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Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis 44479f328e fix(macos-container): launch gateway as a module, not /app/gateway_init.py
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The macOS infra container's init script still spawned the supervisor as
`python3 /app/gateway_init.py`. 5ad3449 moved bot_bottle from flat files
under /app into a pip-installed package, so that file no longer exists:
the supervisor never started, mitmdump never generated its CA, and the
launch failed downstream with a misleading "gateway CA not available"
error pointing at TLS rather than at the supervisor.

This is the same defect 127ba49 fixed for the firecracker backend. It
survived on macOS because CI has no Apple Container runner — the KVM
runner added in c193b04 covers firecracker, and ubuntu-latest covers
docker, but nothing exercises macos_container.

test_macos_infra asserted the substring "gateway_init.py", which the
broken path satisfied; it now asserts the module form, matching the
assertion 127ba49 already made in test_firecracker_infra_vm.

Verified end to end on the macos-container backend: image builds, CA is
generated, agent registers, and a headless bottle runs a prompt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 14:37:09 -04:00
didericis ca91fc4d91 fix(security): authenticate the orchestrator control plane (issue #400 Critical)
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test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 1m21s
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The control plane had no caller authentication — dispatch() routed every
request straight through, and the only guards anywhere were the
(source_ip, identity_token) checks inside /resolve and /attribute, which
authenticate the *bottle* a request is about, not the *caller*. On the
consolidated backends the agent shares a network with the control-plane port
(macOS: the infra container runs 8099 on the agent's --internal network;
docker: the orchestrator container sits on the shared gateway network), so a
prompt-injected agent could GET /bottles (enumerate siblings + policies),
PUT /bottles/<id>/policy (rewrite its own egress allowlist to allow-all),
POST /resolve (read the injected upstream credentials it's never meant to
see), and POST /supervise/respond (self-approve its own proposals). Every
README guarantee collapsed to the agent's discretion.

Fix: a per-host control-plane secret required on every route but GET /health,
compared with hmac.compare_digest. It is held only by the trusted callers and
never handed to an agent:
- minted + persisted 0600 at <root>/control-plane-token (paths.host_control_plane_token);
- injected as $BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN into the orchestrator + gateway
  containers via bare `--env NAME` (value inherited from the launch process,
  so it never lands on argv or in `container/docker inspect`);
- presented by the gateway's PolicyResolver (reads the env) on /resolve, and by
  the host CLI's OrchestratorClient (reads the host file) on every call.

The agent container is never given the env var or the host file, so from a
bottle every /bottles*, /resolve, /attribute, and /supervise/* call now
returns 401 — closing the enumeration, allowlist-rewrite, credential-lift, and
self-approval. The existing (source_ip, identity_token) checks stay as
defense-in-depth.

Enforced when configured: macOS + docker inject the secret (→ enforced). With
no secret set the server runs open and warns loudly at startup — a
fail-visible fallback for the unit suite and for Firecracker, whose
port-scoped nft already blocks agents from 8099 (wiring the secret into its
infra-VM init is a clean fast-follow, left out here to avoid churning the
prebuilt-artifact hash).

Verified end-to-end on real Apple Container: infra comes up healthy, the host
CLI (with the secret) lists bottles while an unauthenticated GET /bottles gets
401, all five issue-#400 attacks from inside the agent get 401, and egress
policy still works (200 allowed / 403 denied) — proving the gateway
authenticates to /resolve with the secret. 1829 unit tests pass, pyright
clean, pylint 9.91.

Refs #400.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 05:15:16 -04:00
didericis 4a607ad098 refactor(macos): one infra container (control plane + gateway), fixes shared-DB races
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Adopts the firecracker infra-VM pattern for macOS: the orchestrator control
plane and the gateway data plane now run in a SINGLE Apple container instead of
two. Apple Containers are lightweight VMs with separate kernels, so the prior
two-container design had both guests writing one bot-bottle.db over virtiofs,
where fcntl locks are not coherent across kernels — concurrent writes (the
orchestrator's registry vs the gateway supervise daemon's queue) could corrupt
it. One container = one kernel = coherent locking.

The DB moves onto a container-only Apple volume (bot-bottle-mac-db), never
bind-mounted from the host, so no host process opens the live file either. The
host CLI already reaches registry + supervise state over the control-plane HTTP
surface (cli/supervise.py uses OrchestratorClient), exactly as firecracker's
VM-only DB requires.

Two simplifications fall out of the single container:
- No DNS dance: the control plane and gateway daemons reach each other over
  127.0.0.1, so the orchestrator-before-gateway ordering (a workaround for
  Apple having no container DNS) is gone, along with the moved-IP recreate
  logic it needed.
- Net -243 lines.

Mechanics: the infra container runs from the gateway image with the
control-plane source bind-mounted read-only (like the docker orchestrator, so a
code change needs no rebuild) and a small sh -c init that starts both processes
(mirrors firecracker's _infra_init). Also implements the macOS backend's
ensure_orchestrator() and adds it to discover_orchestrator_url, so operator
tools (supervise) can bring up / find the control plane on demand — previously
the macOS backend died with "no orchestrator control plane".

Verified end-to-end on real Apple Container 1.0.0: the single infra container
comes up healthy (one address for control plane + gateway), both processes run,
the DB is written on the container-only volume, host-side supervise works over
HTTP, and a registered agent gets 200 for an allowed host / 403 for a denied
one. 1824 unit tests pass with `container` absent (CI parity), pyright clean,
pylint 9.89.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 04:14:14 -04:00