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didericis 095896817c docs(prd): 0070 secret-handling as a future pattern (SecretProvider, #355)
lint / lint (push) Successful in 2m3s
Add a "Secret handling — FUTURE pattern (not v1)" subsection: vault as a
separate trust domain holding long-lived roots, deriving short-lived
scoped creds where the upstream allows (with the honest limit that a
compromised proxy can still abuse currently-authorized access). The
mechanism is a generic, user-extensible SecretProvider that generalizes
PRD 0048's DeployKeyProvisioner and drops into the manifest wherever a raw
token is accepted — discovered from ~/.bot-bottle/contrib like user
AgentProviders. Marked explicitly as not required for the initial
orchestrator; tracked as #355.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-13 12:14:25 -04:00
didericis a30dd49967 docs(prd): 0070 per-host orchestrator service
Fold the per-bottle sidecar bundle into a single persistent per-host
orchestrator: runs the sidecar functions (egress/git-gate/supervise),
coordinates with the console, and brokers agent launches. Virtualized
from the start with backend-native isolation (fc VM / apple ctr / docker
ctr), fronted by a single backend-agnostic contract; per-backend
variation lives on BottleBackend, not a parallel Orchestrator hierarchy.

Leads with the security review (secret concentration, shared fate, the
launch-broker-as-new-privileged-core, and the source-IP attribution
invariant each backend must enforce). Proposes one SQLite DB owned by the
orchestrator for runtime state (slot leases, approvals, registry) —
distinct from build-time constants (flat .env) and user config
(declarative ~/.bot-bottle). Sequences docker -> firecracker -> macos,
developing the service as a plain-process dev-harness before the VM.

Supersedes 0069's Stage-1/4 sidecar framing; depends on 0069's nix-built
fixed images. Tracking issue #351.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-13 12:14:25 -04:00
didericis 2b970d1170 refactor(firecracker): single-source the network-pool defaults
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 54s
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test / coverage (pull_request) Successful in 56s
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Update Quality Badges / update-badges (push) Successful in 57s
The pool params (size, IP base, iface prefix, nft table) were triplicated
— hardcoded in netpool.py, scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh, and
nix/firecracker-netpool.nix — plus the IP math (3x) and the nft ruleset
(2x). Nothing enforced agreement; changing the base (ce3fad9, off CGNAT)
forced a coordinated three-file edit, and a missed one would silently
provision a range the launcher doesn't expect.

Collapse to one source of truth:

  * netpool.defaults.env — a plain KEY=VALUE file (bash-sourceable,
    systemd EnvironmentFile-compatible, Python- and Nix-parseable) holding
    the four defaults. A BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env var still overrides any key.
  * netpool.py reads it for the Python defaults (missing file = hard
    error, not confusing empty defaults).
  * the shell script falls back to it (no literal `:-8` / `10.243.0.0`),
    and its `up` is now non-destructive/idempotent (only creates a
    missing TAP), so re-running never cuts a live VM.
  * the Nix module readFile-parses it for its option defaults and
    delegates bring-up to the SAME shell script (dropping its duplicate
    IP math, nft ruleset, and TAP loop) — passing every value as
    Environment= so the store-detached script never needs the file.

Net: defaults 3x -> 1x, nft ruleset 2x -> 1x, TAP loop 2x -> 1x. The one
remaining IP-math dup (Python launch-addressing vs bash bring-up) is
justified — different runtimes. Tests now guard the invariant (Python
reads the shared file; the script/module hold no literals) instead of
pinning duplicated strings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-13 04:27:48 -04:00
Quality Badge Bot 1bfc6c5d16 chore: update quality badges
- Coverage: 82%
- Core coverage: 95%

[skip ci]
2026-07-12 20:54:05 +00:00
8 changed files with 535 additions and 142 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# bot-bottle
[![test](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg?branch=main)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/actions?workflow=test.yml)
[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-84%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
[![coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-82%25-brightgreen)](https://coverage.readthedocs.io/)
[![core coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/core%20coverage-95%25-brightgreen)](https://gitea.dideric.is/didericis/bot-bottle/src/branch/main/docs/decisions/0004-coverage-policy.md)
**Problem:** Developer wants to run a coding agent without supervision, but they don't want a prompt injected or misbehaving agent wrecking their environment or exfiltrating sensitive data.
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# Firecracker network-pool defaults — the SINGLE source of these values.
#
# Read by every consumer so they can't drift:
# * netpool.py — parses this for the Python defaults (below).
# * scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh — falls back to these when the
# matching BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env var is unset.
# * nix/firecracker-netpool.nix — readFile-parses this for its option
# defaults, then passes the resolved values back as Environment=.
#
# Plain KEY=VALUE (no quoting, no inline comments, no spaces around `=`)
# so it is bash-sourceable, systemd EnvironmentFile-compatible, and
# trivially parseable from Python and Nix. A real BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env
# var of the same name always overrides the value here.
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE=8
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=10.243.0.0
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=bbfc
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=bot_bottle_fc
+40 -9
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@@ -4,11 +4,13 @@ config renderers (shell command + NixOS module) shown to operators.
The Firecracker backend needs a privileged one-time network setup:
a pool of point-to-point TAP devices (owned by the invoking user, so
`./cli.py start` never needs root) and a dedicated nftables table that
isolates every VM. This module is the single source of truth for the
pool parameters — the shell script (`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`),
the NixOS module (`nix/firecracker-netpool.nix`), and the backend's
fail-closed preflight all derive from these constants so they can't
drift.
isolates every VM. The pool parameters live in exactly one place —
`netpool.defaults.env`, a plain KEY=VALUE file next to this module —
and every consumer reads *that*: this module (below), the shell script
(`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`), and the NixOS module
(`nix/firecracker-netpool.nix`). A `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_*` env var of the
same name always overrides the file, and the backend's fail-closed
preflight derives from these accessors, so nothing can drift.
Topology (per slot i):
* TAP ``bbfc{i}`` — no shared bridge, so no docker0 / virbr0 / cni0
@@ -43,18 +45,47 @@ from typing import IO
from ...log import die
# The pool defaults live in one shared file (see module docstring); the
# shell script and NixOS module read the same file, so the values can't
# drift. This is a packaged data file — a missing/broken install is a
# hard error, surfaced here rather than as confusing empty defaults.
DEFAULTS_FILE = Path(__file__).with_name("netpool.defaults.env")
def _load_defaults() -> dict[str, str]:
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for raw in DEFAULTS_FILE.read_text().splitlines():
line = raw.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
continue
key, _, value = line.partition("=")
out[key.strip()] = value.strip()
return out
_DEFAULTS = _load_defaults()
def _cfg(key: str) -> str:
"""A `BOT_BOTTLE_FC_*` env var overrides the shared-file default."""
try:
return os.environ.get(key) or _DEFAULTS[key]
except KeyError:
die(f"{key} is missing from {DEFAULTS_FILE.name} (broken install)")
# Interface names are capped at 15 chars (IFNAMSIZ-1); "bbfc" + a small
# index stays well under that and is distinctive enough to grep for.
IFACE_PREFIX = os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX", "bbfc")
NFT_TABLE = "bot_bottle_fc"
IFACE_PREFIX = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX")
NFT_TABLE = _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE")
def pool_size() -> int:
return int(os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE", "8"))
return int(_cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"))
def ip_base() -> str:
return os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE", "10.243.0.0")
return _cfg("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE")
# Sidecar ports the VM reaches at its host-side TAP IP. Kept in sync
@@ -1,10 +1,16 @@
# PRD 0069: Firecracker-native, Docker-free backend
- **Status:** Draft
- **Status:** Draft (partially superseded)
- **Author:** Claude
- **Created:** 2026-07-12
- **Issue:** #348
> **Superseded in part by [PRD 0070](0070-per-host-orchestrator.md) (#351):**
> the sidecar-consolidation framing here (Stage 1, per-host sidecar; Stage 4,
> sidecar-as-VM) is taken over by 0070's per-host orchestrator. This PRD still
> owns the docker-free **image-building** work — Stage 2 (nix-built fixed
> images, a dependency of 0070) and Stage 3 (in-VM Dockerfile builder).
## Summary
Make the Firecracker backend depend on **firecracker + KVM only**, removing
+313
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@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
# PRD 0070: Per-host orchestrator service
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** Claude
- **Created:** 2026-07-12
- **Issue:** #351
- **Supersedes:** the Stage-1 / Stage-4 sidecar-consolidation framing of
PRD 0069 (#348). Depends on 0069's nix-built fixed images (Stage 2) for
bootstrapping; 0069 still owns the docker-free image-building work.
## Summary
Replace the **per-bottle sidecar bundle** with a single **persistent,
per-host orchestrator**: one long-lived service that runs the sidecar
functions (egress / git-gate / supervise), coordinates with the console,
and brokers agent launches and teardown. It is **virtualized from the
start** using each backend's native isolation primitive — a Firecracker
microVM on the Firecracker backend, an Apple container on macOS, a Docker
container on the legacy backend — and is fronted by a single
**backend-agnostic contract**. Per-backend variation lives on
`BottleBackend`, not in the orchestrator.
## Motivation
Today each bottle spins up its own sidecar bundle (egress mitmproxy +
git-gate + supervise). That costs:
- **Resources.** N bottles → N heavy bundles booting and idling.
- **Operational churn.** Per-launch container/VM lifecycle for the
sidecars, a control path baked at launch and torn down at exit.
- **A blurry contract.** "How a bottle talks to its sidecar" is
re-implemented per backend instead of being one agreed interface.
A per-host orchestrator collapses the first two and forces the third to
be made explicit. It's also the component that will own per-host runtime
**state** (slot leases, the approval queue, the bottle registry) — today
that's ad-hoc `fcntl`-locked files.
## Security review (read this first)
Consolidation is a real change to the trust model. The goal is to **not
significantly weaken** the posture; some properties strengthen, some
weaken, and the weakened ones must be mitigated by design, not hand-waved.
### What gets stronger
- **Build/host isolation of untrusted inputs** (with 0069 Stage 3): user
Dockerfiles build in a disposable VM instead of on the host.
- **One audited privileged surface.** Today the launcher runs as the full
host user and needs the Docker socket (root-equivalent). The orchestrator
model replaces that with a **thin launch broker** (below) — a small,
structured, auditable privileged core instead of a fat socket.
- **Attribution is enforced, not assumed.** Making source-IP identity a
first-class contract invariant (below) means each backend must *prove*
it, rather than the sidecar implicitly trusting network position.
### What gets weaker, and the mitigation
1. **Secret concentration.** Per-bottle sidecars isolate secrets at the
process boundary — each holds only its bottle's tokens/keys. A host
orchestrator concentrates **every bottle's** egress tokens, git deploy
keys, and the console credential in one long-lived process. A single
attribution bug leaks bottle A's token into bottle B's request — a class
of bug that *cannot exist* per-bottle.
- *Mitigation:* lean on the enforced source-IP invariant for
attribution; keep the most secret-dense, least-shareable service
(**git-gate**, per-repo deploy keys, no natural source-IP scoping)
**per-bottle** unless there's a compelling reason; scope each secret
to the bottle in the state DB so a lookup can't return the wrong
bottle's secret by construction (key every secret access by the
verified source identity, never by ambient state).
2. **Shared fate.** Orchestrator down = no new launches, and running
agents lose egress / git / supervise. Compromise = the whole host's
fleet, plus launch authority, plus the console token.
- *Mitigation:* the orchestrator is itself confined (its own VM/container
with its own fail-closed egress); make it **restartable without killing
running agent VMs** (agents keep running; they briefly lose sidecar
connectivity until it's back); persist state to a host volume so a
restart re-adopts live bottles rather than losing them.
3. **The launch broker is the new privileged core.** We don't eliminate
host privilege — we shrink and relocate it. If the broker accepts
arbitrary paths/commands, the orchestrator VM can escape through it.
- *Mitigation:* the broker takes **structured requests only** — "launch
bottle from *this* content-addressed, nix-built rootfs on TAP slot
*k*", never "run this argv". It validates against a fixed image set,
not caller-supplied paths. It is small enough to audit line-by-line.
4. **The egress proxy now parses every bottle's traffic in one process.**
Higher blast radius for a mitmproxy/TLS-bump bug.
- *Mitigation:* this is the argument for virtualizing the orchestrator
from the start (Stage B, not a host daemon) — the code that TLS-bumps
and parses agent traffic and holds every token runs **inside its own
confined VM**, not as a host process. If egress sharing's blast radius
feels too high, egress can stay per-bottle while supervise (near-zero
secrets) goes host-level first.
### The attribution invariant
Source-IP attribution is what makes a shared orchestrator safe: one
process serves every bottle and tells them apart by source address. The
*mechanism* is identical everywhere (read source IP → look up bottle); the
**guarantee that the address can't be forged is a per-backend
responsibility** and part of the contract:
> **Invariant:** a packet's source address, as seen by the orchestrator,
> *provably* identifies the originating bottle.
- **Firecracker** — enforced by the `/31` point-to-point TAP + the
`bot_bottle_fc` nft table (strongest; already built).
- **Docker** — the per-bottle `--internal` network + anti-spoof; weaker,
must be made explicit.
- **Apple** — the host-only network.
If a backend can't honor the invariant, source-IP consolidation is not
safe there and that backend keeps per-bottle sidecars. The invariant is a
hard precondition, not an aspiration.
### Secret handling — a FUTURE pattern (not v1)
> **Status: future / not required for the initial orchestrator.** The
> initial cut can inject secrets as today; this section records the
> direction so v1 doesn't paint itself into a corner. Tracked as its own
> work in **#355** (generic `SecretProvider`).
The residual weakness after all of the above is **long-lived credential
concentration** — the data-plane proxies must hold every bottle's upstream
tokens because the agent must never see them. You can't policy-gate the
component whose job is to *use* all the secrets, so a full RCE of a proxy
drains its authorized set regardless. Two moves bound this without
pretending to prevent it:
1. **Vault as a separate trust domain.** The long-lived *roots* live in a
distinct process (ideally its own VM) that the byte-parsing data plane
never shares memory with. The proxies request secrets from it; the
crown jewels are not in the process an agent-facing parser can pop.
2. **Derive short-lived, scoped creds where the upstream allows it.** The
vault holds the root and mints expiring, narrowly-scoped credentials
per bottle-start (or per request) — GitHub App installation tokens,
OAuth/STS token exchange, forge deploy tokens. A compromise then leaks
short-lived material, not permanent keys. For upstreams stuck on static
keys the vault passes the value through (only the at-rest / audit /
revocation benefits apply, not lifetime reduction) — this residue is
accepted and documented, not solved.
Even a plain per-request fetch (no derivation) still buys **at-rest**
reduction (process memory holds only in-flight secrets), a **detection /
rate-limit / revocation chokepoint**, and clean **cross-component
scoping** (an egress RCE can't request git-gate's creds). It does *not*
prevent abuse of currently-authorized access during the compromise window.
**Mechanism (see #355):** generalize the existing `DeployKeyProvisioner`
(PRD 0048) into a user-extensible **`SecretProvider`** droppable into the
manifest anywhere a raw token value is accepted, discovered from
`~/.bot-bottle/contrib/<name>/secret_provider.py` exactly as user
`AgentProvider`s are — because maintaining every forge/cloud/OAuth
provider in-tree is untenable. The orchestrator's vault mints via these
providers; but the abstraction is shippable independently and today's
per-bottle sidecars can use it too.
## Design
### The contract (backend-agnostic)
Three surfaces; only one is per-backend.
1. **Control plane (CLI / console → orchestrator)** — an RPC:
`launch_bottle`, `teardown_bottle`, `register_policy`,
`deregister_bottle`, `supervise_queue`. Fully backend-agnostic. Both the
local `cli.py` and the remote console funnel through it, so policy is
uniform and `cli.py` becomes a thin client rather than a parallel
launcher.
2. **Data plane (agent → orchestrator)** — the egress / git / supervise
endpoints. Already agnostic today (agents dial `http://sidecar:9099`);
only the *address* and *how packets get there* are per-backend.
3. **Launch / wire (orchestrator → backend)** — the irreducibly
backend-specific part; lives on `BottleBackend`.
### One `Orchestrator`, no subclass tree
The orchestrator is a **single concrete class** holding all the
backend-neutral logic — egress addon, git-gate, supervise, source-IP
attribution, live-reload control plane, console client. It never branches
on backend; it *composes* a `BottleBackend`. That composition is what makes
the contract agnostic: there is nothing backend-specific left in the
orchestrator to leak.
Rejected alternative: an `Orchestrator` ABC with per-backend
implementations. The interesting logic (proxies, attribution, control
plane) is backend-neutral, so three subclasses would triplicate the hard
part; and a second hierarchy paralleling `BottleBackend` reintroduces the
same hand-maintained lockstep coupling we just removed from the netpool
constants (PR #350). Composition over a parallel tree.
### `BottleBackend` absorbs the per-backend variation
A small, cohesive surface — reused for launching agent bottles *and* the
orchestrator's own unit (the orchestrator is just another native unit):
```
launch_unit(spec) -> Handle # agent bottle OR the orchestrator itself
# (fc microVM / apple ctr / docker ctr)
wire(unit, endpoint) -> None # DNAT+forward (fc) | attach shared net (docker/apple)
endpoint_of(unit) -> Endpoint # address resolution
health(unit) -> Status
```
Plus the **launch broker** — the answer to "a VM/container can't spawn its
own host-network siblings." The orchestrator can't directly open host
`/dev/kvm` + a host TAP fd (Firecracker), and a container can't spawn
siblings without a root-equivalent socket (Docker). So every backend
exposes a broker the orchestrator calls to launch an agent:
- **Firecracker** — a thin, structured host shim (see security #3). This
replaces today's implicit "launcher runs as host user."
- **Docker** — the socket today (fat, root-equivalent — the thing 0069's
Stage 3 removes); a narrower broker later.
- **Apple** — the `container` CLI/daemon.
If `BottleBackend` bloats, the pressure valve is composition one level
down: vend a `backend.network()` / `Wiring` collaborator rather than
piling methods on — the same discipline, recursed.
### State: one SQLite DB, owned by the orchestrator
The orchestrator is the natural owner of per-host **runtime state**:
- pool **slot leases** (which bottle holds slot *i*) — replaces today's
`fcntl`-locked files with WAL-mode transactions;
- the **supervise approval queue** + remembered approvals;
- the **live bottle registry** (source IP → bottle → policy/secrets refs),
the lookup table the attribution invariant reads.
This is deliberately **not** a "single source of truth for all config."
Config splits into three tiers with different homes:
| Tier | Example | Home |
|---|---|---|
| Build-time constants | pool size, IP base, nft table | flat `.env` (PR #350) — must be readable by Nix eval + root bash, zero runtime |
| User-authored config | bottle manifests, egress routes, secret refs | declarative files under `~/.bot-bottle/` — trust boundary at `$HOME`, git-trackable, "unknown keys die at load" |
| Runtime state | slot leases, approvals, registry | **SQLite**, owned by the orchestrator |
SQLite is right for the runtime tier (mutable, concurrent, queried) and
wrong for the other two (Nix can't read it at eval time; it fights the
declarative manifest trust model). Keep the tiers separate.
## Sequencing
Jump straight to the **virtualized** end state (not a host-daemon stepping
stone): a host daemon's agent→`localhost` transport is throwaway once the
orchestrator becomes a VM. Decouple the two risks instead:
- **Consolidation risk** (one process, all secrets, attribution, reload)
and **packaging/transport risk** (VM-to-VM wiring, the shim) are
independent. Develop the orchestrator **service as a plain process
dev-harness** first, so the consolidation logic (attribution, reload,
secret handling) is proven with fast iteration — *then* wrap that exact
service in the VM and solve wiring separately.
Backend order (cheapest proof → hardest → last):
1. **Docker orchestrator** — nearly free (the sidecar bundle is already
containers; collapse N bundles into one persistent container). Proves
consolidation + the `BottleBackend` seam with the least moving parts.
2. **Firecracker orchestrator** — the real work: the shim + VM-to-VM
routing (host forwards `bbfcN` → orchestrator TAP; the nft table grows
forward rules where today it drops all non-DNAT egress). Built against
the dev-harness so the app logic is already proven.
3. **macOS (Apple container)** — last (container-to-container networking).
Keep the sidecar **service one shared thing** throughout.
## Non-goals
- Removing OCI/Dockerfile support for agent images (0069's concern).
- A single database for *all* config (see the three-tier table).
- Changing the per-bottle isolation of agent workloads — only the sidecar
is consolidated; agents stay one-VM/container-each.
## Relationship to other work
- **PRD 0069 (#348):** 0070 subsumes its Stage 1 (per-host sidecar) and
Stage 4 (sidecar-as-VM). 0069 retains Stage 2 (nix-built fixed images —
a **dependency** here: the orchestrator and agent base must be
nix-built so the broker launches from a fixed image set and bootstrapping
has no chicken-and-egg) and Stage 3 (in-VM Dockerfile builder).
- **Minimal CI runner (paused):** the Firecracker broker + no host Docker
is what lets a dedicated `gitea` runner user drop the root-equivalent
`docker` group — it only needs broker-socket access + `kvm`/pool group
membership. This work unblocks it.
- **Generic `SecretProvider` (#355):** the future secret-handling
mechanism (see "Secret handling") — generalizes PRD 0048's
`DeployKeyProvisioner` into a user-extensible provider that mints
short-lived creds. Shippable independently; the orchestrator's vault
mints through it.
- **PR #350 (netpool single-source):** the same "one source per fact,
composition over parallel hierarchies" discipline the contract follows.
## Open questions
- **Egress sharing tradeoff:** is the secret-concentration blast radius of
one shared mitmproxy worth the resource win, or share only supervise
(near-zero secrets) and keep egress + git-gate per-bottle initially?
- **Control-plane shape:** RPC transport (unix socket / vsock / HTTP over
the TAP) and the live-reload protocol for per-bottle policy.
- **State re-adoption:** exact scheme for an orchestrator restart to
re-adopt running agent VMs from the SQLite registry without racing
in-flight launches.
- **VM-to-VM routing:** the nft forward rules + addressing for a
per-host orchestrator VM on its own TAP.
- **Broker request schema:** the exact structured contract that stays
auditable and can't be coerced into launching arbitrary payloads.
+67 -93
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@@ -1,104 +1,70 @@
# bot-bottle Firecracker network pool — declarative NixOS module.
#
# The one-time privileged setup the Firecracker backend needs: a pool of
# user-owned point-to-point TAP devices plus a fail-closed nftables table
# that confines every microVM to its own sidecar.
# user- (or group-) owned point-to-point TAP devices plus a fail-closed
# nftables table that confines every microVM to its own sidecar.
#
# NON-INVASIVE BY DESIGN. It does NOT flip `networking.nftables.enable`
# (which would switch your whole host firewall backend) or
# `systemd.network.enable` (which would hand your interfaces to
# systemd-networkd). Instead a single systemd oneshot service brings the
# pool up on boot — the declarative equivalent of
# `sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh up`. The `inet <tableName>` table
# is independent (its own hooks at priority -10), so it coexists with an
# iptables `networking.firewall`, Docker, ufw, firewalld, etc.
# systemd-networkd). Instead a single systemd oneshot brings the pool up
# on boot by running the SAME bring-up script as every other install
# path (`scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`) — so the TAP/nft logic lives in
# exactly one place. The `inet <tableName>` table is independent (its own
# hooks at priority -10), so it coexists with an iptables
# `networking.firewall`, Docker, ufw, firewalld, etc.
#
# The oneshot is only restarted when this config changes, so a
# `nixos-rebuild switch` doesn't tear down TAPs out from under running
# VMs unless you actually changed the pool.
# The oneshot is only restarted when this config changes, and the shared
# script is non-destructive (it never tears down an existing TAP), so a
# `nixos-rebuild switch` won't cut TAPs out from under running VMs.
#
# The option defaults MUST match the backend constants in
# bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.py (pool size, IP base, iface
# prefix, table name). The backend reads the same values at launch from
# the BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env vars; if you override an option here, override
# the matching env var for the CLI too (or set writeEnvFile = true below
# to have this module emit them). Keep the two sides in lockstep.
# Single source of the pool defaults: bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/
# netpool.defaults.env. This module readFile-parses it for the option
# defaults below, then passes the resolved values back to the script as
# Environment=, so the host pool and the CLI launcher can't drift.
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
let
cfg = config.services.bot-bottle-firecracker;
# --- IPv4 <-> int (full 32-bit carry math) -------------------------
toOctets = s: map lib.toInt (lib.splitString "." s);
ipToInt = s:
let o = toOctets s; in
(lib.elemAt o 0) * 16777216
+ (lib.elemAt o 1) * 65536
+ (lib.elemAt o 2) * 256
+ (lib.elemAt o 3);
intToIp = n:
# --- shared single-source defaults ---------------------------------
# Parse the KEY=VALUE defaults file (the same one netpool.py and the
# shell script read). Pure eval — just readFile, no import-from-
# derivation — so it works for both flake and channel consumers.
readDefaults = file:
let
b0 = n / 16777216; r0 = n - b0 * 16777216;
b1 = r0 / 65536; r1 = r0 - b1 * 65536;
b2 = r1 / 256;
b3 = r1 - b2 * 256;
in "${toString b0}.${toString b1}.${toString b2}.${toString b3}";
lines = lib.splitString "\n" (builtins.readFile file);
keep = l: l != "" && !(lib.hasPrefix "#" l) && lib.hasInfix "=" l;
toPair = l:
let parts = lib.splitString "=" l;
in lib.nameValuePair (lib.head parts)
(lib.concatStringsSep "=" (lib.tail parts));
in lib.listToAttrs (map toPair (lib.filter keep lines));
baseInt = ipToInt cfg.ipBase;
defaults = readDefaults ../bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env;
# Slot i: host = base + 2i (the VM's gateway), on its own /31.
slots = lib.genList (i: {
iface = "${cfg.ifacePrefix}${toString i}";
hostIp = intToIp (baseInt + 2 * i);
}) cfg.poolSize;
# The one bring-up implementation, shared with the sudo/systemd paths.
netpoolScript = ../scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh;
ip = "${pkgs.iproute2}/bin/ip";
nft = "${pkgs.nftables}/bin/nft";
# /31 alignment == an even final octet (only bit 0 matters for base+2i).
lastOctet = lib.toInt (lib.last (lib.splitString "." cfg.ipBase));
# Idempotent ruleset: (create-if-absent → delete → recreate) is atomic
# within one `nft -f`, so re-running `up` always lands a clean table.
nftFile = pkgs.writeText "bot-bottle-fc.nft" ''
table inet ${cfg.tableName}
delete table inet ${cfg.tableName}
table inet ${cfg.tableName} {
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority -10; policy accept;
iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return
ct state established,related accept
ct status dnat accept
drop
}
chain input {
type filter hook input priority -10; policy accept;
iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return
ct state established,related accept
drop
}
}
'';
# The script needs ip/nft/sysctl + the usual coreutils. It gets every
# pool value via the unit's Environment=, so it never reads the shared
# defaults file (which isn't beside it once copied to the store).
runtimePath = with pkgs; [ iproute2 nftables procps coreutils gnused ];
# A non-owner user can't open a user-owned TAP, but any member of a
# TAP's owning GROUP can (the kernel checks owner-uid OR owning-group).
# So `group` lets an interactive user and a CI-runner user share one
# pool; `owner` is the single-user default.
tapOwn = if cfg.group != null then "group ${cfg.group}" else "user ${cfg.owner}";
ownEnv =
if cfg.group != null
then { BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP = cfg.group; }
else { BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER = cfg.owner; };
upScript = pkgs.writeShellScript "bot-bottle-fc-netpool-up" ''
set -eu
${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (s: ''
${ip} link show ${s.iface} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${ip} tuntap add dev ${s.iface} mode tap ${tapOwn}
${ip} addr replace ${s.hostIp}/31 dev ${s.iface}
${ip} link set ${s.iface} up
'') slots}
${nft} -f ${nftFile}
'';
downScript = pkgs.writeShellScript "bot-bottle-fc-netpool-down" ''
${nft} delete table inet ${cfg.tableName} 2>/dev/null || true
${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (s: ''
${ip} link show ${s.iface} >/dev/null 2>&1 && ${ip} tuntap del dev ${s.iface} mode tap || true
'') slots}
'';
unitEnv = {
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE = toString cfg.poolSize;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE = cfg.ipBase;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX = cfg.ifacePrefix;
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE = cfg.tableName;
} // ownEnv;
in
{
options.services.bot-bottle-firecracker = {
@@ -106,25 +72,28 @@ in
poolSize = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.ints.positive;
default = 8;
default = lib.toInt defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE;
defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
description = "Number of pool slots (concurrent bottles). Must match BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE.";
};
ipBase = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "10.243.0.0";
default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE;
defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
description = ''
Base IPv4 of the /31 pool; slot i uses host = base + 2i. Must
be /31-aligned (even final address) and must match
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE. Default is an obscure RFC-1918 /16 that
dodges docker/libvirt/k8s/LAN and, deliberately, Tailscale's
100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT range.
be /31-aligned (even final octet) and must match
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE. The shared default is an obscure RFC-1918
/16 that dodges docker/libvirt/k8s/LAN and, deliberately,
Tailscale's 100.64.0.0/10 CGNAT range.
'';
};
ifacePrefix = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "bbfc";
default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX;
defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
description = "TAP interface name prefix. Must match BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX.";
};
@@ -153,7 +122,8 @@ in
tableName = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "bot_bottle_fc";
default = defaults.BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE;
defaultText = lib.literalMD "the shared `netpool.defaults.env` value";
description = "nftables table name for the isolation boundary. Must match netpool.NFT_TABLE.";
};
@@ -171,7 +141,7 @@ in
config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
assertions = [
{
assertion = lib.mod baseInt 2 == 0;
assertion = lib.mod lastOctet 2 == 0;
message = "services.bot-bottle-firecracker.ipBase must be /31-aligned (even final octet); got ${cfg.ipBase}.";
}
{
@@ -183,17 +153,20 @@ in
# VM->sidecar traffic is DNAT'd and forwarded, so forwarding must be on.
boot.kernel.sysctl."net.ipv4.ip_forward" = 1;
# One oneshot brings up the whole pool (TAPs + independent nft table).
# No networking.nftables.enable / systemd.network.enable — see header.
# One oneshot brings up the whole pool (TAPs + independent nft table)
# by running the shared bring-up script. No networking.nftables.enable
# / systemd.network.enable — see header.
systemd.services."bot-bottle-firecracker-netpool" = {
description = "bot-bottle Firecracker TAP pool + nft isolation table";
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
after = [ "network-pre.target" ];
path = runtimePath;
environment = unitEnv;
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
ExecStart = upScript;
ExecStop = downScript;
ExecStart = "${pkgs.bash}/bin/bash ${netpoolScript} up";
ExecStop = "${pkgs.bash}/bin/bash ${netpoolScript} down";
};
};
@@ -202,6 +175,7 @@ in
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE=${toString cfg.poolSize}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE=${cfg.ipBase}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX=${cfg.ifacePrefix}
BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE=${cfg.tableName}
'';
};
};
+40 -19
View File
@@ -33,24 +33,44 @@
# sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh down
# ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh status
#
# Env overrides (must match the backend's util.py constants):
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE number of slots (default 8)
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE base IPv4 of the /31 pool (default 10.243.0.0)
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX TAP name prefix (default bbfc)
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER owning user (default $SUDO_USER or $USER)
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP owning group; if set, TAPs are group-owned
# instead of user-owned, so any group member
# (e.g. an interactive user + a CI runner
# user) can open the pool. Overrides OWNER.
# Pool params default to the shared single-source file
# (bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env); a matching
# env var overrides its key:
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE number of slots
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE base IPv4 of the /31 pool
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX TAP name prefix
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE isolation table name
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER owning user (default $SUDO_USER or $USER)
# BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP owning group; if set, TAPs are group-owned
# instead of user-owned, so any group member
# (e.g. an interactive user + a CI runner
# user) can open the pool. Overrides OWNER.
set -euo pipefail
POOL_SIZE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-8}"
IP_BASE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-10.243.0.0}"
PREFIX="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX:-bbfc}"
# The single source of the pool defaults, shared with netpool.py and the
# Nix module. The Nix path passes every value as env (the script runs
# from the store, detached from this file), so this lookup only matters
# on the direct/sudo path where the script sits in the repo tree.
_SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
_DEFAULTS="$_SCRIPT_DIR/../bot_bottle/backend/firecracker/netpool.defaults.env"
_default() { # value of KEY=... from the shared file; empty if unavailable
[ -f "$_DEFAULTS" ] || return 0
sed -n "s/^$1=//p" "$_DEFAULTS" | tail -1
}
POOL_SIZE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE)}"
IP_BASE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE)}"
PREFIX="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX)}"
TABLE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE)}"
OWNER="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_OWNER:-${SUDO_USER:-$USER}}"
GROUP="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP:-}"
TABLE="bot_bottle_fc"
# Fail loudly rather than provisioning a half/empty range if a value
# resolved to nothing (env unset AND the shared file unreadable).
for _v in POOL_SIZE IP_BASE PREFIX TABLE; do
[ -n "${!_v}" ] || { echo "error: $_v unresolved (set BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* or fix $_DEFAULTS)" >&2; exit 1; }
done
# Sidecar ports (must match the backend). egress=9099, supervise=9100,
# git-http=9420. Reached by the VM at its host-side TAP IP.
@@ -94,12 +114,13 @@ cmd_up() {
for i in $(seq 0 $((POOL_SIZE-1))); do
local dev host
dev="$(iface "$i")" ; host="$(host_ip "$i")"
if ip link show "$dev" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
ip link set "$dev" down 2>/dev/null || true
ip tuntap del dev "$dev" mode tap 2>/dev/null || true
fi
ip tuntap add dev "$dev" mode tap "${own_args[@]}"
ip addr add "$host/31" dev "$dev"
# Non-destructive + idempotent: only create a missing TAP (tearing
# an existing one down would cut a running VM), and `addr replace`
# is safe to re-run. Ownership is fixed at creation, so to change
# owner/group run `down` then `up`.
ip link show "$dev" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| ip tuntap add dev "$dev" mode tap "${own_args[@]}"
ip addr replace "$host/31" dev "$dev"
ip link set "$dev" up
echo " $dev host=$host guest=$(guest_ip "$i") $own_desc"
done
+50 -19
View File
@@ -67,10 +67,24 @@ class TestNetpoolRenderers(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertNotIn("networking.nftables.enable = true", mod)
self.assertNotIn("systemd.network.enable = true", mod)
self.assertIn("bot-bottle-firecracker-netpool", mod) # the oneshot
self.assertIn(netpool.NFT_TABLE, mod)
self.assertIn('iifname != "${cfg.ifacePrefix}*" return', mod)
# Supports group-owned TAPs (shared pool for a multi-user host).
self.assertIn("group ${cfg.group}", mod)
self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP", mod)
def test_nixos_module_delegates_and_holds_no_literals(self):
# Single-source discipline: the module must NOT re-implement the
# bring-up (it delegates to the shared script) and must NOT hard-
# code the pool defaults (it readFile-parses the shared .env), so
# nothing can drift from netpool.py / the shell script.
root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
mod = (root / "nix" / "firecracker-netpool.nix").read_text()
# Delegation to the one bring-up implementation + shared defaults.
self.assertIn("scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh", mod)
self.assertIn("netpool.defaults.env", mod)
self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE", mod)
# No duplicated literals or nft ruleset.
self.assertNotIn(netpool.ip_base(), mod) # 10.243.0.0
self.assertNotIn(netpool.NFT_TABLE, mod) # bot_bottle_fc
self.assertNotIn("ct status dnat", mod) # the nft ruleset
def test_shell_setup_reflects_overrides(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE": "3"}):
@@ -262,26 +276,43 @@ class TestBottleAgentArgv(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertIn("USER=node", argv)
class TestSetupScriptConsistency(unittest.TestCase):
"""The shell setup script duplicates the pool defaults; keep them in
lockstep with the Python constants so the two setup paths agree."""
class TestNetpoolDefaultsSingleSource(unittest.TestCase):
"""The pool defaults live in one shared file (netpool.defaults.env);
Python parses it and the shell script + Nix module read the same file,
so the three setup paths can't drift."""
def _script(self) -> str:
root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
return (root / "scripts" / "firecracker-netpool.sh").read_text()
def _root(self) -> Path:
return Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
def test_defaults_match_python(self):
script = self._script()
def _shared_defaults(self) -> dict[str, str]:
text = netpool.DEFAULTS_FILE.read_text()
out: dict[str, str] = {}
for raw in text.splitlines():
line = raw.strip()
if line and not line.startswith("#") and "=" in line:
k, _, v = line.partition("=")
out[k.strip()] = v.strip()
return out
def test_python_reads_the_shared_file(self):
d = self._shared_defaults()
with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
self.assertIn(f'POOL_SIZE:-{netpool.pool_size()}', script)
self.assertIn(f'BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE:-{netpool.ip_base()}', script)
self.assertIn(f'IFACE_PREFIX:-{netpool.IFACE_PREFIX}', script)
self.assertEqual(int(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE"]), netpool.pool_size())
self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE"], netpool.ip_base())
# Module constants resolve through the same shared file.
self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IFACE_PREFIX"], netpool.IFACE_PREFIX)
self.assertEqual(d["BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE"], netpool.NFT_TABLE)
def test_table_name_and_ports_match(self):
script = self._script()
self.assertIn(f'TABLE="{netpool.NFT_TABLE}"', script)
for port in netpool.SIDECAR_PORTS:
self.assertIn(str(port), script)
def test_env_var_overrides_the_shared_default(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, {"BOT_BOTTLE_FC_IP_BASE": "10.99.0.0"}):
self.assertEqual("10.99.0.0", netpool.ip_base())
def test_script_defers_to_shared_file_without_literals(self):
script = (self._root() / "scripts" / "firecracker-netpool.sh").read_text()
# Delegates its defaults to the shared file, not hardcoded values.
self.assertIn("netpool.defaults.env", script)
self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_POOL_SIZE)", script)
self.assertIn('TABLE="${BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE:-$(_default BOT_BOTTLE_FC_NFT_TABLE)}"', script)
class TestBootArgs(unittest.TestCase):