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didericis 121c3e82eb test(egress): set orchestrator URL for entrypoint tests; cover fail-closed guard
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The egress_entrypoint.sh fail-closed guard (this branch) exits 1 when
BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is unset, which broke the argv-construction
tests that ran the script without it. Set the URL in the shared
_run_entrypoint helper (a precondition for reaching mitmdump now, like
PATH) and add a test asserting the guard fails closed when it's absent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UoEZHDjv84ChoZbozQERhJ
2026-07-17 21:47:36 -04:00
didericis 96977084fc refactor(gateway): fail closed without an orchestrator URL; drop stale single-tenant comments
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Follow-ups from the #402 review of the single-tenant data-plane teardown.

- egress_entrypoint.sh: refuse to launch mitmdump when
  BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is unset, so the fail-closed guarantee no
  longer rests solely on mitmproxy's errorcheck addon exiting on the
  addon's load-time raise. A misconfigured gateway can never come up as
  a bare TLS-bumping open proxy with no policy.
- orchestrator/gateway.py: ensure_running() raises GatewayError on an
  empty orchestrator URL — a URL-less launch would only crash-loop the
  now-resolver-only daemons (egress raises, git-http exits 1, supervise
  exits 2). The env-injection branch is now unconditional.
- Drop stale "single-tenant" / "reads routes.yaml" comments in
  gateway.py and egress_entrypoint.sh, and the /etc/egress/routes.yaml
  layout line in Dockerfile.gateway.
- Tests: gateway fixtures supply an orchestrator URL; add a
  refuse-without-URL test and assert the URL env is injected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UoEZHDjv84ChoZbozQERhJ
2026-07-17 21:40:14 -04:00
didericis f26579c552 refactor(gateway): remove the single-tenant data-plane paths (audit #400 finding 3)
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All three backends (docker, firecracker, macos-container) now launch through
the consolidated orchestrator, and every production gateway sets
BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL — so the legacy single-tenant (`resolver is None`)
branches in the shared gateway's data plane were unreachable dead code, a second
security-relevant path to keep correct in parallel with the live one. Make the
orchestrator resolver mandatory and delete the single-tenant paths from the
three data-plane modules.

egress_addon.py: drop the static routes file entirely — EGRESS_ROUTES, _reload,
the SIGHUP handler, self.config, and the SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env slug. The
per-request /resolve is the only policy source; __init__ fail-closes if
BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL is unset. Introspection (`_egress.local/allowlist`)
now reports the calling bottle's *resolved* routes. The block/redact log gates
and _req_ctx redaction now read the per-flow config/env from the request-time
stash, so they use each bottle's log level and token set (they silently used the
empty static config before). Nothing sends `docker kill --signal HUP` to the
gateway in the consolidated model (the egress applicators fail closed), so
removing the SIGHUP reload is safe.

git_http_backend.py: resolver mandatory; no flat-root fallback. main() refuses
to start without an orchestrator URL; a request whose source resolves to no
bottle 404s.

supervise_server.py: resolver mandatory; every proposal is attributed to the
source-IP-resolved bottle. Remove handle_list_egress_routes (the proxy-fetch
introspection that only worked when the proxy carried one bottle's identity) —
list-egress-routes is answered from the resolved policy. main() refuses to start
without an orchestrator URL.

Tests: a host-side fake resolver serves each test's Config through the real
parse path (a small YAML-subset emitter round-trips route_to_yaml_dict); the
response/websocket hooks stash it as request() would. Deletes the tests for the
removed static-config, SIGHUP-reload, and single-tenant-passthrough paths; adds
fail-closed-without-orchestrator coverage.

Follow-up: gateway_init still forwards SIGHUP to the egress child (now dormant —
no one sends it); the README still describes the docker backend's per-bottle
topology. Both are outside the data-plane teardown.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UoEZHDjv84ChoZbozQERhJ
2026-07-17 18:02:59 -04:00
5 changed files with 8 additions and 82 deletions
@@ -94,12 +94,6 @@ def provision_git_gate(
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", "/etc/git-gate"])
transport.cp_into(str(plan.hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/pre-receive")
transport.cp_into(str(plan.access_hook_script), "/etc/git-gate/access-hook")
# The access-hook is exec'd directly (not via `sh`), so it needs the x bit.
# Set it here rather than trusting the copy to carry the staged 0o700:
# `docker cp` preserves source mode, but the Apple `container cp` does not,
# landing the hook 0o644 → EACCES when the git-http handler tries to exec it.
# chmod on the gateway side is backend-neutral and fixes every transport.
transport.exec(["chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"])
creds = _creds_dir(bottle_id)
transport.exec(["mkdir", "-p", creds])
for u in plan.upstreams:
+2 -4
View File
@@ -112,10 +112,8 @@ class GitGate(ABC):
access_hook = stage_dir / "git_gate_access_hook.sh"
access_hook.write_text(git_gate_render_access_hook())
# 0o700 (not 0o600): git daemon execs --access-hook directly,
# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. The gateway copy
# does not necessarily preserve this mode (`docker cp` does, the
# Apple `container cp` does not), so provision_git_gate re-applies
# +x on the gateway side — see backend/docker/gateway_provision.py.
# not via `sh`, so the script needs the x bit. docker cp
# preserves source mode into the container.
access_hook.chmod(0o700)
upstreams_with_files: list[GitGateUpstream] = []
for u in upstreams:
+6 -18
View File
@@ -136,24 +136,12 @@ class GitHttpHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
"GIT_GATE_ACCESS_HOOK", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook",
)
peer = self.client_address[0]
try:
hook = subprocess.run(
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError) as exc:
# The access-hook couldn't be run (missing, not executable,
# timed out, …). Fail closed with a real HTTP error rather
# than letting the exception kill the handler thread — an
# unhandled exception closes the socket with no response, which
# the client sees as an opaque "empty reply from server".
self.log_message(
"access-hook could not run for %s: %s", parsed.path, exc,
)
self.send_error(503, "git-gate access-hook unavailable")
return
hook = subprocess.run(
[hook_path, "upload-pack", str(repo_dir), peer, peer],
capture_output=True,
check=False,
timeout=GIT_GATE_TIMEOUT_SECS,
)
if hook.returncode != 0:
detail = (hook.stderr or hook.stdout).decode(
"utf-8", errors="replace",
-12
View File
@@ -69,18 +69,6 @@ class TestProvisionGitGate(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(1, len(exec_scripts))
self.assertIn("repo=/git/bottle1/${name}.git", exec_scripts[0][-1])
def test_makes_access_hook_executable_on_the_gateway(self) -> None:
# Regression: the access-hook is exec'd directly, so it needs the x
# bit. The copy alone can't be trusted to carry the staged 0o700
# (`docker cp` preserves mode, the Apple `container cp` does not),
# so provisioning must re-apply +x on the gateway side.
calls: list[list[str]] = []
with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
provision_git_gate(DockerGatewayTransport("gw"), "bottle1", _plan(_up("foo")))
self.assertIn(
["docker", "exec", "gw", "chmod", "+x", "/etc/git-gate/access-hook"], calls,
)
def test_omits_known_hosts_copy_when_absent(self) -> None:
calls: list[list[str]] = []
with patch(_RUN, side_effect=_recorder(calls)):
-42
View File
@@ -375,48 +375,6 @@ class TestGitHttpBackend(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("access-hook denied", logged)
self.assertIn("exit=2", logged)
def test_access_hook_that_cannot_run_fails_closed_503(self):
"""Regression: when the access-hook can't be exec'd (missing / not
executable — a PermissionError from subprocess.run), the handler must
fail closed with a real HTTP status instead of letting the exception
kill the thread, which closes the socket with no response and the
client sees an opaque "empty reply from server"."""
from http.server import ThreadingHTTPServer
import io
import sys
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
root = Path(tmp)
(root / "repo.git").mkdir()
old_root = os.environ.get("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT")
os.environ["GIT_PROJECT_ROOT"] = str(root)
self.addCleanup(self._restore_env, old_root)
server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), GitHttpHandler)
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
with mock.patch(
"bot_bottle.git_http_backend.subprocess.run",
side_effect=PermissionError(13, "Permission denied"),
):
buf = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(sys, "stdout", buf):
req = urllib.request.Request(
f"http://127.0.0.1:{server.server_port}"
"/repo.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack",
method="GET",
)
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5)
self.fail("expected HTTPError 503")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: # type: ignore
self.assertEqual(503, e.code)
self.assertIn("access-hook could not run", buf.getvalue())
@staticmethod
def _restore_env(value: str | None) -> None:
if value is None: