Reads the host's Claude OAuth session key from ~/.claude.json at launch
and forwards it only to the egress sidecar (never to the agent), placing
a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent env so Claude Code
starts without seeing the real credential.
Mirrors the existing Codex forward_host_credentials flow (PRD 0029).
Adds claude_auth.py to extract and validate the sessionKey, a
CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF constant in egress.py, and updates
manifest_agent.py to allow the flag for both 'codex' and 'claude'
templates. Also adds a mutual-exclusion check that rejects setting
both auth_token and forward_host_credentials together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Skill names become host/guest path segments interpolated into the
`bottle.exec` shell strings in each contrib provider's provision_skills.
They were validated only as strings, so a name with shell metacharacters
or path traversal could reach the command.
Layer two defenses:
- Primary: reject any skill name that isn't kebab-case
([a-z][a-z0-9-]*) at manifest load, reusing the convention already
enforced on bottle/agent filenames (new is_valid_entity_name helper
in manifest_schema). Fails loud and early, protecting every consumer
of the name — not just the exec call sites.
- Failsafe: shlex.quote the interpolated skills_dir / dst paths in the
claude, codex, and pi providers, so a future unvalidated field can't
inject shell metacharacters even if it bypasses the load-time check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9