Compare commits

...

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis-claude 650f3aa93e refactor(manifest): remove empty EGRESS_ROLES and related plumbing
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 30s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 45s
EGRESS_ROLES, EGRESS_SINGLETON_ROLES, and PROVIDER_EGRESS_ROLES were
all empty frozensets after the codex_auth and claude_code_oauth roles
were removed. Delete the constants and all validation code that iterated
over them (the singleton-role loop and provider-role check in
_validate_egress_routes, the EGRESS_ROLES membership test in
EgressRoute.from_dict). EgressRoute.from_dict now rejects any role
string unconditionally; _validate_egress_routes loses its
agent_provider_template parameter entirely.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 01:57:55 +00:00
didericis-claude 8a038dcceb refactor(manifest): remove codex_auth egress role
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 30s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 42s
Both provider-owned roles are now gone. Provider auth routes are
provisioner-owned (claude: auth_token, codex: forward_host_credentials);
the role field and validation plumbing stay for future use but EGRESS_ROLES
is empty. Any manifest declaring a role now fails at parse time.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 01:50:41 +00:00
didericis 3b96de95ab fix(agent): move default claude env vars to the right location
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 36s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 55s
2026-06-01 21:41:38 -04:00
didericis-claude 962f8144fc fix(agent): always emit passthrough egress route for api.anthropic.com
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 45s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 56s
Mirrors the Codex pattern: Claude always gets a tls_passthrough route
for api.anthropic.com so user-set tokens aren't stripped by pipelock,
whether or not auth_token is declared. Auth injection (scheme + token_ref)
and the placeholder env only apply when auth_token is set.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 01:34:25 +00:00
didericis-claude 200a113cce feat(manifest): add agent_provider.auth_token for Claude OAuth via egress
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 39s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 1m0s
Operators can now declare:

  agent_provider:
    template: claude
    auth_token: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN

and the provisioner injects a provider-owned api.anthropic.com egress
route (Bearer, tls_passthrough) rather than requiring a manually
declared route with the former claude_code_oauth role.

Changes:
- Add auth_token field to AgentProvider; validate claude-only.
- Remove claude_code_oauth from EGRESS_ROLES / PROVIDER_EGRESS_ROLES.
  Manifests that declare the role now fail at parse time with "unknown
  role" — the provisioner owns the route.
- agent_provision_plan: replace manifest_egress_routes/has_provider_auth
  with auth_token; Claude branch injects the api.anthropic.com route,
  placeholder env, and nonessential-traffic flags when auth_token is set.
- Add hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] to AgentProvisionPlan; Claude
  branch populates it with CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN.
- Remove auth_role from AgentProviderRuntime and placeholder_env_for().
- print_util.visible_agent_env_names: accept hidden_env_names from the
  plan instead of dispatching on agent_provider_template.
- Both backends: drop manifest_egress_routes call, pass auth_token.
- PRD 0029 rescoped to cover both Codex and Claude provider auth.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 01:24:18 +00:00
didericis-claude 2eb6e02ee1 refactor(agent): move placeholder env injection into agent_provision_plan
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 29s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 42s
The has_provider_auth check and egress-placeholder injection were
duplicated in both backends. Move them into agent_provision_plan so
the provisioner owns that decision entirely:

- Replace has_provider_auth: bool param with manifest_egress_routes,
  compute has_provider_auth internally from the route roles.
- Inject CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress-placeholder inside the plan
  when has_provider_auth, alongside the existing nonessential-traffic
  vars. Backends no longer touch the placeholder env.
- Remove placeholder_env from AgentProviderRuntime; expose
  placeholder_env_for() for print_util's hide-from-summary logic.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 00:57:43 +00:00
didericis-claude 86cfd94b72 fix(codex): emit passthrough egress routes when not forwarding host credentials
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 47s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 49s
When forward_host_credentials is false, Codex bottles should still get
tls_passthrough routes for the OpenAI/ChatGPT hosts so that tokens a
user sets via `codex login` after launch aren't stripped by pipelock's
header DLP. Previously no routes were emitted, which would have blocked
those requests entirely once pipelock enforcement tightens.

Rename the test to reflect the new expected behavior.

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 00:39:32 +00:00
didericis-claude 0233b481b1 fix(egress): break circular import with manifest via TYPE_CHECKING
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 44s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 55s
manifest → agent_provider → egress → manifest created a cycle that
caused ImportError on any module import. With from __future__ import
annotations already present, Bottle is only needed at type-check time
(annotations are lazy strings under PEP 563).

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-02 00:28:57 +00:00
didericis-claude b79b49090f refactor: provision egress routes via AgentProvisionPlan
test / unit (pull_request) Failing after 31s
test / integration (pull_request) Failing after 18s
Remove provider-specific branching from egress.py and pipelock.py.
Previously, `egress_routes_for_bottle` and `pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough`
both contained `template == "codex"` checks — the same pattern the rest
of the PR moved out of the backends.

Root cause: `EgressRoute` had no `tls_passthrough` field, so pipelock
couldn't learn from the synthesised Codex routes that they needed
passthrough. Fix:

- Add `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough: bool`. `egress_manifest_routes` lifts
  the existing `pipelock.tls_passthrough` manifest flag here; provider
  routes set it directly.
- Add `AgentProvisionPlan.egress_routes`. `agent_provision_plan` populates
  it for Codex + `forward_host_credentials`, including `tls_passthrough=True`.
- Replace Codex-specific `egress_routes_for_bottle` logic with a generic
  `_merge_provider_route` helper. Backends call `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle,
  plan.egress_routes)`; no provider type checks inside egress or pipelock.
- Rewrite `pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough` to read `route.tls_passthrough`
  from the merged route set instead of re-implementing the provider check.
- Both backends now call `agent_provision_plan` before `Egress.prepare` and
  `PipelockProxy.prepare`, threading `plan.egress_routes` to both. `has_provider_auth`
  is derived from `egress_manifest_routes` (manifest routes only — provider
  routes carry no auth roles, so the result is identical).

Assisted-by: Claude Code
2026-06-01 23:27:27 +00:00
15 changed files with 486 additions and 437 deletions
+40 -8
View File
@@ -13,11 +13,17 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import Literal
from .codex_auth import write_codex_dummy_auth_file
from .egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
PROVIDER_CLAUDE = "claude"
PROVIDER_CODEX = "codex"
PROVIDER_TEMPLATES = frozenset({PROVIDER_CLAUDE, PROVIDER_CODEX})
# Hosts that egress injects the host ChatGPT bearer on when Codex
# forward_host_credentials is enabled. Pipelock must pass these through
# (no TLS MITM) or its header DLP blocks the injected JWT.
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com")
PromptMode = Literal["append_file", "read_prompt_file"]
@@ -27,8 +33,6 @@ class AgentProviderRuntime:
command: str
image: str
dockerfile: str
auth_role: str
placeholder_env: str
prompt_mode: PromptMode
bypass_args: tuple[str, ...]
resume_args: tuple[str, ...]
@@ -63,6 +67,16 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
Backends interpret this plan with their own copy/exec primitives.
Provider-specific content stays here so future provider plugins can
return the same shape without adding backend-plan fields.
`egress_routes` are provider-declared EgressRoutes that backends
pass to `Egress.prepare` and `PipelockProxy.prepare`. This keeps
provider logic out of the egress and pipelock modules — they merge
provider routes generically without knowing the provider type.
`hidden_env_names` is the set of env var names the provider injected
as non-secret placeholders. `print_util.visible_agent_env_names` uses
this to suppress them from the preflight summary so operators don't
mistake them for real credentials.
"""
template: str
@@ -76,6 +90,8 @@ class AgentProvisionPlan:
files: tuple[AgentProvisionFile, ...] = ()
pre_copy: tuple[AgentProvisionCommand, ...] = ()
verify: tuple[AgentProvisionCommand, ...] = ()
egress_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = field(default_factory=frozenset)
_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
@@ -87,8 +103,6 @@ _RUNTIMES = {
command="claude",
image="bot-bottle-claude:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.claude"),
auth_role="claude_code_oauth",
placeholder_env="CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
prompt_mode="append_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-skip-permissions",),
resume_args=("--continue",),
@@ -99,8 +113,6 @@ _RUNTIMES = {
command="codex",
image="bot-bottle-codex:latest",
dockerfile=str(_REPO_ROOT / "Dockerfile.codex"),
auth_role="",
placeholder_env="",
prompt_mode="read_prompt_file",
bypass_args=("--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox",),
resume_args=("resume", "--last"),
@@ -120,8 +132,8 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
state_dir: Path,
guest_home: str = "/home/node",
guest_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
auth_token: str = "",
forward_host_credentials: bool = False,
has_provider_auth: bool = False,
host_env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> AgentProvisionPlan:
runtime = runtime_for(template)
@@ -131,6 +143,8 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
files: list[AgentProvisionFile] = []
pre_copy: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
verify: list[AgentProvisionCommand] = []
egress_routes: list[EgressRoute] = []
hidden_env_names: frozenset[str] = frozenset()
if template == PROVIDER_CODEX:
env_vars["CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE"] = "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"
@@ -147,6 +161,13 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
config_file.chmod(0o600)
files.append(AgentProvisionFile(config_file, config_path))
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer" if forward_host_credentials else "",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF if forward_host_credentials else "",
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if forward_host_credentials:
auth_file = state_dir / "codex-auth.json"
write_codex_dummy_auth_file(auth_file, host_env or dict(os.environ))
@@ -172,9 +193,18 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
"codex host credentials: dummy auth was copied into the "
"guest, but Codex did not accept it"
)))
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE and has_provider_auth:
if template == PROVIDER_CLAUDE:
env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"] = "1"
env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"] = "1"
egress_routes.append(EgressRoute(
host="api.anthropic.com",
auth_scheme="Bearer" if auth_token else "",
token_ref=auth_token,
tls_passthrough=True,
))
if auth_token:
env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] = "egress-placeholder"
hidden_env_names = frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"})
return AgentProvisionPlan(
template=template,
@@ -188,6 +218,8 @@ def agent_provision_plan(
files=tuple(files),
pre_copy=tuple(pre_copy),
verify=tuple(verify),
egress_routes=tuple(egress_routes),
hidden_env_names=hidden_env_names,
)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ class DockerBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
| set(self.forwarded_env.keys())
| set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
),
agent_provider_template=self.agent_provider_template,
hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
)
print(file=sys.stderr)
+32 -40
View File
@@ -159,17 +159,44 @@ def resolve_plan(
prompt_file.write_text("")
prompt_file.chmod(0o600)
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(bottle, slug, pipelock_dir)
git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
git_gate_plan = git_gate.prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
# Everything that should reach the bottle by-name (so its value
# never lands on argv or in env_file) goes into one dict. Nothing
# mutates the host os.environ.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
_write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt)
use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node"),
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
)
guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=guest_env)
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = proxy.prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = egress.prepare(bottle, slug, egress_dir)
egress_plan = egress.prepare(
bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
supervise_plan = None
if bottle.supervise:
@@ -197,41 +224,6 @@ def resolve_plan(
slug, supervise_dir,
dockerfile_content=dockerfile_content,
)
resolved = resolve_env(manifest, spec.agent_name)
# Everything that should reach the bottle by-name (so its value
# never lands on argv or in env_file) goes into one dict. Nothing
# mutates the host os.environ.
forwarded_env: dict[str, str] = dict(resolved.forwarded)
# Some provider CLIs refuse to start without *some* credential
# env var even when egress will strip + re-inject the real
# Authorization header. For those providers, auth_role names the
# route marker that enables a non-secret placeholder env. Codex is
# intentionally absent here: it should use its device/ChatGPT login
# state, and an OPENAI_API_KEY placeholder would force API-key auth.
has_provider_auth = any(
provider_runtime.auth_role
and provider_runtime.auth_role in r.roles
for r in egress_plan.routes
)
if has_provider_auth and provider_runtime.placeholder_env:
forwarded_env[provider_runtime.placeholder_env] = "egress-placeholder"
_write_env_file(resolved, env_file)
prompt_file.write_text(agent.prompt)
use_runsc = docker_mod.runsc_available()
agent_provision = agent_provision_plan(
template=provider.template,
dockerfile=dockerfile_path,
state_dir=agent_dir,
guest_home=os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node"),
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
has_provider_auth=has_provider_auth,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
)
guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
for key, val in agent_provision.env_vars.items():
guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=guest_env)
return DockerBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
+6 -10
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from typing import Sequence
from ..agent_provider import runtime_for
from ..log import info
@@ -30,16 +29,13 @@ def print_multi(label: str, values: Sequence[str]) -> None:
def visible_agent_env_names(
env_names: Sequence[str], *, agent_provider_template: str,
env_names: Sequence[str], *, hidden_env_names: frozenset[str],
) -> list[str]:
"""Env names worth showing in launch summaries.
Provider auth placeholders (currently `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`)
are implementation details: they are non-secret dummy values that
satisfy the provider CLI while egress injects the real upstream
Authorization header. Showing them in preflight makes the operator
think a real key is entering the agent, so hide only the active
provider-owned placeholder.
Provider-injected placeholder env vars are implementation details:
they are non-secret dummy values that satisfy provider CLIs while
egress injects the real Authorization header. The plan's
`hidden_env_names` carries exactly which names to suppress.
"""
hidden = {runtime_for(agent_provider_template).placeholder_env}
return sorted({name for name in env_names if name and name not in hidden})
return sorted({name for name in env_names if name and name not in hidden_env_names})
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ class SmolmachinesBottlePlan(BottlePlan):
set(bottle.env.keys())
| set(self.agent_provision.guest_env.keys())
),
agent_provider_template=self.agent_provider_template,
hidden_env_names=self.agent_provision.hidden_env_names,
)
upstreams = [
f"{g.Name}{g.Upstream}" for g in bottle.git
+25 -35
View File
@@ -95,44 +95,10 @@ def resolve_plan(
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE": "/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt",
}
# Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
# platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
# a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
# dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
# bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
# dependency).
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(bottle, slug, pipelock_dir)
git_gate_dir = git_gate_state_dir(slug)
git_gate_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
git_gate_plan = GitGate().prepare(bottle, slug, git_gate_dir)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = Egress().prepare(bottle, slug, egress_dir)
# Some provider CLIs refuse to start without *some* credential
# env var even when egress will strip + re-inject the real
# Authorization header. For those providers, auth_role names the
# route marker that enables a non-secret placeholder env. Codex is
# intentionally absent here: it should use its device/ChatGPT login
# state, and an OPENAI_API_KEY placeholder would force API-key auth.
has_provider_auth = any(
provider_runtime.auth_role
and provider_runtime.auth_role in r.roles
for r in egress_plan.routes
)
if has_provider_auth and provider_runtime.placeholder_env:
guest_env[provider_runtime.placeholder_env] = "egress-placeholder"
supervise_plan = None
if bottle.supervise:
supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
supervise_plan = Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir)
# Prompt file is always written (mode 0o600) so the in-VM
# path always exists. Content is the agent's `prompt`
# field (markdown body) — empty for agents with no prompt.
@@ -167,7 +133,7 @@ def resolve_plan(
guest_home=os.environ.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GUEST_HOME", "/home/node"),
guest_env=guest_env,
forward_host_credentials=provider.forward_host_credentials,
has_provider_auth=has_provider_auth,
auth_token=provider.auth_token,
host_env=dict(os.environ),
)
merged_guest_env = dict(agent_provision.guest_env)
@@ -175,6 +141,30 @@ def resolve_plan(
merged_guest_env.setdefault(key, val)
agent_provision = replace(agent_provision, guest_env=merged_guest_env)
# Inner Plans for the four bundle daemons. The ABCs are
# platform-neutral — `.prepare()` writes config files + returns
# a Plan dataclass with no backend-specific assumptions. State
# dirs are still keyed by slug under the docker backend's
# bottle_state layout (shared on-host convention; not a docker
# dependency).
pipelock_dir = pipelock_state_dir(slug)
pipelock_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
proxy_plan = PipelockProxy().prepare(
bottle, slug, pipelock_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
egress_dir = egress_state_dir(slug)
egress_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
egress_plan = Egress().prepare(
bottle, slug, egress_dir, agent_provision.egress_routes,
)
supervise_plan = None
if bottle.supervise:
supervise_dir = supervise_state_dir(slug)
supervise_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
supervise_plan = Supervise().prepare(slug, supervise_dir)
return SmolmachinesBottlePlan(
spec=spec,
stage_dir=stage_dir,
+80 -56
View File
@@ -27,11 +27,13 @@ from __future__ import annotations
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
from .log import die
if TYPE_CHECKING:
from .manifest import Bottle
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS = ("api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com")
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF = "BOT_BOTTLE_CODEX_HOST_ACCESS_TOKEN"
@@ -67,9 +69,14 @@ class EgressRoute:
under `token_env`. Routes that share a `token_ref` coalesce to
one `token_env` slot.
`roles` carries the manifest route's optional role markers (see
`manifest.EGRESS_ROLES`). The launch step reads these for
side effects like the claude-code OAuth placeholder env."""
`roles` carries the manifest route's role tuple (reserved for
future use; always empty today).
`tls_passthrough` signals that pipelock must not TLS-MITM this
host — either because the manifest declared `pipelock.tls_passthrough:
true` (lifted in `egress_manifest_routes`) or because a provider
route set it (e.g. egress injects its own Bearer on that host
after the agent boundary and pipelock's header DLP would block it)."""
host: str
path_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
@@ -77,6 +84,7 @@ class EgressRoute:
token_env: str = ""
token_ref: str = ""
roles: tuple[str, ...] = ()
tls_passthrough: bool = False
@dataclass(frozen=True)
@@ -161,84 +169,94 @@ def egress_manifest_routes(
token_env=token_env,
token_ref=r.TokenRef,
roles=r.Role,
tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
))
else:
out.append(EgressRoute(
host=r.Host,
path_allowlist=r.PathAllowlist,
roles=r.Role,
tls_passthrough=r.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough,
))
return tuple(out)
def egress_routes_for_bottle(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> tuple[EgressRoute, ...]:
"""Effective egress routes. This is what gets rendered into
routes.yaml + what the addon enforces.
"""Effective egress routes for the agent. This is what gets rendered
into routes.yaml and what the addon enforces.
Operators that want to allow a host usually declare it directly in
`bottle.egress.routes` as an authenticated route or bare-pass entry
(`- host: <name>`). Codex host-credential forwarding is the
provider-owned exception: when explicitly enabled, it adds or
upgrades the Codex API hosts to egress-owned authenticated routes. The
legacy `bottle.egress.allowlist` folding is gone — egress is the
single allowlist surface."""
Merges manifest-declared routes with provider-owned routes. The
manifest is the primary surface; `provider_routes` are synthesised
by `agent_provision_plan` and may add or upgrade manifest entries.
Provider routes that conflict with an existing authenticated manifest
route (different auth scheme or token ref) raise a hard error."""
routes = list(egress_manifest_routes(bottle))
if not bottle.agent_provider.forward_host_credentials:
return tuple(routes)
if bottle.agent_provider.template != "codex":
return tuple(routes)
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
routes = _ensure_codex_host_credential_route(routes, host)
for pr in provider_routes:
routes = _merge_provider_route(routes, pr)
return tuple(routes)
def _next_token_env(routes: list[EgressRoute]) -> str:
def _find_or_alloc_token_env(routes: list[EgressRoute], token_ref: str) -> str:
"""Return the existing token_env slot for `token_ref`, or allocate the next one."""
for route in routes:
if route.token_ref == token_ref and route.token_env:
return route.token_env
return f"EGRESS_TOKEN_{len({r.token_env for r in routes if r.token_env})}"
def _codex_host_credential_token_env(routes: list[EgressRoute]) -> str:
for route in routes:
if route.token_ref == CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF:
return route.token_env
return _next_token_env(routes)
def _ensure_codex_host_credential_route(
routes: list[EgressRoute], host: str,
def _merge_provider_route(
routes: list[EgressRoute], pr: EgressRoute,
) -> list[EgressRoute]:
"""Merge one provider-declared route into the manifest route list.
Upgrade a bare-pass manifest route to authenticated if the provider
declares auth for that host, or append if the host isn't in the manifest.
Identical auth (same scheme + token_ref) on an existing route is a
no-op, with a tls_passthrough upgrade if the provider route sets it.
Conflicting auth (different scheme or token_ref) dies."""
for idx, route in enumerate(routes):
if route.host.lower() != host:
if route.host.lower() != pr.host.lower():
continue
if route.auth_scheme or route.token_ref:
if (
route.auth_scheme == "Bearer"
and route.token_ref == CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
):
return routes
die(
"codex host credential forwarding conflicts with an "
f"authenticated egress route for {host}. Remove that "
"route auth block or disable agent_provider.forward_host_credentials."
)
if route.auth_scheme == pr.auth_scheme and route.token_ref == pr.token_ref:
if pr.tls_passthrough and not route.tls_passthrough:
routes[idx] = EgressRoute(
host=route.host,
path_allowlist=route.path_allowlist,
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_env=_codex_host_credential_token_env(routes),
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
auth_scheme=route.auth_scheme,
token_env=route.token_env,
token_ref=route.token_ref,
roles=route.roles,
tls_passthrough=True,
)
return routes
die(
f"provider egress route for {pr.host!r} conflicts with an "
f"authenticated manifest route (different auth scheme or token "
f"ref). Remove the manifest route's auth block or disable the "
f"feature that adds this provider route."
)
token_env = _find_or_alloc_token_env(routes, pr.token_ref)
routes[idx] = EgressRoute(
host=route.host,
path_allowlist=route.path_allowlist,
auth_scheme=pr.auth_scheme,
token_env=token_env,
token_ref=pr.token_ref,
roles=route.roles,
tls_passthrough=pr.tls_passthrough,
)
return routes
token_env = _find_or_alloc_token_env(routes, pr.token_ref)
routes.append(EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_env=_codex_host_credential_token_env(routes),
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
host=pr.host,
auth_scheme=pr.auth_scheme,
token_env=token_env,
token_ref=pr.token_ref,
tls_passthrough=pr.tls_passthrough,
))
return routes
@@ -338,18 +356,23 @@ class Egress(ABC):
sidecar's start/stop lifecycle is backend-specific and lives on
concrete subclasses."""
def prepare(self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path) -> EgressPlan:
"""Lift `bottle.egress.routes` into resolved routes,
render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
def prepare(
self,
bottle: Bottle,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> EgressPlan:
"""Lift `bottle.egress.routes` + `provider_routes` into resolved
routes, render the routes file (mode 600) under `stage_dir`, and
return the plan. Pure host-side, no docker subprocess. The
token-env map records the mapping the launch step uses to
forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's
environ.
forward values from the host's environ into the sidecar's environ.
Returned plan is incomplete: the launch step must fill
`internal_network` / `egress_network` / `pipelock_proxy_url`
via `dataclasses.replace` before passing it to `.start`."""
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)
routes_path = stage_dir / "egress_routes.yaml"
routes_path.write_text(egress_render_routes(routes))
routes_path.chmod(0o600)
@@ -361,6 +384,7 @@ class Egress(ABC):
)
__all__ = [
"CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF",
"EGRESS_HOSTNAME",
"EGRESS_ROUTES_IN_CONTAINER",
"Egress",
+39 -99
View File
@@ -175,47 +175,6 @@ class GitEntry:
# token-not-Bearer quirk (go-gitea/gitea#16734).
EGRESS_AUTH_SCHEMES = ("Bearer", "token")
# Optional per-route role markers. A role signals "this route plays
# a specific named part in the bottle's auth flow"; the launch step
# acts on the marker.
#
# claude_code_oauth: this route auth-injects on the agent's
# claude-code OAuth flow. Triggers prepare.py
# to ship a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN
# to the agent (so claude-code starts) and
# disable nonessential-traffic / error-reporting
# env vars. Host doesn't matter to the placeholder
# logic — declare the role on whichever route
# injects the OAuth header.
#
# codex_auth: placeholder marker reserved for follow-up Codex
# credential-injection work. It is still accepted so
# existing manifests and future egress-held auth flows
# have a stable role name, but it no longer triggers an
# OPENAI_API_KEY placeholder. Codex bottles should prefer
# device/ChatGPT login state today.
#
# Routes without a `role` are pure proxy entries: egress
# enforces path_allowlist + injects auth on its own, but nothing
# special happens on the agent side.
EGRESS_ROLES = frozenset({
"claude_code_oauth",
"codex_auth",
})
# Singleton roles may appear on at most one route per bottle. Some
# roles drive a single provider auth path; two routes claiming one
# marker would leave "which one is canonical?" ambiguous.
EGRESS_SINGLETON_ROLES = frozenset({
"claude_code_oauth",
"codex_auth",
})
PROVIDER_EGRESS_ROLES = {
"claude": frozenset({"claude_code_oauth"}),
"codex": frozenset({"codex_auth"}),
}
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AgentProvider:
@@ -224,20 +183,30 @@ class AgentProvider:
`template` selects a built-in launch/runtime contract. `dockerfile`
optionally points at a custom agent-image Dockerfile while leaving
bot-bottle's sidecar infrastructure intact.
`auth_token` names the host env var that holds the provider's OAuth
token (Claude only). The provisioner injects a provider-owned egress
route for api.anthropic.com that re-injects this token as the Bearer
header, and sets a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent
so the Claude Code CLI starts.
`forward_host_credentials` forwards the host Codex auth token into
the egress sidecar (Codex only).
"""
template: str = "claude"
dockerfile: str = ""
auth_token: str = ""
forward_host_credentials: bool = False
@classmethod
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "AgentProvider":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider")
for k in d:
if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "forward_host_credentials"}:
if k not in {"template", "dockerfile", "auth_token", "forward_host_credentials"}:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider has unknown key {k!r}; "
f"allowed: template, dockerfile, forward_host_credentials"
f"allowed: template, dockerfile, auth_token, forward_host_credentials"
)
template = d.get("template", "claude")
if not isinstance(template, str) or not template:
@@ -256,6 +225,17 @@ class AgentProvider:
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.dockerfile must be a "
f"string (was {type(dockerfile).__name__})"
)
auth_token = d.get("auth_token", "")
if not isinstance(auth_token, str):
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token must be a "
f"string (was {type(auth_token).__name__})"
)
if auth_token and template != "claude":
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' agent_provider.auth_token is only "
f"supported for template 'claude'"
)
forward_host_credentials = d.get("forward_host_credentials", False)
if not isinstance(forward_host_credentials, bool):
raise ManifestError(
@@ -270,6 +250,7 @@ class AgentProvider:
return cls(
template=template,
dockerfile=dockerfile,
auth_token=auth_token,
forward_host_credentials=forward_host_credentials,
)
@@ -428,10 +409,8 @@ class EgressRoute:
manifest's `auth` block is omitted both fields are empty strings —
no Authorization is written, no token forwarded.
`Role` is an optional tuple of named markers (see
EGRESS_ROLES). The launch step reads these and triggers
associated side effects (e.g. the `claude_code_oauth` marker
causes prepare.py to set a placeholder OAuth env on the agent).
`Role` is reserved for future use; all role strings are currently
rejected by the validator.
Validation rules (enforced in `from_dict`):
- `host` required, non-empty.
@@ -440,10 +419,7 @@ class EgressRoute:
`token_ref` as non-empty strings; an empty `auth: {}` is an
error rather than a synonym for "no auth" (omit `auth` for
that case).
- `role` optional. String or list of strings drawn from
EGRESS_ROLES. Singleton roles (see
EGRESS_SINGLETON_ROLES) may appear on at most one
route per bottle.
- `role` optional, reserved — any non-empty value is rejected.
"""
Host: str
@@ -541,11 +517,10 @@ class EgressRoute:
f"{label} role must be a string or a list of strings "
f"(was {type(role_raw).__name__})"
)
for r in roles:
if r not in EGRESS_ROLES:
if roles:
raise ManifestError(
f"{label} role {r!r} is not one of "
f"{', '.join(sorted(EGRESS_ROLES))}"
f"{label} role {roles[0]!r} is not accepted; "
f"the 'role' field is reserved for future use"
)
pipelock = (
@@ -581,9 +556,7 @@ class EgressConfig:
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@classmethod
def from_dict(
cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object, *, agent_provider_template: str = "claude",
) -> "EgressConfig":
def from_dict(cls, bottle_name: str, raw: object) -> "EgressConfig":
d = _as_json_object(raw, f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress")
routes_raw = d.get("routes")
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = ()
@@ -598,9 +571,7 @@ class EgressConfig:
EgressRoute.from_dict(bottle_name, i, entry)
for i, entry in enumerate(routes_list)
)
_validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name, routes, agent_provider_template=agent_provider_template,
)
_validate_egress_routes(bottle_name, routes)
for k in d:
if k != "routes":
raise ManifestError(
@@ -691,10 +662,7 @@ class Bottle:
)
egress = (
EgressConfig.from_dict(
name, d["egress"],
agent_provider_template=agent_provider.template,
)
EgressConfig.from_dict(name, d["egress"])
if "egress" in d
else EgressConfig()
)
@@ -1058,21 +1026,15 @@ def _is_ip_literal(value: str) -> bool:
def _validate_egress_routes(
bottle_name: str,
routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...],
*,
agent_provider_template: str = "claude",
) -> None:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`:
"""Cross-validation for `bottle.egress.routes`: hosts must be unique.
- Hosts must be unique within the bottle. The proxy matches by
exact-host (v1, prefix matching is on path_allowlist only);
duplicate hosts leave the route choice ambiguous.
- Singleton roles (see EGRESS_SINGLETON_ROLES) may appear
on at most one route per bottle.
The proxy matches by exact-host (v1); duplicate hosts leave the
route choice ambiguous so we reject them up front.
No cross-validation against `bottle.git` is performed. git-gate
(SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different
protocols; declaring both for the same host is a legitimate
dev setup."""
(SSH push/fetch) and egress (HTTPS) broker different protocols;
declaring both for the same host is a legitimate dev setup."""
seen_hosts: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in routes:
key = r.Host.lower()
@@ -1082,25 +1044,6 @@ def _validate_egress_routes(
f"{r.Host!r}; each host must be unique on the proxy."
)
seen_hosts[key] = None
for role in EGRESS_SINGLETON_ROLES:
with_role = [r for r in routes if role in r.Role]
if len(with_role) > 1:
hosts = ", ".join(r.Host for r in with_role)
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes has {len(with_role)} "
f"routes with role {role!r} (hosts: {hosts}); this role drives a "
f"single launch-step side effect — pick one."
)
allowed_roles = PROVIDER_EGRESS_ROLES[agent_provider_template]
for route in routes:
for role in route.Role:
if role not in allowed_roles:
raise ManifestError(
f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress route for host "
f"{route.Host!r} has role {role!r}, but provider "
f"{agent_provider_template!r} only accepts roles "
f"{', '.join(sorted(allowed_roles)) or '(none)'}"
)
def _validate_unique_git_names(bottle_name: str, git: tuple[GitEntry, ...]) -> None:
@@ -1311,10 +1254,7 @@ def _merge_bottles(
merged_supervise = (
child.supervise if "supervise" in child_raw else parent.supervise
)
_validate_egress_routes(
name, merged_egress.routes,
agent_provider_template=merged_agent_provider.template,
)
_validate_egress_routes(name, merged_egress.routes)
return Bottle(
env=merged_env,
+33 -37
View File
@@ -21,11 +21,7 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
from pathlib import Path
from typing import cast
from .egress import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
EGRESS_HOSTNAME,
egress_routes_for_bottle,
)
from .egress import EGRESS_HOSTNAME, EgressRoute, egress_routes_for_bottle
from .supervise import SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME
from .manifest import Bottle
@@ -54,14 +50,17 @@ PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME = "pipelock"
# --- Allowlist resolution --------------------------------------------------
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
def pipelock_effective_allowlist(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock allows. Sorted for stability.
Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle)` egress is the
single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is the downstream
copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For bottles without
any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except for supervise
sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
Always mirrors `egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes)`
egress is the single allowlist surface, and pipelock's allowlist is
the downstream copy for defense-in-depth + DLP body scanning. For
bottles without any `egress.routes[]` declared, this is empty except
for supervise sidecar traffic when `supervise: true`.
The supervise sidecar's hostname is auto-added when supervise
is enabled (sibling-sidecar traffic that flows through pipelock
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ def pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
`bottle.git` do NOT contribute here git traffic flows
through git-gate (PRD 0008), not pipelock."""
seen: dict[str, None] = {}
for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle):
for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if r.host:
seen.setdefault(r.host, None)
if bottle.supervise:
@@ -102,32 +101,23 @@ def pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle: Bottle) -> bool:
return False
def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle: Bottle) -> list[str]:
def pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(
bottle: Bottle,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> list[str]:
"""Hostnames pipelock should pass through (no TLS MITM).
A route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`. This is
useful for provider API routes where egress injects the
Authorization header after the agent boundary; pipelock still
enforces the host allowlist but does not decrypt and scan that
provider request.
A manifest route opts in with `pipelock.tls_passthrough: true`
(lifted into `EgressRoute.tls_passthrough` in `egress_manifest_routes`).
Provider routes that set `tls_passthrough=True` (e.g. Codex credential
routes where egress injects the host bearer after the agent boundary)
are also included. Both arrive via `egress_routes_for_bottle` no
provider-specific branching needed here.
"""
seen: dict[str, None] = {host: None for host in DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH}
for route in bottle.egress.routes:
if route.Pipelock.TlsPassthrough:
seen.setdefault(route.Host, None)
# forward_host_credentials makes egress inject the host ChatGPT bearer
# on the Codex API hosts AFTER the agent boundary. Pipelock sits
# downstream of egress and DLP-scans request headers; left to MITM
# these routes it flags the injected JWT as a leaked secret
# ("request header contains secret") and blocks. Pass them through so
# pipelock still enforces the host allowlist on CONNECT but does not
# decrypt + rescan egress-owned auth. The auto-added routes live in
# egress_routes_for_bottle, not bottle.egress.routes, so add the
# hosts explicitly here.
provider = bottle.agent_provider
if provider.forward_host_credentials and provider.template == "codex":
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS:
seen.setdefault(host, None)
for route in egress_routes_for_bottle(bottle, provider_routes):
if route.tls_passthrough:
seen.setdefault(route.host, None)
return sorted(seen.keys())
@@ -159,6 +149,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
ca_cert_path: str = "",
ca_key_path: str = "",
ssrf_ip_allowlist: tuple[str, ...] = (),
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> dict[str, object]:
"""Build the structured pipelock config dict the sidecar will load.
@@ -188,7 +179,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
"version": 1,
"mode": "strict",
"enforce": True,
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle),
"api_allowlist": pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle, provider_routes),
"forward_proxy": {"enabled": True},
}
if not pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle):
@@ -222,7 +213,7 @@ def pipelock_build_config(
"enabled": True,
"ca_cert": ca_cert_path,
"ca_key": ca_key_path,
"passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle),
"passthrough_domains": pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(bottle, provider_routes),
}
effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist = pipelock_effective_ssrf_ip_allowlist(
bottle, ssrf_ip_allowlist,
@@ -336,7 +327,11 @@ class PipelockProxy:
(`PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER` / `PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER`)."""
def prepare(
self, bottle: Bottle, slug: str, stage_dir: Path
self,
bottle: Bottle,
slug: str,
stage_dir: Path,
provider_routes: tuple[EgressRoute, ...] = (),
) -> PipelockProxyPlan:
"""Write the pipelock yaml config (mode 600) under `stage_dir`
and return the plan for launch. Pure host-side, no docker
@@ -359,6 +354,7 @@ class PipelockProxy:
bottle,
ca_cert_path=PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER,
ca_key_path=PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER,
provider_routes=provider_routes,
)
yaml_path.write_text(pipelock_render_yaml(cfg))
yaml_path.chmod(0o600)
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# PRD 0029: Codex host credentials through egress
# PRD 0029: Provider auth credentials through egress
- **Status:** Draft
- **Author:** didericis-codex
@@ -7,9 +7,12 @@
## Summary
Allow Codex bottles to use a host-authorized ChatGPT/device-login
access token by forwarding it only into the egress sidecar, gated by an
explicit `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` manifest flag.
Allow provider bottles to inject host credentials into the egress
sidecar without exposing them to the agent. Codex uses
`agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` for ChatGPT/device-login
access tokens. Claude uses `agent_provider.auth_token` to name the host
env var holding its OAuth token, which egress injects on
`api.anthropic.com` requests.
## Problem
@@ -51,8 +54,8 @@ possible, not in the agent.
current access token at launch; operators can restart after host Codex
refreshes auth.
- Copying host `~/.codex/auth.json` credentials into the agent.
- Allowing arbitrary host credential forwarding. This PRD covers Codex
ChatGPT/device-login credentials only.
- Allowing arbitrary host credential forwarding beyond the two providers
covered here (Codex ChatGPT/device-login and Claude OAuth).
- Hot-applying new authenticated Codex routes to an existing running
sidecar. The current hot-apply path cannot safely populate new token
env slots in an already-running container.
@@ -64,6 +67,15 @@ possible, not in the agent.
- Add `agent_provider.forward_host_credentials` to the bottle manifest
schema, defaulting to `false`.
- Support the flag for `agent_provider.template: codex`.
- Add `agent_provider.auth_token` to the bottle manifest schema.
- Support the field for `agent_provider.template: claude`: the named
host env var is forwarded only into the egress sidecar as the Bearer
token for `api.anthropic.com`, and a placeholder
`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` is set in the agent so the Claude Code CLI
starts without a real credential.
- Remove the `claude_code_oauth` egress route role, which previously
required operators to declare the OAuth route manually. The provisioner
now injects it from `auth_token`.
- Read host Codex auth from `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` when `CODEX_HOME` is
set, otherwise from `~/.codex/auth.json`.
- Extract only `tokens.access_token` for egress injection.
+71 -16
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,12 @@ import tempfile
import unittest
from pathlib import Path
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import agent_provision_plan, runtime_for
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS,
agent_provision_plan,
runtime_for,
)
from bot_bottle.egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF
def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
@@ -19,16 +24,6 @@ def _jwt(exp: int) -> str:
class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
def test_claude_keeps_oauth_placeholder(self):
runtime = runtime_for("claude")
self.assertEqual("claude_code_oauth", runtime.auth_role)
self.assertEqual("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", runtime.placeholder_env)
def test_codex_does_not_inject_openai_api_key_placeholder(self):
runtime = runtime_for("codex")
self.assertEqual("", runtime.auth_role)
self.assertEqual("", runtime.placeholder_env)
def test_codex_plan_declares_home_state(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = agent_provision_plan(
@@ -76,19 +71,79 @@ class TestAgentProviderRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.verify))
self.assertIn("CODEX_HOME=/run/codex-home", plan.verify[0].argv)
def test_claude_with_provider_auth_disables_nonessential_traffic(self):
def test_claude_with_auth_token_injects_provider_route_and_placeholder(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = agent_provision_plan(
template="claude",
dockerfile="/tmp/Dockerfile.claude",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
has_provider_auth=True,
auth_token="BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
)
self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.egress_routes))
route = plan.egress_routes[0]
self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", route.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN", route.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
self.assertEqual("egress-placeholder", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"])
self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"])
self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"])
self.assertEqual(frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"}), plan.hidden_env_names)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_populates_egress_routes(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
home = Path(tmp) / "host-codex"
home.mkdir()
(home / "auth.json").write_text(json.dumps({
"auth_mode": "chatgpt",
"tokens": {"access_token": _jwt(2000000000)},
}))
plan = agent_provision_plan(
template="codex",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
forward_host_credentials=True,
host_env={"CODEX_HOME": str(home)},
)
hosts = [r.host for r in plan.egress_routes]
self.assertEqual(sorted(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS), sorted(hosts))
for r in plan.egress_routes:
self.assertEqual("Bearer", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, r.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
def test_codex_without_forward_host_credentials_has_passthrough_egress_routes(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = agent_provision_plan(
template="codex",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
forward_host_credentials=False,
)
self.assertEqual(
"1",
plan.env_vars["CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC"],
{r.host for r in plan.egress_routes},
set(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS),
)
self.assertEqual("1", plan.env_vars["DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING"])
for r in plan.egress_routes:
self.assertEqual("", r.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("", r.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(r.tls_passthrough)
def test_claude_without_auth_token_has_passthrough_egress_route(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="bb-provider.") as tmp:
plan = agent_provision_plan(
template="claude",
dockerfile="",
state_dir=Path(tmp),
)
self.assertEqual(1, len(plan.egress_routes))
route = plan.egress_routes[0]
self.assertEqual("api.anthropic.com", route.host)
self.assertEqual("", route.auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("", route.token_ref)
self.assertTrue(route.tls_passthrough)
self.assertNotIn("CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", plan.env_vars)
self.assertEqual(frozenset(), plan.hidden_env_names)
if __name__ == "__main__":
+85 -52
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import unittest
from bot_bottle.egress import (
CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
EgressRoute,
egress_manifest_routes,
egress_render_routes,
egress_resolve_token_values,
@@ -23,19 +24,13 @@ def _bottle(routes):
}).bottles["dev"]
def _codex_bottle(*, forward_host_credentials: bool, routes):
return Manifest.from_json_obj({
"bottles": {
"dev": {
"agent_provider": {
"template": "codex",
"forward_host_credentials": forward_host_credentials,
},
"egress": {"routes": routes},
}
},
"agents": {"demo": {"skills": [], "prompt": "", "bottle": "dev"}},
}).bottles["dev"]
def _provider_route(host: str, token_ref: str, *, tls_passthrough: bool = False) -> EgressRoute:
return EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_ref=token_ref,
tls_passthrough=tls_passthrough,
)
class TestRoutesForBottle(unittest.TestCase):
@@ -100,9 +95,8 @@ class TestRoutesForBottle(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("", routes[1].token_env)
class TestRoutesForBottleUsesManifestOnly(unittest.TestCase):
"""The effective route table is exactly the manifest-declared
routes. Provider defaults are not injected implicitly."""
class TestRoutesForBottleManifestOnly(unittest.TestCase):
"""Without provider routes the effective table is exactly the manifest."""
def test_no_manifest_routes_means_no_effective_routes(self):
b = _bottle([])
@@ -123,58 +117,97 @@ class TestRoutesForBottleUsesManifestOnly(unittest.TestCase):
effective = [r.host for r in egress_routes_for_bottle(b)]
self.assertEqual(["x.example"], effective)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_adds_codex_routes(self):
b = _codex_bottle(forward_host_credentials=True, routes=[])
def test_tls_passthrough_lifted_from_manifest(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "api.openai.com",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"},
"pipelock": {"tls_passthrough": True},
}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
self.assertEqual(["api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com"], [r.host for r in routes])
self.assertTrue(routes[0].tls_passthrough)
def test_tls_passthrough_false_by_default(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "api.github.com"}])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
self.assertFalse(routes[0].tls_passthrough)
class TestProviderRouteMerge(unittest.TestCase):
"""Provider routes are merged into manifest routes generically."""
def test_provider_route_appended_when_not_in_manifest(self):
b = _bottle([])
pr = _provider_route("api.openai.com", "TOK")
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
self.assertEqual("api.openai.com", routes[0].host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", routes[0].auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[0].token_env)
self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, routes[0].token_ref)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", routes[1].auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[1].token_env)
self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, routes[1].token_ref)
self.assertEqual("TOK", routes[0].token_ref)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_upgrades_bare_chatgpt_route(self):
b = _codex_bottle(
forward_host_credentials=True,
routes=[{"host": "chatgpt.com", "path_allowlist": ["/backend-api/"]}],
)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
self.assertEqual(2, len(routes))
def test_two_provider_routes_with_same_token_ref_share_slot(self):
b = _bottle([])
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (
_provider_route("api.openai.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF),
_provider_route("chatgpt.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF),
))
self.assertEqual(["api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com"], [r.host for r in routes])
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[0].token_env)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[1].token_env)
def test_provider_route_upgrades_bare_manifest_route(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "chatgpt.com", "path_allowlist": ["/backend-api/"]}])
pr = _provider_route("chatgpt.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
self.assertEqual("chatgpt.com", routes[0].host)
self.assertEqual("Bearer", routes[0].auth_scheme)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[0].token_env)
self.assertEqual(CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, routes[0].token_ref)
self.assertEqual(("/backend-api/",), routes[0].path_allowlist)
self.assertEqual("api.openai.com", routes[1].host)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[1].token_env)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_accepts_explicit_synthetic_route(self):
b = _codex_bottle(
forward_host_credentials=True,
routes=[{
def test_provider_route_noop_when_same_auth_already_in_manifest(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "api.openai.com",
"auth": {
"scheme": "Bearer",
"token_ref": CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
},
}],
)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
self.assertEqual(["api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com"], [r.host for r in routes])
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF},
}])
pr = _provider_route("api.openai.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[0].token_env)
self.assertEqual("EGRESS_TOKEN_0", routes[1].token_env)
def test_codex_forward_host_credentials_conflicts_with_authed_route(self):
b = _codex_bottle(
forward_host_credentials=True,
routes=[{
def test_provider_route_upgrades_tls_passthrough_on_existing_same_auth(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "api.openai.com",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF},
}])
pr = _provider_route(
"api.openai.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, tls_passthrough=True,
)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertEqual(1, len(routes))
self.assertTrue(routes[0].tls_passthrough)
def test_provider_route_conflicts_with_different_authed_manifest_route(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "chatgpt.com",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "OTHER"},
}],
)
}])
pr = _provider_route("chatgpt.com", CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF)
with self.assertRaises(Die):
egress_routes_for_bottle(b)
egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
def test_provider_route_tls_passthrough_set_on_appended_route(self):
b = _bottle([])
pr = _provider_route("api.openai.com", "TOK", tls_passthrough=True)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertTrue(routes[0].tls_passthrough)
def test_provider_route_tls_passthrough_set_on_upgraded_bare_route(self):
b = _bottle([{"host": "api.openai.com"}])
pr = _provider_route("api.openai.com", "TOK", tls_passthrough=True)
routes = egress_routes_for_bottle(b, (pr,))
self.assertTrue(routes[0].tls_passthrough)
class TestTokenEnvMap(unittest.TestCase):
+31 -60
View File
@@ -85,6 +85,31 @@ class TestAgentProviderHostCredentials(unittest.TestCase):
"forward_host_credentials": True,
})
def test_auth_token_defaults_empty(self):
b = _provider_config_bottle({"template": "claude"})
self.assertEqual("", b.agent_provider.auth_token)
def test_auth_token_allowed_for_claude(self):
b = _provider_config_bottle({
"template": "claude",
"auth_token": "BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN",
})
self.assertEqual("BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN", b.agent_provider.auth_token)
def test_auth_token_must_be_string(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_config_bottle({
"template": "claude",
"auth_token": 42,
})
def test_auth_token_rejected_for_codex(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_config_bottle({
"template": "codex",
"auth_token": "SOME_TOKEN",
})
class TestPathAllowlist(unittest.TestCase):
def test_optional(self):
@@ -178,29 +203,12 @@ class TestRole(unittest.TestCase):
b = _bottle([{"host": "x.example"}])
self.assertEqual((), b.egress.routes[0].Role)
def test_string_normalizes_to_tuple(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"role": "claude_code_oauth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"},
}])
self.assertEqual(("claude_code_oauth",),
b.egress.routes[0].Role)
def test_list_supported(self):
b = _bottle([{
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"role": ["claude_code_oauth"],
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"},
}])
self.assertEqual(("claude_code_oauth",),
b.egress.routes[0].Role)
def test_unknown_role_rejected(self):
# The role enum is locked down — typos shouldn't silently
# become no-op markers.
def test_any_role_rejected(self):
# All former roles removed; the field is reserved for future use.
for role in ("claude_code_oauth", "codex_auth", "totally-made-up"):
with self.subTest(role=role):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_bottle([{"host": "x.example", "role": "totally-made-up"}])
_bottle([{"host": "x.example", "role": role}])
def test_non_string_role_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
@@ -208,44 +216,7 @@ class TestRole(unittest.TestCase):
def test_list_with_non_string_item_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_bottle([{"host": "x.example",
"role": ["claude_code_oauth", 42]}])
def test_singleton_claude_code_oauth_enforced(self):
# Two routes both claiming the role would make "which one
# drives the placeholder env?" ambiguous.
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_bottle([
{"host": "api.anthropic.com", "role": "claude_code_oauth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T1"}},
{"host": "api2.anthropic.example",
"role": "claude_code_oauth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T2"}},
])
def test_codex_auth_role_allowed_for_codex_provider(self):
b = _provider_bottle("codex", [{
"host": "api.openai.com",
"role": "codex_auth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "OPENAI_TOKEN"},
}])
self.assertEqual(("codex_auth",), b.egress.routes[0].Role)
def test_claude_role_rejected_for_codex_provider(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_provider_bottle("codex", [{
"host": "api.anthropic.com",
"role": "claude_code_oauth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"},
}])
def test_codex_role_rejected_for_default_claude_provider(self):
with self.assertRaises(ManifestError):
_bottle([{
"host": "api.openai.com",
"role": "codex_auth",
"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"},
}])
_bottle([{"host": "x.example", "role": ["x", 42]}])
class TestPipelockPolicy(unittest.TestCase):
+17 -9
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ git-gate (PRD 0008)."""
import unittest
from bot_bottle.agent_provider import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS
from bot_bottle.egress import CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF, EgressRoute
from bot_bottle.manifest import Manifest
from bot_bottle.pipelock import (
pipelock_effective_allowlist,
@@ -116,17 +118,23 @@ class TestTlsPassthrough(unittest.TestCase):
def test_forward_host_credentials_passes_through_codex_hosts(self):
# Egress injects the host bearer on the Codex API hosts; pipelock
# must pass them through or its header DLP blocks the injected JWT
# ("request header contains secret"). These routes are auto-added
# (not in bottle.egress.routes), so passthrough is host-derived.
passthrough = pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(_bottle({
"agent_provider": {
"template": "codex",
"forward_host_credentials": True,
},
}))
# ("request header contains secret"). Provider routes carry
# tls_passthrough=True; pipelock reads this via egress_routes_for_bottle.
provider_routes = tuple(
EgressRoute(
host=host,
auth_scheme="Bearer",
token_ref=CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF,
tls_passthrough=True,
)
for host in CODEX_HOST_CREDENTIAL_HOSTS
)
passthrough = pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(
_bottle({}), provider_routes,
)
self.assertEqual(["api.openai.com", "chatgpt.com"], passthrough)
def test_no_codex_passthrough_without_forward_host_credentials(self):
def test_no_codex_passthrough_without_provider_routes(self):
passthrough = pipelock_effective_tls_passthrough(_bottle({
"agent_provider": {"template": "codex"},
}))
+4 -4
View File
@@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ from bot_bottle.backend.print_util import visible_agent_env_names
class TestVisibleAgentEnvNames(unittest.TestCase):
def test_codex_shows_openai_api_key_if_user_declares_it(self):
def test_shows_all_when_no_hidden_names(self):
self.assertEqual(
["CUSTOM", "OPENAI_API_KEY"],
visible_agent_env_names(
["OPENAI_API_KEY", "CUSTOM"],
agent_provider_template="codex",
hidden_env_names=frozenset(),
),
)
def test_hides_only_active_provider_placeholder(self):
def test_hides_provider_placeholder(self):
self.assertEqual(
["CUSTOM", "OPENAI_API_KEY"],
visible_agent_env_names(
["CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "CUSTOM"],
agent_provider_template="claude",
hidden_env_names=frozenset({"CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"}),
),
)