Consolidated egress ran every bottle through one process but keyed the
supervise proposal queue off a single SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG env and kept
one *global* DLP safelist — so in the shared gateway an operator's token
approval for bottle A would (a) be attributed to the wrong bottle and
(b) leak into bottle B's DLP scan (A's approved secret passes B's egress).
This slice keys both per bottle, resolved by source IP.
- policy_resolver: add `resolve_policy_and_bottle_id` — policy + bottle id
in one `/resolve`, so egress keys routing *and* the supervise
queue/safelist from a single round-trip. Fail-closed (403 -> (None,None)).
- egress_addon_core: add `resolve_client_context` (+ `ContextResolverLike`)
returning `(Config, bottle_id)`, sharing the fail-closed parse with
`resolve_client_config` via `_config_from_policy`.
- egress_addon: `_active_config` -> `_resolve_flow` returns `(Config, slug)`;
`safe_tokens` set -> per-bottle `_safe_tokens_for(slug)`; the token-allow
write/await/archive + the approved-token add all use the resolved slug.
Single-tenant (no resolver) unchanged — slug = the env SUPERVISE_BOTTLE_SLUG.
New tests cover the resolver, the fail-closed context matrix, and the
cross-tenant isolation (an approval lands only in the calling bottle's
safelist; the proposal is keyed by the source-IP-attributed bottle;
unattributed IPs can't supervise).
Out of scope (noted): the git-gate gitleaks-allow hook + supervise_server
agent-proposal paths, and websocket DLP (still self.config-only, inert in
consolidated mode) — follow-up slices.
pyright 0 errors; pylint 9.83/10; unit suite green (1700 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
First per-module ratchet under ADR 0004. Extend the adapter flow suite
to cover the remaining behavioural gaps:
- inbound response DLP: injection block (403), warn (logged, forwarded),
and LOG_FULL response logging
- WebSocket inbound (server->client) scanning: injection kills the
connection; warn does not; no-websocket is a no-op
- redaction scrubs the token in a header and the request path, not just
the body
- supervise queue-write OSError fails closed (403)
- _token_allow_timeout_from_env: unset/valid/non-numeric/non-positive
- SIGHUP handler reloads routes; a reload failure keeps the last good
config
- LOG_FULL logs the forwarded request
egress_addon.py: 76% -> 94%. The remaining misses are the low-value
edges (no-SIGHUP platform, hostname-redaction-fails-closed) called out
in the egress adapter PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9
The mitmproxy adapter `egress_addon.py` was omitted from coverage
because it can't import on the host (mitmproxy is sidecar-only) and
only its log-redaction helpers were exercised. Add a request/response
flow suite that stubs mitmproxy and drives the adapter glue:
introspection, allowlist enforcement, auth strip+inject, git
push/fetch blocking, the outbound-DLP block/redact/supervise policy
branches (including the operator approval round-trip), inbound
response scanning, and WebSocket frame scanning.
Removes the `bot_bottle/egress_addon.py` omit from `.coveragerc`;
the adapter now reports ~76% covered.
Closes#286
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9
didericis
didericis-codex