PRD 0018 chunk 4 spike: empirically verified that pipelock's SSRF
guard checks proxied-request destinations (e.g. api.anthropic.com →
public IP) and not source IPs of incoming connections. The
bottle's own internal CIDR was being added to ssrf.ip_allowlist
defensively, but that defense isn't load-bearing — direct pipelock
probe (`curl --proxy http://pipelockhttps://api.anthropic.com/`)
returns 404 from upstream rather than blocking on SSRF.
So:
- Networks become compose-managed (`internal: true` on the
internal network; the egress one is a normal user-defined
bridge). Compose creates + removes them via up/down.
- launch.py drops the `docker network create` + `network_inspect_cidr`
+ pipelock yaml re-render dance.
- The pre-create/external scaffolding from chunk 3 goes with it.
End-to-end `./cli.py start` still works; cleanup leaves no
orphans. If real-world use surfaces an SSRF block we hadn't
predicted, the allowlist can come back via subnet-pinning rather
than pre-create.
PRD 0018 chunk 3. Each instance is now one `docker compose` project:
- launch.py renders the compose spec via chunk-1's
bottle_plan_to_compose, writes it to state/<slug>/docker-compose.yml,
`docker compose up -d`s, and (on teardown) dumps
`docker compose logs --no-color --timestamps` to
state/<slug>/compose.log before `docker compose down`.
- Networks are pre-created (`docker network create --internal` +
user-defined bridge) so pipelock yaml can know the internal CIDR
before compose-up. Compose references them with `external: true`;
the launch step's ExitStack still owns network removal.
- Agent still runs `sleep infinity`; claude reaches it via
`docker exec -it` exactly like before (per the PRD's resolved
TTY question).
- metadata.json grows a `compose_project` field so dashboard /
cleanup tooling can derive compose invocations without
re-deriving the slug.
Security follow-ups from chunk-2 review:
(b) CA private keys: pipelock + egress ca-key.pem land at 0o600
explicitly. The mitmproxy cert+key concat stays 0o644 because
the egress container's uid-1000 user reads it through the
bind mount; parent dir at 0o700 still restricts host-side
reach.
(c) Apply atomicity: egress_apply + pipelock_apply switch from
`docker cp` to host-side write-temp-then-rename on the
bind-mount source. POSIX rename is atomic on the same
filesystem, so a sidecar SIGHUP racing the apply can't see
a half-written routes.yaml / pipelock.yaml.
Per-sidecar Docker{Sidecar}.start/stop methods stay in place — the
integration test suite drives them directly to validate each image
in isolation, which is still useful. launch.py no longer calls
them; a follow-up chunk can prune if the integration tests move to
the compose lifecycle.
git-gate entrypoint's chmod 600 on the keyfile + known_hosts now
tolerates EROFS (`|| true`) — the host SSH key is already 0600
(SSH refuses to load otherwise), so the inside-container chmod
was already a no-op in the docker-cp path and now just needs to
not error on the read-only bind mount.
422 unit tests pass; supervise integration test passes; end-to-end
`./cli.py start implementer` brings up the project, attaches,
captures full merged logs on teardown, and reaps all containers +
networks.
PRD 0018 chunk 1. New module `claude_bottle/backend/docker/compose.py`
exposing `bottle_plan_to_compose(plan) -> dict` — a pure function that
translates a fully-resolved DockerBottlePlan into a Compose v2 spec.
Not wired in yet. Tests cover the conditional-service matrix (git
on/off × egress on/off × supervise on/off) plus per-service shape
(images vs builds, network aliases, bind mounts, env vars, depends_on).
didericis