orchestrator,
+> *provably* identifies the originating bottle.
+
+- **Firecracker** — enforced by the `/31` point-to-point TAP + the
+  `bot_bottle_fc` nft table (strongest; already built).
+- **Docker** — the per-bottle `--internal` network + anti-spoof; weaker,
+  must be made explicit.
+- **Apple** — the host-only network.
+
+If a backend can't honor the invariant, source-IP consolidation is not
+safe there and that backend keeps per-bottle sidecars. The invariant is a
+hard precondition, not an aspiration.
+
+### Secret handling — a FUTURE pattern (not v1)
+
+> **Status: future / not required for the initial orchestrator.** The
+> initial cut can inject secrets as today; this section records the
+> direction so v1 doesn't paint itself into a corner. Tracked as its own
+> work in **#355** (generic `SecretProvider`).
+
+The residual weakness after all of the above is **long-lived credential
+concentration** — the data-plane proxies must hold every bottle's upstream
+tokens because the agent must never see them. You can't policy-gate the
+component whose job is to *use* all the secrets, so a full RCE of a proxy
+drains its authorized set regardless. Two moves bound this without
+pretending to prevent it:
+
+1. **Vault as a separate trust domain.** The long-lived *roots* live in a
+   distinct process (ideally its own VM) that the byte-parsing data plane
+   never shares memory with. The proxies request secrets from it; the
+   crown jewels are not in the process an agent-facing parser can pop.
+2. **Derive short-lived, scoped creds where the upstream allows it.** The
+   vault holds the root and mints expiring, narrowly-scoped credentials
+   per bottle-start (or per request) — GitHub App installation tokens,
+   OAuth/STS token exchange, forge deploy tokens. A compromise then leaks
+   short-lived material, not permanent keys. For upstreams stuck on static
+   keys the vault passes the value through (only the at-rest / audit /
+   revocation benefits apply, not lifetime reduction) — this residue is
+   accepted and documented, not solved.
+
+Even a plain per-request fetch (no derivation) still buys **at-rest**
+reduction (process memory holds only in-flight secrets), a **detection /
+rate-limit / revocation chokepoint**, and clean **cross-component
+scoping** (an egress RCE can't request git-gate's creds). It does *not*
+prevent abuse of currently-authorized access during the compromise window.
+
+**Mechanism (see #355):** generalize the existing `DeployKeyProvisioner`
+(PRD 0048) into a user-extensible **`SecretProvider`** droppable into the
+manifest anywhere a raw token value is accepted, discovered from
+`~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/secret_provider.py` exactly as user
+`AgentProvider`s are — because maintaining every forge/cloud/OAuth
+provider in-tree is untenable. The orchestrator's vault mints via these
+providers; but the abstraction is shippable independently and today's
+per-bottle sidecars can use it too.
+
+## Design
+
+### The contract (backend-agnostic)
+
+Three surfaces; only one is per-backend.
+
+1. **Control plane (CLI / console → orchestrator)** — an RPC:
+   `launch_bottle`, `teardown_bottle`, `register_policy`,
+   `deregister_bottle`, `supervise_queue`. Fully backend-agnostic. Both the
+   local `cli.py` and the remote console funnel through it, so policy is
+   uniform and `cli.py` becomes a thin client rather than a parallel
+   launcher.
+2. **Data plane (agent → orchestrator)** — the egress / git / supervise
+   endpoints. Already agnostic today (agents dial `http://sidecar:9099`);
+   only the *address* and *how packets get there* are per-backend.
+3. **Launch / wire (orchestrator → backend)** — the irreducibly
+   backend-specific part; lives on `BottleBackend`.
+
+### One `Orchestrator`, no subclass tree
+
+The orchestrator is a **single concrete class** holding all the
+backend-neutral logic — egress addon, git-gate, supervise, source-IP
+attribution, live-reload control plane, console client. It never branches
+on backend; it *composes* a `BottleBackend`. That composition is what makes
+the contract agnostic: there is nothing backend-specific left in the
+orchestrator to leak.
+
+Rejected alternative: an `Orchestrator` ABC with per-backend
+implementations. The interesting logic (proxies, attribution, control
+plane) is backend-neutral, so three subclasses would triplicate the hard
+part; and a second hierarchy paralleling `BottleBackend` reintroduces the
+same hand-maintained lockstep coupling we just removed from the netpool
+constants (PR #350). Composition over a parallel tree.
+
+### `BottleBackend` absorbs the per-backend variation
+
+A small, cohesive surface — reused for launching agent bottles *and* the
+orchestrator's own unit (the orchestrator is just another native unit):
+
+```
+launch_unit(spec) -> Handle      # agent bottle OR the orchestrator itself
+                                 # (fc microVM / apple ctr / docker ctr)
+wire(unit, endpoint) -> None     # DNAT+forward (fc) | attach shared net (docker/apple)
+endpoint_of(unit) -> Endpoint    # address resolution
+health(unit) -> Status
+```
+
+Plus the **launch broker** — the answer to "a VM/container can't spawn its
+own host-network siblings." The orchestrator can't directly open host
+`/dev/kvm` + a host TAP fd (Firecracker), and a container can't spawn
+siblings without a root-equivalent socket (Docker). So every backend
+exposes a broker the orchestrator calls to launch an agent:
+
+- **Firecracker** — a thin, structured host shim (see security #3). This
+  replaces today's implicit "launcher runs as host user."
+- **Docker** — the socket today (fat, root-equivalent — the thing 0069's
+  Stage 3 removes); a narrower broker later.
+- **Apple** — the `container` CLI/daemon.
+
+If `BottleBackend` bloats, the pressure valve is composition one level
+down: vend a `backend.network()` / `Wiring` collaborator rather than
+piling methods on — the same discipline, recursed.
+
+### State: one SQLite DB, owned by the orchestrator
+
+The orchestrator is the natural owner of per-host **runtime state**:
+
+- pool **slot leases** (which bottle holds slot *i*) — replaces today's
+  `fcntl`-locked files with WAL-mode transactions;
+- the **supervise approval queue** + remembered approvals;
+- the **live bottle registry** (source IP → bottle → policy/secrets refs),
+  the lookup table the attribution invariant reads.
+
+This is deliberately **not** a "single source of truth for all config."
+Config splits into three tiers with different homes:
+
+| Tier | Example | Home |
+|---|---|---|
+| Build-time constants | pool size, IP base, nft table | flat `.env` (PR #350) — must be readable by Nix eval + root bash, zero runtime |
+| User-authored config | bottle manifests, egress routes, secret refs | declarative files under `~/.bot-bottle/` — trust boundary at `$HOME`, git-trackable, "unknown keys die at load" |
+| Runtime state | slot leases, approvals, registry | **SQLite**, owned by the orchestrator |
+
+SQLite is right for the runtime tier (mutable, concurrent, queried) and
+wrong for the other two (Nix can't read it at eval time; it fights the
+declarative manifest trust model). Keep the tiers separate.
+
+## Sequencing
+
+Jump straight to the **virtualized** end state (not a host-daemon stepping
+stone): a host daemon's agent→`localhost` transport is throwaway once the
+orchestrator becomes a VM. Decouple the two risks instead:
+
+- **Consolidation risk** (one process, all secrets, attribution, reload)
+  and **packaging/transport risk** (VM-to-VM wiring, the shim) are
+  independent. Develop the orchestrator **service as a plain process
+  dev-harness** first, so the consolidation logic (attribution, reload,
+  secret handling) is proven with fast iteration — *then* wrap that exact
+  service in the VM and solve wiring separately.
+
+Backend order (cheapest proof → hardest → last):
+
+1. **Docker orchestrator** — nearly free (the sidecar bundle is already
+   containers; collapse N bundles into one persistent container). Proves
+   consolidation + the `BottleBackend` seam with the least moving parts.
+2. **Firecracker orchestrator** — the real work: the shim + VM-to-VM
+   routing (host forwards `bbfcN` → orchestrator TAP; the nft table grows
+   forward rules where today it drops all non-DNAT egress). Built against
+   the dev-harness so the app logic is already proven.
+3. **macOS (Apple container)** — last (container-to-container networking).
+
+Keep the sidecar **service one shared thing** throughout.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Removing OCI/Dockerfile support for agent images (0069's concern).
+- A single database for *all* config (see the three-tier table).
+- Changing the per-bottle isolation of agent workloads — only the sidecar
+  is consolidated; agents stay one-VM/container-each.
+
+## Relationship to other work
+
+- **PRD 0069 (#348):** 0070 subsumes its Stage 1 (per-host sidecar) and
+  Stage 4 (sidecar-as-VM). 0069 retains Stage 2 (nix-built fixed images —
+  a **dependency** here: the orchestrator and agent base must be
+  nix-built so the broker launches from a fixed image set and bootstrapping
+  has no chicken-and-egg) and Stage 3 (in-VM Dockerfile builder).
+- **Minimal CI runner (paused):** the Firecracker broker + no host Docker
+  is what lets a dedicated `gitea` runner user drop the root-equivalent
+  `docker` group — it only needs broker-socket access + `kvm`/pool group
+  membership. This work unblocks it.
+- **Generic `SecretProvider` (#355):** the future secret-handling
+  mechanism (see "Secret handling") — generalizes PRD 0048's
+  `DeployKeyProvisioner` into a user-extensible provider that mints
+  short-lived creds. Shippable independently; the orchestrator's vault
+  mints through it.
+- **PR #350 (netpool single-source):** the same "one source per fact,
+  composition over parallel hierarchies" discipline the contract follows.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- **Egress sharing tradeoff:** is the secret-concentration blast radius of
+  one shared mitmproxy worth the resource win, or share only supervise
+  (near-zero secrets) and keep egress + git-gate per-bottle initially?
+- **Control-plane shape:** RPC transport (unix socket / vsock / HTTP over
+  the TAP) and the live-reload protocol for per-bottle policy.
+- **State re-adoption:** exact scheme for an orchestrator restart to
+  re-adopt running agent VMs from the SQLite registry without racing
+  in-flight launches.
+- **VM-to-VM routing:** the nft forward rules + addressing for a
+  per-host orchestrator VM on its own TAP.
+- **Broker request schema:** the exact structured contract that stays
+  auditable and can't be coerced into launching arbitrary payloads.

nix/firecracker-netpool.nix

@@ -1,104 +1,70 @@
 # bot-bottle Firecracker network pool — declarative NixOS module.
 #
 # The one-time privileged setup the Firecracker backend needs: a pool of
-# user-owned point-to-point TAP devices plus a fail-closed nftables table
+# user- (or group-) owned point-to-point TAP devices plus a fail-closed
-# that confines every microVM to its own sidecar.
+# nftables table that confines every microVM to its own sidecar.
 #
 # NON-INVASIVE BY DESIGN. It does NOT flip `networking.nftables.enable`
 # (which would switch your whole host firewall backend) or
 # `systemd.network.enable` (which would hand your interfaces to
-# systemd-networkd). Instead a single systemd oneshot service brings the
+# systemd-networkd). Instead a single systemd oneshot brings the pool up
-# pool up on boot — the declarative equivalent of
+# on boot by running the SAME bring-up script as every other install
-# `sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh up`. The `inet <tableName>` table
+# path (`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`) — so the TAP/nft logic lives in
-# is independent (its own hooks at priority -10), so it coexists with an
+# exactly one place. The `inet <tableName>` table is independent (its own
-# iptables `networking.firewall`, Docker, ufw, firewalld, etc.
+# hooks at priority -10), so it coexists with an iptables
+# `networking.firewall`, Docker, ufw, firewalld, etc.
 #
-# The oneshot is only restarted when this config changes, so a
+# The oneshot is only restarted when this config changes, and the shared
-# `nixos-rebuild switch` doesn't tear down TAPs out from under running
+# script is non-destructive (it never tears down an existing TAP), so a
-# VMs unless you actually changed the pool.
+# `nixos-rebuild switch` won't cut TAPs out from under running VMs.
 #
-# The option defaults MUST match the backend constants in
+# Single source of the pool defaults: bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/
-# bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.py (pool size, IP base, iface
+# netpool.defaults.env. This module readFile-parses it for the option
-# prefix, table name). The backend reads the same values at launch from
+# defaults below, then passes the resolved values back to the script as
-# the BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env vars; if you override an option here, override
+# Environment=, so the host pool and the CLI launcher can't drift.
-# the matching env var for the CLI too (or set writeEnvFile = true below
-# to have this module emit them). Keep the two sides in lockstep.
 { config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
 
 let
   cfg = config.services.bot-bottle-firecracker;
 
-  # --- IPv4 <-> int (full 32-bit carry math) -------------------------
+  # --- shared single-source defaults ---------------------------------
-  toOctets = s: map lib.toInt (lib.splitString "." s);
+  # Parse the KEY=VALUE defaults file (the same one netpool.py and the
-  ipToInt = s:
+  # shell script read). Pure eval — just readFile, no import-from-
-    let o = toOctets s; in
+  # derivation — so it works for both flake and channel consumers.
-    (lib.elemAt o 0) * 16777216
+  readDefaults = file:
-    + (lib.elemAt o 1) * 65536
-    + (lib.elemAt o 2) * 256
-    + (lib.elemAt o 3);
-  intToIp = n:
     let
-      b0 = n / 16777216;      r0 = n - b0 * 16777216;
+      lines = lib.splitString "\n" (builtins.readFile file);
-      b1 = r0 / 65536;        r1 = r0 - b1 * 65536;
+      keep = l: l != "" && !(lib.hasPrefix "#" l) && lib.hasInfix "=" l;
-      b2 = r1 / 256;
+      toPair = l:
-      b3 = r1 - b2 * 256;
+        let parts = lib.splitString "=" l;
-    in "${toString b0}.${toString b1}.${toString b2}.${toString b3}";
+        in lib.nameValuePair (lib.head parts)
+             (lib.concatStringsSep "=" (lib.tail parts));
+    in lib.listToAttrs (map toPair (lib.filter keep lines));
 
-  baseInt = ipToInt cfg.ipBase;
+  defaults = readDefaults ../bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env;
 
-  # Slot i: host = base + 2i (the VM's gateway), on its own /31.
+  # The one bring-up implementation, shared with the sudo/systemd paths.
-  slots = lib.genList (i: {
+  netpoolScript = ../scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh;
-    iface = "${cfg.ifacePrefix}${toString i}";
-    hostIp = intToIp (baseInt + 2 * i);
-  }) cfg.poolSize;
 
-  ip = "${pkgs.iproute2}/bin/ip";
+  # /31 alignment == an even final octet (only bit 0 matters for base+2i).
-  nft = "${pkgs.nftables}/bin/nft";
+  lastOctet = lib.toInt (lib.last (lib.splitString "." cfg.ipBase));
 
-  # Idempotent ruleset: (create-if-absent → delete → recreate) is atomic
+  # The script needs ip/nft/sysctl + the usual coreutils. It gets every
-  # within one `nft -f`, so re-running `up` always lands a clean table.
+  # pool value via the unit's Environment=, so it never reads the shared
-  nftFile = pkgs.writeText "bot-bottle-fc.nft" ''
+  # defaults file (which isn't beside it once copied to the store).
-    table inet ${cfg.tableName}
+  runtimePath = with pkgs; [ iproute2 nftables procps coreutils gnused ];
-    delete table inet ${cfg.tableName}
-    table inet ${cfg.tableName} {
-      chain forward {
-        type filter hook forward priority -10; policy accept;
-        iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return
-        ct state established,related accept
-        ct status dnat accept
-        drop
-      }
-      chain input {
-        type filter hook input priority -10; policy accept;
-        iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return
-        ct state established,related accept
-        drop
-      }
-    }
-  '';
 
-  # A non-owner user can't open a user-owned TAP, but any member of a
+  ownEnv =
-  # TAP's owning GROUP can (the kernel checks owner-uid OR owning-group).
+    if cfg.group != null
-  # So `group` lets an interactive user and a CI-runner user share one
+    then { BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP = cfg.group; }
-  # pool; `owner` is the single-user default.
+    else { BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER = cfg.owner; };
-  tapOwn = if cfg.group != null then "group ${cfg.group}" else "user ${cfg.owner}";
 
-  upScript = pkgs.writeShellScript "bot-bottle-fc-netpool-up" ''
+  unitEnv = {
-    set -eu
+    BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE = toString cfg.poolSize;
-    ${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (s: ''
+    BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE = cfg.ipBase;
-      ${ip} link show ${s.iface} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${ip} tuntap add dev ${s.iface} mode tap ${tapOwn}
+    BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX = cfg.ifacePrefix;
-      ${ip} addr replace ${s.hostIp}/31 dev ${s.iface}
+    BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE = cfg.tableName;
-      ${ip} link set ${s.iface} up
+  } // ownEnv;
-    '') slots}
-    ${nft} -f ${nftFile}
-  '';
-
-  downScript = pkgs.writeShellScript "bot-bottle-fc-netpool-down" ''
-    ${nft} delete table inet ${cfg.tableName} 2>/dev/null || true
-    ${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (s: ''
-      ${ip} link show ${s.iface} >/dev/null 2>&1 && ${ip} tuntap del dev ${s.iface} mode tap || true
-    '') slots}
-  '';
 in
 {
   options.services.bot-bottle-firecracker = {
@@ -106,25 +72,28 @@ in
 
     poolSize = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.ints.positive;
-      default = 8;
+      default = lib.toInt defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE;
+      defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
       description = "Number of pool slots (concurrent bottles). Must match BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE.";
     };
 
     ipBase = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.str;
-      default = "10.243.0.0";
+      default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE;
+      defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
       description = ''
         Base IPv4 of the /31 pool; slot i uses host = base + 2i. Must
-        be /31-aligned (even final address) and must match
+        be /31-aligned (even final octet) and must match
-        BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE. Default is an obscure RFC-1918 /16 that
+        BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE. The shared default is an obscure RFC-1918
-        dodges docker/libvirt/k8s/LAN and, deliberately, Tailscale's
+        /16 that dodges docker/libvirt/k8s/LAN and, deliberately,
-        100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT range.
+        Tailscale's 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT range.
       '';
     };
 
     ifacePrefix = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.str;
-      default = "bbfc";
+      default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX;
+      defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
       description = "TAP interface name prefix. Must match BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX.";
     };
 
@@ -153,7 +122,8 @@ in
 
     tableName = lib.mkOption {
       type = lib.types.str;
-      default = "bot_bottle_fc";
+      default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE;
+      defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
       description = "nftables table name for the isolation boundary. Must match netpool.NFT_TABLE.";
     };
 
@@ -171,7 +141,7 @@ in
   config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
     assertions = [
       {
-        assertion = lib.mod baseInt 2 == 0;
+        assertion = lib.mod lastOctet 2 == 0;
         message = "services.bot-bottle-firecracker.ipBase must be /31-aligned (even final octet); got ${cfg.ipBase}.";
       }
       {
@@ -183,17 +153,20 @@ in
     # VM->sidecar traffic is DNAT'd and forwarded, so forwarding must be on.
     boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
 
-    # One oneshot brings up the whole pool (TAPs + independent nft table).
+    # One oneshot brings up the whole pool (TAPs + independent nft table)
-    # No networking.nftables.enable / systemd.network.enable — see header.
+    # by running the shared bring-up script. No networking.nftables.enable
+    # / systemd.network.enable — see header.
     systemd.services."bot-bottle-firecracker-netpool" = {
       description = "bot-bottle Firecracker TAP pool + nft isolation table";
       wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
       after = [ "network-pre.target" ];
+      path = runtimePath;
+      environment = unitEnv;
       serviceConfig = {
         Type = "oneshot";
         RemainAfterExit = true;
-        ExecStart = upScript;
+        ExecStart = "${pkgs.bash}/bin/bash ${netpoolScript} up";
-        ExecStop = downScript;
+        ExecStop = "${pkgs.bash}/bin/bash ${netpoolScript} down";
       };
     };
 
@@ -202,6 +175,7 @@ in
         BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE=${toString cfg.poolSize}
         BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=${cfg.ipBase}
         BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=${cfg.ifacePrefix}
+        BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=${cfg.tableName}
       '';
     };
   };

scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh

@@ -33,24 +33,44 @@
 #   sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh down
 #   ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh status
 #
-# Env overrides (must match the backend's util.py constants):
+# Pool params default to the shared single-source file
-#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE   number of slots (default 8)
+# (bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env); a matching
-#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE     base IPv4 of the /31 pool (default 10.243.0.0)
+# env var overrides its key:
-#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX  TAP name prefix (default bbfc)
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE     number of slots
-#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER       owning user (default $SUDO_USER or $USER)
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE       base IPv4 of the /31 pool
-#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP       owning group; if set, TAPs are group-owned
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX  TAP name prefix
-#                             instead of user-owned, so any group member
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE     isolation table name
-#                             (e.g. an interactive user + a CI runner
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER         owning user (default $SUDO_USER or $USER)
-#                             user) can open the pool. Overrides OWNER.
+#   BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP         owning group; if set, TAPs are group-owned
+#                               instead of user-owned, so any group member
+#                               (e.g. an interactive user + a CI runner
+#                               user) can open the pool. Overrides OWNER.
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
-POOL_SIZE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-8}"
+# The single source of the pool defaults, shared with netpool.py and the
-IP_BASE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-10.243.0.0}"
+# Nix module. The Nix path passes every value as env (the script runs
-PREFIX="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX:-bbfc}"
+# from the store, detached from this file), so this lookup only matters
+# on the direct/sudo path where the script sits in the repo tree.
+_SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+_DEFAULTS="$_SCRIPT_DIR/../bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env"
+_default() {  # value of KEY=... from the shared file; empty if unavailable
+    [ -f "$_DEFAULTS" ] || return 0
+    sed -n "s/^$1=//p" "$_DEFAULTS" | tail -1
+}
+
+POOL_SIZE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE)}"
+IP_BASE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE)}"
+PREFIX="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX)}"
+TABLE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE)}"
 OWNER="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}"
 GROUP="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP:-}"
-TABLE="bot_bottle_fc"
+
+# Fail loudly rather than provisioning a half/empty range if a value
+# resolved to nothing (env unset AND the shared file unreadable).
+for _v in POOL_SIZE IP_BASE PREFIX TABLE; do
+    [ -n "${!_v}" ] || { echo "error: $_v unresolved (set BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* or fix $_DEFAULTS)" >&2; exit 1; }
+done
 
 # Sidecar ports (must match the backend). egress=9099, supervise=9100,
 # git-http=9420. Reached by the VM at its host-side TAP IP.
@@ -94,12 +114,13 @@ cmd_up() {
     for i in $(seq 0 $((POOL_SIZE-1))); do
         local dev host
         dev="$(iface "$i")" ; host="$(host_ip "$i")"
-        if ip link show "$dev" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        # Non-destructive + idempotent: only create a missing TAP (tearing
-            ip link set "$dev" down 2>/dev/null || true
+        # an existing one down would cut a running VM), and `addr replace`
-            ip tuntap del dev "$dev" mode tap 2>/dev/null || true
+        # is safe to re-run. Ownership is fixed at creation, so to change
-        fi
+        # owner/group run `down` then `up`.
-        ip tuntap add dev "$dev" mode tap "${own_args[@]}"
+        ip link show "$dev" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
-        ip addr add "$host/31" dev "$dev"
+            || ip tuntap add dev "$dev" mode tap "${own_args[@]}"
+        ip addr replace "$host/31" dev "$dev"
         ip link set "$dev" up
         echo "  $dev  host=$host  guest=$(guest_ip "$i")  $own_desc"
     done

tests/unit/test_firecracker_backend.py

@@ -67,10 +67,24 @@ class TestNetpoolRenderers(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn("networking.nftables.enable = true", mod)
         self.assertNotIn("systemd.network.enable = true", mod)
         self.assertIn("bot-bottle-firecracker-netpool", mod)  # the oneshot
-        self.assertIn(netpool.NFT_TABLE, mod)
-        self.assertIn('iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return', mod)
         # Supports group-owned TAPs (shared pool for a multi-user host).
-        self.assertIn("group ${cfg.group}", mod)
+        self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP", mod)
+
+    def test_nixos_module_delegates_and_holds_no_literals(self):
+        # Single-source discipline: the module must NOT re-implement the
+        # bring-up (it delegates to the shared script) and must NOT hard-
+        # code the pool defaults (it readFile-parses the shared .env), so
+        # nothing can drift from netpool.py / the shell script.
+        root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+        mod = (root / "nix" / "firecracker-netpool.nix").read_text()
+        # Delegation to the one bring-up implementation + shared defaults.
+        self.assertIn("scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh", mod)
+        self.assertIn("netpool.defaults.env", mod)
+        self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE", mod)
+        # No duplicated literals or nft ruleset.
+        self.assertNotIn(netpool.ip_base(), mod)      # 10.243.0.0
+        self.assertNotIn(netpool.NFT_TABLE, mod)      # bot_bottle_fc
+        self.assertNotIn("ct status dnat", mod)       # the nft ruleset
 
     def test_shell_setup_reflects_overrides(self):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE": "3"}):
@@ -262,26 +276,43 @@ class TestBottleAgentArgv(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("USER=node", argv)
 
 
-class TestSetupScriptConsistency(unittest.TestCase):
+class TestNetpoolDefaultsSingleSource(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The shell setup script duplicates the pool defaults; keep them in
+    """The pool defaults live in one shared file (netpool.defaults.env);
-    lockstep with the Python constants so the two setup paths agree."""
+    Python parses it and the shell script + Nix module read the same file,
+    so the three setup paths can't drift."""
 
-    def _script(self) -> str:
+    def _root(self) -> Path:
-        root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
+        return Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
-        return (root / "scripts" / "firecracker-netpool.sh").read_text()
 
-    def test_defaults_match_python(self):
+    def _shared_defaults(self) -> dict[str, str]:
-        script = self._script()
+        text = netpool.DEFAULTS_FILE.read_text()
+        out: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for raw in text.splitlines():
+            line = raw.strip()
+            if line and not line.startswith("#") and "=" in line:
+                k, _, v = line.partition("=")
+                out[k.strip()] = v.strip()
+        return out
+
+    def test_python_reads_the_shared_file(self):
+        d = self._shared_defaults()
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
-            self.assertIn(f'POOL_SIZE:-{netpool.pool_size()}', script)
+            self.assertEqual(int(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"]), netpool.pool_size())
-            self.assertIn(f'BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-{netpool.ip_base()}', script)
+            self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE"], netpool.ip_base())
-            self.assertIn(f'IFACE_PREFIX:-{netpool.IFACE_PREFIX}', script)
+        # Module constants resolve through the same shared file.
+        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX"], netpool.IFACE_PREFIX)
+        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE"], netpool.NFT_TABLE)
 
-    def test_table_name_and_ports_match(self):
+    def test_env_var_overrides_the_shared_default(self):
-        script = self._script()
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE": "10.99.0.0"}):
-        self.assertIn(f'TABLE="{netpool.NFT_TABLE}"', script)
+            self.assertEqual("10.99.0.0", netpool.ip_base())
-        for port in netpool.SIDECAR_PORTS:
+
-            self.assertIn(str(port), script)
+    def test_script_defers_to_shared_file_without_literals(self):
+        script = (self._root() / "scripts" / "firecracker-netpool.sh").read_text()
+        # Delegates its defaults to the shared file, not hardcoded values.
+        self.assertIn("netpool.defaults.env", script)
+        self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE)", script)
+        self.assertIn('TABLE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE)}"', script)
 
 
 class TestBootArgs(unittest.TestCase):