feat(claude): add forward_host_credentials support

Reads the host's Claude OAuth session key from ~/.claude.json at launch
and forwards it only to the egress sidecar (never to the agent), placing
a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent env so Claude Code
starts without seeing the real credential.

Mirrors the existing Codex forward_host_credentials flow (PRD 0029).
Adds claude_auth.py to extract and validate the sessionKey, a
CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF constant in egress.py, and updates
manifest_agent.py to allow the flag for both 'codex' and 'claude'
templates. Also adds a mutual-exclusion check that rejects setting
both auth_token and forward_host_credentials together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

fix(claude): read credentials from ~/.claude/.credentials.json

The actual OAuth token is in ~/.claude/.credentials.json under
claudeAiOauth.accessToken, not in ~/.claude.json.
~/.claude.json holds only UI state and profile metadata (oauthAccount
has no token fields). expiresAt in the credentials file is milliseconds,
not seconds.

Discovered after testing against Claude Code 2.1.198.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

fix(claude): fall back to macOS Keychain for credentials

On macOS, Claude Code stores credentials in the Keychain under
service "Claude Code-credentials" rather than in a file. When
~/.claude/.credentials.json is absent, shell out to:
  security find-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" -w
and parse the result as the same JSON schema.

~/.claude.json holds only profile/UI metadata (oauthAccount has
no token fields). expiresAt in the credentials is milliseconds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs(prd): fix credential path references (~/.claude/.credentials.json)

fix(test): suppress gitleaks false positives on synthetic Claude tokens

.gitea/workflows/test.yml

@@ -4,15 +4,16 @@
 # dependencies are required to execute it. Tests are split by directory:
 #
 #   tests/unit/         — pure unit tests; always run
-#   tests/integration/  — need a reachable backend; skip cleanly when
-#                         the backend isn't available on the runner
+#   tests/integration/  — need a reachable Docker daemon; skip cleanly
+#                         (via tests/_docker.py:skip_unless_docker) when
+#                         Docker isn't available on the runner
 #   tests/canaries/     — upstream regression canaries; run on a separate
 #                         schedule (see canaries.yml), not here
 #
-# Integration tests run once per backend in separate jobs. Each job sets
-# BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND explicitly so the test suite uses the right backend.
-# Backends that aren't available on the runner fail the preflight step
-# rather than silently skipping inside the test output.
+# This workflow assumes the Gitea Actions runner exposes the host Docker
+# socket to the job container so `docker` commands inside the job can
+# reach the daemon. If that's not yet configured on the runner the
+# integration tests will skip rather than fail.
 
 name: test
 
@@ -22,24 +23,9 @@ on:
       - main
     paths:
       - '**.py'
-      - '.gitea/workflows/**.yml'
-      - 'scripts/**'
-      - 'README.md'
-      # The Firecracker infra artifact the integration/coverage jobs pull is
-      # versioned by a content hash of the Dockerfiles (+ bot_bottle/, init);
-      # pyproject.toml drives the in-image package install. Changes here alter
-      # what those jobs build/pull, so they must re-run the suite.
-      - 'Dockerfile*'
-      - 'pyproject.toml'
   pull_request:
     paths:
       - '**.py'
-      - '.gitea/workflows/**.yml'
-      - 'scripts/**'
-      - 'README.md'
-      - 'Dockerfile*'
-      - 'pyproject.toml'
-  workflow_dispatch:
 
 jobs:
   unit:
@@ -62,7 +48,7 @@ jobs:
       - name: Report unit coverage
         run: python3 -m coverage report -m
 
-  integration-docker:
+  integration:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
@@ -79,96 +65,33 @@ jobs:
             echo "docker not on PATH — integration tests will skip"
           fi
 
-      - name: Run integration tests (docker)
-        env:
-          BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND: docker
+      - name: Run integration tests
         run: python3 -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
 
-  # Integration tests against the Firecracker backend. Runs on a self-hosted
-  # KVM runner (label `kvm`) where /dev/kvm and the TAP/nft pool are available.
+  # Combined unit+integration coverage report (informational). See
+  # docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md.
   #
-  # Restricted to same-repo PRs, push to main, and workflow_dispatch — fork
-  # PRs don't execute untrusted code on the privileged runner.
-  #
-  # Runner prerequisites (provision once; see README "Firecracker on Linux"):
-  # `firecracker` on PATH, `/dev/kvm` accessible, Docker, cached kernel +
-  # static dropbear, and the pool as a persistent systemd unit.
-  integration-firecracker:
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, kvm]
-    if: >-
-      github.event_name == 'push' ||
-      github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
-      (github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-       github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository)
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Preflight — Firecracker host is ready
-        run: |
-          command -v firecracker >/dev/null || {
-            echo "firecracker not on PATH — provision the runner (README: Firecracker on Linux)"; exit 1; }
-          test -e /dev/kvm || { echo "/dev/kvm missing — KVM not available on this runner"; exit 1; }
-          # `backend status` exits non-zero unless the TAP pool is up + no
-          # range overlap; it prints the exact `backend setup` fix.
-          python3 cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker
-
-      # No dev-requirements install: the integration suite runs on stdlib
-      # `unittest` (pylint/pyright are lint.yml's concern, not this job's),
-      # and the self-hosted runner's Nix python env has no `pip` module
-      # (`python3 -m pip` → "No module named pip"). Nothing to install.
-      - name: Run integration tests (firecracker)
-        env:
-          BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND: firecracker
-        run: python3 -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration -v
-
-  # Combined unit+integration coverage + the diff-coverage gate (the hard
-  # gate: new/changed lines >= 90%). See docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md.
-  #
-  # This runs on a self-hosted KVM runner (label `kvm`), NOT ubuntu-latest,
-  # because the Firecracker backend's subprocess/VM orchestration
-  # (launch/boot/SSH/isolation-probe) is covered by the integration suite,
-  # and that suite needs `/dev/kvm` + the provisioned TAP/nft pool — which a
-  # container-based runner doesn't have. On such a runner the firecracker
-  # integration test skips and its ~230 orchestration lines read as
-  # uncovered, so the gate can't pass there.
-  #
-  # Restricted to the same events as integration-firecracker (same-repo PRs,
-  # push, workflow_dispatch) for the same security reason.
-  #
-  # See #414 for the planned follow-up: artifact-based coverage combination
-  # (run tests once in their respective jobs, combine .coverage files here).
+  # The hard diff-coverage gate (changed lines >= 90%) is DEFERRED: the
+  # Firecracker backend's VM/SSH orchestration is covered by the integration
+  # suite, which needs /dev/kvm + the provisioned TAP/nft pool — a
+  # container-based runner skips it and those lines read uncovered, so the
+  # gate can't pass here. Re-enabling it on a self-hosted KVM runner is
+  # tracked separately (see PRD 0069 / #348 and the ci-runner branch).
   coverage:
-    timeout-minutes: 15
-    runs-on: [self-hosted, kvm]
-    if: >-
-      github.event_name == 'push' ||
-      github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' ||
-      (github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-       github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository)
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Checkout
         uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
 
-      - name: Preflight — Firecracker host is ready
-        run: |
-          command -v firecracker >/dev/null || {
-            echo "firecracker not on PATH — provision the runner (README: Firecracker on Linux)"; exit 1; }
-          test -e /dev/kvm || { echo "/dev/kvm missing — KVM not available on this runner"; exit 1; }
-          # `backend status` exits non-zero unless the TAP pool is up + no
-          # range overlap; it prints the exact `backend setup` fix.
-          python3 cli.py backend status --backend=firecracker
+      # No actions/setup-python: the runner image already ships Python 3.12,
+      # and older act_runner engines mishandle setup-python's PATH (coverage
+      # lands in one interpreter, `python3` resolves to another). Install
+      # straight into the ephemeral job container's system Python —
+      # --break-system-packages is safe because the container is disposable.
+      - name: Install dev requirements
+        run: python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages -r requirements-dev.txt
 
-      # No dev-requirements install: `coverage` is already provided by the
-      # self-hosted runner's Nix python env, and that env has no `pip`
-      # module to install into anyway. `scripts/coverage.sh` +
-      # `diff_coverage.py` need only `coverage` (not pylint/pyright).
-      - name: Combined coverage (unit + integration, incl. firecracker)
+      - name: Combined coverage report (unit + integration)
         run: PYTHON=python3 bash scripts/coverage.sh critical
-
-      - name: Diff-coverage gate (changed lines >= 90%)
-        run: |
-          git fetch --no-tags origin main:refs/remotes/origin/main
-          python3 scripts/diff_coverage.py --base origin/main --min 90

.gitea/workflows/tracker-policy-pr.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: tracker-policy-pr
 
 on:
   pull_request:
-    types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronize, labeled, unlabeled]
+    types: [opened, edited, reopened, synchronized, labeled, unlabeled]
 
 jobs:
   check-pr:

Dockerfile.gateway

@@ -98,9 +98,6 @@ RUN pip install --no-cache-dir /src/
 
 # mitmdump -s requires a file path, not a module. Write a one-line shim that
 # re-exports `addons` from the installed package; mitmdump finds it there.
-# WORKDIR here also creates /app so the shim + COPYs below can write into it
-# (nothing created /app before this point).
-WORKDIR /app
 RUN printf 'from bot_bottle.egress_addon import addons\n' > /app/egress_addon.py
 COPY bot_bottle/egress_entrypoint.sh /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
 RUN chmod +x /app/egress-entrypoint.sh
@@ -120,6 +117,8 @@ RUN mkdir -p \
 # subset the bottle uses.
 EXPOSE 8888 9099 9418 9420 9100
 
+WORKDIR /app
+
 # PID 1 is the supervisor. It owns signal handling and exit-code
 # propagation; no `exec` chain in the entrypoint itself.
 ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "-m", "bot_bottle.gateway_init"]

README.md

@@ -90,8 +90,6 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker ./cli.py start <agent>
 
 > **NixOS:** enable `virtualisation.docker`, ensure the KVM module is loaded (`boot.kernelModules = [ "kvm-intel" ];` or `kvm-amd`), and add your user to the `kvm` and `docker` groups. For the network pool, consume the flake module — `imports = [ inputs.bot-bottle.nixosModules.firecracker-netpool ]; services.bot-bottle-firecracker = { enable = true; owner = "you"; };` — then `nixos-rebuild switch` (imperative nft/TAP rules don't survive a rebuild; channel users can `imports = [ <bot-bottle>/nix/firecracker-netpool.nix ]`). `firecracker` isn't in nixpkgs by default as a user binary — install the release binary (pin the version) and put it on `PATH`.
 
-> **CI:** the coverage gate (`.gitea/workflows/test.yml` → `coverage` job) runs on a self-hosted runner labelled `kvm`, because the Firecracker backend's VM/SSH orchestration is exercised only by the integration suite, which needs `/dev/kvm` + the provisioned pool (a container runner would skip it and read as uncovered). Provision that runner exactly like a normal Firecracker host — `firecracker` on `PATH`, `/dev/kvm`, Docker, the cached guest kernel + static dropbear, and the pool installed as the persistent systemd unit — then register it with the `kvm` label. The unit/lint jobs still run on `ubuntu-latest`.
-
 ```sh
 ./cli.py start <agent>   # builds the image on first run, drops you into claude
 ```

bot_bottle/agent_provider.py

@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ PROVIDER_TEMPLATES = frozenset({PROVIDER_CLAUDE, PROVIDER_CODEX, PROVIDER_PI})
 # forward_host_credentials is enabled. Pipelock must pass these through
 # (no TLS MITM) or its header DLP blocks the injected JWT.
 CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com")
+
+# Host that egress injects the host Claude bearer on when Claude
+# forward_host_credentials is enabled.
+CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.anthropic.com",)
 PromptMode = Literal[
     "append_file",
     "read_prompt_file",

bot_bottle/audit_store.py

@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ class AuditStore(DbStore):
         super().__init__(db_path or host_db_path(), migrations)
 
     def write_audit_entry(self, entry: AuditEntry) -> Path:
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT INTO supervise_audit_entries (
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ class AuditStore(DbStore):
     def read_audit_entries(self, component: str, slug: str) -> list[AuditEntry]:
         if not self.db_path.is_file():
             return []
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             rows = conn.execute(
                 """
                 SELECT * FROM supervise_audit_entries

bot_bottle/backend/docker/setup.py

@@ -27,14 +27,10 @@ def _docker_on_path() -> bool:
 def _daemon_reachable() -> bool:
     if not _docker_on_path():
         return False
-    try:
-        return subprocess.run(
-            ["docker", "info"],
-            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-            check=False, timeout=5,
-        ).returncode == 0
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-        return False
+    return subprocess.run(
+        ["docker", "info"],
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False,
+    ).returncode == 0
 
 
 def _print_install_pointer() -> None:

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/image_builder.py

@@ -38,39 +38,25 @@ _BUILD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 900.0
 
 
 def _dockerfile_hash(dockerfile: Path) -> str:
-    """The Dockerfile's content hash. The shipped agent Dockerfiles COPY
-    nothing from the build context (see .dockerignore), so their content fully
-    determines the built image; a Dockerfile that adds COPY will want the
+    """Cache key: the Dockerfile's content. The shipped agent Dockerfiles
+    COPY nothing from the build context (see .dockerignore), so their content
+    fully determines the image; a Dockerfile that adds COPY will want the
     context folded in here too."""
     return hashlib.sha256(dockerfile.read_bytes()).hexdigest()[:16]
 
 
-def _rootfs_digest(dockerfile: Path) -> str:
-    """Cache key for the built AND boot-injected agent rootfs. Two inputs
-    determine the on-disk rootfs: the Dockerfile (the image) and the guest init
-    injected into it (`util._GUEST_INIT`). Folding the init in means a fix to
-    it — e.g. making /tmp world-writable — busts the cache instead of silently
-    reusing a stale rootfs built with the old init."""
-    h = hashlib.sha256()
-    h.update(_dockerfile_hash(dockerfile).encode())
-    h.update(b"\0")
-    h.update(util._GUEST_INIT.encode())
-    return h.hexdigest()[:16]
-
-
 def build_agent_rootfs_dir(
     dockerfile: Path, *, image_tag: str, smoke_test: tuple[str, ...] = (),
 ) -> Path:
     """Build `dockerfile` in the infra VM (buildah, no host docker), export its
     rootfs, inject the guest boot bits, and return the cached base dir — the
-    same shape `util.build_rootfs_ext4` consumes. Cached by Dockerfile content
-    + injected guest init, so a repeat launch skips the rebuild but an init or
-    Dockerfile change rebuilds.
+    same shape `util.build_rootfs_ext4` consumes. Cached by Dockerfile content,
+    so a repeat launch skips the rebuild.
 
     `smoke_test` (the provider's declared argv, e.g. `("claude","--version")`)
     is run in the freshly built image before export, catching an npm
     silent-failure image at build time rather than at first agent use."""
-    digest = _rootfs_digest(dockerfile)
+    digest = _dockerfile_hash(dockerfile)
     base = util.cache_dir() / "rootfs" / f"agent-{digest}"
     if (base / ".bb-ready").is_file():
         info(f"using cached agent rootfs {base.name}")

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/infra_artifact.py

@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ def infra_artifact_version(init_script: str, *, repo_root: Path = _REPO_ROOT) ->
         h.update(name.encode())
         h.update(b"\0")
         h.update((repo_root / name).read_bytes())
-    h.update(b"pyproject.toml\0")
-    h.update((repo_root / "pyproject.toml").read_bytes())
     h.update(b"init\0")
     h.update(init_script.encode())
     return h.hexdigest()[:16]

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/infra_vm.py

@@ -161,23 +161,20 @@ def ensure_running() -> InfraVm:
     slot = netpool.orch_slot()
     url = f"http://{slot.guest_ip}:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT}"
     key = _infra_dir() / "id_ed25519"
-    want = _expected_version()
-    if _adoptable(key, url, want):
+    if key.exists() and _health_ok(url):
         info(f"adopting running infra VM at {url}")
         return InfraVm(guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, private_key=key)
 
     with _singleton_lock():
         # Re-check under the lock: another launcher may have booted it while
         # we waited for the lock (double-checked, so we adopt not re-boot).
-        if _adoptable(key, url, want):
+        if key.exists() and _health_ok(url):
             info(f"adopting running infra VM at {url}")
             return InfraVm(guest_ip=slot.guest_ip, private_key=key)
-        # Clear a stale/hung/OUTDATED VM holding the link before booting fresh.
-        stop()
+        stop()  # clear a stale/hung VM holding the link before booting fresh
         ensure_built()
         infra = boot()
         wait_for_health(infra)
-        _record_booted_version(want)
         return infra
 
 
@@ -196,15 +193,9 @@ def _singleton_lock() -> Generator[None, None, None]:
 
 
 def stop() -> None:
-    """Stop the infra VM singleton (idempotent — absent is success). Reaps the
-    recorded VMM AND any orphaned firecracker still bound to the infra config —
-    the PID file drifts after crashes / out-of-band kills, and a survivor would
-    hold the orchestrator TAP so the next boot dies with "tap … Resource busy".
-    Drops the version marker so a stopped VM is never treated as adoptable."""
+    """Stop the infra VM singleton (idempotent — absent is success)."""
     _kill_pidfile()
-    _kill_infra_firecrackers()
     _pid_file().unlink(missing_ok=True)
-    _version_file().unlink(missing_ok=True)
 
 
 def boot() -> InfraVm:
@@ -247,36 +238,6 @@ def _pid_file() -> Path:
     return _infra_dir() / "vm.pid"
 
 
-def _version_file() -> Path:
-    """Records the infra-artifact version the *running* VM booted from, so a
-    later launcher can tell whether the singleton it found is the current code.
-    Without it, a healthy VM built from an older image gets adopted forever and
-    the new code never boots — every infra change would need an out-of-band
-    kill to dislodge the stale VM (and races whatever launched next)."""
-    return _infra_dir() / "booted-version"
-
-
-def _expected_version() -> str:
-    return infra_artifact.infra_artifact_version(_infra_init())
-
-
-def _adoptable(key: Path, url: str, want: str) -> bool:
-    """Adopt a running infra VM only if it booted from the CURRENT version and
-    its control plane is healthy. A missing/mismatched marker means a prior
-    launcher booted an older infra image — reboot rather than reuse stale code."""
-    if not key.exists():
-        return False
-    try:
-        booted = _version_file().read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
-    except OSError:
-        return False
-    return booted == want and _health_ok(url)
-
-
-def _record_booted_version(version: str) -> None:
-    _version_file().write_text(version + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
-
-
 # The registry "volume": a host-side ext4 file attached to the infra VM as a
 # second virtio-block device (guest /dev/vdb), mounted at the control plane's
 # DB dir. It outlives the ephemeral rootfs, so the bottle registry survives an
@@ -348,28 +309,6 @@ def _kill_pidfile() -> None:
         pass
 
 
-def _kill_infra_firecrackers(proc_root: Path = Path("/proc")) -> None:
-    """SIGKILL any firecracker VMM whose `--config-file` is this host's infra
-    config, independent of the PID file — reaps orphans it lost track of so the
-    orchestrator TAP is free to rebind. Scoped to the infra config path, so the
-    interactive pool's agent/infra VMs (other config paths) are untouched."""
-    cfg = str(_infra_dir() / "config.json")
-    for entry in proc_root.iterdir():
-        if not entry.name.isdigit():
-            continue
-        try:
-            if (entry / "comm").read_text().strip() != "firecracker":
-                continue
-            args = (entry / "cmdline").read_bytes().split(b"\0")
-        except OSError:
-            continue  # process vanished / not ours
-        if any(a.decode("utf-8", "replace") == cfg for a in args):
-            try:
-                os.kill(int(entry.name), signal.SIGKILL)
-            except (OSError, ValueError):
-                pass
-
-
 def _health_ok(url: str) -> bool:
     try:
         with urllib.request.urlopen(f"{url}/health", timeout=1.0) as resp:
@@ -494,7 +433,7 @@ BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT=/var/lib/bot-bottle python3 -m bot_bottle.orchestrator \\
 BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS=egress,git-http,supervise \\
 BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:{CONTROL_PLANE_PORT} \\
 SUPERVISE_DB_PATH=/var/lib/bot-bottle/db/bot-bottle.db \\
-    python3 -m bot_bottle.gateway_init &
+    python3 /app/gateway_init.py &
 
 # Reap as PID 1; children are backgrounded, so `wait` blocks.
 while : ; do wait ; done

bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/util.py

@@ -368,11 +368,6 @@ mount -t devtmpfs dev /dev 2>/dev/null
 mkdir -p /dev/pts && mount -t devpts devpts /dev/pts 2>/dev/null
 mount -o remount,rw / 2>/dev/null
 
-# /tmp must be world-writable + sticky. The rootless rootfs build can land
-# it 0755/root-owned, leaving the agent (uid 1000 node) unable to create
-# scratch dirs there — git worktrees, build temp, `git init /tmp/...`, etc.
-mkdir -p /tmp && chmod 1777 /tmp
-
 # Install the per-bottle SSH pubkey from the kernel cmdline.
 KEY=$(sed -n 's/.*bb_pubkey=\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p' /proc/cmdline | base64 -d 2>/dev/null)
 if [ -n "$KEY" ]; then

bot_bottle/cli/__init__.py

@@ -38,13 +38,6 @@ COMMANDS = {
     "supervise": cmd_supervise,
 }
 
-# Commands that manage host prerequisites (or are otherwise store-free) and
-# must run before — or without — a migrated DB. `backend` provisions/probes
-# the host (TAP pool, /dev/kvm, firecracker) and never opens the store, so
-# gating it on the schema breaks preflight on a fresh CI runner where stdin
-# isn't a TTY and the migration prompt can't be answered.
-NO_MIGRATION_COMMANDS = frozenset({"backend"})
-
 
 def usage() -> None:
     sys.stderr.write(f"usage: {PROG} <command> [args...]\n\n")
@@ -87,7 +80,7 @@ def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> int:
         usage()
         die(f"unknown command: {command}")
     mgr = StoreManager.instance()
-    if command not in NO_MIGRATION_COMMANDS and not mgr.is_migrated():
+    if not mgr.is_migrated():
         sys.stderr.write("bot-bottle: database schema is out of date\n")
         sys.stderr.write("Migrate now? [y/N] ")
         sys.stderr.flush()

bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py

@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@ from ...agent_provider import (
     provider_startup_args,
 )
 from ...backend.docker import util as docker_mod
-from ...egress import EgressRoute
+from ...egress import CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
 from ...log import die, info, warn
+from .claude_auth import claude_host_access_token
 
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
@@ -118,7 +119,6 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
         color: str = "",
         provider_settings: dict[str, object] | None = None,
     ) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
-        del forward_host_credentials, host_env
         resolved_guest_env = dict(guest_env or {})
         startup_args = provider_startup_args(provider_settings)
         guest_home = self.guest_home
@@ -180,13 +180,24 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
                 claude_settings,
                 f"{guest_home}/.claude/settings.json",
             ))
+        provisioned_env: dict[str, str] = {}
+        if forward_host_credentials:
+            _host_env = host_env or dict(os.environ)
+            provisioned_env[CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF] = (
+                claude_host_access_token(_host_env)
+            )
+
+        cred_token_ref = (
+            CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials
+            else auth_token
+        )
         egress_routes = (EgressRoute(
             host="api.anthropic.com",
-            auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
-            token_ref=auth_token,
+            auth_scheme="Bearer" if (auth_token or forward_host_credentials) else "",
+            token_ref=cred_token_ref,
         ),)
         hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
-        if auth_token:
+        if auth_token or forward_host_credentials:
             env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = "egress-placeholder"
             hidden_env_names = frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"})
 
@@ -208,6 +219,7 @@ class ClaudeAgentProvider(AgentProvider):
             files=tuple(files),
             egress_routes=egress_routes,
             hidden_env_names=hidden_env_names,
+            provisioned_env=provisioned_env,
         )
 
     def provision_skills(self, plan: "BottlePlan", bottle: "Bottle") -> None:

bot_bottle/contrib/claude/claude_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+"""Host Claude auth helpers.
+
+Reads the host's Claude Code credentials and returns only the access
+token needed by egress. Does not expose refresh tokens or raw payloads.
+
+Credential storage by platform:
+  Linux  — ~/.claude/.credentials.json
+  macOS  — macOS Keychain, service "Claude Code-credentials"
+            (file path is tried first; Keychain is the fallback)
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from ...log import die
+
+
+_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE = "Claude Code-credentials"
+
+
+def claude_auth_path(host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> Path:
+    env = os.environ if host_env is None else host_env
+    home = env.get("HOME")
+    if home:
+        return Path(home) / ".claude" / ".credentials.json"
+    return Path.home() / ".claude" / ".credentials.json"
+
+
+def _read_keychain() -> dict[str, object] | None:
+    """Try the macOS Keychain. Returns parsed JSON dict or None."""
+    if sys.platform != "darwin":
+        return None
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["security", "find-generic-password", "-s", _KEYCHAIN_SERVICE, "-w"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=10,
+        )
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        return None
+    if result.returncode != 0 or not result.stdout.strip():
+        return None
+    try:
+        raw = json.loads(result.stdout.strip())
+    except json.JSONDecodeError:
+        return None
+    return raw if isinstance(raw, dict) else None
+
+
+def claude_host_access_token(
+    host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    *,
+    now: datetime | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    path = claude_auth_path(host_env)
+    raw: dict[str, object] | None = None
+
+    if path.is_file():
+        try:
+            raw = json.loads(path.read_text())
+        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
+            die(f"claude host credentials: could not read valid JSON at {path}: {e}")
+        if not isinstance(raw, dict):
+            die(f"claude host credentials: {path} must contain a JSON object")
+    else:
+        raw = _read_keychain()
+        if raw is None:
+            die(
+                f"claude host credentials: auth file missing at {path} and "
+                f"macOS Keychain lookup for '{_KEYCHAIN_SERVICE}' failed. "
+                "Run `claude login` on the host or disable "
+                "agent_provider.forward_host_credentials."
+            )
+
+    oauth = raw.get("claudeAiOauth")
+    if not isinstance(oauth, dict):
+        die(
+            "claude host credentials: claudeAiOauth is missing from credentials. "
+            "Run `claude login` on the host or disable "
+            "agent_provider.forward_host_credentials."
+        )
+
+    access_token = oauth.get("accessToken")
+    if not isinstance(access_token, str) or not access_token:
+        die(
+            "claude host credentials: claudeAiOauth.accessToken is missing or empty. "
+            "Run `claude login` on the host and restart the bottle."
+        )
+
+    # expiresAt is in milliseconds
+    expires_at = oauth.get("expiresAt")
+    if isinstance(expires_at, (int, float)):
+        check_now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+        exp_dt = datetime.fromtimestamp(float(expires_at) / 1000.0, timezone.utc)
+        if exp_dt <= check_now:
+            die(
+                "claude host credentials: host Claude access token is expired. "
+                "Run `claude login` on the host and restart the bottle."
+            )
+
+    return access_token
+
+
+__all__ = [
+    "claude_auth_path",
+    "claude_host_access_token",
+]

bot_bottle/db_store.py

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import sqlite3
-from contextlib import contextmanager
 from pathlib import Path
 
 try:
@@ -29,21 +28,12 @@ class DbStore:
         conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
         return conn
 
-    @contextmanager
-    def _connection(self):
-        conn = self._connect()
-        try:
-            with conn:
-                yield conn
-        finally:
-            conn.close()
-
     def is_migrated(self) -> bool:
         """Return True if the DB is fully up-to-date, False if migration is needed."""
         if not self.db_path.exists():
             return False
         try:
-            with self._connection() as conn:
+            with self._connect() as conn:
                 row = conn.execute(
                     "SELECT version FROM schema_versions WHERE module = ?",
                     (self._migrations.schema_key,),
@@ -55,7 +45,7 @@ class DbStore:
 
     def migrate(self) -> None:
         """Apply any pending migrations and set permissions on the DB file."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             self._migrations.apply(conn)
         self._chmod()
 

bot_bottle/egress.py

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from .manifest import ManifestBottle
 
 CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CODEX_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
+CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
 
 EGRESS_HOSTNAME = "egress"
 
@@ -400,6 +401,7 @@ class Egress(ABC):
         )
 
 __all__ = [
+    "CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF",
     "CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF",
     "EGRESS_HOSTNAME",
     "EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME",

bot_bottle/git_gate_render.py

@@ -419,24 +419,18 @@ PY
 while IFS=' ' read -r old new ref; do
   [ -z "$ref" ] && continue
   [ "$new" = "$zero" ] && continue
-  # Scan only the commits this push introduces — those reachable from
-  # $new but not from any ref the gate already has. Everything already
-  # on the gate arrived via upstream mirror-fetch or a previously
-  # gitleaks-scanned push, so it's already-upstream or already-scanned;
-  # re-scanning it only resurfaces historical fixture findings.
-  #
-  # Applies to both new refs and updates. The old existing-branch range
-  # `$old..$new` walks commits reachable from the new tip but not the
-  # *old branch tip*: on a rebase/force-push onto a freshly-advanced
-  # main that pulls in all of main's new history (incl. the deliberate
-  # sandbox-escape gitleaks fixtures), blocking the push. `--not --all`
-  # excludes anything already on the gate regardless of ancestry, so it
-  # is also correct for non-fast-forward pushes (a rebase can skip
-  # commits off the direct path). Security-equivalent per PRD 0028's
-  # analysis: the bare repo's refs come only from trusted upstream
-  # mirror-fetch or gitleaks-gated pushes.
-  # See PRD 0028 (open question) / issues #106, #346.
-  log_opts="$new --not --all"
+  if [ "$old" = "$zero" ]; then
+    # New ref: scan only the commits this push introduces — those
+    # reachable from $new but not from any ref the gate already has.
+    # Everything already on the gate arrived via upstream mirror-fetch
+    # or a previously gitleaks-scanned push, so it's already-upstream
+    # or already-scanned; re-scanning it (the old `$new` full-ancestry
+    # range) only resurfaces historical findings and blocks every new
+    # branch. See PRD 0028 / issue #106.
+    log_opts="$new --not --all"
+  else
+    log_opts="$old..$new"
+  fi
   echo "git-gate: gitleaks scanning $ref ($log_opts)" >&2
   if ! gitleaks git --log-opts="$log_opts" --no-banner --redact 1>&2; then
     echo "git-gate: gitleaks rejected push to $ref" >&2

bot_bottle/manifest_agent.py

@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
     header, and sets a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent
     so the Claude Code CLI starts.
 
-    `forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
-    the egress daemon (Codex only).
+    `forward_host_credentials` forwards the host provider auth token into
+    the egress sidecar (Codex and Claude). For Codex this reads
+    `~/.codex/auth.json`; for Claude it reads `~/.claude/.credentials.json`.
     """
 
     template: str = "claude"
@@ -92,10 +93,15 @@ class ManifestAgentProvider:
                 f"is only supported for built-in templates "
                 f"({', '.join(sorted(PROVIDER_TEMPLATES))})"
             )
-        if forward_host_credentials and template != "codex":
+        if forward_host_credentials and template not in {"codex", "claude"}:
             raise ManifestError(
                 f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
-                "is currently only supported for template 'codex'"
+                "is only supported for templates 'codex' and 'claude'"
+            )
+        if forward_host_credentials and auth_token:
+            raise ManifestError(
+                f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.forward_host_credentials "
+                "and auth_token both set; use one or the other"
             )
         settings = _parse_provider_settings(bottle_name, template, d.get("settings"))
         return cls(

bot_bottle/orchestrator/registry.py

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
             metadata=metadata,
             policy=policy,
         )
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
                 "DELETE FROM orchestrator_bottles "
                 "WHERE source_ip = ? AND state = 'active' AND bottle_id != ?",
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
     def set_policy(self, bottle_id: str, policy: str) -> bool:
         """Update a bottle's policy in place (live reload). Returns True if
         the bottle exists."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             cur = conn.execute(
                 "UPDATE orchestrator_bottles SET policy = ? WHERE bottle_id = ?",
                 (policy, bottle_id),
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
 
     def deregister(self, bottle_id: str) -> bool:
         """Remove a bottle. Returns True if a row was deleted."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             cur = conn.execute(
                 "DELETE FROM orchestrator_bottles WHERE bottle_id = ?", (bottle_id,)
             )
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
 
     def get(self, bottle_id: str) -> BottleRecord | None:
         """Return the bottle by id, or None if absent."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             row = conn.execute(
                 "SELECT * FROM orchestrator_bottles WHERE bottle_id = ?", (bottle_id,)
             ).fetchone()
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
 
     def all(self) -> list[BottleRecord]:
         """Every registered bottle, oldest first."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             rows = conn.execute(
                 "SELECT * FROM orchestrator_bottles ORDER BY created_at"
             ).fetchall()
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ class RegistryStore(DbStore):
         source IP is unspoofable (Firecracker `/31` + nft) and the control
         plane is reachable only by the trusted gateway; pair with the
         identity token (`attribute`) elsewhere."""
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             rows = conn.execute(
                 "SELECT * FROM orchestrator_bottles "
                 "WHERE source_ip = ? AND state = 'active'",

bot_bottle/queue_store.py

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
         super().__init__(resolved, migrations)
 
     def write_proposal(self, proposal: Proposal) -> Path:
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT OR REPLACE INTO supervise_proposals (
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
         return self.db_path
 
     def read_proposal(self, proposal_id: str) -> Proposal:
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             row = conn.execute(
                 """
                 SELECT * FROM supervise_proposals
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
     def list_pending_proposals(self) -> list[Proposal]:
         if not self.db_path.is_file():
             return []
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             rows = conn.execute(
                 """
                 SELECT p.* FROM supervise_proposals p
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
     def list_all_pending_proposals(self) -> list[Proposal]:
         if not self.db_path.is_file():
             return []
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             rows = conn.execute(
                 """
                 SELECT p.* FROM supervise_proposals p
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
         return [self._row_to_proposal(row) for row in rows]
 
     def write_response(self, response: Response) -> Path:
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
                 """
                 INSERT OR REPLACE INTO supervise_responses (
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
         return self.db_path
 
     def read_response(self, proposal_id: str) -> Response:
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             row = conn.execute(
                 """
                 SELECT * FROM supervise_responses
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ class QueueStore(DbStore):
     def archive_proposal(self, proposal_id: str) -> None:
         if not self.db_path.is_file():
             return
-        with self._connection() as conn:
+        with self._connect() as conn:
             conn.execute(
                 """
                 UPDATE supervise_proposals SET archived = 1

bot_bottle/supervise.py

@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ from .supervise_types import (
     STATUS_MODIFIED,
     STATUS_REJECTED,
     TOOLS,
-    TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL,
     TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
     TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
     TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW,
@@ -264,7 +263,6 @@ __all__ = [
     "TOOLS",
     "EGRESS_FORWARD_PROXY",
     "EGRESS_INTROSPECT_URL",
-    "TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",
     "TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW",

bot_bottle/supervise_server.py

@@ -2,24 +2,14 @@
 
 Per-bottle MCP server exposing tools the agent calls to propose egress
 config changes when stuck. The tools are `egress-allow`,
-`egress-block`, `list-egress-routes`, and `check-proposal`.
+`egress-block`, and `list-egress-routes`.
 
-Each queued proposal tool call:
+Each queued tool call:
 
   1. Validates the proposed file syntactically.
   2. Writes a Proposal to the host SQLite database.
-  3. Blocks polling for a matching Response row, up to a short grace
-     window (`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`, default 30s).
-  4. On a decision within the window, returns the operator's
-     `{status, notes}`. On timeout, returns `status: pending` **with the
-     proposal id** and leaves the proposal queued — the flow is
-     non-blocking past the grace window (PRD prd-new / issue #412).
-
-`check-proposal` is the non-blocking companion: given a `proposal_id`
-returned by a `pending` response, it reports the current decision
-(`pending` | `approved` | `modified` | `rejected`) without re-proposing,
-so an approval made out-of-band (e.g. a web review console) can be resumed
-without holding an HTTP request open.
+  3. Blocks polling for a matching Response row.
+  4. Returns the operator's `{status, notes}` to the agent.
 
 One shared server fronts every bottle (PRD 0070) and attributes each
 proposal to the calling bottle by source IP, resolved from the orchestrator
@@ -32,9 +22,7 @@ Speaks MCP over HTTP+JSON-RPC. Methods handled:
   * `initialize`           — handshake; returns server info + caps.
   * `notifications/initialized` — ack-only.
   * `tools/list`           — returns the tool definitions.
-  * `tools/call`           — validates, queues, waits out the grace
-                             window, returns (pending past it); or, for
-                             `check-proposal`, a non-blocking status poll.
+  * `tools/call`           — validates, queues, blocks, returns.
 
 Everything else returns JSON-RPC error -32601 (method not found).
 
@@ -244,31 +232,6 @@ TOOL_DEFINITIONS: list[dict[str, object]] = [
         ),
         "inputSchema": _proposal_input_schema(),
     },
-    {
-        "name": _sv.TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL,
-        "description": (
-            "Poll a previously queued proposal for the operator's decision "
-            "WITHOUT blocking or re-proposing. Pass the `proposal_id` you "
-            "got back when an `egress-allow`/`egress-block` call returned "
-            "`status: pending`. Returns the current status: `pending` (no "
-            "decision yet — poll again later), `approved`, `modified`, "
-            "`rejected`, or `unknown` (no such queued proposal — wrong id, "
-            "or it was already resolved and read)."
-        ),
-        "inputSchema": {
-            "type": "object",
-            "properties": {
-                "proposal_id": {
-                    "type": "string",
-                    "description": (
-                        "The proposal id from a `pending` response."
-                    ),
-                },
-            },
-            "required": ["proposal_id"],
-            "additionalProperties": False,
-        },
-    },
 ]
 
 
@@ -390,7 +353,7 @@ def handle_tools_call(
             deadline=deadline,
         )
     except TimeoutError:
-        text = format_pending_response_text(proposal.id, config.response_timeout_seconds)
+        text = format_pending_response_text(config.response_timeout_seconds)
         return {
             "content": [{"type": "text", "text": text}],
             "isError": False,
@@ -407,54 +370,6 @@ def handle_tools_call(
     }
 
 
-def handle_check_proposal(
-    params: dict[str, object],
-    config: ServerConfig,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Non-blocking poll of a queued proposal's decision, by id.
-
-    Never creates a Proposal (so `check-proposal` isn't in `TOOLS`); it only
-    reads the queue. Resolution order mirrors the synchronous path's terminal
-    step — a decided proposal is archived here exactly as `handle_tools_call`
-    archives it after `wait_for_response`, so `pending` proposals stay visible
-    to the operator until they're both decided *and* polled."""
-    args_raw = params.get("arguments", {})
-    if not isinstance(args_raw, dict):
-        raise _RpcClientError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, "tools/call 'arguments' must be an object")
-    proposal_id = args_raw.get("proposal_id")
-    if not isinstance(proposal_id, str) or not proposal_id.strip():
-        raise _RpcClientError(
-            ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
-            "check-proposal: 'proposal_id' is required and must be a non-empty string",
-        )
-    proposal_id = proposal_id.strip()
-
-    try:
-        response = _sv.read_response(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-    except FileNotFoundError:
-        # No decision yet — distinguish "still queued" from "unknown id".
-        try:
-            _sv.read_proposal(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-        except FileNotFoundError:
-            return {
-                "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_unknown_proposal_text(proposal_id)}],
-                "isError": True,
-            }
-        return {
-            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_still_pending_text(proposal_id)}],
-            "isError": False,
-        }
-
-    try:
-        _sv.archive_proposal(config.bottle_slug, proposal_id)
-    except OSError as e:
-        raise _RpcInternalError(f"failed to archive proposal: {e}") from e
-    return {
-        "content": [{"type": "text", "text": format_response_text(response)}],
-        "isError": response.status == _sv.STATUS_REJECTED,
-    }
-
-
 def format_response_text(response: "_sv.Response") -> str:
     """Pretty-print a Response for the tool's text content. The agent
     reads the text and decides whether to retry / give up / surface."""
@@ -467,35 +382,12 @@ def format_response_text(response: "_sv.Response") -> str:
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
-def format_pending_response_text(proposal_id: str, timeout_seconds: float) -> str:
-    """Grace-window timeout: the proposal stays queued, and the agent is
-    told the id so it can `check-proposal` instead of re-proposing."""
+def format_pending_response_text(timeout_seconds: float) -> str:
     return "\n".join([
         "status: pending",
-        f"proposal_id: {proposal_id}",
         (
-            f"notes: no operator decision within {timeout_seconds:g}s; the "
-            "proposal remains queued. Poll it (do not re-propose) by calling "
-            f"`check-proposal` with proposal_id={proposal_id!r}."
-        ),
-    ])
-
-
-def format_still_pending_text(proposal_id: str) -> str:
-    return "\n".join([
-        "status: pending",
-        f"proposal_id: {proposal_id}",
-        "notes: still queued; no operator decision yet. Call `check-proposal` again later.",
-    ])
-
-
-def format_unknown_proposal_text(proposal_id: str) -> str:
-    return "\n".join([
-        "status: unknown",
-        f"proposal_id: {proposal_id}",
-        (
-            "notes: no queued proposal with this id for this bottle — the id "
-            "may be wrong, or the proposal was already resolved and read."
+            "notes: operator response timed out after "
+            f"{timeout_seconds:g}s; proposal remains queued"
         ),
     ])
 
@@ -590,11 +482,6 @@ class MCPHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
             # — silently dropping base routes like api.anthropic.com on approval.
             if req.params.get("name") == _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES:
                 return self._resolved_routes_payload()
-            # `check-proposal` is a non-blocking read of the calling bottle's
-            # own queue — attributed by source IP like a proposal, but it
-            # never queues or blocks.
-            if req.params.get("name") == _sv.TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL:
-                return handle_check_proposal(req.params, self._attributed_config(config))
             # Attribute the proposal to the source-IP-resolved bottle, so the one
             # shared server queues each bottle's proposal under its own slug.
             return handle_tools_call(req.params, self._attributed_config(config))

bot_bottle/supervise_types.py

@@ -20,10 +20,6 @@ TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW = "egress-allow"
 TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW = "gitleaks-allow"
 TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW = "egress-token-allow"
 TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES = "list-egress-routes"
-# Read-only agent tool: poll a queued proposal for the operator's decision
-# without blocking or re-proposing. It never becomes a `Proposal.tool` (no
-# queue record is created for it), so it is intentionally NOT in `TOOLS`.
-TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL = "check-proposal"
 TOOLS: tuple[str, ...] = (
     TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
     TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
@@ -160,7 +156,6 @@ __all__ = [
     "TOOLS",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK",
-    "TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL",
     "TOOL_EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW",
     "TOOL_GITLEAKS_ALLOW",
     "TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES",

docs/prds/prd-new-claude-forward-host-credentials.md

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# PRD prd-new: Claude forward_host_credentials
+
+- **Status:** Draft
+- **Author:** claude
+- **Created:** 2026-07-01
+- **Issue:** #325
+
+## Summary
+
+Add `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials: true` support for the
+`claude` template, mirroring the existing Codex flow. When enabled,
+bot-bottle reads the host's Claude OAuth session key from
+`~/.claude/.credentials.json` at launch, forwards it only to the egress sidecar,
+and injects a placeholder `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` into the agent so
+Claude Code starts without ever seeing the real credential.
+
+## Problem
+
+Running a Claude agent in a container today requires the operator to
+manually extract a long-lived OAuth token (`claude setup-token`), export
+it as `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, and reference it explicitly in
+the manifest with `agent_provider.auth_token:
+"BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN"`. This is a two-step manual ceremony
+that is easy to skip or do incorrectly.
+
+The host already stores a valid Claude session in `~/.claude/.credentials.json`
+after `claude login`. Codex already automates an
+equivalent extraction from `~/.codex/auth.json`. There is no reason
+Claude bottles cannot do the same.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- A Claude bottle with `forward_host_credentials: true` in the manifest
+  uses the host's `~/.claude/.credentials.json` session key at launch with no
+  additional operator steps.
+- The agent container receives only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder`
+  — never the real token.
+- The real session key lives only in the egress sidecar's environment.
+- Missing, malformed, or expired host Claude auth fails launch with a
+  clear operator-facing message.
+- Existing `auth_token` behavior is unchanged.
+- `forward_host_credentials: true` is rejected in the manifest when both
+  `auth_token` and `forward_host_credentials` are set, since they serve
+  the same purpose.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Refreshing Claude OAuth tokens in the sidecar.
+- Writing a dummy `~/.claude.json` auth state to the agent (unlike the
+  Codex flow, Claude Code reads its credential from `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
+  in env, not from an auth file — no guest-side auth marker is needed).
+- Supporting `forward_host_credentials` for providers other than `codex`
+  and `claude`.
+
+## Design
+
+### Manifest schema
+
+```yaml
+agent_provider:
+  template: claude
+  forward_host_credentials: true
+```
+
+Rejects in manifest validation when:
+- Template is not `codex` or `claude`.
+- Both `auth_token` and `forward_host_credentials` are set.
+
+### Host auth extraction (`contrib/claude/claude_auth.py`)
+
+Claude Code credential storage varies by platform:
+
+- **Linux**: `~/.claude/.credentials.json`
+- **macOS**: macOS Keychain, service `"Claude Code-credentials"`
+  (the file path is tried first; Keychain is the fallback when the file
+  is absent)
+
+`~/.claude.json` contains only UI state and profile metadata — no token.
+
+The credentials JSON schema (same whether from file or Keychain):
+
+```json
+{
+  "claudeAiOauth": {
+    "accessToken": "<access-token>",
+    "refreshToken": "<refresh-token>",
+    "expiresAt": 1748276587173,
+    "scopes": ["user:inference", "user:profile"]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+`expiresAt` is in **milliseconds** (not seconds).
+
+At prepare/launch time, when `forward_host_credentials: true`:
+
+1. Try `~/.claude/.credentials.json`; on macOS, if absent, run
+   `security find-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" -w`
+   and parse its stdout as JSON.
+2. Require a `claudeAiOauth` dict.
+3. Require a non-empty `claudeAiOauth.accessToken` string.
+4. If `claudeAiOauth.expiresAt` is present, divide by 1000 and require
+   the result to be in the future.
+5. Return only the access token to the launch path.
+
+Errors name the missing or invalid condition and point the operator at
+`claude login`, without printing token values.
+
+### Egress route
+
+When `forward_host_credentials: true`:
+
+- Provision the session key in `provisioned_env` under
+  `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN` (new constant in `egress.py`).
+- Set up the `api.anthropic.com` egress route with `auth_scheme: Bearer`
+  and `token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN`.
+- Set `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder` in the agent env and
+  add it to `hidden_env_names`.
+
+No dummy auth file and no `verify` step are needed — Claude Code reads
+the credential from the env var, not from a file.
+
+### Constants
+
+- `CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"`
+  in `egress.py` (alongside the existing `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF`).
+- `CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.anthropic.com",)` in
+  `agent_provider.py` (alongside the existing `CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS`).
+
+### Data flow
+
+```
+Host ~/.claude/.credentials.json  →  bot-bottle launch
+                            │
+                            ├──► egress sidecar env (real token only)
+                            │
+                            └──► agent env: CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder
+
+Agent  →  HTTPS to api.anthropic.com (via egress)
+Egress →  injects Authorization: Bearer <real token>
+Egress →  forwards to api.anthropic.com
+```
+
+## Open questions
+
+None — the Codex precedent makes the design clear.

docs/prds/prd-new-nonblocking-supervise.md

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# PRD prd-new: Non-blocking supervise (async approval + proposal polling)
-
-- **Status:** Draft
-- **Author:** didericis
-- **Created:** 2026-07-18
-- **Issue:** #412
-
-## Summary
-
-The per-bottle supervise MCP server (`bot_bottle/supervise_server.py`)
-answers `tools/call` **synchronously**: it queues the agent's proposal and
-blocks the tool call polling for the operator's decision. On timeout it
-returns `status: pending` and leaves the proposal queued — but it hands the
-agent **no proposal id** and offers **no way to poll a specific pending
-proposal**, so the only way to learn the outcome is to re-propose (a
-duplicate).
-
-This PRD makes the MCP flow non-blocking and pollable, so an approval can
-happen out-of-band (a human taking minutes-to-hours in a review console)
-without holding an HTTP request open or wedging the agent:
-
-1. Include the `proposal_id` in the `pending` response.
-2. Add a `check-proposal` MCP tool: a non-blocking status lookup by
-   proposal id.
-3. Keep the short synchronous grace window for the common "operator is
-   right there" fast path.
-
-## Problem
-
-`handle_tools_call` → `_sv.wait_for_response(...)` blocks up to
-`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` (default 30s). Two problems follow:
-
-- **Human latency ≠ tool-call latency.** A real review — rendered diff,
-  RBAC routing to an approver, someone tapping approve on their phone — is
-  minutes-to-hours. Holding the MCP request open that long is fragile
-  (proxy/keepalive timeouts, the mitmproxy egress hop, and the agent
-  harness's own tool-call timeout, which a long block can trip and stall
-  the whole turn).
-- **No resume path.** The pending fallback already exists, but without a
-  proposal id and a poll tool the agent can't reconnect to that specific
-  decision — it re-proposes, duplicating the queue entry.
-
-This is also the precondition for the planned web-console human-review
-flow (RBAC, audit retention, mobile) — see issue #412.
-
-**Safety note:** the MCP tools only *propose* policy changes; enforcement
-stays at the egress proxy and the git-gate. Returning early on `pending`
-therefore opens no hole — the agent still cannot egress or push anything
-unapproved.
-
-## Goals / success criteria
-
-- A `pending` MCP response carries the `proposal_id`.
-- An agent can call `check-proposal(proposal_id)` and get the current
-  state (`pending` | `approved` | `modified` | `rejected`) **without
-  blocking** and **without creating a new proposal**.
-- The synchronous fast path (operator approves within the grace window) is
-  unchanged: the first `tools/call` still returns the decision directly.
-- No change to enforcement, attribution (source-IP → bottle), or the
-  operator-side queue/response schema.
-
-## Non-goals
-
-- The git-gate `pre-receive` path (it is synchronous by nature and cannot
-  poll — its async variant is reject-fast + re-push; tracked as a
-  follow-up).
-- Backpressure / in-flight-proposal caps.
-- MCP server→client notifications (event-driven resume).
-- Any web-console UI (this PRD is the protocol groundwork it needs).
-
-## Design
-
-### `pending` response carries the id
-
-`handle_tools_call`'s timeout branch formats the pending text with the
-`proposal.id` and a pointer to `check-proposal`, so the agent knows what to
-poll.
-
-### `check-proposal` tool
-
-A new read-only MCP tool (`TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL = "check-proposal"`),
-attributed to the calling bottle by source IP exactly like the proposal
-tools. Input: `{ "proposal_id": string }`. Behavior:
-
-1. `read_response(slug, id)` →
-   - **found**: archive the proposal (same terminal step the synchronous
-     path takes) and return the decision via `format_response_text`;
-     `isError` iff rejected.
-2. **not found** → `read_proposal(slug, id)` →
-   - **found**: still queued → return `status: pending`.
-   - **not found**: unknown id, or already resolved-and-archived (e.g. a
-     second poll) → return `status: unknown`, `isError: true`.
-
-Both lookups already raise `FileNotFoundError` when absent
-(`queue_store.py`), so the handler needs no new store methods. `check-`
-`proposal` is the only path (besides the synchronous response) that
-archives, so a proposal that times out to `pending` stays visible to the
-operator until it is decided and then polled.
-
-### Grace window
-
-Left at the existing 30s default (`SUPERVISE_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS`),
-which doubles as the instant-approve fast path. Tuning it down is an
-operator setting, not a code change; noted for the console rollout.
-
-## Implementation chunks
-
-1. **(this PR)** `TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL` constant; `check-proposal` tool
-   definition + `handle_check_proposal`; dispatch wiring; `proposal_id` in
-   the pending text; unit tests. Files: `bot_bottle/supervise_types.py`,
-   `bot_bottle/supervise.py` (re-export), `bot_bottle/supervise_server.py`,
-   `tests/unit/test_supervise_server.py`.
-2. **(follow-up)** git-gate `pre-receive` reject-fast + re-push.
-3. **(follow-up)** per-bottle in-flight-proposal backpressure cap.
-4. **(follow-up)** MCP notifications for event-driven resume; web-console
-   review flow (RBAC, audit retention) on top.
-
-## Open questions
-
-- Should a resolved-but-unpolled proposal auto-archive after some TTL, or
-  only on poll? (Leaning: only on poll, so a decision is never lost to a
-  reaper before the agent sees it.)
-- Does the agent harness need an explicit "you have a pending proposal"
-  nudge, or is returning `pending` from the original call enough? (Deferred
-  to the notifications chunk.)

docs/research/agent-sandbox-landscape.md

@@ -14,34 +14,22 @@ detectors, PRD 0017 / 0053), and git-push secret scanning is handled by
 **gitleaks** in the git-gate. "pipelock" below has been replaced with the
 current mechanism; it survives only in older PRDs as history.
 
-Updated again 2026-07-18: six additional tools added (Cleanroom,
-container-use, Docker sbx, Anthropic srt, Microsoft AGT, Open Agent
-Passport); an **Agent-tailored policy** row added to the comparison table;
-a separate Governance layers section added for AGT and OAP. See the
-second addendum at the end.
-
 ## Summary
 
-Fifteen projects surveyed across two categories: isolation/sandbox tools
-and governance/pre-action authorization layers (the latter don't provide
-VM or container isolation but do per-agent policy enforcement at the
-tool-call level). None duplicate bot-bottle's combination of local
-VM-per-bottle isolation, a declarative per-role manifest, per-agent
-egress allowlist + outbound-content DLP, bottle/agent split, and the
-composable `extends:` policy model. Three clusters stand out:
+Nine projects surveyed. None duplicate bot-bottle's combination of
+local VM-per-bottle isolation (Firecracker microVM on KVM Linux, Apple
+Container on macOS — Docker is now only the legacy fallback), a
+declarative JSON manifest, per-agent egress allowlist + outbound-content
+DLP via bot-bottle's own egress scanner (plus gitleaks secret-scanning on
+git push), and bottle/agent split. Two clusters stand out:
 
 - **Closest neighbours** — agent-safehouse and litterbox: local,
   single-user, thin wrappers over an existing OS primitive
   (`sandbox-exec`, Podman + Landlock).
-- **Different category (isolation)** — tilde.run (hosted SaaS), boxlite
-  and microsandbox (microVM libraries for platform builders), CubeSandbox
+- **Different category** — tilde.run (hosted SaaS), boxlite and
+  microsandbox (microVM libraries for platform builders), CubeSandbox
   (self-hosted multi-tenant microVM service), endo-familiar
   (capability-security paradigm, no OS isolation).
-- **New: governance/pre-action layers** — Microsoft AGT and Open Agent
-  Passport (OAP): framework-embedded tool-call interceptors with
-  per-agent declarative policy. Closest competitors on agent-tailored
-  policy, but operate at the tool-call level rather than providing
-  network/filesystem isolation; they complement rather than substitute.
 
 The microVM cluster (matchlock, smolmachines, boxlite, microsandbox,
 CubeSandbox) is the most relevant for the v2 isolation discussion in
@@ -222,157 +210,20 @@ claim that the monetization positioning leans on. See the addendum.
 - **Maturity**: Open-sourced July 2026 off production Tencent Cloud use;
   most-starred project in this set (~10.4k).
 
-### Cleanroom *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: https://github.com/buildkite/cleanroom
-- **License**: Apache 2.0
-- **Isolation**: MicroVM — Firecracker on Linux, Virtualization.framework
-  on macOS. Digest-pinned OCI images.
-- **Locality**: Self-hosted server (CI-oriented).
-- **Agent integration**: Generic process sandbox; CI-first, not a
-  Claude/agent wrapper.
-- **Config**: `cleanroom.yaml` in the repo being sandboxed defines egress
-  rules, resources, and network policy. Cleanroom resolves this from the
-  commit being run.
-- **Network policy**: Default-deny + per-repo hostname allowlist (resolved
-  from DNS answers + destination IP:port). Co-hosted services on the same
-  IP:port are not distinguished. OIDC-backed auth for remote servers.
-- **Credentials**: Host-side only; not injected in-flight but not present
-  in the VM.
-- **Notable**: Policy lives in the *repo being sandboxed*, not in an
-  agent-role definition — closer to per-repo scoping than per-role.
-  Supports Docker-inside-sandbox (`services.docker.required: true`), OIDC
-  authorization, suspend/resume lifecycle.
-- **Maturity**: Active Buildkite product.
-
-### container-use *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: https://github.com/dagger/container-use
-- **License**: Apache 2.0
-- **Isolation**: Docker container per agent + git worktree per agent.
-  Containers share the host kernel; stronger than bare host but weaker
-  than microVM.
-- **Locality**: Local.
-- **Agent integration**: MCP stdio server — Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf.
-  `claude mcp add container-use -- container-use stdio`.
-- **Config**: None for security policy. Environments are provisioned on
-  demand; no allowlist or credential config.
-- **Network policy**: Not addressed.
-- **Notable**: Per-agent git branches (`container-use/<env_name>`);
-  parallel agents without filesystem conflict; real-time log visibility
-  and terminal attach for intervention; git-based review workflow.
-  Oriented toward parallel development safety, not security containment.
-- **Maturity**: Early development, active.
-
-### Docker sbx *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: Docker proprietary (`sbx` CLI, separate from `docker`).
-- **License**: Proprietary.
-- **Isolation**: MicroVM (Docker's own implementation) — each session gets
-  its own kernel, Docker daemon inside the VM, and filesystem.
-- **Locality**: Local (macOS and Windows; does not require Docker Desktop).
-- **Agent integration**: Explicit wrapper — Claude Code, Codex, Gemini
-  CLI, Copilot CLI, Kiro. Launches agent inside the VM with
-  `--dangerously-skip-permissions` by default.
-- **Config**: Open / Balanced / Locked Down network presets at launch. No
-  per-role manifest.
-- **Network policy**: Default-deny; preset levels control strictness. TUI
-  dashboard shows a live log of every outbound connection (allowed and
-  blocked) with point-and-click allow/block for hosts.
-- **Credentials**: OS keychain + host-side proxy injection — API keys
-  never enter the VM.
-- **Notable**: Best DX among microVM tools (one command, works like native
-  yolo Claude but inside a VM); branch mode creates a git worktree in
-  `.sbx/`. Network policy is preset-based, not role-declarative.
-- **Maturity**: GA 2026.
-
-### Anthropic srt *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
-  (`@anthropic-ai/sandbox-runtime` on npm, `sandbox-runtime` on PyPI)
-- **License**: Apache 2.0 (experimental).
-- **Isolation**: OS-level only — Seatbelt (`sandbox-exec`) on macOS,
-  bubblewrap on Linux, WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) account-fenced on
-  Windows. **No container or VM.** Lowest overhead in the set.
-- **Locality**: Local.
-- **Agent integration**: Claude Code's sandboxed bash tool uses this
-  internally. Can wrap any arbitrary process (`srt <command>`). Cloud
-  Claude Code sessions use full microVMs instead.
-- **Config**: Programmatic per-invocation — allow/deny path lists for
-  filesystem; allow/denylist for network (HTTP proxy + SOCKS5).
-- **Network policy**: Proxy-based filtering (HTTP + SOCKS5); domain
-  allowlist/denylist enforced at proxy layer. Custom proxy supported
-  (e.g. mitmproxy for inspection + audit). Processes that ignore proxy
-  env vars may bypass filtering on some platforms.
-- **Notable**: Cross-platform (macOS/Linux/Windows); wraps any process,
-  not just agents; no role/manifest concept. Annotated as a research
-  preview — APIs may change.
-- **Maturity**: Early research preview.
-
-## Governance / pre-action authorization layers
-
-These two tools don't provide VM or filesystem isolation; they intercept
-tool calls before execution and evaluate them against a per-agent
-declarative policy. They are the closest competitors on **agent-tailored
-policy** and complement isolation sandboxes rather than substituting for
-them.
-
-### Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit (AGT) *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit
-- **License**: MIT (~3.3k stars, open-sourced April 2, 2026).
-- **Isolation**: None (OS/VM). Execution rings (0–3, inspired by CPU
-  privilege levels) control what an agent can do at the framework layer.
-  MCP security gateway treats MCP traffic as an untrusted boundary.
-- **Locality**: Embedded in the agent framework (Python, TypeScript, .NET,
-  Rust, Go; 20+ framework adapters).
-- **Agent integration**: Framework-agnostic. Plugs into Semantic Kernel,
-  AutoGen, and others as a middleware layer.
-- **Config**: YAML policy per agent — tools can be `allowed`, `denied`,
-  `sandboxed`, or routed through an `approval` step. Every action passes
-  through a governance gate checking: agent DID, trust score, risk tier,
-  requested tool, action type, and policy rules.
-- **Network policy**: Not directly — operates at tool-call level.
-- **Credentials**: Per-agent DID (Ed25519 decentralized identifier); agent
-  does not borrow a human's credentials.
-- **Notable**: Dynamic trust score (0–1,000, behavioral decay) —
-  privilege follows observed behaviour, not just provisioning. Covers all
-  10 OWASP Agentic Top 10 risks. Kill switch + SLO monitoring. Sub-ms
-  policy enforcement.
-- **Maturity**: MIT, ~3.3k ⭐, v3.7.0 May 2026.
-
-### Open Agent Passport (OAP) *(added 2026-07-18)*
-- **Source**: https://github.com/aporthq/aport-spec ; spec at
-  https://api.aport.io/spec/spec/oap/oap-spec.md/ ; arXiv 2603.20953
-- **License**: Open specification.
-- **Isolation**: None. Pre-action hook only — intercepts tool calls
-  synchronously before execution, evaluates against a cloud-registry
-  declarative policy, fails closed.
-- **Locality**: Local hook + cloud policy registry.
-- **Agent integration**: Framework-agnostic; hook pattern.
-- **Config**: Declarative policy rules in a cloud registry (evaluated in
-  order; first failing rule denies). Ed25519-signed, hash-chained audit
-  records per decision.
-- **Network policy**: Not directly.
-- **Notable**: 53ms median authorization decision (N=1,000). In an
-  adversarial testbed ($5,000 bounty, 1,151 sessions), social engineering
-  succeeded 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a
-  restrictive OAP policy, 0% success across 879 attempts. Assumes
-  framework runtime is not compromised.
-- **Maturity**: Specification + reference implementation, 2026.
-
 ## Comparison table
 
-*Isolation/sandbox tools only. AGT and OAP are governance layers — see their per-project notes above.*
-
-| Axis | bot-bottle | endo-familiar | litterbox | agent-safehouse | matchlock | tilde.run | boxlite | microsandbox | smolmachines | CubeSandbox | Cleanroom | container-use | Docker sbx | Anthropic srt |
-|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
-| Isolation | MicroVM per bottle default (Firecracker/KVM on Linux, Apple Container on macOS) + own egress DLP scanner; Docker legacy fallback, gVisor there if present | Object-capability (no OS isolation) | Podman + opt. Landlock | macOS `sandbox-exec` | MicroVM (Firecracker / Virt.fw) | Hosted container (unverified) | MicroVM (KVM / Hypervisor.fw) | MicroVM (libkrun) | MicroVM (libkrun / KVM) | MicroVM (RustVMM / KVM) | MicroVM (Firecracker / Virt.fw) | Docker container + git worktree | MicroVM (proprietary) | OS-level (Seatbelt / bubblewrap / WFP) — no container |
-| Local vs hosted | Local | Local | Local (Linux) | Local (macOS) | Local | Hosted SaaS | Local | Local | Local | Self-hosted (server/cluster) | Self-hosted server | Local | Local | Local |
-| Open source | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | MIT | No | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Proprietary | Apache 2.0 (experimental) |
-| Agent target | Claude Code | Generic (demo) | Generic | Multi-agent wrapper | Generic (+ Claude/OpenAI SDKs) | Claude focus | Generic | Claude + Cursor (MCP/Skills) | Generic (AGENTS.md) | E2B-compatible (platform builders) | CI / generic process | Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf (MCP) | Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, Copilot, Kiro | Claude Code (and any process) |
-| Network policy | Default-deny via own egress scanner + per-bottle allowlist + content DLP + gitleaks on git push | Capability model only | Limited | Not addressed | Default-deny + allowlist + secret-injecting proxy | Default-deny + logging | Per-VM net (unverified) | Not documented | Off by default + allowlist | Default-deny allowlist + instant egress block + audit logs + per-sandbox tokens (eBPF) + credential vault | Default-deny + per-repo host allowlist (cleanroom.yaml) | Not addressed | Default-deny; Open / Balanced / Locked Down presets; live TUI network panel | Proxy-based allowlist/denylist (HTTP + SOCKS5); custom proxy supported |
-| Parallel agents | Yes (one bottle per agent) | n/a | Not addressed | One at a time | Multiple VMs | Yes (dashboard) | SDK-level | SDK-level | Architectural | Yes (2,000+/host claimed) | Yes (server model) | Yes (per-agent containers + worktrees) | Yes | Yes |
-| Long-running posture | Persistent by default (named, supervised) | n/a (demo) | Session (up while in use) | Per-invocation | Ephemeral VM per run | Per-run (versioned) | Ephemeral + snapshot/fork | Ephemeral / on-demand | Named persistent by default | Ephemeral + auto pause/resume | Per-run + suspend/resume | Per-agent container (ephemeral) | Per-session; branch mode creates git worktree in .sbx/ | Per-invocation |
-| DX: run Claude yolo-style | One command → interactive yolo Claude (`start <agent>`, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` default) | n/a (lib demo) | Wizard + build, then run claude inside (Linux only) | One-command wrapper (`safehouse claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`) | CLI: run a cmd in a VM (not a Claude wrapper) | Hosted (`tilde exec`), not local-native | SDK code required (build the run yourself) | CLI/MCP: sandbox-as-a-tool for the agent, not a wrapper around it | SSH into a named machine, run claude there | Stand up a cluster + drive via E2B SDK | CI-oriented, not a Claude wrapper | MCP server: `claude mcp add container-use -- container-use stdio` | One command: `sbx` wraps claude with `--dangerously-skip-permissions` default | Library/wrapper, not a standalone CLI |
-| Config | JSON manifest (bottles + agents) | Programmatic refs | CLI wizard | Profile files / shell fns | CLI / SDK | DSL + CLI + SDK | SDK | CLI / SDK / MCP | TOML Smolfile | E2B-compatible SDK | cleanroom.yaml in repo | None (no policy config) | Preset levels at launch | Programmatic per-invocation (allow/deny lists) |
-| Agent-tailored policy | Yes — bottle/agent split; declarative per-role egress + credentials; composable via `extends:` | Partial — capability model scopes per-agent, but no declarative role manifest | No | Partial — per-agent profile files (Seatbelt); no egress | No | Yes — per-agent DSL RBAC (allow/deny/approve per action/repo/agent) | No | No | No | No — per-sandbox SDK config, not role-scoped | Partial — per-repo cleanroom.yaml, not per-role | No | No — network presets only | No |
-| Maturity | Active July 2026 | Research (2022+) | Early (~66 ⭐) | Active (~1.4k ⭐) | Experimental (~574 ⭐) | Private preview | YC, ~4.7k ⭐ | YC, ~6k ⭐, beta | ~3.1k ⭐ | Tencent, prod, ~10.4k ⭐ | Active (Buildkite product) | Early development | GA 2026 | Early research preview |
+| Axis | bot-bottle | endo-familiar | litterbox | agent-safehouse | matchlock | tilde.run | boxlite | microsandbox | smolmachines | CubeSandbox |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Isolation | MicroVM per bottle default (Firecracker/KVM on Linux, Apple Container on macOS) + own egress DLP scanner; Docker legacy fallback, gVisor there if present | Object-capability (no OS isolation) | Podman + opt. Landlock | macOS `sandbox-exec` | MicroVM (Firecracker / Virt.fw) | Hosted container (unverified) | MicroVM (KVM / Hypervisor.fw) | MicroVM (libkrun) | MicroVM (libkrun / KVM) | MicroVM (RustVMM / KVM) |
+| Local vs hosted | Local | Local | Local (Linux) | Local (macOS) | Local | Hosted SaaS | Local | Local | Local | Self-hosted (server/cluster) |
+| Open source | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | MIT | No | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 | Apache 2.0 |
+| Agent target | Claude Code | Generic (demo) | Generic | Multi-agent wrapper | Generic (+ Claude/OpenAI SDKs) | Claude focus | Generic | Claude + Cursor (MCP/Skills) | Generic (AGENTS.md) | E2B-compatible (platform builders) |
+| Network policy | Default-deny via own egress scanner + per-bottle allowlist + content DLP + gitleaks on git push | Capability model only | Limited | Not addressed | Default-deny + allowlist + secret-injecting proxy | Default-deny + logging | Per-VM net (unverified) | Not documented | Off by default + allowlist | Default-deny allowlist + instant egress block + audit logs + per-sandbox tokens (eBPF) + credential vault |
+| Parallel agents | Yes (one bottle per agent) | n/a | Not addressed | One at a time | Multiple VMs | Yes (dashboard) | SDK-level | SDK-level | Architectural | Yes (2,000+/host claimed) |
+| Long-running posture | Persistent by default (named, supervised) | n/a (demo) | Session (up while in use) | Per-invocation | Ephemeral VM per run | Per-run (versioned) | Ephemeral + snapshot/fork | Ephemeral / on-demand | Named persistent by default | Ephemeral + auto pause/resume |
+| DX: run Claude yolo-style | One command → interactive yolo Claude (`start <agent>`, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` default) | n/a (lib demo) | Wizard + build, then run claude inside (Linux only) | One-command wrapper (`safehouse claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`) | CLI: run a cmd in a VM (not a Claude wrapper) | Hosted (`tilde exec`), not local-native | SDK code required (build the run yourself) | CLI/MCP: sandbox-as-a-tool for the agent, not a wrapper around it | SSH into a named machine, run claude there | Stand up a cluster + drive via E2B SDK |
+| Config | JSON manifest (bottles + agents) | Programmatic refs | CLI wizard | Profile files / shell fns | CLI / SDK | DSL + CLI + SDK | SDK | CLI / SDK / MCP | TOML Smolfile | E2B-compatible SDK |
+| Maturity | Active May 2026 | Research (2022+) | Early (~66 ⭐) | Active (~1.4k ⭐) | Experimental (~574 ⭐) | Private preview | YC, ~4.7k ⭐ | YC, ~6k ⭐, beta | ~3.1k ⭐ | Tencent, prod, ~10.4k ⭐ |
 
 ## What's closest, what's different
 
@@ -382,41 +233,11 @@ existing OS primitive, low-dep. The split is the isolation primitive —
 bot-bottle now defaults to a VM per bottle (Firecracker microVM on KVM
 Linux, Apple Container on macOS) with its own DLP-scanning egress proxy,
 keeping Docker only as a legacy fallback; agent-safehouse uses
-`sandbox-exec`; litterbox uses Podman + Landlock. matchlock and
-smolmachines are close on *both* the policy side (default-deny net,
-per-host allowlist) and — now that bot-bottle has moved off
-containers-by-default — the microVM isolation primitive.
-
-**New closest on agent-tailored policy.** Two governance tools are the
-direct competitors on the "coarse-grained sandbox" axis. **tilde.run**
-has had per-agent DSL RBAC since its launch (though it's hosted SaaS).
-**Microsoft AGT** is the most serious new entrant: per-agent DID
-identity, YAML policy that can allow/deny/sandbox/approve individual tool
-calls per agent, and a dynamic behavioural trust score. It operates at
-the framework tool-call layer, not the network layer — so it's
-complementary to bot-bottle's network/filesystem isolation rather than a
-direct substitute, but on the "does this sandbox know what this agent is
-for?" question it is the most complete answer in the field. OAP's
-pre-action hook pattern achieves similar goals with cryptographic audit
-and a 0% adversarial-attack success rate under a restrictive policy.
-
-**New closest on DX.** **Docker sbx** is the first tool in this set that
-matches bot-bottle on the "one command, dangerously-skip-permissions safe
-by default" DX bar, at microVM isolation strength, with host-side
-credential injection. It is proprietary, preset-based (not role-
-declarative), and cloud-agent-specific, but it directly competes on the
-UX proposition. agent-safehouse was the previous DX peer; Docker sbx
-materially raises the bar.
-
-**New closest on repo-scoped policy.** **Cleanroom** (Buildkite) is the
-first tool to combine microVM isolation with a declarative egress policy
-file — though the policy lives in the repo being sandboxed
-(`cleanroom.yaml`), not in an agent-role manifest. That makes it per-
-repo rather than per-role: the same Cleanroom config applies to any
-agent running in that repo. The distinction matters for bot-bottle's
-use case (one developer running multiple agent *roles* with different
-egress footprints), but for CI/CD use cases Cleanroom is a direct
-alternative.
+`sandbox-exec`; litterbox
+uses Podman + Landlock. matchlock and smolmachines are close on *both* the
+policy side (default-deny net, per-host allowlist) and — now that
+bot-bottle has moved off containers-by-default — the microVM isolation
+primitive.
 
 **Solving a different problem.** tilde.run is hosted SaaS for team /
 production agent pipelines with data-versioned rollback — explicitly
@@ -588,57 +409,3 @@ Why it matters anyway:
   and per-sandbox egress tokens (eBPF virtual switch vs. bot-bottle's
   mitmproxy egress proxy) before the next iteration of bot-bottle's
   in-flight-secret feature — see borrowable idea #2 above.
-
-## Addendum 2026-07-18 (second pass) — agent-tailored policy landscape
-
-The second-pass question was: how novel is bot-bottle's per-agent,
-role-tailored sandbox relative to the expanded field?
-
-**The short answer:** on the isolation + network + role-tailoring
-combination, bot-bottle remains the only tool in this set. On
-role-tailored *policy at the tool-call level*, Microsoft AGT and OAP are
-the most complete answers, but they don't provide isolation; they
-complement rather than substitute.
-
-**The competitive picture by axis:**
-
-- *Agent-tailored egress (declarative, per-role)* — bot-bottle and
-  tilde.run. Cleanroom is per-repo, not per-role. Everyone else is
-  per-session or not addressed.
-- *Agent-tailored tool-call policy (declarative, per-agent identity)* —
-  Microsoft AGT (YAML policy + DID identity + trust score), OAP
-  (declarative policy rules + cryptographic audit). Neither provides
-  network/filesystem isolation.
-- *Composable policy (role overlays)* — bot-bottle (`extends:`). No
-  other tool surveyed supports composable role-policy inheritance.
-- *Isolation + DX (one-command safe yolo)* — bot-bottle and Docker sbx.
-  Docker sbx is proprietary, preset-based, and cloud-agent-specific;
-  it's the first DX-class competitor at microVM isolation strength.
-
-**What the HN "coarse-grained" complaint maps to:** The complaint is
-that a VM isolates the filesystem but doesn't know if the agent
-*should* be sending an email. bot-bottle's bottle/agent split is a
-structural answer to this: the bottle manifest declares exactly what
-the role can reach, and the sandbox enforces it at the network layer.
-Microsoft AGT is the most complete answer at the semantic/tool-call
-layer. The gap both leave open is *intent classification* — knowing
-whether a permitted action is consistent with the agent's actual task.
-See `hn-agent-safety-discourse-july-2026.md` for the blast-radius
-analysis.
-
-**Borrowable from new tools:**
-
-- **Microsoft AGT's trust-score decay** — privilege that reflects
-  observed behaviour rather than static provisioning. Applied to
-  bot-bottle: a bottle that has triggered DLP alerts or supervise holds
-  could auto-downgrade its network preset, or flag the session for
-  closer review. Fits the existing supervise-server architecture.
-- **Docker sbx's live network TUI** — real-time per-session view of
-  allowed and blocked outbound connections with point-and-click
-  allow/block. `cli.py supervise` is the right surface; adding a
-  live-connections panel would directly address the "I can't see what
-  the agent is doing" gap without any backend changes.
-- **OAP's cryptographic audit chain** — Ed25519-signed, hash-chained
-  audit records. Currently bot-bottle logs egress decisions but doesn't
-  chain them. A tamper-evident audit record per session would be useful
-  for the compliance use case the CubeSandbox positioning targets.

docs/research/hn-agent-safety-discourse-july-2026.md

@@ -204,43 +204,6 @@ MCP STDIO server from within the agent is still sandboxed by the VM, and
 any outbound calls from that server must pass the egress allowlist and
 outbound DLP scanner.
 
-**Per-agent role tailoring (the "coarse-grained sandbox" complaint)**
-
-The Feb 2026 HN thread that argued "sandboxes are too coarse-grained"
-was pointing at a real gap: a VM isolates the filesystem but doesn't
-know whether an agent *should* be sending email or calling an external
-API. bot-bottle's bottle/agent split is a structural answer at the
-network layer — the bottle manifest declares exactly what each role can
-reach (which hosts, which paths, which HTTP methods), and the egress
-scanner enforces it. A `gitea-dev` bottle that only lists
-`gitea.dideric.is` and `api.anthropic.com` structurally cannot send
-email or reach AWS, not because the model was told not to, but because
-those routes don't exist.
-
-The `extends:` composition model means provider-level policy (the Claude
-auth route) lives in one base bottle and role-specific overlays are
-stacked on top — no duplication, and changing the base propagates to all
-derived roles.
-
-Competitive position on this axis (from `agent-sandbox-landscape.md`):
-
-| Tool | Agent-tailored policy |
-|---|---|
-| **bot-bottle** | Yes — declarative per-role manifest; `extends:` composition; egress + credentials scoped to role |
-| **tilde.run** | Yes — per-agent DSL RBAC (allow/deny/approve per action/repo/agent), but hosted SaaS |
-| **Microsoft AGT** | Yes — YAML policy + per-agent DID + trust score, but tool-call level only (no network isolation) |
-| **OAP** | Yes — declarative pre-action policy + cryptographic audit, but no isolation |
-| **Cleanroom** | Partial — per-repo `cleanroom.yaml`, not per-role |
-| **Docker sbx** | No — network presets only |
-| **Anthropic srt** | No — programmatic per-invocation |
-| **matchlock / smolmachines / microsandbox** | No |
-| **agent-safehouse** | Partial — per-agent Seatbelt profiles; no egress |
-
-Two takeaways: bot-bottle and tilde.run are the only isolation tools
-with declarative role-tailored policy; Microsoft AGT and OAP are the
-closest competitors on role-tailoring but operate at the tool-call layer
-without network/filesystem isolation — complementary, not substitutes.
-
 **Outbound exfiltration (any injection class)**
 
 Whatever triggers the agent — README injection, Agentjacking, MCP

pyproject.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [build-system]
 requires = ["setuptools>=68"]
-build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+build-backend = "setuptools.backends.legacy:build"
 
 [project]
 name = "bot-bottle"

scripts/coverage.sh

@@ -26,9 +26,8 @@ rm -f .coverage
 echo "== unit ==" >&2
 "$PY" -m coverage run -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/unit
 
-echo "== integration (firecracker; skips docker tests) ==" >&2
-BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS=1 \
-    "$PY" -m coverage run --append -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration
+echo "== integration (skips without Docker) ==" >&2
+"$PY" -m coverage run --append -m unittest discover -t . -s tests/integration
 
 echo "== combined report ==" >&2
 "$PY" -m coverage report -m

tests/_bin.py

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-"""Resolved paths to system binaries used by subprocess-based tests.
-
-NixOS and other non-FHS hosts don't populate ``/bin`` (there is no
-``/bin/sleep``), so tests that spawn real short-lived helper processes
-must resolve the binary from ``PATH`` rather than hardcoding an FHS path.
-Import the resolved constant (e.g. ``SLEEP``) instead of writing
-``/bin/sleep`` inline.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import shutil
-
-
-def resolve(name: str, fallback: str) -> str:
-    """Absolute path to ``name`` from ``PATH``; ``fallback`` on FHS hosts
-    where the binary isn't on ``PATH`` but lives at a known ``/bin`` path."""
-    return shutil.which(name) or fallback
-
-
-# Real ``sleep`` binary. ``/bin/sleep`` is absent on NixOS; resolve from
-# PATH so subprocess tests run instead of erroring with FileNotFoundError.
-SLEEP = resolve("sleep", "/bin/sleep")

tests/_docker.py

@@ -2,44 +2,24 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
 import shutil
 import subprocess
 import unittest
 
 
 def docker_available() -> bool:
-    if os.environ.get("SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS"):
-        return False
     if shutil.which("docker") is None:
         return False
-    try:
-        return (
-            subprocess.run(
-                ["docker", "info"],
-                stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-                stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
-                check=False,
-                timeout=5,
-            ).returncode
-            == 0
-        )
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-        return False
+    return (
+        subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "info"],
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            check=False,
+        ).returncode
+        == 0
+    )
 
 
 def skip_unless_docker(reason: str = "docker unreachable"):
     return unittest.skipUnless(docker_available(), reason)
-
-
-def skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker(
-    reason: str = "neither Docker nor Firecracker selected",
-):
-    """Skip a backend-agnostic test unless one supported backend can run.
-
-    Firecracker does not require the host Docker daemon. The KVM coverage job
-    deliberately sets ``SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS`` to exclude Docker-only integration
-    classes while still exercising this path.
-    """
-    firecracker_selected = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND") == "firecracker"
-    return unittest.skipUnless(firecracker_selected or docker_available(), reason)

tests/integration/test_sandbox_escape.py

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from bot_bottle.backend import BottleSpec, get_bottle_backend
 from bot_bottle.bottle_state import cleanup_state
 from bot_bottle.manifest import ManifestIndex
-from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker
+from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker
 
 
 # Secrets planted in the bottle env as literals (agents substitute via
@@ -67,14 +67,13 @@ _DUMMY_HOST_KEY = (
 )
 
 
-@skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()
+@skip_unless_docker()
 @unittest.skipIf(
-    os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true"
-    and os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND") != "firecracker",
-    "skipped under act_runner unless BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=firecracker: "
-    "egress_tls_init uses a host bind mount the runner container can't "
-    "see, and the network topology hides sibling-gateway visibility — "
-    "these constraints don't apply on the self-hosted KVM runner",
+    os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIONS") == "true",
+    "skipped under act_runner: egress_tls_init uses a host bind mount "
+    "the runner container can't see, and the network topology hides "
+    "sibling-gateway visibility — same constraint as the other "
+    "bottle-bringup integration tests",
 )
 class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
     """End-to-end attacks against a real bottle. The bottle stays
@@ -91,9 +90,11 @@ class TestSandboxEscape(unittest.TestCase):
 
     @classmethod
     def setUpClass(cls) -> None:
-        # Pin Docker when BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND is unset to preserve the
-        # Docker-backed CI path. Firecracker uses its persistent infra VM for
-        # the shared gateway and therefore does not require host Docker.
+        # Docker is always required (the agent + companion containers run under it,
+        # and VM backends still use it for the gateway); the
+        # class-level @skip_unless_docker already covers that. Pin
+        # Docker when BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND is unset to preserve the
+        # Docker-backed CI path.
         cls._backend_name = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", "docker")
 
         # Throwaway static key for the git-gate fixture. It need not

tests/unit/test_agent_provider.py

@@ -9,11 +9,15 @@ import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from bot_bottle.agent_provider import (
+    CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
     CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
     build_agent_provision_plan,
     prompt_args,
 )
-from bot_bottle.egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
+from bot_bottle.egress import (
+    CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
+    CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
+)
 
 
 def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
@@ -292,6 +296,67 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
             )
         self.assertEqual({}, plan.provisioned_env)
 
+    def test_claude_forward_host_credentials_populates_egress_route(self):
+        access_token = "sk-ant-oat01-test-key"  # gitleaks:allow
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            home = Path(tmp) / "host-claude"
+            cred_dir = home / ".claude"
+            cred_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+            (cred_dir / ".credentials.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+                "claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": access_token},
+            }))
+            plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
+                prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
+                forward_host_credentials=True,
+                host_env={"HOME": str(home)},
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.egress_routes))
+        route = plan.egress_routes[0]
+        self.assertIn(route.host, CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS)
+        self.assertEqual("Bearer", route.auth_scheme)
+        self.assertEqual(CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, route.token_ref)
+        self.assertEqual("egress-placeholder", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"])
+        self.assertEqual(frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"}), plan.hidden_env_names)
+
+    def test_claude_forward_host_credentials_populates_provisioned_env(self):
+        access_token = "sk-ant-oat01-test-key"  # gitleaks:allow
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            home = Path(tmp) / "host-claude"
+            cred_dir = home / ".claude"
+            cred_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+            (cred_dir / ".credentials.json").write_text(json.dumps({
+                "claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": access_token},
+            }))
+            plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
+                prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
+                forward_host_credentials=True,
+                host_env={"HOME": str(home)},
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            {CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF: access_token},
+            plan.provisioned_env,
+        )
+
+    def test_claude_without_forward_host_credentials_has_empty_provisioned_env(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
+            plan = build_agent_provision_plan(
+                template="claude",
+                dockerfile="",
+                state_dir=Path(tmp),
+                instance_name="bot-bottle-test",
+                prompt_file=Path(tmp) / "prompt.txt",
+                forward_host_credentials=False,
+            )
+        self.assertEqual({}, plan.provisioned_env)
+
     def test_pi_plan_writes_default_ollama_models(self):
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
             plan = build_agent_provision_plan(

tests/unit/test_backend_setup.py

@@ -215,18 +215,6 @@ class TestDockerSetupStatus(unittest.TestCase):
         with patch.object(dk.shutil, "which", return_value=None):
             self.assertFalse(dk._daemon_reachable())
 
-    def test_daemon_reachable_true_when_daemon_responds(self):
-        with patch.object(dk.shutil, "which", return_value="/usr/bin/docker"), \
-             patch.object(dk.subprocess, "run",
-                          return_value=subprocess.CompletedProcess([], 0)):
-            self.assertTrue(dk._daemon_reachable())
-
-    def test_daemon_reachable_false_on_timeout(self):
-        with patch.object(dk.shutil, "which", return_value="/usr/bin/docker"), \
-             patch.object(dk.subprocess, "run",
-                          side_effect=subprocess.TimeoutExpired(["docker", "info"], 5)):
-            self.assertFalse(dk._daemon_reachable())
-
     def test_status_reports_missing_docker(self):
         with patch.object(dk.shutil, "which", return_value=None):
             rc, out = _cap(dk.status)

tests/unit/test_cli_dispatch.py

@@ -95,60 +95,5 @@ class TestMainDispatch(unittest.TestCase):
             self.assertEqual(130, main(["x"]))
 
 
-class TestMigrationGate(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The dispatcher's schema-migration gate (cli/__init__.py)."""
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        # Force the "schema out of date" branch for every test here.
-        patcher = patch.object(StoreManager, "is_migrated", return_value=False)
-        patcher.start()
-        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
-        self.addCleanup(StoreManager.reset)
-
-    def test_store_command_blocks_when_stdin_cannot_confirm(self) -> None:
-        # Non-TTY stdin at EOF (as in CI): the [y/N] prompt reads "" and the
-        # command is refused rather than migrating silently.
-        ran: list[bool] = []
-
-        def handler(_rest: list[str]) -> int:
-            ran.append(True)
-            return 0
-
-        with patch.dict(climod.COMMANDS, {"list": handler}), \
-                patch("sys.stdin", io.StringIO("")), \
-                patch("sys.stderr", io.StringIO()):
-            self.assertEqual(1, main(["list"]))
-        self.assertEqual([], ran, "gated command must not dispatch")
-
-    def test_backend_command_skips_gate(self) -> None:
-        # `backend` provisions/probes the host and never opens the store, so
-        # it must run even on an unmigrated DB with unanswerable stdin.
-        ran: list[bool] = []
-
-        def handler(_rest: list[str]) -> int:
-            ran.append(True)
-            return 0
-
-        with patch.dict(climod.COMMANDS, {"backend": handler}), \
-                patch("sys.stdin", io.StringIO("")), \
-                patch("sys.stderr", io.StringIO()):
-            self.assertEqual(0, main(["backend", "status"]))
-        self.assertEqual([True], ran, "exempt command must dispatch")
-
-    def test_store_command_migrates_on_confirmation(self) -> None:
-        migrated: list[bool] = []
-
-        def handler(_rest: list[str]) -> int:
-            return 0
-
-        with patch.dict(climod.COMMANDS, {"list": handler}), \
-                patch.object(StoreManager, "migrate",
-                             side_effect=lambda: migrated.append(True)), \
-                patch("sys.stdin", io.StringIO("y\n")), \
-                patch("sys.stderr", io.StringIO()):
-            self.assertEqual(0, main(["list"]))
-        self.assertEqual([True], migrated, "confirmed gate must migrate")
-
-
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_cli_start_selector.py

@@ -57,14 +57,6 @@ class TestCmdStartSelector(unittest.TestCase):
         self._bottle_picker_mock = self._bottle_picker_patch.start()
         self._bottle_picker_mock.return_value = ["claude"]  # default: one bottle selected
 
-        # name_color_modal opens /dev/tty and blocks on keyboard input on
-        # self-hosted runners that have a real controlling terminal. Stub it
-        # out like the other tui pickers so tests don't wait for a keypress.
-        self._modal_patch = patch.object(
-            tui_mod, "name_color_modal", return_value=("researcher", ""),
-        )
-        self._modal_patch.start()
-
         self._env_patch = patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=False)
         self._env_patch.start()
         os.environ.pop("BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND", None)
@@ -74,7 +66,6 @@ class TestCmdStartSelector(unittest.TestCase):
         self._launch_patch.stop()
         self._agent_picker_patch.stop()
         self._bottle_picker_patch.stop()
-        self._modal_patch.stop()
         self._env_patch.stop()
 
     # ------------------------------------------------------------------

tests/unit/test_contrib_claude_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+"""Unit: host Claude auth extraction."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
+
+from bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth import (
+    claude_auth_path,
+    claude_host_access_token,
+)
+from bot_bottle.log import Die
+
+
+def _cred_json(access_token: str, **extra: object) -> str:
+    payload: dict[str, object] = {"claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": access_token, **extra}}
+    return json.dumps(payload)
+
+
+class TestClaudeHostAccessToken(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-claude-auth.")
+        self.home = Path(self.tmp.name)
+        self.cred_dir = self.home / ".claude"
+        self.cred_dir.mkdir()
+        self.auth_path = self.cred_dir / ".credentials.json"
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self.tmp.cleanup()
+
+    def _write(self, payload: dict) -> None:  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
+        self.auth_path.write_text(json.dumps(payload))
+
+    def test_auth_path_uses_home_env(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.auth_path,
+            claude_auth_path({"HOME": str(self.home)}),
+        )
+
+    # --- file-based (Linux) ---
+
+    def test_file_returns_access_token(self):
+        key = "sk-ant-oat01-real-key"  # gitleaks:allow
+        self._write({"claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": key}})
+        out = claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+        self.assertEqual(key, out)
+
+    def test_file_missing_claude_ai_oauth_dies(self):
+        self._write({"hasCompletedOnboarding": True})
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_file_missing_access_token_dies(self):
+        self._write({"claudeAiOauth": {"expiresAt": 2000000000000}})
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_file_empty_access_token_dies(self):
+        self._write({"claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": ""}})
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_file_expired_token_dies(self):
+        # expiresAt is milliseconds; 1_000_000 ms is year 1970
+        self._write({
+            "claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": "sk-ant-oat01-x", "expiresAt": 1_000_000},  # gitleaks:allow
+        })
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token(
+                {"HOME": str(self.home)},
+                now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+            )
+
+    def test_file_future_expiry_is_accepted(self):
+        key = "sk-ant-oat01-y"  # gitleaks:allow
+        # 2_000_000_000_000 ms ≈ year 2033
+        self._write({
+            "claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": key, "expiresAt": 2_000_000_000_000},
+        })
+        out = claude_host_access_token(
+            {"HOME": str(self.home)},
+            now=datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=timezone.utc),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(key, out)
+
+    def test_file_absent_expiry_is_accepted(self):
+        key = "sk-ant-oat01-z"  # gitleaks:allow
+        self._write({"claudeAiOauth": {"accessToken": key}})
+        out = claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+        self.assertEqual(key, out)
+
+    def test_file_non_json_dies(self):
+        self.auth_path.write_text("not json {{{")
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_file_json_array_root_dies(self):
+        self.auth_path.write_text("[]")
+        with self.assertRaises(Die):
+            claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+
+    def test_file_extra_fields_are_ignored(self):
+        key = "sk-ant-oat01-real"  # gitleaks:allow
+        self._write({
+            "claudeAiOauth": {
+                "accessToken": key,
+                "refreshToken": "sk-ant-ort01-secret",  # gitleaks:allow
+                "scopes": ["user:inference"],
+                "expiresAt": 2_000_000_000_000,
+            },
+        })
+        out = claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(self.home)})
+        self.assertEqual(key, out)
+
+    # --- macOS Keychain fallback ---
+
+    def _home_without_creds(self) -> Path:
+        """A home dir that has .claude/ but no .credentials.json."""
+        empty = self.home / "no-creds"
+        (empty / ".claude").mkdir(parents=True)
+        return empty
+
+    def _mock_keychain(self, stdout: str, returncode: int = 0) -> MagicMock:
+        mock = MagicMock()
+        mock.returncode = returncode
+        mock.stdout = stdout
+        return mock
+
+    def test_keychain_used_when_file_absent(self):
+        key = "sk-ant-oat01-keychain"  # gitleaks:allow
+        home = self._home_without_creds()
+        with patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.subprocess.run",
+            return_value=self._mock_keychain(_cred_json(key)),
+        ), patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.sys.platform", "darwin",
+        ):
+            out = claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(home)})
+        self.assertEqual(key, out)
+
+    def test_keychain_failure_when_file_absent_dies(self):
+        home = self._home_without_creds()
+        with patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.subprocess.run",
+            return_value=self._mock_keychain("", returncode=44),
+        ), patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.sys.platform", "darwin",
+        ):
+            with self.assertRaises(Die):
+                claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(home)})
+
+    def test_no_file_no_keychain_on_linux_dies(self):
+        home = self._home_without_creds()
+        with patch("bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.sys.platform", "linux"):
+            with self.assertRaises(Die):
+                claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(home)})
+
+    def test_keychain_non_json_dies(self):
+        home = self._home_without_creds()
+        with patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.subprocess.run",
+            return_value=self._mock_keychain("not-json"),
+        ), patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.sys.platform", "darwin",
+        ):
+            with self.assertRaises(Die):
+                claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(home)})
+
+    def test_keychain_security_not_found_dies(self):
+        home = self._home_without_creds()
+        with patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.subprocess.run",
+            side_effect=FileNotFoundError,
+        ), patch(
+            "bot_bottle.contrib.claude.claude_auth.sys.platform", "darwin",
+        ):
+            with self.assertRaises(Die):
+                claude_host_access_token({"HOME": str(home)})
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_db_store.py

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-"""Unit: DbStore._connection() context manager and is_migrated()."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import sqlite3
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-from bot_bottle.db_store import DbStore
-from bot_bottle.migrations import TableMigrations
-
-
-def _store(tmp: Path) -> DbStore:
-    migrations = TableMigrations("test", ["CREATE TABLE items (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY)"])
-    return DbStore(tmp / "test.db", migrations)
-
-
-class TestDbStoreIsMigrated(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_returns_false_when_db_absent(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            store = _store(Path(d))
-            self.assertFalse(store.is_migrated())
-
-    def test_returns_false_when_schema_versions_missing(self):
-        # DB file exists but has no schema_versions table → OperationalError → False.
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            store = _store(Path(d))
-            conn = sqlite3.connect(store.db_path)
-            conn.close()
-            self.assertFalse(store.is_migrated())
-
-    def test_returns_true_after_migrate(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            store = _store(Path(d))
-            store.migrate()
-            self.assertTrue(store.is_migrated())
-
-    def test_returns_false_when_behind(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            migrations = TableMigrations(
-                "test",
-                [
-                    "CREATE TABLE items (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY)",
-                    "ALTER TABLE items ADD COLUMN name TEXT",
-                ],
-            )
-            store = DbStore(Path(d) / "test.db", migrations)
-            # Apply only the first migration manually.
-            conn = sqlite3.connect(store.db_path)
-            with conn:
-                TableMigrations("test", [migrations.migrations[0]]).apply(conn)
-            conn.close()
-            self.assertFalse(store.is_migrated())
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_docker_test_helpers.py

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for integration-test backend selection helpers."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from tests._docker import skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker
-
-
-class TestSkipUnlessDockerOrFirecracker(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_firecracker_runs_when_docker_tests_are_disabled(self):
-        with patch.dict(
-            os.environ,
-            {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "firecracker", "SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS": "1"},
-            clear=True,
-        ):
-            decorated = skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()(type("Case", (), {}))
-
-        self.assertFalse(getattr(decorated, "__unittest_skip__", False))
-
-    def test_non_firecracker_still_skips_when_docker_tests_are_disabled(self):
-        with patch.dict(
-            os.environ,
-            {"BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND": "docker", "SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS": "1"},
-            clear=True,
-        ):
-            decorated = skip_unless_docker_or_firecracker()(type("Case", (), {}))
-
-        self.assertTrue(getattr(decorated, "__unittest_skip__", False))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_firecracker_backend.py

@@ -35,12 +35,9 @@ class TestNetpoolSlots(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_slot_ip_math_31_pairs(self):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE": "100.64.0.0"}):
             s0, s1 = netpool.slot(0), netpool.slot(1)
-        # Iface names track netpool's (env-driven) prefix — the KVM CI runner
-        # overrides it for its isolated pool, so don't hardcode "bbfc".
-        pfx = netpool.IFACE_PREFIX
-        self.assertEqual((f"{pfx}0", "100.64.0.0", "100.64.0.1"),
+        self.assertEqual(("bbfc0", "100.64.0.0", "100.64.0.1"),
                          (s0.iface, s0.host_ip, s0.guest_ip))
-        self.assertEqual((f"{pfx}1", "100.64.0.2", "100.64.0.3"),
+        self.assertEqual(("bbfc1", "100.64.0.2", "100.64.0.3"),
                          (s1.iface, s1.host_ip, s1.guest_ip))
 
     def test_guest_cidr_is_31(self):
@@ -183,14 +180,11 @@ class TestNetpoolOverlap(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual("tailscale0", conflicts[0].dev)
 
     def test_ignores_own_taps_and_default(self):
-        # The "own tap" route uses netpool's (env-driven) iface name, so the
-        # test still exercises the self-ignore path on the KVM CI runner, whose
-        # BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX differs from the default.
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE": "10.243.0.0",
                                      "BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE": "8"}), \
              self._routes([
                  {"dst": "default", "dev": "enp4s0"},
-                 {"dst": "10.243.0.0/31", "dev": netpool.slot(0).iface},
+                 {"dst": "10.243.0.0/31", "dev": "bbfc0"},
                  {"dst": "192.168.1.0/24", "dev": "enp4s0"},
              ]):
             self.assertEqual([], netpool.overlapping_routes())
@@ -209,7 +203,7 @@ class TestNetpoolAllocation(unittest.TestCase):
             # over (and here, exhaust the pool).
             slot, lock = netpool.allocate("first")
             self.addCleanup(lock.close)
-            self.assertEqual(netpool.slot(0).iface, slot.iface)
+            self.assertEqual("bbfc0", slot.iface)
             with patch.object(netpool, "die",
                               side_effect=SystemExit("exhausted")):
                 with self.assertRaises(SystemExit):
@@ -329,14 +323,9 @@ class TestNetpoolDefaultsSingleSource(unittest.TestCase):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
             self.assertEqual(int(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"]), netpool.pool_size())
             self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE"], netpool.ip_base())
-        # The module's *defaults* come from the same shared file. Assert the
-        # parsed defaults (not IFACE_PREFIX/NFT_TABLE, which layer a live env
-        # override on top — the KVM CI runner sets those for its isolated pool,
-        # which would otherwise mask this single-source check).
-        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX"],
-                         netpool._DEFAULTS["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX"])
-        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE"],
-                         netpool._DEFAULTS["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE"])
+        # Module constants resolve through the same shared file.
+        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX"], netpool.IFACE_PREFIX)
+        self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE"], netpool.NFT_TABLE)
 
     def test_env_var_overrides_the_shared_default(self):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE": "10.99.0.0"}):

tests/unit/test_firecracker_helpers.py

@@ -63,12 +63,9 @@ class TestNetpoolProbes(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(2, ok.call_count)
 
     def test_missing_taps(self):
-        # Derive the expected iface from netpool's (env-driven) config rather
-        # than hardcoding "bbfc1": the KVM CI runner sets BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* for
-        # its isolated pool, so the prefix there is not the default.
         with patch.dict("os.environ", {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE": "2"}), \
              patch.object(netpool, "tap_present", side_effect=[True, False]):
-            self.assertEqual([netpool.slot(1).iface], netpool.missing_taps())
+            self.assertEqual(["bbfc1"], netpool.missing_taps())
 
     def test_orch_slot_is_top_of_ip_base_16(self):
         # Dedicated orchestrator link: /31 at the top of the IP_BASE /16,

tests/unit/test_firecracker_image_builder.py

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ class TestBuildAgentRootfsDir(unittest.TestCase):
         self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
 
     def test_cache_hit_skips_rebuild(self):
-        digest = image_builder._rootfs_digest(self.dockerfile)
+        digest = image_builder._dockerfile_hash(self.dockerfile)
         base = self.cache / "rootfs" / f"agent-{digest}"
         base.mkdir(parents=True)
         (base / ".bb-ready").write_text("ok\n")
@@ -55,17 +55,6 @@ class TestBuildAgentRootfsDir(unittest.TestCase):
             image_builder._dockerfile_hash(other),
         )
 
-    def test_rootfs_digest_tracks_dockerfile_and_init(self):
-        # Same Dockerfile, different injected init -> different rootfs key, so
-        # an init fix (e.g. /tmp perms) rebuilds instead of reusing a stale
-        # rootfs; different Dockerfiles also differ.
-        base = image_builder._rootfs_digest(self.dockerfile)
-        with patch.object(image_builder.util, "_GUEST_INIT", "#!/bin/sh\n# changed\n"):
-            self.assertNotEqual(base, image_builder._rootfs_digest(self.dockerfile))
-        other = self.cache / "Dockerfile2"
-        other.write_text("FROM python:3.12-slim\n")
-        self.assertNotEqual(base, image_builder._rootfs_digest(other))
-
 
 class TestSmokeTest(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_empty_argv_is_noop(self):

tests/unit/test_firecracker_infra_vm.py

@@ -38,9 +38,7 @@ class TestBuildInfraRootfs(unittest.TestCase):
         # and exports PATH so gateway_init's subprocess daemons find python3.
         init = build.call_args.kwargs["init_script"]
         self.assertIn("bot_bottle.orchestrator", init)
-        # Gateway launches via the installed package (there is no
-        # /app/gateway_init.py file since the daemons moved into bot_bottle).
-        self.assertIn("bot_bottle.gateway_init", init)
+        self.assertIn("gateway_init.py", init)
         self.assertIn("export PATH=", init)
         # Persistent registry volume mounted at the DB dir before the CP starts.
         self.assertIn("/dev/vdb", init)
@@ -140,58 +138,27 @@ class TestWaitForHealth(unittest.TestCase):
 
 
 class TestEnsureRunningSingleton(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_adopts_when_healthy_and_version_matches(self):
-        # Healthy control plane + existing key + matching version marker
-        # -> adopt (no boot), vm=None.
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = Path(td)
-            (d / "id_ed25519").write_text("k")
-            (d / "booted-version").write_text("v-current\n")
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_expected_version", return_value="v-current"), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "boot") as boot:
-                infra = infra_vm.ensure_running()
+    def test_adopts_when_healthy(self):
+        # A healthy control plane + existing key -> adopt (no boot), vm=None.
+        with patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True), \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir") as d, \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "boot") as boot:
+            keydir = MagicMock()
+            (keydir / "id_ed25519").exists.return_value = True
+            d.return_value = keydir
+            infra = infra_vm.ensure_running()
         boot.assert_not_called()
         self.assertIsNone(infra.vm)
 
-    def test_reboots_when_version_stale(self):
-        # Healthy control plane but the running VM booted an OLDER image
-        # (marker mismatch) -> reboot rather than adopt stale code.
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = Path(td)
-            (d / "id_ed25519").write_text("k")
-            (d / "booted-version").write_text("v-old\n")
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_expected_version", return_value="v-current"), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built"), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "wait_for_health"), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "boot") as boot:
-                boot.return_value = infra_vm.InfraVm(
-                    guest_ip="10.243.255.1", private_key=Path("/k"), vm=MagicMock())
-                infra_vm.ensure_running()
-            stop.assert_called_once()      # dislodge the outdated VM
-            boot.assert_called_once()
-            # The fresh boot records the current version for the next launcher.
-            self.assertEqual("v-current\n", (d / "booted-version").read_text())
-
     def test_boots_when_unhealthy(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=Path(td)), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_expected_version", return_value="v-current"), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=False), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built") as built, \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "boot") as boot, \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "wait_for_health") as wait:
-                boot.return_value = infra_vm.InfraVm(
-                    guest_ip="10.243.255.1", private_key=Path("/k"), vm=MagicMock())
-                infra_vm.ensure_running()
+        with patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=False), \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "stop") as stop, \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "ensure_built") as built, \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "boot") as boot, \
+             patch.object(infra_vm, "wait_for_health") as wait:
+            boot.return_value = infra_vm.InfraVm(
+                guest_ip="10.243.255.1", private_key=Path("/k"), vm=MagicMock())
+            infra_vm.ensure_running()
         stop.assert_called_once()      # clear a stale VM first
         built.assert_called_once()
         boot.assert_called_once()
@@ -218,74 +185,5 @@ class TestKillPidfile(unittest.TestCase):
             kill.assert_not_called()
 
 
-class TestAdoptable(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _dir(self, td: str, *, key: bool = True, version: str | None = None) -> Path:
-        d = Path(td)
-        if key:
-            (d / "id_ed25519").write_text("k")
-        if version is not None:
-            (d / "booted-version").write_text(version + "\n")
-        return d
-
-    def test_true_when_key_version_and_health(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = self._dir(td, version="v1")
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True):
-                self.assertTrue(infra_vm._adoptable(d / "id_ed25519", "u", "v1"))
-
-    def test_false_when_key_missing(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = self._dir(td, key=False, version="v1")
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d):
-                self.assertFalse(infra_vm._adoptable(d / "id_ed25519", "u", "v1"))
-
-    def test_false_when_no_version_marker(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = self._dir(td)  # key present, no booted-version
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d):
-                self.assertFalse(infra_vm._adoptable(d / "id_ed25519", "u", "v1"))
-
-    def test_false_when_version_mismatch(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
-            d = self._dir(td, version="v-old")
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=d), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm, "_health_ok", return_value=True):
-                self.assertFalse(infra_vm._adoptable(d / "id_ed25519", "u", "v1"))
-
-
-class TestKillInfraFirecrackers(unittest.TestCase):
-    def _fake_proc(self, root: Path, pid: int, comm: str, cmdline: list[str]) -> None:
-        p = root / str(pid)
-        p.mkdir()
-        (p / "comm").write_text(comm + "\n")
-        (p / "cmdline").write_bytes(b"\0".join(a.encode() for a in cmdline) + b"\0")
-
-    def test_kills_only_matching_infra_firecracker(self):
-        import tempfile
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td, \
-             tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as proc:
-            infra_dir = Path(td)
-            cfg = str(infra_dir / "config.json")
-            root = Path(proc)
-            # target: firecracker bound to the infra config -> killed
-            self._fake_proc(root, 111, "firecracker",
-                            ["firecracker", "--no-api", "--config-file", cfg])
-            # a firecracker for a different (interactive) VM -> spared
-            self._fake_proc(root, 222, "firecracker",
-                            ["firecracker", "--config-file", "/home/u/other.json"])
-            # a non-firecracker process on the same config path -> spared
-            self._fake_proc(root, 333, "python3", ["python3", cfg])
-            (root / "not-a-pid").mkdir()
-            with patch.object(infra_vm, "_infra_dir", return_value=infra_dir), \
-                 patch.object(infra_vm.os, "kill") as kill:
-                infra_vm._kill_infra_firecrackers(proc_root=root)
-            kill.assert_called_once_with(111, infra_vm.signal.SIGKILL)
-
-
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_gateway_init.py

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 Tests both the helper functions in `bot_bottle.gateway_init`
 and the supervisor's end-to-end signal / exit-code behavior. The
-end-to-end tests use real subprocesses (`sleep`, `/bin/sh -c '...'`) —
-short-lived, no docker required — so they run under `tests/unit/`
-rather than `tests/integration/`."""
+end-to-end tests use real subprocesses (`/bin/sleep`,
+`/bin/sh -c '...'`) — short-lived, no docker required — so they
+run under `tests/unit/` rather than `tests/integration/`."""
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ from bot_bottle.gateway_init import (
     _env_for_daemon,
     _selected_daemons,
 )
-from tests._bin import SLEEP
 
 
 class TestEnvForDaemon(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -183,7 +182,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         # up and the supervisor never set shutdown_at.
         specs = [
             _DaemonSpec("crasher", ("/bin/sh", "-c", "exit 1")),
-            _DaemonSpec("longrun", (SLEEP, "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("longrun", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         # signal-killed longrun's negative returncode.
         specs = [
             _DaemonSpec("crasher", ("/bin/sh", "-c", "exit 1")),
-            _DaemonSpec("longrun", (SLEEP, "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("longrun", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -260,7 +259,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         specs = [
             _DaemonSpec("egress", sighup_marker),
-            _DaemonSpec("other",  (SLEEP, "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("other",  ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -283,7 +282,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_forward_signal_unknown_daemon_no_op(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         delivered = sup.forward_signal(signal.SIGHUP, "ghost")
@@ -295,8 +294,8 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         # Restart one daemon; the other (supervise, the MCP server
         # in production) must remain untouched.
         specs = [
-            _DaemonSpec("git-gate", (SLEEP, "30")),
-            _DaemonSpec("supervise", (SLEEP, "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("supervise", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -320,8 +319,8 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
 
     def test_request_restart_is_drained_by_tick(self):
         specs = [
-            _DaemonSpec("git-gate", (SLEEP, "30")),
-            _DaemonSpec("supervise", (SLEEP, "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
+            _DaemonSpec("supervise", ("/bin/sleep", "30")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -344,7 +343,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_repeated_restart_requests_coalesce(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         time.sleep(0.1)
@@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_request_restart_unknown_daemon_no_op(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         ok = sup.request_restart("ghost")
@@ -377,7 +376,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_restart_unknown_daemon_no_op(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         ok = sup.restart_daemon("ghost")
@@ -386,7 +385,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_restart_during_shutdown_is_no_op(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         sup.request_shutdown(reason="test")
@@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self._drive(sup)
 
     def test_pending_restart_dropped_during_shutdown(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", (SLEEP, "30"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sleep", "30"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         time.sleep(0.1)
@@ -414,8 +413,8 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         # both should receive SIGTERM and exit. Signal-only
         # shutdown clamps to a zero supervisor exit code.
         specs = [
-            _DaemonSpec("a", (SLEEP, "60")),
-            _DaemonSpec("b", (SLEEP, "60")),
+            _DaemonSpec("a", ("/bin/sleep", "60")),
+            _DaemonSpec("b", ("/bin/sleep", "60")),
         ]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
@@ -450,7 +449,7 @@ class TestSupervisor(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(0, rc)
 
     def test_idempotent_shutdown_requests(self):
-        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", (SLEEP, "60"))]
+        specs = [_DaemonSpec("a", ("/bin/sleep", "60"))]
         sup = _Supervisor(specs)
         sup.start_all()
         time.sleep(0.1)
@@ -471,7 +470,7 @@ class TestMainEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
 
     @classmethod
     def setUpClass(cls):
-        for p in ("/bin/sh", SLEEP):
+        for p in ("/bin/sh", "/bin/sleep"):
             if not Path(p).exists():
                 raise unittest.SkipTest(f"missing {p}")
 
@@ -486,8 +485,8 @@ class TestMainEndToEnd(unittest.TestCase):
             "import os, runpy, sys\n"
             "from bot_bottle import gateway_init as si\n"
             "si._DAEMONS = (\n"
-            f"  si._DaemonSpec('alpha', ({SLEEP!r},'30')),\n"
-            f"  si._DaemonSpec('beta',  ({SLEEP!r},'30')),\n"
+            "  si._DaemonSpec('alpha', ('/bin/sleep','30')),\n"
+            "  si._DaemonSpec('beta',  ('/bin/sleep','30')),\n"
             ")\n"
             "sys.exit(si.main([]))\n"
         )

tests/unit/test_git_gate.py

@@ -168,18 +168,16 @@ class TestHookRender(unittest.TestCase):
         # Stdin is buffered to a tempfile so both phases can re-read.
         self.assertIn("refs_file=$(mktemp)", hook)
 
-    def test_scan_scoped_to_incoming_commits(self):
-        # Every non-delete push scans only commits new to the gate, not
-        # the full ancestry and not the `$old..$new` delta — otherwise
-        # historical fixtures block new-branch pushes (PRD 0028 / #106)
-        # and a rebase/force-push onto an advanced main drags in main's
-        # history incl. the sandbox-escape fixtures (#346).
+    def test_new_ref_scan_scoped_to_incoming_commits(self):
+        # A new branch (old=all-zeros) must scan only commits new to the
+        # gate, not the full ancestry — otherwise historical findings
+        # block every new-branch push (PRD 0028 / issue #106).
         hook = git_gate_render_hook()
         self.assertIn('log_opts="$new --not --all"', hook)
-        # Neither the full-ancestry range nor the ancestry-blind delta
-        # range may survive.
+        # The old over-broad full-ancestry range must be gone.
         self.assertNotIn('log_opts="$new"', hook)
-        self.assertNotIn('log_opts="$old..$new"', hook)
+        # Existing-branch delta scan is unchanged.
+        self.assertIn('log_opts="$old..$new"', hook)
 
     def test_forward_ssh_is_non_interactive_and_bounded(self):
         # No prompt (BatchMode) and a connect timeout, so an unreachable

tests/unit/test_infra_artifact.py

@@ -93,17 +93,6 @@ class TestVersionInputs(unittest.TestCase):
         (pkg / "netpool.defaults.env").write_text("FOO=1\n")
         for name in ("Dockerfile.orchestrator", "Dockerfile.gateway", "Dockerfile.infra"):
             (root / name).write_text(f"FROM scratch  # {name}\n")
-        (root / "pyproject.toml").write_text("[project]\nname = 'bot-bottle'\n")
-
-    def test_pyproject_toml_change_bumps_version(self) -> None:
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:
-            root = Path(d)
-            self._fake_repo(root)
-            before = ia.infra_artifact_version("init", repo_root=root)
-            (root / "pyproject.toml").write_text(
-                "[project]\nname = 'bot-bottle'\ndependencies = ['httpx']\n")
-            after = ia.infra_artifact_version("init", repo_root=root)
-        self.assertNotEqual(before, after)
 
     def test_non_python_file_change_bumps_version(self) -> None:
         with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as d:

tests/unit/test_manifest_egress.py

@@ -80,11 +80,19 @@ class TestAgentProviderHostCredentials(unittest.TestCase):
                 "forward_host_credentials": "yes",
             })
 
-    def test_forward_host_credentials_rejected_for_claude(self):
+    def test_forward_host_credentials_allowed_for_claude(self):
+        b = _provider_config_bottle({
+            "template": "claude",
+            "forward_host_credentials": True,
+        })
+        self.assertTrue(b.agent_provider.forward_host_credentials)
+
+    def test_forward_host_credentials_and_auth_token_rejected_together(self):
         with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
             _provider_config_bottle({
                 "template": "claude",
                 "forward_host_credentials": True,
+                "auth_token": "SOME_TOKEN",
             })
 
     def test_auth_token_defaults_empty(self):

tests/unit/test_manifest_validation.py

@@ -86,10 +86,22 @@ class TestAgentProviderValidation(unittest.TestCase):
                 "b", {"forward_host_credentials": True, "template": "weird"}
             )
 
-    def test_forward_creds_non_codex_template(self) -> None:
+    def test_forward_creds_pi_template_rejected(self) -> None:
         with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
             ManifestAgentProvider.from_dict(
-                "b", {"forward_host_credentials": True, "template": "claude"}
+                "b", {"forward_host_credentials": True, "template": "pi"}
+            )
+
+    def test_forward_creds_claude_allowed(self) -> None:
+        p = ManifestAgentProvider.from_dict(
+            "b", {"forward_host_credentials": True, "template": "claude"}
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(p.forward_host_credentials)
+
+    def test_forward_creds_and_auth_token_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
+            ManifestAgentProvider.from_dict(
+                "b", {"forward_host_credentials": True, "auth_token": "T", "template": "claude"}
             )
 
     def test_valid_claude_auth_token(self) -> None:

tests/unit/test_supervise_server.py

@@ -32,9 +32,7 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise_server import (
     _RpcError,
     _RpcInternalError,
     _response_timeout_from_env,
-    format_pending_response_text,
     format_response_text,
-    handle_check_proposal,
     handle_initialize,
     handle_tools_call,
     handle_tools_list,
@@ -220,7 +218,6 @@ class TestHandleToolsList(unittest.TestCase):
                 _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
                 _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK,
                 _sv.TOOL_LIST_EGRESS_ROUTES,
-                _sv.TOOL_CHECK_PROPOSAL,
             ]),
             sorted(names),
         )
@@ -487,10 +484,9 @@ class TestFormatResponseText(unittest.TestCase):
 
 class TestFormatPendingResponseText(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_formats_timeout_message(self):
-        text = supervise_server.format_pending_response_text("prop-9", 12.5)
+        text = supervise_server.format_pending_response_text(12.5)
         self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
         self.assertIn("12.5s", text)
-        self.assertIn("proposal_id: prop-9", text)
 
 
 # --- End-to-end HTTP sanity ------------------------------------------------
@@ -689,129 +685,5 @@ class TestResolvedRoutesPayload(unittest.TestCase):
             _handler(None)._resolved_routes_payload()
 
 
-class TestNonBlockingSupervise(unittest.TestCase):
-    """PRD prd-new / issue #412: pending responses carry the proposal id, and
-    `check-proposal` polls a queued proposal without blocking or re-proposing."""
-
-    _ROUTES = "routes:\n  - host: example.com\n"
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="supervise-nonblock-test.")
-        self._home_patch = use_bottle_root(Path(self._tmp.name) / ".bot-bottle")
-        self.config = ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev")
-        _qs.QueueStore("dev").migrate()
-        _as.AuditStore().migrate()
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        self._home_patch()
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _seed_proposal(self) -> "_sv.Proposal":
-        p = _sv.Proposal.new(
-            bottle_slug="dev",
-            tool=_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-            proposed_file=self._ROUTES,
-            justification="need example.com",
-            current_file_hash=_sv.sha256_hex(self._ROUTES),
-        )
-        _sv.write_proposal(p)
-        return p
-
-    def _check(self, proposal_id: str) -> dict[str, object]:
-        return handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {"proposal_id": proposal_id}}, self.config)
-
-    # --- pending response carries the id ---
-
-    def test_pending_text_includes_id_and_pointer(self):
-        text = format_pending_response_text("abc-123", 30.0)
-        self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
-        self.assertIn("proposal_id: abc-123", text)
-        self.assertIn("check-proposal", text)
-
-    def test_tools_call_timeout_returns_pending_with_id_and_stays_queued(self):
-        # No responder → the grace window expires → pending, not blocked forever.
-        result = handle_tools_call(
-            {
-                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                "arguments": {"routes_yaml": self._ROUTES, "justification": "x"},
-            },
-            ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["isError"])  # type: ignore[index]
-        text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
-        self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
-        pending = _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")
-        self.assertEqual(1, len(pending))  # still queued, not archived
-        self.assertIn(pending[0].id, text)  # agent got the id to poll
-
-    # --- check-proposal poll ---
-
-    def test_check_returns_approved_and_archives(self):
-        p = self._seed_proposal()
-        _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=p.id, status=_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="ok"))
-        result = self._check(p.id)
-        self.assertFalse(result["isError"])
-        text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
-        self.assertIn("status: approved", text)
-        self.assertIn("notes: ok", text)
-        with self.assertRaises(FileNotFoundError):  # archived on read
-            _sv.read_proposal("dev", p.id)
-
-    def test_check_rejected_sets_isError(self):
-        p = self._seed_proposal()
-        _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=p.id, status=_sv.STATUS_REJECTED, notes="no"))
-        result = self._check(p.id)
-        self.assertTrue(result["isError"])
-        self.assertIn("status: rejected", result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
-
-    def test_check_pending_when_no_decision_yet(self):
-        p = self._seed_proposal()
-        result = self._check(p.id)
-        self.assertFalse(result["isError"])
-        text = result["content"][0]["text"]  # type: ignore[index]
-        self.assertIn("status: pending", text)
-        self.assertIn(p.id, text)
-        self.assertEqual(1, len(_sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")))  # not archived
-
-    def test_check_unknown_id_is_error(self):
-        result = self._check("no-such-proposal")
-        self.assertTrue(result["isError"])
-        self.assertIn("status: unknown", result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
-
-    def test_check_missing_id_raises(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {}}, self.config)
-        self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
-
-    def test_check_empty_id_raises(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": {"proposal_id": "   "}}, self.config)
-        self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
-
-    def test_check_arguments_must_be_object(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(_RpcClientError) as cm:
-            handle_check_proposal({"arguments": []}, self.config)
-        self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
-
-    def test_full_nonblocking_round_trip(self):
-        # 1. tools/call times out → pending with id
-        result = handle_tools_call(
-            {
-                "name": _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
-                "arguments": {"routes_yaml": self._ROUTES, "justification": "x"},
-            },
-            ServerConfig(bottle_slug="dev", response_timeout_seconds=0.05),
-        )
-        pid = _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev")[0].id
-        self.assertIn(pid, result["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
-        # 2. operator decides out-of-band
-        _sv.write_response("dev", _sv.Response(proposal_id=pid, status=_sv.STATUS_APPROVED, notes="ok"))
-        # 3. agent resumes by polling — no re-proposing
-        poll = self._check(pid)
-        self.assertFalse(poll["isError"])
-        self.assertIn("status: approved", poll["content"][0]["text"])  # type: ignore[index]
-        self.assertEqual([], _sv.list_pending_proposals("dev"))  # resolved + archived
-
-
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()