Bug: git fetch failed with "connect to host
claude-bottle-ssh-gate-implementer port 30009: Connection refused".
OpenSSH treats a URL-supplied port (the user's remote was
ssh://git@gitea.dideric.is:30009/...) as overriding the
~/.ssh/config Port directive, so even though the config wrote
Port 30000 the agent dialed :30009 — where nothing was listening
because the gate had been assigned BASE_LISTEN_PORT + index.
Fix: the gate's listen port now equals the upstream port. Same
script, same socat, just port = entry.Port. Two entries on the
same upstream port are rejected at prepare time (the gate is one
container with a flat port space).
Re-smoked: probe nc github.com via the gate at :22, banner came
back as expected.
PRD 0007 updated to record the design refinement.
The gate's agent-facing leg sits on the `--internal` network, so
the forwarder image cannot rely on apk/apt at startup. Surfaced
by the DNS spike — a placeholder using `apk add socat` died
silently and gave a false-negative DNS-on-internal result.
Spike: container on a `--internal` user-defined network resolves
another container's name via the embedded resolver at 127.0.0.11
and reaches it over TCP, while egress to the public internet
remains blocked. The PRD's design assumption holds — no design
change needed.
PRD 0006 enabled pipelock's native TLS interception, which broke
git fetch over SSH from inside the agent: pipelock's SNI gate
rejects the SSH banner that follows CONNECT. Document the
architectural fix — a dedicated per-agent TCP-forwarder sidecar
built from bottle.ssh entries — so pipelock can stay maximally
strict on the HTTPS path with no SSH carve-outs.
didericis