fix(macos-container): anchor relative Dockerfile path to build context

`container build` resolves -f relative to the current working directory,
not the build context, so builds failed from any cwd other than the repo
root. Anchor a relative Dockerfile to the context before passing it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

bot_bottle/agent_provider.py

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
     prompt_mode: PromptMode
     bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
     resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
-    remote_control_args: tuple[str, ...]
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -391,7 +390,7 @@ def prompt_args(
     if prompt_mode == "append_file":
         return ["--append-system-prompt-file", prompt_path]
     if prompt_mode == "read_prompt_file":
-        if argv and "resume" in argv:
+        if argv and ("resume" in argv or "remote-control" in argv):
             return []
         return [f"Read and follow the instructions in {prompt_path}."]
     if prompt_mode == "print_read_prompt_file":

bot_bottle/backend/__init__.py

@@ -109,9 +109,8 @@ class BottlePlan(ABC):
     def workspace_plan(self) -> WorkspacePlan:
         return workspace_plan(self.spec, guest_home=self.guest_home)
 
-    def print(self, *, remote_control: bool) -> None:
+    def print(self) -> None:
         """Render the y/N preflight summary to stderr."""
-        del remote_control
         spec = self.spec
         manifest = self.manifest
         agent = manifest.agent

bot_bottle/backend/docker/compose.py

@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ from typing import Any
 from ...egress import (
     EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
     EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
+    egress_agent_env_entries,
+    egress_sidecar_env_entries,
 )
 from ...git_gate import GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME
 from ...log import die, warn
@@ -135,8 +137,7 @@ def _sidecar_bundle_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
     volumes.append(_bind(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path, EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER))
     if ep.routes:
         volumes.append(_bind(ep.routes_path.parent, str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent)))
-        for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
+    env.extend(egress_sidecar_env_entries(ep))
-            env.append(token_env)
 
     # --- git-gate -----------------------------------------------------
     gp = plan.git_gate_plan
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ def _agent_service(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> dict[str, Any]:
     # never lands on argv or in the compose file.
     for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
         env.append(name)
+    env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
 
     service: dict[str, Any] = {
         "image": plan.image,

bot_bottle/backend/egress_apply.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 
 from ..bottle_state import egress_state_dir
 from ..egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME
-from ..egress_addon_core import load_routes
+from ..egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
 
 
 class EgressApplyError(RuntimeError):
@@ -33,11 +33,15 @@ class EgressApplicator(ABC):
     @staticmethod
     def validate_routes_content(content: str) -> None:
         try:
-            load_routes(content)
+            config = load_config(content)
         except ValueError as e:
             raise EgressApplyError(
                 f"proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}"
             ) from e
+        if config.log != LOG_OFF:
+            raise EgressApplyError(
+                "proposed routes.yaml must not change egress logging"
+            )
 
     @staticmethod
     def _routes_path(slug: str) -> Path:

bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/launch.py

@@ -22,7 +22,12 @@ from ...bottle_state import (
     git_gate_state_dir,
     read_committed_image,
 )
-from ...egress import EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER, egress_resolve_token_values
+from ...egress import (
+    EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
+    egress_agent_env_entries,
+    egress_resolve_token_values,
+    egress_sidecar_env_entries,
+)
 from ...git_gate import revoke_git_gate_provisioned_keys
 from ...log import die, info, warn
 from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
@@ -350,9 +355,7 @@ def _sidecar_daemons(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
 
 
 def _sidecar_env_entries(plan: MacosContainerBottlePlan) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    env: list[str] = []
+    env: list[str] = list(egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
-    if plan.egress_plan.routes:
-        env.extend(sorted(plan.egress_plan.token_env_map.keys()))
     if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams:
         env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE={_GIT_GATE_READY_FILE}")
     if plan.supervise_plan is not None:
@@ -420,6 +423,7 @@ def _agent_env_entries(
         env.append(f"{name}={value}")
     for name in sorted(plan.forwarded_env.keys()):
         env.append(name)
+    env.extend(egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan))
     return tuple(env)
 
 

bot_bottle/backend/macos_container/util.py

@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ def build_image(ref: str, context: str, *, dockerfile: str = "") -> None:
     _ensure_builder_dns()
     args = [_CONTAINER, "build", "-t", ref, "--dns", dns_server()]
     if dockerfile:
+        # `container build` resolves -f relative to the current working
+        # directory, not the build context. Anchor a relative Dockerfile to
+        # the context so builds work from any cwd.
+        if not os.path.isabs(dockerfile):
+            dockerfile = os.path.join(context, dockerfile)
         args.extend(["-f", dockerfile])
     args.append(context)
     subprocess.run(args, check=True)

bot_bottle/backend/smolmachines/launch.py

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ from typing import Callable, Generator
 
 from ...egress import (
     EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER,
+    egress_agent_env_entries,
     egress_resolve_token_values,
+    egress_sidecar_env_entries,
 )
 from ...supervise import QUEUE_DIR_IN_CONTAINER, SUPERVISE_PORT
 from ...util import expand_tilde
@@ -228,6 +230,9 @@ def _discover_urls(
         guest_env["GIT_GATE_URL"] = f"http://{agent_git_gate_host}"
     if agent_supervise_url:
         guest_env["MCP_SUPERVISE_URL"] = agent_supervise_url
+    for entry in egress_agent_env_entries(plan.egress_plan):
+        name, value = entry.split("=", 1)
+        guest_env[name] = value
 
     return dataclasses.replace(
         plan,
@@ -316,11 +321,7 @@ def _bundle_launch_spec(
     volumes.append((str(ep.mitmproxy_ca_host_path), EGRESS_CA_IN_CONTAINER, True))
     if ep.routes:
         volumes.append((str(ep.routes_path.parent), str(Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).parent), True))
-        # Bare-name entries for upstream-token slots. Their values
+    env.extend(egress_sidecar_env_entries(ep))
-        # come from the docker-run subprocess env (inherited from
-        # the operator's shell), never landing on argv.
-        for token_env in sorted(ep.token_env_map.keys()):
-            env.append(token_env)
 
     # --- git-gate ---------------------------------------------
     gp = plan.git_gate_plan

bot_bottle/cli/resume.py

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ from .start import _launch_bottle
 def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} resume", add_help=True)
     parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
-    parser.add_argument("--remote-control", action="store_true")
     parser.add_argument(
         "identity",
         help="bottle identity from a prior `start` (see its session-end output)",
@@ -56,6 +55,5 @@ def cmd_resume(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     return _launch_bottle(
         spec,
         dry_run=args.dry_run,
-        remote_control=args.remote_control,
         backend_name=backend_name,
     )

bot_bottle/cli/start.py

@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog=f"{PROG} start", add_help=True)
     parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
     parser.add_argument("--cwd", action="store_true", help="copy host cwd into the running bottle")
-    parser.add_argument("--remote-control", action="store_true")
     parser.add_argument(
         "--backend",
         choices=known_backend_names(),
@@ -89,7 +88,6 @@ def cmd_start(argv: list[str]) -> int:
     return _launch_bottle(
         spec,
         dry_run=dry_run,
-        remote_control=args.remote_control,
         backend_name=backend_name,
     )
 
@@ -134,7 +132,7 @@ def prepare_with_preflight(
 
 
 def attach_agent(
-    bottle: Bottle, *, remote_control: bool = False, resume: bool = False,
+    bottle: Bottle, *, resume: bool = False,
     agent_provider_template: str = "claude",
     startup_args: tuple[str, ...] = (),
 ) -> int:
@@ -153,8 +151,6 @@ def attach_agent(
         "(Ctrl-D or 'exit' to leave; container will be removed)"
     )
     agent_args = list(runtime.bypass_args)
-    if remote_control:
-        agent_args.extend(runtime.remote_control_args)
     agent_args.extend(startup_args)
     if resume:
         agent_args.extend(runtime.resume_args)
@@ -218,9 +214,9 @@ def _text_prompt_yes() -> bool:
     return reply in ("y", "Y", "yes", "YES")
 
 
-def _text_render_preflight(*, remote_control: bool):
+def _text_render_preflight():
     def _render(plan: DockerBottlePlan) -> None:
-        plan.print(remote_control=remote_control)
+        plan.print()
     return _render
 
 
@@ -228,7 +224,6 @@ def _launch_bottle(
     spec: BottleSpec,
     *,
     dry_run: bool,
-    remote_control: bool,
     backend_name: str | None = None,
 ) -> int:
     """Shared launch core for `start` and `resume`. Builds the plan,
@@ -240,7 +235,7 @@ def _launch_bottle(
         plan, identity = prepare_with_preflight(
             spec,
             stage_dir=stage_dir,
-            render_preflight=_text_render_preflight(remote_control=remote_control),
+            render_preflight=_text_render_preflight(),
             prompt_yes=_text_prompt_yes,
             dry_run=dry_run,
             backend_name=backend_name,
@@ -253,7 +248,6 @@ def _launch_bottle(
             agent_provider_template = getattr(plan, "agent_provider_template", "claude")
             exit_code = attach_agent(
                 bottle,
-                remote_control=remote_control,
                 agent_provider_template=agent_provider_template,
                 startup_args=plan.agent_provision.startup_args,
             )

bot_bottle/contrib/claude/agent_provider.py

@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
     prompt_mode="append_file",
     bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
     resume_args=("--continue",),
-    remote_control_args=("--remote-control",),
 )
 
 

bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 # bot-bottle Codex provider image.
 #
 # Mirrors the default Claude image shape: Node LTS, git/network tooling,
-# non-root node user, and the provider CLI installed globally.
+# non-root node user, and the provider CLI installed for that user.
 
 FROM node:22-slim
 
 RUN apt-get update \
-  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl \
+  && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates curl procps \
   && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
 # App-specific deps. Python isn't required by codex itself
@@ -17,12 +17,15 @@ RUN apt-get update \
   && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 python3-pip python3-venv \
   && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
 
-RUN npm install -g --no-fund --no-audit @openai/codex@0.136.0 \
-  && npm cache clean --force
-
 USER node
 WORKDIR /home/node
 
-RUN mkdir -p /home/node/.codex
+ENV PATH="/home/node/.local/bin:${PATH}"
+
+# Remote-control support requires the standalone Codex install layout
+# under ~/.codex/packages/standalone/current. The npm package can run
+# the TUI, but remote-control commands expect this installer-owned path.
+RUN mkdir -p /home/node/.codex \
+  && curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh | sh
 
 CMD ["codex"]

bot_bottle/contrib/codex/agent_provider.py

@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
     prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
     bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
     resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
-    remote_control_args=(),
 )
 
 

bot_bottle/contrib/pi/agent_provider.py

@@ -166,7 +166,6 @@ _RUNTIME = AgentProviderRuntime(
     prompt_mode="append_system_prompt",
     bypass_args=(),
     resume_args=(),
-    remote_control_args=(),
 )
 
 

bot_bottle/dlp_detectors.py

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import gzip
 import re
 import typing
 import unicodedata
+from math import log2
+from collections import Counter
 from urllib.parse import quote as url_quote
 
 try:
@@ -107,20 +109,21 @@ def redact_tokens(
     text: str,
     *,
     env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
 ) -> str:
     """Replace token pattern matches and (if env given) provisioned secrets with REDACT."""
     for _, pattern in TOKEN_PATTERNS:
         text = pattern.sub(REDACT, text)
     if env is not None:
         for key, value in env.items():
-            if key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") and value:
+            if any(key.startswith(p) for p in sensitive_prefixes) and value:
                 for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
                     text = text.replace(variant, REDACT)
     return text
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Known secrets detector (Phase 1b)
+# Known secrets detector
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
@@ -161,18 +164,65 @@ def _encoded_variants(secret: str) -> list[str]:
     return variants
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Fragmentation-resistant helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Minimum length of alnum projection for projection-based checks to run.
+# Short secrets produce too many false positives in projection space.
+_ALNUM_MIN_LEN = 8
+
+# Minimum window length for the partial-substring sliding scan.
+PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN = 12
+
+
+def _alnum_projection(text: str) -> str:
+    """Return text with every non-alphanumeric character stripped.
+
+    Used for fragmentation-resistant matching: separator-injected secrets
+    (spaces, hyphens, dots inserted between characters) are identical to
+    their originals in alnum projection space.
+    """
+    return "".join(c for c in text if c.isalnum())
+
+
+def _find_partial_window(secret_alnum: str, text_alnum: str, min_len: int) -> int | None:
+    """Return the position in text_alnum where any min_len-char window of
+    secret_alnum first appears, or None.
+
+    Slides a window of width min_len across secret_alnum and searches for
+    each window in text_alnum.  The first hit position is returned.
+    """
+    if len(secret_alnum) < min_len or len(text_alnum) < min_len:
+        return None
+    for i in range(len(secret_alnum) - min_len + 1):
+        window = secret_alnum[i:i + min_len]
+        pos = text_alnum.find(window)
+        if pos >= 0:
+            return pos
+    return None
+
+
 def scan_known_secrets(
     text: str,
     *,
     location: str = "body",
     env: typing.Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
     safe_tokens: typing.AbstractSet[str] | None = None,
 ) -> ScanResult | None:
     if env is None:
         return None
+
+    # Pre-compute alnum projection of the scan text once; reused per secret.
+    text_alnum: str | None = None
+
     for key, value in env.items():
-        if not key.startswith("EGRESS_TOKEN_") or not value:
+        if not any(key.startswith(p) for p in sensitive_prefixes) or not value:
             continue
+
+        # Pass 1: exact match across encoded variants (original behaviour).
+        approved_exact = False
         for variant in _encoded_variants(value):
             pos = text.find(variant)
             if pos >= 0:
@@ -180,6 +230,7 @@ def scan_known_secrets(
                 # (PRD 0062); a different encoding of the same secret is a
                 # fresh block.
                 if safe_tokens is not None and variant in safe_tokens:
+                    approved_exact = True
                     continue
                 return ScanResult(
                     severity="block",
@@ -188,6 +239,104 @@ def scan_known_secrets(
                     context=_snippet(text, pos, pos + len(variant)),
                     matched=variant,
                 )
+        if approved_exact:
+            # Exact match was found and approved; projection passes would
+            # fire on the same value, so skip them for this secret.
+            continue
+
+        # Pass 2 & 3: fragmentation-resistant projection checks.
+        secret_alnum = _alnum_projection(value)
+        if len(secret_alnum) < _ALNUM_MIN_LEN:
+            continue
+
+        if text_alnum is None:
+            text_alnum = _alnum_projection(text)
+
+        # Pass 2: full alnum-projection exact match (catches separator injection).
+        pos2 = text_alnum.find(secret_alnum)
+        if pos2 >= 0:
+            return ScanResult(
+                severity="block",
+                reason=(
+                    f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location} "
+                    f"(fragmented match — separator injection)"
+                ),
+                location=location,
+                context=_snippet(text_alnum, pos2, pos2 + len(secret_alnum)),
+            )
+
+        # Pass 3: sliding-window partial match (catches chunked-substring leaks).
+        pos3 = _find_partial_window(secret_alnum, text_alnum, PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN)
+        if pos3 is not None:
+            return ScanResult(
+                severity="block",
+                reason=(
+                    f"provisioned secret from {key} found in {location} "
+                    f"(partial match — at least {PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN} consecutive "
+                    f"alphanumeric chars)"
+                ),
+                location=location,
+                context=_snippet(text_alnum, pos3, pos3 + PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN),
+            )
+
+    return None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Entropy detector (warn-only)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Sliding window size and step for the entropy scan.
+ENTROPY_WINDOW = 64
+ENTROPY_STEP = 32
+
+# Bits-per-character threshold.  Random ASCII printable ≈ 6.6 bits; random
+# lowercase hex ≈ 4 bits; random base64url ≈ 6 bits.  5.5 sits above
+# typical structured data (JSON, URLs) while staying below truly random
+# content.
+ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD = 5.5
+
+
+def _shannon_entropy(text: str) -> float:
+    if not text:
+        return 0.0
+    counts = Counter(text)
+    n = len(text)
+    return -sum((c / n) * log2(c / n) for c in counts.values())
+
+
+def scan_entropy(
+    text: str,
+    *,
+    location: str = "body",
+    window: int = ENTROPY_WINDOW,
+    threshold: float = ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD,
+) -> ScanResult | None:
+    """Warn-only detector: flag windows of `window` chars with Shannon entropy
+    above `threshold` bits per character.
+
+    Never blocks; always returns severity='warn'.  Disabled by default —
+    routes must opt in via dlp.outbound_detectors=['entropy'].
+    """
+    if not text:
+        return None
+    step = max(1, window // 2)
+    end = len(text)
+    # Scan overlapping windows; also check the final tail if shorter than window.
+    positions = list(range(0, end - window + 1, step))
+    if end < window:
+        positions = [0]
+    elif (end - window) % step != 0:
+        positions.append(end - window)
+    for i in positions:
+        chunk = text[i:i + window]
+        if _shannon_entropy(chunk) >= threshold:
+            return ScanResult(
+                severity="warn",
+                reason=f"high-entropy content in {location} (possible encrypted exfil)",
+                location=location,
+                context=_snippet(text, i, i + len(chunk)),
+            )
     return None
 
 
@@ -306,11 +455,18 @@ def scan_crlf_injection(text: str) -> ScanResult | None:
 
 
 __all__ = [
+    "ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD",
+    "ENTROPY_WINDOW",
+    "ENTROPY_STEP",
+    "PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN",
     "REDACT",
     "SNIPPET_CONTEXT",
     "TOKEN_PATTERNS",
+    "_alnum_projection",
+    "_shannon_entropy",
     "redact_tokens",
     "scan_crlf_injection",
+    "scan_entropy",
     "scan_known_secrets",
     "scan_naive_injection",
     "scan_token_patterns",

bot_bottle/egress.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ specific and lives on concrete subclasses (see
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import dataclasses
+import secrets
 from abc import ABC
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -34,6 +35,50 @@ EGRESS_HOSTNAME = "egress"
 EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
 EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME = Path(EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER).name
 
+_CANARY_ENV_WORDS = (
+    "ACCORD",
+    "ANCHOR",
+    "ATLAS",
+    "CANON",
+    "CIPHER",
+    "EMBER",
+    "FALCON",
+    "HARBOR",
+    "LANTERN",
+    "MARBLE",
+    "NOVA",
+    "ORBIT",
+    "PIVOT",
+    "RADIUS",
+    "SUMMIT",
+    "VECTOR",
+)
+
+
+def _random_canary_env() -> str:
+    first = secrets.choice(_CANARY_ENV_WORDS)
+    remaining = tuple(word for word in _CANARY_ENV_WORDS if word != first)
+    second = secrets.choice(remaining)
+    return f"{first}_{second}_SECRET"
+
+
+def egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Return sidecar env entries needed by egress across all backends."""
+    env: list[str] = []
+    if plan.routes:
+        env.extend(sorted(plan.token_env_map.keys()))
+    if plan.canary and plan.canary_env:
+        env.append(f"{plan.canary_env}={plan.canary}")
+        env.append(f"BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES={plan.canary_env}")
+    return tuple(env)
+
+
+def egress_agent_env_entries(plan: "EgressPlan") -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Return agent-visible egress env entries shared by all backends."""
+    if plan.canary and plan.canary_env:
+        return (f"{plan.canary_env}={plan.canary}",)
+    return ()
+
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class EgressRoute(Route):
@@ -65,6 +110,8 @@ class EgressPlan:
     mitmproxy_ca_host_path: Path = Path()
     mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path: Path = Path()
     log: int = 0
+    canary: str = ""
+    canary_env: str = ""
 
 
 def egress_manifest_routes(
@@ -324,12 +371,18 @@ class Egress(ABC):
         routes_path = stage_dir / EGRESS_ROUTES_FILENAME
         routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes, log=log))
         routes_path.chmod(0o600)
+        # Generate a per-session fake secret under a plausible random env name.
+        # The sidecar marks that exact env name as sensitive for known-secret
+        # scanning; the agent receives the same name/value as exfil bait.
+        canary = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
         return EgressPlan(
             slug=slug,
             routes_path=routes_path,
             routes=routes,
             token_env_map=egress_token_env_map(routes),
             log=log,
+            canary=canary,
+            canary_env=_random_canary_env(),
         )
 
 __all__ = [
@@ -344,5 +397,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "egress_render_routes",
     "egress_resolve_token_values",
     "egress_routes_for_bottle",
+    "egress_agent_env_entries",
+    "egress_sidecar_env_entries",
     "egress_token_env_map",
 ]

bot_bottle/egress_addon.py

@@ -160,26 +160,37 @@ class EgressAddon:
         )
 
     def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+        headers = {
+            k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
+            for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()
+            if k.lower() != "authorization"
+        }
+        body = redact_tokens(flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
         sys.stderr.write(
             json.dumps({
                 "event": "egress_request",
                 "host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
                 "method": flow.request.method,
                 "path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
-                "headers": dict(flow.request.headers),
+                "headers": headers,
-                "body": flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "",
+                "body": body,
             })
             + "\n"
         )
 
     def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+        headers = {
+            k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
+            for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()
+        }
+        body = redact_tokens(flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
         sys.stderr.write(
             json.dumps({
                 "event": "egress_response",
                 "host": flow.request.pretty_host,
                 "status": flow.response.status_code,
-                "headers": dict(flow.response.headers),
+                "headers": headers,
-                "body": flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "",
+                "body": body,
             })
             + "\n"
         )

bot_bottle/egress_addon_core.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ VALID_METHODS = frozenset({
     "CONNECT",
 })
 
-OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets"})
+OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"token_patterns", "known_secrets", "entropy"})
 INBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES = frozenset({"naive_injection_detection"})
 
 # Per-route policy for what the proxy does when an outbound DLP detector
@@ -439,15 +439,6 @@ def route_to_yaml_dict(r: Route) -> dict[str, object]:
     return d
 
 
-def load_routes(text: str) -> tuple[Route, ...]:
-    """Parse YAML text → routes."""
-    try:
-        payload = parse_yaml_subset(text)
-    except YamlSubsetError as e:
-        raise ValueError(f"routes payload: invalid YAML: {e}") from e
-    return parse_routes(payload)
-
-
 def parse_config(payload: object) -> "Config":
     """Parse a full egress config payload (top-level log level + routes)."""
     if not isinstance(payload, dict):
@@ -729,17 +720,28 @@ def scan_outbound(
     try:
         from dlp_detectors import (  # type: ignore[import-not-found]
             scan_crlf_injection,
+            scan_entropy,
             scan_known_secrets,
             scan_token_patterns,
         )
     except ImportError:  # pragma: no cover - host-side path
         from .dlp_detectors import (  # type: ignore[import-not-found]
             scan_crlf_injection,
+            scan_entropy,
             scan_known_secrets,
             scan_token_patterns,
         )
 
-    text = body if isinstance(body, str) else body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    # Binary bodies: latin-1 is a bijective byte↔codepoint mapping that
+    # preserves every byte value, so ASCII-range secret strings remain
+    # findable by str.find / regex.  Prefer strict UTF-8 for valid text bodies.
+    if isinstance(body, bytes):
+        try:
+            text = body.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError:
+            text = body.decode("latin-1")
+    else:
+        text = body
 
     # CRLF injection is only an attack in the request line + headers, never the
     # body: an HTTP body is delimited by Content-Length, so CRLF bytes there
@@ -758,12 +760,30 @@ def scan_outbound(
             return result
 
     if _detector_enabled(route.outbound_detectors, "known_secrets"):
+        # BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES lets operators add extra env prefixes
+        # beyond EGRESS_TOKEN_* without changing the manifest schema.
+        extra_raw = environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES", "")
+        extra = tuple(p for p in extra_raw.split(",") if p)
+        sensitive_prefixes = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",) + extra
         result = scan_known_secrets(
-            text, location="body", env=environ, safe_tokens=safe_tokens,
+            text, location="body", env=environ,
+            sensitive_prefixes=sensitive_prefixes, safe_tokens=safe_tokens,
         )
         if result is not None:
             return result
 
+    # Entropy scanning requires explicit opt-in: it is NOT part of the
+    # default "all detectors" set because it produces false positives on
+    # legitimate base64 / binary payloads.  Routes must list "entropy" in
+    # dlp.outbound_detectors to enable it.
+    if (
+        route.outbound_detectors is not None
+        and "entropy" in route.outbound_detectors
+    ):
+        result = scan_entropy(text, location="body")
+        if result is not None:
+            return result
+
     return None
 
 
@@ -833,7 +853,6 @@ __all__ = [
     "is_git_push_request",
     "is_git_fetch_request",
     "load_config",
-    "load_routes",
     "match_route",
     "outbound_scan_headers",
     "parse_config",

bot_bottle/supervise_server.py

@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ from pathlib import Path
 try:
     # Same-directory imports inside the bundle container; these files are
     # COPYed flat under /app by Dockerfile.sidecars.
-    from egress_addon_core import load_routes
+    from egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
     import supervise as _sv
 except ModuleNotFoundError:
     # Package imports for host-side tests and tooling.
-    from .egress_addon_core import load_routes
+    from .egress_addon_core import LOG_OFF, load_config
     from . import supervise as _sv
 
 
@@ -297,12 +297,17 @@ def validate_proposed_file(tool: str, content: str) -> None:
         pass
     elif tool in (_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW, _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK):
         try:
-            load_routes(content)
+            config = load_config(content)
         except ValueError as e:
             raise _RpcError(
                 ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
                 f"{tool}: proposed routes.yaml is not valid: {e}",
             ) from e
+        if config.log != LOG_OFF:
+            raise _RpcError(
+                ERR_INVALID_PARAMS,
+                f"{tool}: proposed routes.yaml must not change egress logging",
+            )
     else:
         raise _RpcError(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, f"unknown tool {tool!r}")
 

docs/prds/0063-strengthen-outbound-exfil-detection.md

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+# PRD 0063: Strengthen outbound exfiltration detection
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-25
+- **Issue:** #259
+
+## Summary
+
+The current DLP system has two detection tiers: weak (vendor token regexes)
+and strong (exact matching of provisioned `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values in multiple
+encodings). This PRD adds four complementary hardening layers in ranked order
+of impact:
+
+1. **Canary tokens** — inject a per-session fake secret into the agent's
+   environment; any outbound appearance is a zero-false-positive exfil signal.
+2. **Broadened known-value scanning** — extend the strong tier beyond
+   `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` via a `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` sidecar env var.
+3. **Fragmentation-resistant matching** — catch separator injection and
+   long-substring leaks via alnum projection and sliding-window substring
+   search.
+4. **Entropy scoring** — warn-only flag on high-entropy blobs as a
+   complementary signal for encrypted exfil.
+
+## Problem
+
+After PRD 0056 the outbound scan covers all HTTP request surfaces (host, path,
+query, headers, body). But the content-based strong tier only matches
+`EGRESS_TOKEN_*` values and their encodings. Three gaps remain:
+
+| Gap | How an agent exploits it |
+|-----|--------------------------|
+| No canary | There is no "can't be false-positive" signal |
+| Narrow prefix filter | Sensitive values provisioned under other env prefixes (MCP keys, API keys injected via the agent provider) are invisible to `scan_known_secrets` |
+| Fragmentation blindness | Inserting `-`, space, or `\n` between secret characters turns an exact-match into a miss |
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+1. Each launched bottle has a unique canary token in the agent's environment
+   under a randomized `WORD_WORD_SECRET` env var name. The egress sidecar gets
+   the same env var and registers that exact name through
+   `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES`. Any outbound appearance of the canary
+   blocks the request as a known-secret match.
+2. `scan_known_secrets` accepts a `sensitive_prefixes` parameter (default:
+   `("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)`). `scan_outbound` reads
+   `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` from `environ` and merges those prefixes
+   in, so operators can mark additional env vars as scanned values without
+   changing the manifest schema.
+3. For every secret that passes exact-match, a secondary alnum-projection pass
+   checks for the secret with all non-alphanumeric characters stripped. This
+   catches separator-injection evasion (`MY-SECRET` → body contains
+   `MY SECRET`).
+4. A sliding-window partial-match pass checks for long-enough contiguous
+   substrings of the secret's alnum projection in the text's alnum projection.
+   Any match ≥ `PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN` (12 chars) blocks with reason
+   `"partial match"`.
+5. A new `scan_entropy` detector flags outbound text windows with Shannon
+   entropy ≥ `ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD` (5.5 bits/char) at **warn** severity
+   only. It is registered under the new detector name `"entropy"` in
+   `OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES` and disabled by default (routes must opt in).
+6. Binary request bodies are decoded via `latin-1` instead of
+   `utf-8 errors="replace"`, preserving every byte value and allowing
+   ASCII-range secrets to be found within binary payloads.
+7. All new behaviour is unit-tested; existing tests pass unchanged.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Rolling per-host buffer for split-across-requests detection (state in the
+  stateless addon is complex; deferred).
+- Additional vendor regexes.
+- ML / embedding-based detection.
+- Entropy-based hard blocks (warn only per the issue).
+
+## Design
+
+### Canary token flow
+
+```
+Egress.prepare()
+  canary = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+  canary_env = <random WORD_WORD_SECRET>
+  EgressPlan(canary=canary, canary_env=canary_env, ...)
+
+Docker compose render:
+  sidecar env: <canary_env>=<canary>
+  sidecar env: BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=<canary_env>
+  agent env:   <canary_env>=<canary>      ← visible to agent as a "secret"
+
+macos-container launch: same literals added to sidecar + agent env entries
+```
+
+The sidecar uses `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` to make the random canary env
+name part of the existing `scan_known_secrets` detector without adding a
+manifest schema field.
+
+### Broadened known-value scanning
+
+`scan_known_secrets` gains a `sensitive_prefixes` parameter:
+
+```python
+def scan_known_secrets(
+    text: str,
+    *,
+    location: str = "body",
+    env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    sensitive_prefixes: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",),
+) -> ScanResult | None:
+```
+
+`scan_outbound` reads `BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES` (comma-separated list
+of additional prefixes) from `environ` and appends them:
+
+```python
+extra = tuple(
+    p for p in environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES", "").split(",") if p
+)
+sensitive_prefixes = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",) + extra
+```
+
+`redact_tokens` receives the same treatment for consistent redaction.
+
+### Fragmentation-resistant matching
+
+A new helper `_alnum_projection(text)` strips all non-alphanumeric characters.
+`scan_known_secrets` runs two passes per secret:
+
+1. **Exact pass** — existing encoded-variant loop (unchanged).
+2. **Alnum-projection pass** — if the secret's alnum projection has ≥ 8 chars,
+   check if it appears in the text's alnum projection. Match → block with
+   `"fragmented match (separator injection)"` reason.
+3. **Partial-substring pass** — if the secret's alnum projection has ≥
+   `PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN` chars (12), slide a window of that length across the
+   secret's projection and look for each window in the text's alnum projection.
+   First match → block with `"partial match"` reason.
+
+All three passes run only for the `"known_secrets"` detector; the token-pattern
+and entropy detectors are unchanged.
+
+### Entropy scoring
+
+New public function:
+
+```python
+def scan_entropy(
+    text: str,
+    *,
+    location: str = "body",
+    window: int = ENTROPY_WINDOW,           # 64
+    threshold: float = ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD,  # 5.5
+) -> ScanResult | None:
+```
+
+Slides a window of `window` characters across `text` in steps of `window // 2`.
+If any window's Shannon entropy exceeds `threshold`, returns a **warn**-severity
+`ScanResult`. Never blocks.
+
+`OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES` gains `"entropy"`. Routes opt in via their `dlp`
+block; entropy scanning is **off by default** to avoid false-positive noise on
+legitimate binary payloads.
+
+### Binary body handling
+
+In `scan_outbound`, the bytes → str decoding changes from:
+
+```python
+body.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+```
+
+to:
+
+```python
+body.decode("utf-8") if body is str else body.decode("latin-1")
+```
+
+`latin-1` is a bijective byte↔codepoint mapping; every byte value is preserved
+as its corresponding Latin-1 code point, so ASCII-range secret strings remain
+intact and `str.find` / regex still locate them correctly. The fallback from
+strict UTF-8 is tried first so valid UTF-8 bodies are decoded faithfully.
+
+## Implementation
+
+Delivered in three commits on the same branch:
+
+1. **DLP detector changes** — `_alnum_projection`, fragmentation passes,
+   `scan_entropy`, broadened `scan_known_secrets`, updated `scan_outbound` and
+   `redact_tokens`; all accompanying unit tests.
+2. **Canary injection** — `EgressPlan.canary`, `Egress.prepare()`,
+   Docker compose + macos-container backend injection.
+3. **PRD flip** — `Status: Draft → Active`.

docs/prds/0064-log-full-credential-redaction.md

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# PRD 0064: LOG_FULL egress logging credential redaction
+
+- **Status:** Active
+- **Author:** claude
+- **Created:** 2026-06-25
+- **Issue:** #257
+
+## Summary
+
+The `LOG_FULL` egress logging path (`_log_request` and `_log_response` in `egress_addon.py`) writes request/response headers and bodies to stderr without redaction and includes the sidecar-injected upstream `Authorization` header verbatim. This PR applies `redact_tokens` to header values and bodies in both log functions and strips the injected `Authorization` header from request logs entirely.
+
+## Problem
+
+`LOG_FULL` (log level 2) is intended for debugging egress traffic. When active it calls `_log_request` and `_log_response`. Both functions have two related bugs:
+
+1. **Injected `Authorization` header exposure.** `_log_request` is called *after* the sidecar injects upstream credentials (`flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization`). The full header dict — including the live credential — is serialized to stderr. Any log collector that ingests the egress container's stderr will receive the upstream bearer token in plaintext.
+
+2. **Unredacted bodies and header values.** Neither `_log_request` nor `_log_response` passes body or header values through `redact_tokens`. By contrast, `_req_ctx` (used for block/warn events) already calls `redact_tokens` on path and host. Any provisioned secret or recognized token pattern that appears in a request body, response body, or non-Authorization header value will be logged verbatim under `LOG_FULL`.
+
+These two bugs compose: an agent that enables `LOG_FULL` and simultaneously triggers a request that carries a known token gains a write path from credentials → egress logs.
+
+## Goals / Success Criteria
+
+- `_log_request` never logs the `authorization` header in any form.
+- `_log_request` applies `redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ)` to every other header value before serializing.
+- `_log_request` applies `redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)` to the request body before logging.
+- `_log_response` applies `redact_tokens(value, env=os.environ)` to every response header value before logging.
+- `_log_response` applies `redact_tokens(body, env=os.environ)` to the response body before logging.
+- Unit tests cover each of the five cases above.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Redacting host or path in the full-log path (already covered by `_req_ctx` for block/warn events; `_log_request` already calls `redact_tokens` on host and path).
+- Suppressing `LOG_FULL` or adding a new log level.
+- Changing the outbound DLP scan logic.
+
+## Design
+
+### `_log_request`
+
+```python
+def _log_request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+    headers = {
+        k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
+        for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()
+        if k.lower() != "authorization"
+    }
+    body = redact_tokens(flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
+    sys.stderr.write(
+        json.dumps({
+            "event": "egress_request",
+            "host": redact_tokens(flow.request.pretty_host, env=os.environ),
+            "method": flow.request.method,
+            "path": redact_tokens(flow.request.path, env=os.environ),
+            "headers": headers,
+            "body": body,
+        })
+        + "\n"
+    )
+```
+
+The `authorization` key is excluded because by the time `_log_request` is called the sidecar has already injected the upstream credential (`decision.inject_authorization`). Logging it would write a live bearer token to stderr on every allowed request. There is no safe subset to log — the value is always a live credential or empty.
+
+### `_log_response`
+
+```python
+def _log_response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
+    headers = {
+        k: redact_tokens(v, env=os.environ)
+        for k, v in flow.response.headers.items()
+    }
+    body = redact_tokens(flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or "", env=os.environ)
+    sys.stderr.write(
+        json.dumps({
+            "event": "egress_response",
+            "host": flow.request.pretty_host,
+            "status": flow.response.status_code,
+            "headers": headers,
+            "body": body,
+        })
+        + "\n"
+    )
+```
+
+Response headers don't carry injected credentials, so no header name is suppressed — only the values are scrubbed by `redact_tokens`.

tests/unit/test_cli_start_settle.py

@@ -102,6 +102,27 @@ class TestAttachAgent(unittest.TestCase):
             bottle.argv,
         )
 
+    def test_remote_control_is_provider_startup_arg(self):
+        class Bottle:
+            argv: list[str] = []
+
+            def exec_agent(self, argv: list[str], *, tty: bool = True) -> int:
+                self.argv = list(argv)
+                return 0
+
+        bottle = Bottle()
+        exit_code = start_mod.attach_agent(
+            bottle,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            agent_provider_template="codex",
+            startup_args=("remote-control",),
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(0, exit_code)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
+            bottle.argv,
+        )
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_compose.py

@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@ def _git_gate_plan(upstreams: tuple[GitGateUpstream, ...] = ()) -> GitGatePlan:
     )
 
 
-def _egress_plan(routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()) -> EgressPlan:
+def _egress_plan(
+    routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
+    *,
+    canary: bool = False,
+) -> EgressPlan:
     token_env_map = {
         r.token_env: r.token_ref
         for r in routes
@@ -95,6 +99,8 @@ def _egress_plan(routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()) -> EgressPlan:
         egress_network=f"bot-bottle-egress-{SLUG}",
         mitmproxy_ca_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "mitmproxy-ca.pem",
         mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=STATE / "egress-ca" / "ca.pem",
+        canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
+        canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
     )
 
 
@@ -112,6 +118,7 @@ def _plan(
     with_git: bool = False,
     with_egress: bool = False,
     supervise: bool = False,
+    canary: bool = False,
 ) -> DockerBottlePlan:
     """Build a fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan. Toggles cover the
     matrix the renderer's conditional-service logic branches on."""
@@ -150,7 +157,7 @@ def _plan(
         slug=SLUG,
         forwarded_env={"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN": "x"},
         git_gate_plan=_git_gate_plan(upstreams),
-        egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes),
+        egress_plan=_egress_plan(routes, canary=canary),
         supervise_plan=_supervise_plan() if supervise else None,
         use_runsc=False,
         agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
@@ -375,6 +382,20 @@ class TestSidecarBundleShape(unittest.TestCase):
         env_strings = sc["environment"]
         self.assertNotIn("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", env_strings)
 
+    def test_canary_env_registered_as_sensitive_in_sidecar(self):
+        sc = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
+        env_strings = sc["environment"]
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
+        self.assertIn(
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+            env_strings,
+        )
+
+    def test_canary_env_visible_to_agent(self):
+        agent = self._render(canary=True)["services"]["agent"]
+        env_strings = agent["environment"]
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", env_strings)
+
     def test_supervise_env_present_when_active(self):
         sc = self._render(supervise=True)["services"]["sidecars"]
         env_strings = sc["environment"]

tests/unit/test_contrib_codex_provider.py

@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ from bot_bottle.supervise import SupervisePlan
 
 
 _URL = "http://supervise:9100/"
+_CODEX_DOCKERFILE = (
+    Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile"
+)
 
 
 def _make_bottle(exec_result: ExecResult | None = None) -> MagicMock:
@@ -276,6 +279,12 @@ class TestCodexProvision(unittest.TestCase):
             )
 
 
+class TestCodexDockerfile(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_installs_procps_for_remote_control_pid_management(self):
+        dockerfile = _CODEX_DOCKERFILE.read_text()
+        self.assertIn("procps", dockerfile)
+
+
 class TestCodexSuperviseMcp(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_noop_when_supervise_disabled(self):
         bottle = _make_bottle()

tests/unit/test_dlp_detectors.py

@@ -1,18 +1,23 @@
 """Unit: DLP detectors (PRD 0053).
 
-Tests for token pattern scanning, known secret detection, and
+Tests for token pattern scanning, known secret detection, fragmentation-
-naive prompt injection detection."""
+resistant matching, entropy scoring, and naive prompt injection detection."""
 
 import base64
 import gzip
 import unittest
 
 from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import (
+    ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD,
+    PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN,
     REDACT,
+    _alnum_projection,
     _encoded_variants,
     _normalize_text,
+    _shannon_entropy,
     redact_tokens,
     scan_crlf_injection,
+    scan_entropy,
     scan_known_secrets,
     scan_naive_injection,
     scan_token_patterns,
@@ -502,6 +507,191 @@ class TestStripCrlf(unittest.TestCase):
         from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import strip_crlf
         self.assertEqual("/api/v1/data?q=hello", strip_crlf("/api/v1/data?q=hello"))
 
+class TestAlnumProjection(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_alphanumeric_unchanged(self):
+        self.assertEqual("abc123XYZ", _alnum_projection("abc123XYZ"))
+
+    def test_strips_hyphens(self):
+        self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my-secret-value"))
+
+    def test_strips_spaces(self):
+        self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my secret value"))
+
+    def test_strips_dots_and_underscores(self):
+        self.assertEqual("mysecretvalue", _alnum_projection("my.secret_value"))
+
+    def test_empty_string(self):
+        self.assertEqual("", _alnum_projection(""))
+
+    def test_all_special_chars(self):
+        self.assertEqual("", _alnum_projection("!@#$%^&*()"))
+
+
+class TestFragmentationResistantMatching(unittest.TestCase):
+    """scan_known_secrets catches separator-injection and partial-substring evasion."""
+
+    # Secrets long enough that their alnum projections are ≥ 8 chars.
+    SECRET = "supersecrettoken99"
+    ENV = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": SECRET}
+
+    def test_exact_match_still_works(self):
+        result = scan_known_secrets(f"key={self.SECRET}", env=self.ENV)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+
+    def test_separator_injection_blocked(self):
+        # Hyphens inserted between chars of the secret.
+        fragmented = "-".join(self.SECRET)
+        result = scan_known_secrets(f"data={fragmented}", env=self.ENV)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+        self.assertIn("separator injection", result.reason)
+
+    def test_space_separator_blocked(self):
+        fragmented = " ".join(self.SECRET)
+        result = scan_known_secrets(f"body: {fragmented}", env=self.ENV)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertIn("separator injection", result.reason)
+
+    def test_partial_substring_blocked(self):
+        # First PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN alnum chars of the secret, no separators.
+        partial = _alnum_projection(self.SECRET)[:PARTIAL_MATCH_MIN_LEN]
+        result = scan_known_secrets(f"x={partial}&y=other", env=self.ENV)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+        self.assertIn("partial match", result.reason)
+
+    def test_short_secret_skips_projection(self):
+        # Secrets shorter than _ALNUM_MIN_LEN in alnum projection are not
+        # fragmentation-checked (too many false positives).
+        short_env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "abc"}
+        # "a b c" has alnum projection "abc" (3 chars, < 8); should not block.
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets("a b c", env=short_env))
+
+    def test_clean_text_not_blocked(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets("nothing to see here", env=self.ENV))
+
+    def test_sensitive_prefixes_param_extra_prefix(self):
+        env = {"MY_CRED_0": self.SECRET, "IGNORED": "other"}
+        result = scan_known_secrets(
+            f"key={self.SECRET}",
+            env=env,
+            sensitive_prefixes=("MY_CRED_",),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertIn("MY_CRED_0", result.reason)
+
+    def test_sensitive_prefixes_default_only_egress_token(self):
+        # A value under a non-EGRESS_TOKEN_ key is ignored with default prefixes.
+        env = {"MY_CRED_0": self.SECRET}
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_known_secrets(f"key={self.SECRET}", env=env))
+
+    def test_canary_prefix_detected(self):
+        canary_value = "canary-fake-secret-value-xyz"
+        env = {"CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary_value}
+        result = scan_known_secrets(
+            f"x={canary_value}",
+            env=env,
+            sensitive_prefixes=("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", result.reason)
+
+
+class TestRedactTokensBroadenedPrefixes(unittest.TestCase):
+    SECRET = "my-provisioned-secret"
+
+    def test_default_redacts_egress_token(self):
+        env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": self.SECRET}
+        out = redact_tokens(f"val={self.SECRET}", env=env)
+        self.assertNotIn(self.SECRET, out)
+        self.assertIn(REDACT, out)
+
+    def test_extra_prefix_redacted(self):
+        env = {"MY_SECRET_KEY": self.SECRET}
+        out = redact_tokens(
+            f"val={self.SECRET}",
+            env=env,
+            sensitive_prefixes=("MY_SECRET_",),
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(self.SECRET, out)
+        self.assertIn(REDACT, out)
+
+    def test_non_matching_prefix_not_redacted(self):
+        env = {"MY_SECRET_KEY": self.SECRET}
+        out = redact_tokens(f"val={self.SECRET}", env=env)
+        # Default prefixes only include EGRESS_TOKEN_ → secret not redacted
+        self.assertIn(self.SECRET, out)
+
+
+class TestShannonEntropy(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_empty_string_zero(self):
+        self.assertEqual(0.0, _shannon_entropy(""))
+
+    def test_single_char_zero(self):
+        self.assertEqual(0.0, _shannon_entropy("aaaaaa"))
+
+    def test_two_equal_chars_one_bit(self):
+        self.assertAlmostEqual(1.0, _shannon_entropy("abababab"), places=10)
+
+    def test_high_entropy_random_like(self):
+        # Uniform 64-char string over 64 distinct symbols has entropy 6 bits.
+        import string
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        text = alphabet  # each char appears exactly once
+        self.assertAlmostEqual(6.0, _shannon_entropy(text), places=10)
+
+
+class TestScanEntropy(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_empty_returns_none(self):
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy(""))
+
+    def test_low_entropy_returns_none(self):
+        # Highly repetitive text has low entropy.
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy("a" * 200))
+
+    def test_high_entropy_warns(self):
+        # Build a 64-char string with entropy > ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD.
+        # Use all 64 distinct printable chars to maximise entropy (~6 bits).
+        import string
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        result = scan_entropy(alphabet, threshold=ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("warn", result.severity)
+        self.assertIn("high-entropy", result.reason)
+
+    def test_never_blocks(self):
+        import string
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        result = scan_entropy(alphabet)
+        # scan_entropy is warn-only; it must never return severity="block".
+        if result is not None:
+            self.assertNotEqual("block", result.severity)
+
+    def test_location_in_result(self):
+        import string
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        result = scan_entropy(alphabet, location="authorization header")
+        if result is not None:
+            self.assertIn("authorization header", result.location)
+
+    def test_structured_json_no_warn(self):
+        # Typical JSON has low entropy and should not be flagged.
+        json_body = '{"status": "ok", "message": "hello world", "count": 42}'
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy(json_body))
+
+    def test_short_text_below_window(self):
+        # Text shorter than the window: checked as one chunk.
+        # Use a uniform string to ensure it won't be flagged.
+        self.assertIsNone(scan_entropy("abcde", threshold=ENTROPY_BLOCK_THRESHOLD))
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_docker_bottle.py

@@ -136,6 +136,16 @@ class TestClaudeArgv(unittest.TestCase):
             argv,
         )
 
+    def test_codex_remote_control_startup_arg_does_not_receive_initial_prompt(self):
+        argv = _codex_bottle("/home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt").agent_argv(
+            ["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["docker", "exec", "-it", "bot-bottle-dev-abc", "codex",
+             "--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "remote-control"],
+            argv,
+        )
+
     def test_codex_resume_does_not_append_initial_prompt(self):
         argv = _codex_bottle("/home/node/.bot-bottle-prompt.txt").agent_argv(
             ["--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox", "resume", "--last"],

tests/unit/test_docker_provision_git_user.py

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ class _Provider(AgentProvider):
         return AgentProviderRuntime(
             template="test", command="test", image="",
             prompt_mode="append_file", bypass_args=(), resume_args=(),
-            remote_control_args=(),
         )
     def provision_plan(self, **kwargs):  # type: ignore[override]
         raise NotImplementedError

tests/unit/test_egress.py

@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
 """Unit: Egress route lift + routes.yaml render + token
 resolution (PRD 0017, PRD 0053)."""
 
+import tempfile
 import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
 
 from bot_bottle.egress import (
     CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
+    Egress,
+    EgressPlan,
     EgressRoute,
+    egress_agent_env_entries,
     egress_manifest_routes,
     egress_render_routes,
     egress_resolve_token_values,
     egress_routes_for_bottle,
+    egress_sidecar_env_entries,
     egress_token_env_map,
 )
 from bot_bottle.log import Die
@@ -316,7 +322,7 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual([], parse_yaml_subset(rendered)["routes"])
 
     def test_round_trip_through_addon_core(self):
-        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
         b = _bottle([
             {"host": "api.github.com",
              "auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "GH_PAT"},
@@ -327,7 +333,7 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
             {"host": "api.anthropic.com"},
         ])
         routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
-        addon_routes = load_routes(egress_render_routes(routes))
+        addon_routes = load_config(egress_render_routes(routes)).routes
         self.assertEqual(3, len(addon_routes))
         self.assertEqual("Bearer", addon_routes[0].auth_scheme)
         self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", addon_routes[0].token_env)
@@ -335,26 +341,26 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual("", addon_routes[2].auth_scheme)
 
     def test_dlp_round_trips(self):
-        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
         b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example", "dlp": {
             "outbound_detectors": ["token_patterns"],
             "inbound_detectors": False,
         }}])
         routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
         rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
-        addon_routes = load_routes(rendered)
+        addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
         self.assertEqual(("token_patterns",), addon_routes[0].outbound_detectors)
         self.assertEqual((), addon_routes[0].inbound_detectors)
 
     def test_outbound_on_match_round_trips(self):
-        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
         b = _bottle([{"host": "logs.example", "dlp": {
             "outbound_on_match": "redact",
         }}])
         routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
         rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
         self.assertIn('outbound_on_match: "redact"', rendered)
-        addon_routes = load_routes(rendered)
+        addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
         self.assertEqual("redact", addon_routes[0].outbound_on_match)
 
     def test_outbound_on_match_default_omitted_from_render(self):
@@ -364,12 +370,12 @@ class TestRenderRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotIn("outbound_on_match", rendered)
 
     def test_git_fetch_policy_round_trips(self):
-        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_routes
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import load_config
         b = _bottle([{"host": "github.com", "git": {"fetch": True}}])
         routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
         rendered = egress_render_routes(routes)
         self.assertEqual({"fetch": True}, self._parsed(routes)[0]["git"])
-        addon_routes = load_routes(rendered)
+        addon_routes = load_config(rendered).routes
         self.assertTrue(addon_routes[0].git_fetch)
 
     def test_log_zero_omitted_from_render(self):
@@ -443,5 +449,119 @@ class TestResolveTokenValues(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual({"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "codex-access-token"}, out)
 
 
+class TestCanaryGeneration(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Egress.prepare() generates a unique canary token per session."""
+
+    def _bottle_obj(self):
+        return ManifestIndex.from_json_obj({
+            "bottles": {"dev": {"egress": {"routes": []}}},
+            "agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
+        }).bottles["dev"]
+
+    def _make_plan(self) -> EgressPlan:
+        # Use a concrete no-op subclass so we can call prepare() without
+        # a real backend.
+        class _TestEgress(Egress):
+            pass
+
+        e = _TestEgress()
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            return e.prepare(self._bottle_obj(), "test-slug", Path(td))
+
+    def test_canary_is_non_empty(self):
+        plan = self._make_plan()
+        self.assertIsInstance(plan.canary, str)
+        self.assertGreater(len(plan.canary), 0)
+        self.assertRegex(plan.canary_env, r"^[A-Z]+_[A-Z]+_SECRET$")
+
+    def test_canary_is_unique_per_session(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as td:
+            bottle = self._bottle_obj()
+
+            class _TestEgress(Egress):
+                pass
+
+            e = _TestEgress()
+            plan_a = e.prepare(bottle, "slug-a", Path(td))
+            plan_b = e.prepare(bottle, "slug-b", Path(td))
+        self.assertNotEqual(plan_a.canary, plan_b.canary)
+
+    def test_canary_detected_by_scan_known_secrets(self):
+        from bot_bottle.dlp_detectors import scan_known_secrets
+
+        plan = self._make_plan()
+        env = {plan.canary_env: plan.canary}
+        result = scan_known_secrets(
+            f"exfil={plan.canary}",
+            env=env,
+            sensitive_prefixes=(plan.canary_env,),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+        self.assertIn(plan.canary_env, result.reason)
+
+    def test_egress_plan_canary_field_default_empty(self):
+        # Verify EgressPlan can be constructed with an empty canary (backward compat).
+        from pathlib import Path
+        plan = EgressPlan(
+            slug="s",
+            routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
+            routes=(),
+            token_env_map={},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual("", plan.canary)
+        self.assertEqual("", plan.canary_env)
+
+
+class TestEgressEnvEntries(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_sidecar_entries_include_route_tokens_and_canary_scan_prefix(self):
+        plan = EgressPlan(
+            slug="s",
+            routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
+            routes=(EgressRoute(host="api.example"),),
+            token_env_map={"EGRESS_TOKEN_1": "T1", "EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "T0"},
+            canary="fake-canary-value",
+            canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(
+            (
+                "EGRESS_TOKEN_0",
+                "EGRESS_TOKEN_1",
+                "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value",
+                "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+            ),
+            egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan),
+        )
+
+    def test_agent_entries_include_only_canary_bait(self):
+        plan = EgressPlan(
+            slug="s",
+            routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
+            routes=(),
+            token_env_map={},
+            canary="fake-canary-value",
+            canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value",),
+            egress_agent_env_entries(plan),
+        )
+
+    def test_canary_entries_omitted_when_name_missing(self):
+        plan = EgressPlan(
+            slug="s",
+            routes_path=Path("/tmp/r.yaml"),
+            routes=(),
+            token_env_map={},
+            canary="fake-canary-value",
+        )
+
+        self.assertEqual((), egress_sidecar_env_entries(plan))
+        self.assertEqual((), egress_agent_env_entries(plan))
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_egress_addon_core.py

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import (
     is_git_fetch_request,
     is_git_push_request,
     load_config,
-    load_routes,
     match_route,
     outbound_scan_headers,
     parse_config,
@@ -289,47 +288,6 @@ class TestParseDlp(unittest.TestCase):
             }]})
 
 
-# --- load_routes ---------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-class TestLoadRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_yaml_text_round_trip(self):
-        routes = load_routes(
-            'routes:\n'
-            '  - host: "api.example"\n'
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
-        self.assertEqual("api.example", routes[0].host)
-
-    def test_full_route_shape_parses(self):
-        routes = load_routes(
-            'routes:\n'
-            '  - host: "api.example"\n'
-            '    auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
-            '    token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_0"\n'
-            '    matches:\n'
-            '      - paths:\n'
-            '          - value: "/v1/"\n'
-            '          - type: "exact"\n'
-            '            value: "/messages"\n'
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
-        r = routes[0]
-        self.assertEqual("api.example", r.host)
-        self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
-        self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", r.token_env)
-        self.assertEqual(1, len(r.matches))
-        self.assertEqual(2, len(r.matches[0].paths))
-
-    def test_empty_routes_list(self):
-        routes = load_routes("routes: []\n")
-        self.assertEqual((), routes)
-
-    def test_invalid_yaml_raises_value_error(self):
-        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-            load_routes("routes:\n\t- host: x\n")
-
-
 # --- load_config / parse_config ------------------------------------------
 
 
@@ -378,6 +336,33 @@ class TestLoadConfig(unittest.TestCase):
         with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
             parse_config("not a dict")
 
+    def test_empty_routes_list(self):
+        cfg = load_config("routes: []\n")
+        self.assertEqual((), cfg.routes)
+
+    def test_full_route_shape_parses(self):
+        cfg = load_config(
+            'routes:\n'
+            '  - host: "api.example"\n'
+            '    auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
+            '    token_env: "EGRESS_TOKEN_0"\n'
+            '    matches:\n'
+            '      - paths:\n'
+            '          - value: "/v1/"\n'
+            '          - type: "exact"\n'
+            '            value: "/messages"\n'
+        )
+        r = cfg.routes[0]
+        self.assertEqual("api.example", r.host)
+        self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
+        self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", r.token_env)
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(r.matches))
+        self.assertEqual(2, len(r.matches[0].paths))
+
+    def test_invalid_yaml_raises_value_error(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            load_config("routes:\n\t- host: x\n")
+
 
 # --- evaluate_matches ---------------------------------------------------
 
@@ -1273,6 +1258,109 @@ class TestBuildTokenAllowPayload(unittest.TestCase):
         result = ScanResult(severity="block", reason="r", matched="x")
         payload = build_token_allow_payload("h", "GET", "/", result)
         self.assertNotIn("context:", payload)
+class TestScanOutboundEnhanced(unittest.TestCase):
+    """scan_outbound changes: binary decode, entropy detector,
+    broadened known-value prefixes, fragmentation resistance."""
+
+    _ROUTE = Route(host="api.example.com")
+    _ROUTE_ENTROPY = Route(
+        host="api.example.com",
+        outbound_detectors=("entropy",),
+    )
+
+    def test_binary_body_latin1_decode_finds_ascii_secret(self):
+        # Body contains valid ASCII secret surrounded by non-UTF-8 bytes.
+        secret = "supersecrettoken99"
+        env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}
+        # Wrap the secret in bytes that are invalid UTF-8.
+        body = b"\x80\x81" + secret.encode("ascii") + b"\xff"
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, body, env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+
+    def test_binary_body_valid_utf8_decoded_correctly(self):
+        env = {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "mysecret"}
+        # Valid UTF-8 body — should be decoded as UTF-8, not latin-1.
+        body = "clean body with mysecret".encode("utf-8")
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, body, env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+
+    def test_entropy_detector_off_by_default(self):
+        import string
+        # High-entropy content should NOT warn if the route has no entropy detector.
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, alphabet, {})
+        self.assertIsNone(result)
+
+    def test_entropy_detector_warns_when_enabled(self):
+        import string
+        alphabet = (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/")[:64]
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE_ENTROPY, alphabet, {})
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("warn", result.severity)
+
+    def test_bot_bottle_sensitive_prefixes_env_var(self):
+        # When the sidecar env contains BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES,
+        # scan_outbound should scan those additional prefixes.
+        secret = "extra-sensitive-value-abc"
+        env = {
+            "MY_CRED_KEY": secret,
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "MY_CRED_",
+        }
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"x={secret}", env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+
+    def test_bot_bottle_sensitive_prefixes_multiple(self):
+        secret = "my-api-key-value-xyz"
+        env = {
+            "ANTHROPIC_API_0": secret,
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "ANTHROPIC_API_,OTHER_",
+        }
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"auth={secret}", env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+
+    def test_canary_detected_via_random_secret_env_name(self):
+        # The fake secret uses a randomized env name that the sidecar marks
+        # as sensitive through BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES.
+        canary = "canaryvalue12345abcdef"
+        env = {
+            "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary,
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+        }
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"data={canary}", env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+        assert result is not None
+        self.assertEqual("block", result.severity)
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", result.reason)
+
+    def test_fragmented_canary_blocked(self):
+        # Canary with separators injected is still caught.
+        canary = "supersecretcanary99"
+        env = {
+            "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET": canary,
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES": "CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+        }
+        fragmented = "-".join(canary)
+        result = scan_outbound(self._ROUTE, f"x={fragmented}", env)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result)
+
+
+class TestOutboundDetectorNames(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_entropy_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
+        self.assertIn("entropy", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
+
+    def test_known_secrets_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
+        self.assertIn("known_secrets", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
+
+    def test_token_patterns_in_outbound_detector_names(self):
+        from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES
+        self.assertIn("token_patterns", OUTBOUND_DETECTOR_NAMES)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/unit/test_egress_addon_log_redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+"""Unit: LOG_FULL credential redaction in _log_request / _log_response (issue #257).
+
+egress_addon.py is sidecar-only code that depends on mitmproxy, which is
+not installed on the host. This file pre-populates sys.modules with the
+minimum mocks needed so EgressAddon can be imported and tested without the
+real mitmproxy package."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import sys
+import types
+import unittest
+from io import StringIO
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Sidecar-import shims — must run before importing egress_addon
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _ensure_shims() -> None:
+    if "mitmproxy" not in sys.modules:
+        _mm = types.ModuleType("mitmproxy")
+        _mh = types.ModuleType("mitmproxy.http")
+        setattr(_mm, "http", _mh)
+        sys.modules["mitmproxy"] = _mm
+        sys.modules["mitmproxy.http"] = _mh
+    if "egress_addon_core" not in sys.modules:
+        import bot_bottle.egress_addon_core as _core
+        sys.modules["egress_addon_core"] = _core
+
+
+_ensure_shims()
+
+from bot_bottle.egress_addon import EgressAddon  # noqa: E402  (import after shims)
+from bot_bottle.egress_addon_core import Config, LOG_FULL  # noqa: E402
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Helpers
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def _addon() -> EgressAddon:
+    """Return a bare EgressAddon with LOG_FULL config and no routes file."""
+    a: EgressAddon = EgressAddon.__new__(EgressAddon)
+    a.config = Config(routes=(), log=LOG_FULL)
+    a.safe_tokens = set()
+    a._supervise_queue_dir = ""
+    a._supervise_slug = ""
+    a._token_allow_timeout = 300.0
+    return a
+
+
+class _Headers:
+    def __init__(self, d: dict[str, str]) -> None:
+        self._d = d
+
+    def items(self) -> list[tuple[str, str]]:
+        return list(self._d.items())
+
+
+class _Request:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        host: str = "api.example.com",
+        method: str = "POST",
+        path: str = "/v1/messages",
+        headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+        body: str = "",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.pretty_host = host
+        self.method = method
+        self.path = path
+        self.headers = _Headers(headers or {})
+        self._body = body
+
+    def get_text(self, *, strict: bool = True) -> str:
+        return self._body
+
+
+class _Response:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        status_code: int = 200,
+        headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+        body: str = "",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.status_code = status_code
+        self.headers = _Headers(headers or {})
+        self._body = body
+
+    def get_text(self, *, strict: bool = True) -> str:
+        return self._body
+
+
+class _Flow:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        request: _Request | None = None,
+        response: _Response | None = None,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.request = request or _Request()
+        self.response = response or _Response()
+
+
+def _log_request(addon: EgressAddon, flow: _Flow) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    buf = StringIO()
+    with patch("sys.stderr", buf):
+        addon._log_request(flow)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    return json.loads(buf.getvalue())
+
+
+def _log_response(addon: EgressAddon, flow: _Flow) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    buf = StringIO()
+    with patch("sys.stderr", buf):
+        addon._log_response(flow)  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    return json.loads(buf.getvalue())
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _log_request — authorization header stripped
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLogRequestAuthorizationStripped(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_lowercase_authorization_excluded(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret"}))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn("authorization", entry["headers"])
+
+    def test_titlecase_authorization_excluded(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"Authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret"}))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn("Authorization", entry["headers"])
+        self.assertNotIn("authorization", entry["headers"])
+
+    def test_non_auth_headers_retained(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={
+            "authorization": "Bearer sk-real-secret",
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+        }))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertIn("content-type", entry["headers"])
+        self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["content-type"])
+
+    def test_no_authorization_header_logs_all_others(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"x-request-id": "abc"}))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertEqual({"x-request-id": "abc"}, entry["headers"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _log_request — body redaction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+_OPENAI_KEY = "sk-" + "A" * 48
+
+
+class TestLogRequestBodyRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_token_pattern_in_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=f"key={_OPENAI_KEY}"))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["body"])
+        self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
+
+    def test_provisioned_secret_in_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        secret = "provisioned-egress-secret-xyz"
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=f"token={secret}"))
+        with patch.dict("os.environ", {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}):
+            entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, entry["body"])
+        self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
+
+    def test_clean_body_preserved(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        payload = '{"model": "claude-3", "max_tokens": 1024}'
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(body=payload))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertEqual(payload, entry["body"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _log_request — non-authorization header value redaction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLogRequestHeaderValuesRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_token_in_custom_header_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"x-api-key": _OPENAI_KEY}))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["headers"].get("x-api-key", ""))
+        self.assertIn("********", entry["headers"].get("x-api-key", ""))
+
+    def test_clean_header_value_preserved(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(headers={"accept": "application/json"}))
+        entry = _log_request(addon, flow)
+        self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["accept"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _log_response — body redaction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLogResponseBodyRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_token_pattern_in_response_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(
+            request=_Request(),
+            response=_Response(body=f'{{"key": "{_OPENAI_KEY}"}}'),
+        )
+        entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, entry["body"])
+        self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
+
+    def test_provisioned_secret_in_response_body_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        secret = "provisioned-egress-secret-xyz"
+        flow = _Flow(
+            request=_Request(),
+            response=_Response(body=f'{{"token": "{secret}"}}'),
+        )
+        with patch.dict("os.environ", {"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": secret}):
+            entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
+        self.assertNotIn(secret, entry["body"])
+        self.assertIn("********", entry["body"])
+
+    def test_clean_response_body_preserved(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(request=_Request(), response=_Response(body='{"result": "ok"}'))
+        entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
+        self.assertEqual('{"result": "ok"}', entry["body"])
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# _log_response — response header value redaction
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+class TestLogResponseHeaderValuesRedacted(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_token_in_response_header_scrubbed(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(
+            request=_Request(),
+            response=_Response(headers={"set-cookie": f"token={_OPENAI_KEY}"}),
+        )
+        entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
+        cookie_val = entry["headers"].get("set-cookie", "")
+        self.assertNotIn(_OPENAI_KEY, cookie_val)
+        self.assertIn("********", cookie_val)
+
+    def test_clean_response_header_preserved(self) -> None:
+        addon = _addon()
+        flow = _Flow(
+            request=_Request(),
+            response=_Response(headers={"content-type": "application/json"}),
+        )
+        entry = _log_response(addon, flow)
+        self.assertEqual("application/json", entry["headers"]["content-type"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/unit/test_egress_apply.py

@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ class TestValidateRoutesContent(unittest.TestCase):
                 '    auth_scheme: "Bearer"\n'
             )
 
+    def test_rejects_log_full(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(EgressApplyError) as cm:
+            applicator.validate_routes_content(
+                'log: 2\n'
+                'routes:\n'
+                '  - host: "x.example"\n'
+            )
+        self.assertIn("must not change egress logging", str(cm.exception))
+
 
 class TestApplyRoutesChange(unittest.TestCase):
     def setUp(self):

tests/unit/test_macos_container_launch.py

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ def _plan(
     supervise: bool = False,
     agent_git_gate_url: str = "",
     agent_supervise_url: str = "",
+    canary: bool = False,
 ) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
     routes_path = stage_dir / "routes.yaml"
     routes_path.write_text("routes: []\n", encoding="utf-8")
@@ -42,6 +43,8 @@ def _plan(
         routes_path=routes_path,
         routes=("route",),
         token_env_map={"EGRESS_TOKEN_0": "HOST_TOKEN"},
+        canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
+        canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
     )
     if git:
         key_path = stage_dir / "origin-key"
@@ -138,6 +141,26 @@ class TestMacosContainerLaunchArgv(unittest.TestCase):
             argv,
         )
 
+    def test_sidecar_argv_registers_canary_env_as_sensitive(self):
+        plan = _plan(stage_dir=self.stage_dir, canary=True)
+        argv = launch._sidecar_run_argv(
+            plan,
+            "bot-bottle-sidecars-dev-abc",
+            "bot-bottle-net-dev-abc",
+            "bot-bottle-egress-dev-abc",
+        )
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", argv)
+        self.assertIn("BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET", argv)
+
+    def test_agent_argv_receives_canary_env(self):
+        plan = _plan(stage_dir=self.stage_dir, canary=True)
+        argv = launch._agent_run_argv(
+            plan,
+            "bot-bottle-net-dev-abc",
+            "192.0.2.10",
+        )
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", argv)
+
     def test_agent_env_points_proxy_at_sidecar_ip(self):
         plan = _plan(
             stage_dir=self.stage_dir,
@@ -271,7 +294,7 @@ def _build_plan(stage_dir: Path) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
         manifest=_MANIFEST,
         stage_dir=stage_dir,
         git_gate_plan=cast(GitGatePlan, SimpleNamespace(upstreams=())),
-        egress_plan=cast(EgressPlan, SimpleNamespace()),
+        egress_plan=cast(EgressPlan, SimpleNamespace(canary="")),
         supervise_plan=None,
         agent_provision=AgentProvisionPlan(
             template="claude",

tests/unit/test_macos_container_util.py

@@ -73,6 +73,33 @@ resolver #2
         )
         self.assertTrue(run.call_args_list[-1].kwargs["check"])
 
+    def test_build_image_anchors_relative_dockerfile_to_context(self):
+        status = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(
+            args=[],
+            returncode=0,
+            stdout=(
+                '[{"status":{"state":"running"},'
+                '"configuration":{"dns":{"nameservers":["9.9.9.9"]}}}]'
+            ),
+            stderr="",
+        )
+        with patch.object(util.subprocess, "run", return_value=status) as run, \
+             patch.object(util.os, "environ", {
+                 "BOT_BOTTLE_MACOS_CONTAINER_DNS": "9.9.9.9",
+             }):
+            util.build_image(
+                "bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
+                "/repo",
+                dockerfile="Dockerfile.sidecars",
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            [
+                "container", "build", "-t", "bot-bottle-sidecars:latest",
+                "--dns", "9.9.9.9", "-f", "/repo/Dockerfile.sidecars", "/repo",
+            ],
+            run.call_args_list[-1].args[0],
+        )
+
     def test_commit_container_execs_tar_and_builds_image(self):
         # stderr is bytes because subprocess.run uses stderr=PIPE without text=True
         completed = util.subprocess.CompletedProcess(

tests/unit/test_plan_print_parity.py

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ def _capture_print(plan: DockerBottlePlan | SmolmachinesBottlePlan) -> list[str]
     orig = sys.stderr
     sys.stderr = buf
     try:
-        plan.print(remote_control=False)
+        plan.print()
     finally:
         sys.stderr = orig
     return buf.getvalue().splitlines()

tests/unit/test_smolmachines_provision.py

@@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle import SmolmachinesBottle
 from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.bottle_plan import (
     SmolmachinesBottlePlan,
 )
-# from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.provision import (
+from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines import launch as _launch
-#     workspace as _workspace,
-# )
 from bot_bottle.backend.smolmachines.launch import _bundle_launch_spec
 from bot_bottle.backend.util import AGENT_CA_PATH
 from bot_bottle.egress import EgressPlan, EgressRoute
@@ -44,7 +42,6 @@ class _Provider(AgentProvider):
         return AgentProviderRuntime(
             template="test", command="test", image="",
             prompt_mode="append_file", bypass_args=(), resume_args=(),
-            remote_control_args=(),
         )
     def provision_plan(self, **kwargs):  # type: ignore[override]
         raise NotImplementedError
@@ -86,6 +83,7 @@ def _plan(
     stage_dir: Path | None = None,
     egress_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
     egress_ca_path: Path = Path(),
+    canary: bool = False,
     supervise: bool = False,
     bundle_ip: str = "192.168.50.2",
     agent_git_gate_host: str = "127.0.0.1:55555",
@@ -156,6 +154,8 @@ def _plan(
             routes=egress_routes,
             token_env_map={},
             mitmproxy_ca_cert_only_host_path=egress_ca_path,
+            canary="fake-canary-value" if canary else "",
+            canary_env="CANON_ALPHA_SECRET" if canary else "",
         ),
         supervise_plan=supervise_plan,
         agent_git_gate_host=agent_git_gate_host,
@@ -411,6 +411,31 @@ class TestBundleLaunchSpec(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn(9420, spec.ports_to_publish)
         self.assertNotIn(9418, spec.ports_to_publish)
 
+    def test_canary_env_registered_as_sensitive_in_bundle(self):
+        plan = _plan(canary=True)
+
+        spec = _bundle_launch_spec(plan, "net", "127.0.0.16")
+
+        self.assertIn("CANON_ALPHA_SECRET=fake-canary-value", spec.environment)
+        self.assertIn(
+            "BOT_BOTTLE_SENSITIVE_PREFIXES=CANON_ALPHA_SECRET",
+            spec.environment,
+        )
+
+    def test_canary_env_visible_to_smolvm_guest(self):
+        plan = _plan(canary=True)
+        with patch.object(
+            _launch._bundle,
+            "bundle_host_port",
+            return_value="65000",
+        ):
+            stamped = _launch._discover_urls(plan, "127.0.0.16")
+
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "fake-canary-value",
+            stamped.guest_env["CANON_ALPHA_SECRET"],
+        )
+
 
 class TestProvisionGitUser(unittest.TestCase):
     """`provision_git` runs `git config --global` inside the

tests/unit/test_supervise_server.py

@@ -67,6 +67,15 @@ class TestValidation(unittest.TestCase):
         with self.assertRaises(_RpcError):
             validate_proposed_file(_sv.TOOL_EGRESS_BLOCK, "routes: nope\n")
 
+    def test_egress_routes_yaml_rejects_log_full(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(_RpcError) as cm:
+            validate_proposed_file(
+                _sv.TOOL_EGRESS_ALLOW,
+                "log: 2\nroutes:\n  - host: example.com\n",
+            )
+        self.assertEqual(ERR_INVALID_PARAMS, cm.exception.code)
+        self.assertIn("must not change egress logging", cm.exception.message)
+
 
 # --- JSON-RPC parsing ------------------------------------------------------