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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis bc52c3525c feat(orchestrator): slice 4 — consolidated per-host sidecar (#352)
The core consolidation win: one persistent sidecar per host, shared by
every bottle, instead of a sidecar bundle per bottle. Safe to share
because the attribution invariant (source IP + identity token) lets the
sidecar map each request to the right bottle.

  * orchestrator/sidecar.py — a backend-neutral `Sidecar` lifecycle
    contract (mirrors LaunchBroker) + a `DockerSidecar` impl. The defining
    behaviour is idempotent singleton: `ensure_running` starts the instance
    if absent and is a no-op if it's already up, so N launches never spawn
    N sidecars; `stop` is idempotent.
  * orchestrator/dockerutil.py — a shared `run_docker` helper; DockerBroker
    now uses it too (DRY with slice 3).
  * service.py — the Orchestrator holds an optional `Sidecar`, exposes
    `ensure_sidecar()` + `sidecar_status()`.
  * control_plane.py — `GET /sidecar` reports it; __main__ gains
    `--sidecar-image` and ensures the single sidecar on startup.

Tests: unit (docker mocked) — is_running, ensure idempotent (no-op when up,
starts when absent), failure raises, stop idempotent; Orchestrator sidecar
wiring/status; control-plane /sidecar; integration (gated) — ensure is a
real idempotent singleton (one container after two ensures), stop removes.
Full suite green (only pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); integration
verified locally against real docker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00
didericis b05f245299 feat(orchestrator): slice 2 — launch lifecycle + signed launch-broker (#352)
Second slice of PRD 0070, still a backend-neutral dev-harness:

  * orchestrator/broker.py — the launch-broker contract. A LaunchRequest is
    structured (static ids/flags only — bottle id, pool slot, a
    content-addressed image_ref; never a path/argv) and signed as a compact
    HS256 JWT so the broker verifies PROVENANCE before acting: a compromised
    co-located component can't forge a launch without the shared secret.
    verify_request is fail-closed (bad sig / malformed / off-schema -> raise).
    Stdlib only (no runtime deps). Ships a StubBroker that records verified
    requests for the harness/tests.
  * orchestrator/service.py — the Orchestrator: owns the registry and brokers
    the lifecycle. launch_bottle mints the bottle + sends a signed launch,
    rolling the registry entry back if the launch fails (no orphans);
    teardown_bottle brokers teardown then deregisters; attribute delegates.
  * control_plane.py — POST /bottles now launches, DELETE tears down (both go
    through the Orchestrator + broker). dispatch/server take an Orchestrator.
  * __main__.py wires an ephemeral secret + StubBroker for the harness.

Tests: broker sign/verify round-trip, tamper/wrong-secret/malformed/off-schema
rejection, StubBroker fail-closed; Orchestrator launch->registry->attribute,
teardown, rollback-on-broker-failure; control-plane updated for launch/teardown.
Full suite green (only the pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); harness does
launch -> attribute -> teardown over HTTP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
2026-07-14 02:38:20 -04:00