When the operator opens a pipelock-block proposal in the detail
view (Enter / 'v'), append a green-coloured line:
→ would allow host: api.github.com
so what's actually about to change is obvious at a glance. The
full failed URL stays above the new line (the path is operator
context — pipelock can't enforce it, just records intent).
- _detail_lines now returns (text, attr) tuples; pipelock-block
appends the host-extract line tagged with the green color pair.
- _detail_view threaded the green_attr through from the main loop
(matches the new-proposal highlight pattern from earlier in this
PR).
- Best-effort URL parsing; unparseable payloads skip the highlight
line rather than render a misleading blank host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reshape the pipelock-block MCP tool around what the agent actually
knows at the moment of failure (the URL pipelock just refused), not
what the operator needs (a full allowlist file).
Before: agent had to read /etc/claude-bottle/current-config/allowlist,
copy the whole file, append their host, send back. Lots of work,
easy to get wrong, and the operator's diff was noisy because the
proposal contained every host the agent saw — most of which weren't
the change.
After: agent calls
pipelock-block(failed_url="https://api.github.com/repos/foo/bar",
justification="...")
supervisor extracts api.github.com, fetches the running allowlist,
adds the host if not already present, applies the merged content.
Path is captured as operator context (the detail view labels it
"failed URL" instead of "proposed file") but isn't enforced —
pipelock's api_allowlist is hostname-only, so the path can't
become an allow rule.
- supervise_server: pipelock-block input schema gains `failed_url`
(replaces `allowlist`); validate_proposed_file checks for
http/https + hostname.
- PROPOSED_FILE_FIELD updated; tool description rewritten.
- dashboard._apply_pipelock_url: extract host, fetch current,
merge, apply.
- _proposed_payload_label: detail view renders "failed URL" for
pipelock-block, "proposed file" otherwise.
- Tests updated end-to-end; new url-host-merge + idempotent-merge +
invalid-url cases added.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a new proposal lands in the dashboard's list, the operator
shouldn't have to compare the list to a mental snapshot to spot
what's new. Render newly-arrived proposals in green for the first
five seconds after they show up.
- _try_init_green: initialise a green color pair; returns 0 if the
terminal lacks color so the highlight degrades to no-op.
- _main_loop tracks first_seen[proposal_id] across refresh ticks,
pruning entries when a proposal leaves the queue.
- _render ORs green into the existing attr (composes with selection
reverse-video — terminal handles the mix).
Applies to all tool types (cred-proxy-block, pipelock-block,
capability-block). If a tool-specific highlight is wanted later,
filter on qp.proposal.tool in _is_recent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`/mcp` showed the supervise server as ✔ connected (initialize is
fast), but any actual tool call failed because the supervise
MCP design is long-poll — the sidecar holds the HTTP request open
until the operator approves in the dashboard (potentially minutes)
and only then returns the response.
Pipelock is a forward proxy with idle timeouts; it cut the long-
polled HTTPS-style request well before the operator could act, and
claude-code reported the tool as ✘ failed.
Fix: add `supervise` to the agent's NO_PROXY when bottle.supervise
is true. The supervise sidecar is on the bottle's internal network
with the `supervise` network-alias, so the agent can dial it
directly via docker DNS — no proxy, no idle timeout.
Body-scanning supervise traffic isn't critical because the operator
reviews every proposal in the TUI before approving. The earlier
pipelock allowlist auto-add for `supervise` stays as belt-and-
braces (handles any proxy-respecting client other than claude-code
that might dial supervise).
Existing bottles need a restart to pick up the new NO_PROXY value
(env can't be changed on a running container). The dashboard's
pipelock-edit workaround from PR #25 unblocks short-running tool
calls in the meantime but won't survive the pipelock idle timeout
on a long-polled call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When PR #19 added the supervise sidecar (PRD 0013), I forgot to
mirror the cred-proxy auto-allow in pipelock_effective_allowlist.
The agent's HTTP_PROXY points at pipelock, so a request for
http://supervise:9100/ (the MCP endpoint claude-code dials) arrives
at pipelock as hostname `supervise` — and pipelock 403s it because
the host isn't in api_allowlist.
End-user symptom: even after `claude mcp add` registers the
supervise server, `/mcp` shows it as ✘ failed and the supervise
sidecar's docker logs are silent (request never gets through).
Mirror what cred-proxy already does: when bottle.supervise is True,
add SUPERVISE_HOSTNAME to the rendered pipelock allowlist. New tests
cover both the auto-add and the no-add-when-disabled invariants.
Existing bottles: the dashboard `pipelock edit <bottle>` verb (or
backend.docker.pipelock_apply.apply_allowlist_change) can apply
this fix to a running bottle without a relaunch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous provisioner wrote ~/.claude/settings.json with an
mcpServers entry — but claude-code doesn't read its mcpServers from
that path. Inside a bottle, /mcp showed "No MCP servers configured"
even though the sidecar was running.
Switch to the official `claude mcp add` command run via docker exec:
docker exec -u node <agent> \
claude mcp add --scope user --transport http supervise <url>
claude-code owns its config file format (~/.claude.json shape, key
names, scope semantics) and has changed it between versions. The
official command writes to the right place in the right shape for
whatever version is installed.
Failure is logged but not fatal — the bottle still works; you just
have to register the server manually with the command surfaced in
the warning. Worst case is a bad agent claude-code version, not a
bad bottle.
To fix an already-running bottle without restarting, the user can
run the same `docker exec` command directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends the preserve-on-capability-block design to also preserve
state on agent crash, and snapshots the transcript on every
teardown so any resume (crash or capability-block) gets a warm
claude session — not a cold start.
- capability_apply: rename _snapshot_transcript → snapshot_transcript
(public; reused below). No behavior change in the capability path.
- cli/start.py: capture bottle.exec_claude's exit code; while the
container is still alive (inside the launch context):
* always snapshot_transcript(identity)
* if exit_code != 0, mark_preserved(identity)
Then the existing _settle_state runs after teardown.
Now the preservation matrix is:
exit 0 (clean) → snapshot + cleanup state
exit ≠0 (crash, Ctrl-C) → snapshot + preserve + show resume hint
capability-block → (already snapshotted/preserved by apply
before teardown; this path is a no-op
because the container is already gone
by the time exec_claude returns)
snapshot_transcript is best-effort — capability-block's earlier
snapshot is not clobbered when the container is already torn down,
and a missing /home/node/.claude is a warn + skip.
Tested behavior: clean exit doesn't preserve, non-zero exit
(including SIGINT/130 and SIGKILL/137) preserves; empty identity
no-ops both helpers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`cli.py cleanup` already enumerated orphan containers + networks
and asked for confirmation before nuking them. Per-bottle state
under ~/.claude-bottle/state/ wasn't touched — accumulated forever,
including orphans from old code paths.
Add state to the cleanup flow with its own prompt: the trade-off is
different from containers (which are pure debris) because a state
dir may carry a resumable bottle (capability-block rebuild +
transcript snapshot) the operator still wants.
Output shows the resumable / orphan / rebuilt-Dockerfile / transcript /
preserve-marker flags for each state dir so the operator sees what
they'd lose. Both sections are skippable independently — answering
"n" to containers doesn't skip the state prompt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously every bottle launch left ~/.claude-bottle/state/<identity>/
behind forever — metadata.json on every run, plus per-bottle
Dockerfile + transcript snapshot on capability-block rebuilds. The
metadata accumulated debris across launches; the only state worth
keeping was the capability-block rebuild bundle.
Make cleanup the default; preserve only on capability-block.
- bottle_state.py: .preserve marker helpers (mark_preserved,
is_preserved, clear_preserve_marker, preserve_marker_path) +
cleanup_state(identity) that rm -rf's the per-bottle dir.
- capability_apply.apply_capability_change writes mark_preserved
before teardown so cli.py's session-end cleanup keeps the dir.
- prepare.py clears any leftover marker at launch (start or resume),
so a marker from a prior capability-block doesn't keep state
alive past a subsequent normal session-end.
- cli/start.py runs the cleanup decision AFTER the launch context
closes: if is_preserved → print resume hint; else cleanup_state.
The resume hint moves out of the launch with-block (was previously
printed unconditionally — would have misled the operator about
whether state was actually kept).
Future-proof: cli.py never persists state speculatively. If the
agent wants to be resumable, it has to go through capability-block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The supervise sidecar (PRD 0013) has been serving MCP at
http://supervise:9100/ since it landed, but the in-bottle Claude
Code had no `.mcp.json` or settings pointing there — so the agent
couldn't actually call cred-proxy-block / pipelock-block /
capability-block as tools. To exercise the flow you had to curl
the sidecar from a sibling container.
This closes that last mile.
- claude_bottle/backend/docker/provision/supervise.py (new):
provision_supervise(plan, target) writes
~/.claude/settings.json into the running agent container with an
mcpServers.supervise entry of type http pointing at the
per-bottle sidecar. No-op when bottle.supervise is False.
- BottleBackend.provision orchestrator gains provision_supervise as
the last step (after CA, prompt, skills, git, cred-proxy). Default
impl is a no-op so non-Docker backends aren't forced to implement it.
- DockerBottleBackend wires it through to the new module.
- Test covers the rendered settings shape so a future regression in
the MCP entry format would surface in unit-level CI.
To test the full flow end-to-end now:
./cli.py start <agent> --cwd # agent's claude sees supervise
# agent calls cred-proxy-block via MCP
./cli.py dashboard # approve
./cli.py resume <identity> # restart with new capabilities
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the cwd-hash identity with a random 5-char base36 suffix
per launch, so two simultaneous `start <agent>` invocations against
the same cwd no longer collide on container names. Each launch is
its own bottle.
State carries metadata: every prepare step writes
~/.claude-bottle/state/<identity>/metadata.json with the
(agent_name, cwd, copy_cwd, started_at) the bottle was launched
with. The new `cli.py resume <identity>` reads this metadata and
re-launches a bottle pinned to the same identity — picking up the
per-bottle Dockerfile (from a prior capability-block apply) and
the transcript snapshot under the same state dir.
- bottle_state.py: bottle_identity(agent_name) drops the cwd param
and gains a random suffix; BottleMetadata dataclass +
read/write/metadata_path helpers.
- BottleSpec gains an optional identity field — resume sets it to
pin the identity; start leaves it empty so prepare mints fresh.
- prepare.py: writes metadata at launch time; uses spec.identity if
provided (resume) else bottle_identity(agent_name) (fresh start).
- start.py: extracted _launch_bottle from cmd_start so resume can
share the launch core; prints `./cli.py resume <identity>` hint
at session end.
- cli/resume.py (new): reads metadata, reconstructs BottleSpec
with the recorded identity + cwd, delegates to _launch_bottle.
Errors clearly when no state exists for the given identity.
- cli/__init__.py: registers `resume` in COMMANDS + usage.
- dashboard.py: capability-block approval status line now appends
the `resume <identity>` hint so the operator can copy-paste the
rebuild command without leaving the TUI.
Closes the rebuild loop in PRD 0016: agent calls capability-block →
operator approves → bottle torn down with state preserved → status
line shows resume command → operator runs it → replacement bottle
boots with the new Dockerfile and prior transcript.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The single point that computed `slug = slugify(agent_name)` in
prepare.py is now `slug = bottle_identity(agent_name, cwd)`. With
--cwd the identity has a sha256(resolved-cwd)[:12] suffix, so the
same agent against different projects gets distinct container
names, network names, queue dir, audit log paths, and per-bottle
state (Dockerfile + transcript). Without --cwd the identity is
just slugify(agent_name), unchanged from before — no-cwd bottles
look the same as today.
The downstream `slug` field on DockerBottlePlan keeps its name —
every module already threads it under "slug" and the value flowing
through is now the bottle's full identity. A comment in prepare.py
flags the change.
Fixes the bug surfaced in PR #22 review: running the same agent
against project-A's cwd then project-B's would silently share
project-A's per-bottle Dockerfile + transcript snapshot, container
name (forcing serialized runs), and queue/audit history.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of PRD 0016. dashboard.approve() now dispatches to
apply_capability_change when the proposal is a capability-block:
cred-proxy-block → apply_routes_change
pipelock-block → apply_allowlist_change
capability-block → apply_capability_change (new in PRD 0016)
CapabilityApplyError joins the ApplyError tuple, so the TUI's key
handlers catch it the same way and surface failures in the status
line.
After a successful capability-block apply, dashboard archives the
proposal+response itself — the supervise sidecar was torn down by
apply_capability_change and can't archive its own queue file.
Without this, dashboard.discover_pending would keep surfacing the
resolved proposal forever.
No audit log for capability-block per PRD 0013 — its record lives
in the per-bottle Dockerfile state + transcript snapshot.
Tests stub apply_capability_change at the dashboard module level,
add TestCapabilityApplyWiring (call wiring, failure-keeps-pending,
no-audit invariant, archive-after-apply), and update TestApproveReject
to stub the capability path too so it stays docker-independent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of PRD 0016. New module
claude_bottle/backend/docker/capability_apply.py:
- apply_capability_change(slug, new_dockerfile): snapshot transcript
→ push working tree → write per-bottle Dockerfile → teardown.
Returns (before, after) for the dashboard's audit/diff render.
- fetch_current_dockerfile(slug): per-bottle Dockerfile if set,
else the repo's Dockerfile.
- Internal helpers _snapshot_transcript, _push_working_tree are
best-effort (log + return on failure); _teardown_bottle is
idempotent (force-rm + network rm silently ignore missing names).
Fire-and-forget from the agent's perspective: by the time the
dashboard writes the response file the supervise sidecar is already
gone (it was torn down), so the agent's tool call connection drops
without receiving the response. The replacement agent (next manual
`cli.py start <agent>`) sees the new per-bottle Dockerfile and the
transcript snapshot for resume. v1 does not auto-relaunch.
Tests cover sequencing (snapshot → push → teardown order), the
per-bottle vs repo Dockerfile fallback chain, empty-input rejection,
and the per-bottle-Dockerfile write. The docker exec / cp / rm
plumbing is covered by the Phase 4 integration test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of PRD 0016. Lays the per-bottle state plumbing that
capability-block remediation will write into:
- claude_bottle/backend/docker/bottle_state.py: bottle_state_dir,
per_bottle_dockerfile (read), write_per_bottle_dockerfile,
per_bottle_image_tag (unique per slug), transcript_snapshot_dir.
Stores under ~/.claude-bottle/state/<slug>/.
- prepare.py: when a per-bottle Dockerfile exists, use
per_bottle_image_tag(slug) as the base image and pass the
per-bottle Dockerfile path through DockerBottlePlan.dockerfile_path.
--cwd still layers a derived image on top.
- launch.py: passes plan.dockerfile_path to build_image so the
per-bottle Dockerfile is what docker build reads.
- DockerBottlePlan gains dockerfile_path field; print() surfaces it
in the preflight summary so the operator can see at-a-glance that
this bottle is running on a rebuilt image.
Phase 2 will write to write_per_bottle_dockerfile (capability-block
approval); Phase 3 wires it into the dashboard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of PRD 0015. Adds the proactive `pipelock edit` path,
mirroring routes edit from PRD 0014:
- discover_pipelock_slugs() lists running pipelock sidecars.
- operator_edit_allowlist(slug, new) wraps apply_allowlist_change
and writes an audit entry tagged ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT.
- New 'p' keybinding in the main TUI: discover slugs, prompt if
multiple, fetch current allowlist, open in $EDITOR, apply on
save.
- Extracts shared scaffolding into _operator_edit_flow used by
both routes-edit and pipelock-edit — DRY without sacrificing
the per-verb status-line copy.
- Footer updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of PRD 0015. dashboard.approve() now dispatches on the
proposal's tool:
cred-proxy-block → apply_routes_change (from PRD 0014)
pipelock-block → apply_allowlist_change (new in PRD 0015)
capability-block → no-op (lands in PRD 0016)
PipelockApplyError joins CredProxyApplyError under the ApplyError
tuple the TUI catches: failures keep the proposal pending and the
status line surfaces the message; no response is written and no
audit entry is appended.
Tests: existing TestApproveReject stubs both apply paths; new
TestPipelockApplyWiring covers the call wiring, failure-propagation,
and real-diff-in-audit invariants.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of PRD 0015. New module
claude_bottle/backend/docker/pipelock_apply.py:
- fetch_current_yaml(slug): docker exec cat of the live
/etc/pipelock.yaml.
- fetch_current_allowlist(slug): parses the yaml, extracts
api_allowlist, renders as one-per-line for the operator/agent.
- parse_allowlist_content / render_allowlist_content: one-per-line
with `#` comments + blank-line tolerance, conservative hostname
validation.
- apply_allowlist_change(slug, new): parses new hosts, fetches +
parses current yaml, swaps api_allowlist, re-renders via
pipelock_render_yaml, docker cp into sidecar, docker restart.
Returns (before, after) as one-per-line strings for the audit diff.
- PipelockApplyError: caller surfaces to operator without crashing
the dashboard.
v1 uses restart, not SIGHUP — pipelock has no in-process reload
hook; adding one is the PRD's open question. Restart drops in-flight
outbound calls and the agent retries pick up the restarted proxy.
Yaml roundtrip is covered by tests: parse(render(cfg)) preserves
all fields pipelock_render_yaml emits, including tls_interception
+ passthrough_domains.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4 of PRD 0014. Adds the proactive routes-edit path that
doesn't require a pending proposal:
- discover_cred_proxy_slugs() lists running cred-proxy sidecars by
parsing docker ps output. Returns [] when docker is unreachable
or not installed (no exception escapes).
- operator_edit_routes(slug, new_content) wraps apply_routes_change
and writes an audit entry tagged ACTION_OPERATOR_EDIT (so a
future reader can distinguish operator-initiated changes from
agent-proposal approvals in the log).
- New 'e' keybinding in the main TUI: discover slugs, prompt if
multiple (or use the only one directly), fetch current routes,
open in $EDITOR, apply on save. CredProxyApplyError lands in the
status line; the operator can retry.
Tests cover audit-entry shape, failure path, and docker-missing
recovery for slug discovery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of PRD 0014. dashboard.approve() now does the real
remediation for cred-proxy-block proposals:
- Calls apply_routes_change(slug, file_to_apply) which fetches the
current routes.json from the running sidecar, validates the new
JSON, docker cp's it in, and SIGHUPs the sidecar.
- Audit entry's diff is now the real before→after from the apply
return — not the empty-string placeholder 0013 wrote.
- On apply failure (CredProxyApplyError): no response file, no
audit entry. Proposal stays pending so the operator can fix the
input and retry. The TUI's key handlers catch the exception and
surface the message in the status line.
- pipelock-block + capability-block remain no-op approvals; their
remediation lands in PRDs 0015 + 0016 and the audit diff stays
empty until then.
- reject path unchanged: no apply, audit entry with empty diff.
Tests stub apply_routes_change at the dashboard module level so the
unit suite doesn't need a running sidecar; integration test in
Phase 5 covers the real docker exec/cp/SIGHUP plumbing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of PRD 0014. New module
claude_bottle/backend/docker/cred_proxy_apply.py:
- fetch_current_routes(slug): docker exec cat of the live
routes.json from the running cred-proxy sidecar.
- validate_routes_json(content): syntactic check before SIGHUP so
failures keep the old routes live and surface a clearer error
than 'reload failed' in the sidecar logs.
- apply_routes_change(slug, new): fetch current → validate new →
write to temp → docker cp into sidecar → docker kill --signal HUP.
Returns (before, after) so the caller can render a real audit diff.
- CredProxyApplyError: caller surfaces to operator without crashing
the dashboard.
docker exec / cp / kill paths are covered by the integration test
in Phase 5; unit tests here cover the validator.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1 of PRD 0014. Adds the in-sidecar SIGHUP signal handler that
re-reads routes.json + re-resolves tokens from env without dropping
in-flight connections:
- reload_routes(server, path, environ=...) does the atomic swap.
Returns (ok, message) so the caller can log/surface failures.
On failure (bad JSON, missing file) the server keeps serving the
old routes rather than dying — typos shouldn't crash the sidecar.
- install_sighup_handler wires SIGHUP → reload_routes. No-op on
platforms without SIGHUP (Windows).
- serve() now installs the handler at startup.
Atomicity: Python attribute reassignment is atomic, and the request
handler reads server.routes/tokens once at the top of _proxy() so
an in-flight request keeps the version it captured.
Tests cover successful reload, JSON-parse failure, and missing-file
failure (both verify the old routes survive).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4 of PRD 0013. Adds `claude-bottle dashboard` subcommand:
- discover_pending() walks ~/.claude-bottle/queue/* and gathers
pending proposals across all bottles, sorted FIFO by arrival.
- approve / approve-with-final-file / reject helpers write the
Response file the sidecar polls, and append an AuditEntry for
cred-proxy and pipelock tools. capability-block proposals don't
write to an audit log here (PRD 0016 captures via rebuild record).
- Stdlib-curses TUI: list view, detail view, $EDITOR shellout for
modify-then-approve, inline prompt for reject reason.
- `dashboard --once` dumps pending proposals to stdout without
bringing up curses — useful for scripted checks and tests.
For 0013 the audit entry's diff field is render_diff("", proposed)
because we don't yet have access to the live on-disk current file;
PRDs 0014 / 0015 fill in real before→after diffs once they own the
host-side config writes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 3 of PRD 0013. Wires the supervise sidecar into bottle launch:
- Manifest: bottle.supervise (bool, default False). Opt-in for v1 so
existing bottles are unchanged.
- supervise.py: adds SupervisePlan + abstract Supervise(ABC) with a
prepare template that stages the per-bottle queue dir on the host
and the current-config dir under stage_dir (routes.json + allowlist
+ Dockerfile). Stdlib-only so it still runs as the in-container
shared helper.
- backend/docker/supervise.py: DockerSupervise concrete start/stop.
No egress network (the sidecar doesn't make outbound calls); just
the bottle's internal network with network-alias "supervise" and a
bind-mount of the host queue dir at /run/supervise/queue.
- Prepare wires supervise.prepare into the DockerBottlePlan, derives
routes_content from cred_proxy_plan, allowlist_content from
pipelock_effective_allowlist, and dockerfile_content from the
repo's Dockerfile. supervise sidecar added to the orphan probe.
- Launch starts the supervise sidecar after pipelock + cred-proxy
but before the agent (so DNS resolution for `supervise` is up on
the agent's first tool call).
- Agent container gets a read-only bind-mount of the current-config
dir at /etc/claude-bottle/current-config when supervise is enabled.
- bottle_plan print + to_dict surface the supervise state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 2 of PRD 0013. Adds the in-container MCP server:
- claude_bottle/supervise_server.py: minimal JSON-RPC over HTTP MCP
server. Handles initialize / notifications/initialized / tools/list /
tools/call. Each tools/call validates the proposed file syntactically,
writes a Proposal to the host-mounted queue, blocks waiting for a
Response, archives both files, returns the operator's {status, notes}
wrapped in MCP content.
- Three tool definitions with JSON Schema inputs: cred-proxy-block
(routes.json), pipelock-block (allowlist), capability-block
(Dockerfile).
- Dockerfile.supervise mirroring the cred-proxy pattern: same pinned
python:3.13-alpine, copies supervise.py + supervise_server.py into
/app, exposes port 9100.
Stdlib-only. Tests cover JSON-RPC parsing, per-tool validation, all
three handlers, the queue round-trip via a background responder
thread, and an end-to-end HTTP sanity check on a random port.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Manifest.resolve walks $HOME/.claude-bottle/{bottles,agents}/ and
$CWD/.claude-bottle/agents/ instead of reading claude-bottle.json.
A bottles/ subdir under $CWD is logged as a warn and ignored —
the filesystem layout IS the trust boundary, no resolver check
needed.
If claude-bottle.json exists alongside no .claude-bottle/ dir at
either location, dies with a clear pointer at the README — the
manifest format changed and we don't silently fall back.
Manifest.from_md_dirs(home, cwd) is the programmatic entry point
tests use to build a Manifest from fixture directories without
touching os.environ. Manifest.from_json_obj is preserved for
tests that still want to build manifests in-memory.
Bottle / agent frontmatter goes through Bottle.from_dict /
Agent.from_dict — same validators as today's JSON path. Unknown
top-level frontmatter keys die with a "did you mean" pointer
listing accepted keys. Filenames that don't match [a-z][a-z0-9-]*
are skipped with a warn.
Agent files accept the Claude Code subagent passthrough fields
(name, description, model, color, memory) so the same file can
drop into ~/.claude/agents/ — claude-bottle ignores them at
launch but doesn't reject.
The dry-run integration test ships a real MD fixture tree now;
all 200 unit + 17 integration tests stay green.
claude_bottle/yaml_subset.py — stdlib-only, ~450 lines. Parses the
bounded shape claude-bottle's manifest files use:
- Block mappings (top-level + nested via indentation)
- Block lists (under a key, items can be scalars or block-style
mappings whose keys align with the rest after the dash)
- Inline lists `[a, b]` and inline dicts `{a: 1}` for one-level
leaves
- Quoted (single + double) and bare strings
- Scalars: string, int, true/false, null/~
Rejects, each with a clear pointer at the line number:
- `yes`/`no`/`on`/`off`/`Y`/`N`/`TRUE`/`FALSE` — only literal
`true` / `false` are bools (the Norway problem stays solved by
"quote your strings if they look like bools")
- Bare strings that look like dates / octals / hex / floats
- Anchors (`&`/`*`), aliases, YAML tags (`!!str`)
- Multi-line block scalars (`|`, `>`)
- Tabs in indentation
- Nested flow style (only one level allowed)
Public API:
parse_yaml_subset(text) -> dict[str, object]
Top level must be a mapping.
parse_frontmatter(text) -> (dict, body_text)
Strips `---` delimiters, parses content as YAML subset, returns
the verbatim body text after the closing fence.
46 unit tests covering every construct the real manifest files use
(the cred_proxy.routes structure, role-as-inline-list, nested
ExtraHosts dicts) plus every rejection case listed in PRD 0011.
claude-code sends Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br on every
request. api.anthropic.com honors it and returns gzip-compressed
SSE responses. Pipelock 2.3.0 has no decompression path; its
response scanner fails closed with "blocked: compressed
sse_stream response cannot be scanned" — and that gate fires
even with response_scanning.enabled=false and sse_streaming
disabled. Verified empirically against the real pipelock image.
Cleanest fix that preserves DLP coverage end-to-end: have
cred-proxy ask upstream for uncompressed bytes. Strip the
agent's Accept-Encoding when building the upstream headers and
inject `Accept-Encoding: identity`. Upstream returns plaintext;
pipelock can scan; no 403.
Bandwidth cost is the gzip ratio one-way (cred-proxy ↔ upstream
through pipelock). For LLM SSE streams that's a few KB extra per
turn — trivial compared to the alternative of leaving
pipelock's response scanner blind.
The previous attempt added a `suppress: [{rule, path}]` entry. The
yaml validated and the entry showed up in the live pipelock's
config, but the BIP-39 detector kept firing — `suppress` only
silences alerts, not enforcement.
Reproduced the failure in isolation, probed three knobs against a
real pipelock with a canonical BIP-39 body
(`abandon abandon ... about`):
suppress: [{rule: "BIP-39 Seed Phrase", path: "/anthropic/**"}]
-> still 403
rules.disabled: ["dlp:BIP-39 Seed Phrase"]
-> still 403
seed_phrase_detection: { enabled: false }
-> 200 (forwarded)
Only the global toggle actually stops the block. Pipelock 2.3.0
has no per-path / per-host knob for this detector, so the
trade-off is: when the bottle declares an `anthropic-base-url`
route, BIP-39 detection comes off globally for that bottle. Every
other DLP pattern (gh*_, sk-ant-, AKIA, etc.) keeps firing — the
ones that actually map to claude-bottle's threat model.
Drops the `suppress:` emitter from pipelock_build_config /
pipelock_render_yaml; replaces with a `seed_phrase_detection:
{ enabled: false }` block driven by
`pipelock_seed_phrase_detection_enabled(bottle)`. Tests flip from
suppress-shape to seed_phrase shape. End-to-end probe through the
real pipelock image confirms BIP-39 bodies forward.
claude-code's chat bodies legitimately trip pipelock's BIP-39 seed-
phrase detector — any 12+ English words that pass the BIP-39
checksum match. The direct path to api.anthropic.com already sits
on tls_interception.passthrough_domains so no body scan runs
there, but the cred-proxy hop is plain HTTP through pipelock and
the body scanner fires.
Add an anthropic-route-specific suppress entry:
suppress:
- rule: "BIP-39 Seed Phrase"
path: "/anthropic/**"
Just this one detector, only on this one path. Every other DLP
pattern (AKIA, gh*_, sk-ant-, etc.) keeps firing — those are
unambiguous credential shapes with no legitimate reason to appear
in a chat completion. Other detectors that fire on natural
language can be added to the suppress list when/if they surface.
Wiring: pipelock_effective_suppress(bottle) computes the entries
from bottle.cred_proxy.routes; pipelock_build_config accepts them
and emits a `suppress:` block; pipelock_render_yaml renders it.
Probed schema with `pipelock check --config` to confirm the
{rule, path} shape; full yaml validates clean.
The agent's HTTP_PROXY points at pipelock, so a request to
http://cred-proxy:9099/... arrives at pipelock; pipelock resolves
the host, sees an RFC1918 address (the bottle's internal Docker
network sits in 172.x), and 403's "SSRF blocked: cred-proxy
resolves to internal IP 172.20.0.4". Bypassing pipelock entirely
would also remove its body scanner from the agent->cred-proxy leg
— we want to keep that DLP coverage.
Pipelock has `ssrf.ip_allowlist` for exactly this: CIDRs that
override the built-in internal-IP block while api_allowlist + body
scanning + tls_interception keep firing.
Wiring:
- `pipelock_build_config` accepts `ssrf_ip_allowlist`; when
non-empty, emits an `ssrf: { ip_allowlist: [...] }` block.
- `pipelock_render_yaml` renders that block.
- `PipelockProxyPlan` gains `internal_network_cidr`.
- New `network_inspect_cidr(name)` helper reads the Docker-assigned
subnet via `docker network inspect`.
- launch.py: after `network_create_internal`, inspect the CIDR,
re-render the yaml with `ssrf_ip_allowlist=(cidr,)`, overwrite
the file in place; `DockerPipelockProxy.start` then docker-cp's
the updated content. Prepare's initial render stays unchanged
(CIDR isn't known yet at prepare time).
The exception scope is the bottle's own internal network only —
agent ↔ pipelock / git-gate / cred-proxy. Body scanning still
applies to the bytes flowing through pipelock; pipelock just no
longer treats those internal IPs as exfil targets.
The agent's HTTP_PROXY env points at pipelock, so an
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL like http://cred-proxy:9099/anthropic doesn't
short-circuit through Docker's embedded DNS — it gets forwarded
through pipelock, which then checks its api_allowlist for the
hostname `cred-proxy` and 403's because the name isn't there. The
agent surfaces the failure as "API Error: 403 blocked: domain not
in allowlist: cred-proxy" on Claude's first call.
Fix: pipelock_effective_allowlist auto-adds CRED_PROXY_HOSTNAME
when bottle.cred_proxy.routes is non-empty (i.e., when the
sidecar will actually be running and reachable).
Move CRED_PROXY_HOSTNAME from backend/docker/cred_proxy.py to the
backend-agnostic claude_bottle/cred_proxy.py so pipelock can
reference it without a layering violation; the docker concrete
imports it from the same place.
Three leftovers from the manifest refactor:
1. provision/cred_proxy.py:223 referenced u.kind == 'gitea' for the
tea login count — kind was removed from the runtime class, so any
bottle with a tea-login route raised AttributeError at provision
time. Switch to `'tea-login' in r.roles`.
2. The runtime class CredProxyUpstream is renamed to CredProxyRoute
(its data is a route on the proxy, not an "upstream"; the field
route.upstream is the upstream URL). Module's own naming now
aligns with manifest.CredProxyRoute and routes.json.
3. cred_proxy_upstreams_for_bottle -> cred_proxy_routes_for_bottle;
CredProxyPlan.upstreams -> CredProxyPlan.routes; local
`upstreams` collections become `routes`. Callers in
backend.py, launch.py, prepare.py, bottle_plan.py,
provision/cred_proxy.py, and tests updated.
Also strips lingering `bottle.tokens` references from docstrings
(pipelock.py, cred_proxy.py prepare(), manifest._parse_https_host,
test_pipelock_allowlist.py module doc) and removes dead helpers
from the integration test (the _bottle helper used a tokens field
that no longer parses).
Replace bottle.tokens (with Kind enum and hardcoded per-kind
route/auth tables) with bottle.cred_proxy.routes — each route
declares its own path, upstream, auth_scheme, token_ref, and
optional role[]. The manifest is now the source of truth for the
proxy's runtime route table; adding an upstream is a manifest edit,
not a code change.
Agent-side rewrites move from per-kind dispatch to per-role tags
on routes:
anthropic-base-url -> set ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=<proxy><path>
npm-registry -> write ~/.npmrc registry=
git-insteadof -> write ~/.gitconfig [url] insteadOf, keyed
off route.upstream (suppressed when
bottle.git brokers the same host)
tea-login -> add a ~/.config/tea/config.yml login
Roles are a list (string accepted as sugar). A gitea route
typically carries ["git-insteadof", "tea-login"]. Singleton roles
(anthropic-base-url, npm-registry) appear on at most one route.
token_env slots are assigned per distinct TokenRef in declaration
order — two routes sharing a token_ref (e.g. github API + git
endpoints) share a slot.
Drops: TOKEN_KINDS, _KIND_ROUTES, _KIND_AUTH_SCHEME, _TOKEN_DEFAULT_HOST,
cred_proxy_route_path_for_gitea, the kind field on CredProxyUpstream,
and the kind-based hardcoding in pipelock_token_hosts (now derives
from route.UpstreamHost).
Legacy bottle.tokens manifests now die with a hint pointing at
bottle.cred_proxy.routes + this PRD. Tests rewritten end-to-end.
Docs + example.json + the dev ~/claude-bottle.json updated to match.
Three coupled fixes that close a documented bypass of git-gate's
gitleaks pre-receive hook:
1. cred-proxy refuses git smart-HTTP push at runtime. Any path
ending in /git-receive-pack or /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack
returns 403 with a pointer at the bottle.git SSH path. Fetch
(upload-pack) is still allowed — the bypass we're closing is
push, where gitleaks is the load-bearing scanner. Hard guarantee.
2. The provisioner suppresses the cred-proxy `~/.gitconfig` insteadOf
rewrite for any host already declared in bottle.git. git-gate is
the canonical git path there; we don't write a competing rule
that would let `git clone https://<host>/...` succeed in ways
that confuse on push. Defense in depth — (1) is the hard guarantee.
3. cred-proxy routes its outbound HTTPS through pipelock. The
sidecar's environ now sets HTTPS_PROXY=<pipelock-url>, and the
image's entrypoint runs `update-ca-certificates` over the
per-bottle pipelock CA (docker cp'd into
/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/pipelock.crt before start) so
the proxy's HTTPS client trusts pipelock's bumped certs.
Consequence: pipelock's allowlist + body scanner now sit in the
cred-proxy egress path the same way they sit in front of direct
agent traffic. The cred-proxy upstream hosts (api.github.com,
github.com, gitea hosts, registry.npmjs.org) come OFF
pipelock's passthrough_domains. Only api.anthropic.com remains
on passthrough (LLM body content legitimately trips DLP).
PRD 0010 updated to reflect all three. Tests adjusted: the
"cred-proxy hosts go on passthrough" assertion in
test_pipelock_allowlist flips to "they don't", a new
TestIsGitPushRequest exercises the smart-HTTP refusal predicate,
and the gitconfig renderer tests cover the per-host suppression
matrix.
git-gate holds an SSH IdentityFile for push/fetch; cred-proxy holds
a PAT for HTTPS REST API calls. The two brokers are orthogonal —
the common dev setup names both on the same host (e.g. gitea.dideric.is
SSH for push, gitea.dideric.is PAT for `tea pr create`).
The original PRD 0010 wording called this a "configuration smell"
and rejected it at parse time. That was wrong; this drops the
overlap rejection from the validator and updates the PRD prose to
match. Tests flip from "rejection" to "coexistence" assertions.
bottle.tokens declarations contribute their upstream hosts to both
pipelock's allowlist (so cred-proxy can reach them) and
passthrough_domains (so pipelock doesn't MITM the connection —
cred-proxy validates real upstream certs with the system CA bundle).
Mapping: anthropic -> api.anthropic.com (already on defaults);
github -> api.github.com + github.com; gitea -> the entry's host;
npm -> registry.npmjs.org.
provision_cred_proxy(plan, target) drops:
- ~/.npmrc with registry= pointing at /npm/ on the proxy
- ~/.gitconfig insteadOf rules for github (https://github.com/) and
per-gitea hosts, appended after provision_git's git-gate rules
- ~/.config/tea/config.yml with a logins: entry per declared gitea
URL, pointing at /gitea/<host>/ on the proxy
Renderers are pure and unit-tested. The dispatcher reads
plan.cred_proxy_plan.upstreams, which the backend wiring (next
commit) populates on DockerBottlePlan.
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL is deliberately *not* a dotfile — it goes into
the agent's docker run -e env so claude sees it from process start.
Mirrors DockerGitGate: build the image, docker create on the internal
network with --network-alias cred-proxy, docker cp the routes.json
into /run/cred-proxy/, attach the egress network, docker start. stop()
is idempotent.
Token values flow host env -> subprocess env -> sidecar env via
docker create -e NAME (no =VALUE on argv). The resolver fails early
with a clear pointer at the missing host env var name if any TokenRef
is unset.
Helpers (cred_proxy_container_name, cred_proxy_url) are agent-side
stable: the URL uses the network alias, not the slugged container
name, so the provisioner can write a fixed http://cred-proxy:9099/
URL regardless of which bottle is running.
Stdlib-only Python proxy: reads /run/cred-proxy/routes.json on boot,
listens on 0.0.0.0:9099, strips inbound Authorization, injects the
configured header (Bearer or token) using the route's token_env env
var, forwards over HTTPS to the upstream, and streams the response
back chunk-by-chunk (SSE-safe).
Hop-by-hop headers are stripped per RFC 7230, including anything
listed in `Connection:`. Content-Length is dropped so http.client
recomputes it on the upstream leg. Tokens never reach routes.json —
they arrive via the container's environ.
Dockerfile.cred-proxy builds on python:3.13-alpine pinned by digest;
mkdir /run/cred-proxy is baked in so docker cp can drop the route
table at start time. No pip install layer.
Smoke-tested: container boots, logs listen line, returns 404 for
unmatched paths. Full request/response cycle covered by the
integration tests in a follow-up commit.
Lifts bottle.tokens into a per-route CredProxyUpstream table, renders a
mode-600 routes.json that carries no token values or host env-var
names, and derives the {token_env: TokenRef} map the launch step will
use to forward host env values into the sidecar's environ.
Shape mirrors GitGate/PipelockProxy: abstract base does the host-side
prepare; start/stop is backend-specific. No backend wiring yet.
TokenEntry carries Kind (anthropic / github / gitea / npm), TokenRef
(name of host env var the CLI resolves at launch), and an optional Url
(required for gitea, fixed for the other kinds). Validation rejects
unknown kinds, duplicate non-gitea entries, duplicate gitea Urls, and
overlap with bottle.git hosts (where git-gate is already brokering).
No wiring yet — the field exists on Bottle but cred-proxy is the next
step. Adds tests/unit/test_manifest_tokens.py.
- Delete tests/unit/test_ssh_gate.py and the fixture_with_ssh helpers.
- test_pipelock_yaml: drop the ssh-leak guard (structurally
impossible now); the remaining tests switch to fixture_minimal.
- test_pipelock_allowlist: rewrite the union/dedup test to
exercise an egress.allowlist that duplicates a baked default
(the property the ssh-leak assertion was hitching onto).
- test_manifest_git: shadow-route assertion becomes a legacy-ssh-
dies-with-hint assertion, since bottle.ssh is now parse-fail.
- test_orphan_cleanup: drop the SSHGate.stop idempotency check;
pipelock equivalent stays.
- test_dry_run_plan: drop assertions on the removed ssh_hosts /
ssh_gate keys.
52 unit tests pass.
GitGateUpstream carries each entry's extra_hosts; a new
git_gate_aggregate_extra_hosts() merges them into one map for the
gate container's /etc/hosts. Same host -> same IP is harmless
duplication; same host -> different IPs is a manifest bug
(/etc/hosts is per-container, not per-upstream) and dies with
the conflicting upstream names.
DockerGitGate.start passes one --add-host host:ip per merged
entry on docker create. Empty map (the default) emits no flags
and is a no-op for bottles that don't need DNS overrides.
Optional `ExtraHosts: { hostname: ip }` map per git entry. The
docker backend will surface these to the gate sidecar via
--add-host so the gate can resolve upstreams whose default
container DNS doesn't point at the reachable IP (e.g.
Tailscale-only hosts with a public DNS A record pointed
elsewhere). The agent-side insteadOf rewrite still keys off
the original hostname, so the manifest's Upstream URL stays
human-readable.
The agent's ~/.gitconfig now uses insteadOf (not pushInsteadOf),
so every git operation against a declared upstream — push, fetch,
clone, pull, ls-remote — routes through the gate. Matches the
gate's now-bidirectional design: fetch is mirrored via the
access-hook, push is gated via gitleaks.
The gate is now a transparent mirror, not push-only. Per-repo
init now runs `git remote add --mirror=fetch origin <url>` so a
later `git fetch origin` mirrors the upstream's full ref graph at
canonical paths. The pre-receive hook forwards accepted refs via
`git push origin` (renamed from upstream).
New: an access-hook script wired via `git daemon --access-hook`
runs `git fetch origin --prune` against the real upstream before
every upload-pack request (clone, fetch, pull, ls-remote). On
upstream error the hook exits non-zero — the agent's fetch fails
rather than the gate serving stale data.
The pre-existing smoke test (ls-remote against unreachable
upstream returns refs) had to invert: under the bidirectional
design any ls-remote success is necessarily a success against
the upstream, so the unreachable-upstream case now correctly
fails closed.
provision_git now does two things: copy the host cwd's .git (when
--cwd is set, existing behavior) and write ~/.gitconfig with
pushInsteadOf rules for each bottle.git entry. A 'git push <real
upstream URL>' from inside the agent transparently rewrites to
'git://<gate>/<name>.git' so the gate gets first crack at the
incoming refs.
pushInsteadOf (not insteadOf) keeps fetch on the original URL —
v1 of the git-gate is push-only scope per PRD 0008. The render
helper is exposed for testing without docker.
Mirrors the SSHGate/PipelockProxy shape: a host-side prepare that
lifts bottle.git into a tuple of GitGateUpstreams and renders two
shell scripts under stage_dir — the gate's entrypoint (which
initializes a bare repo per upstream and execs git daemon
--enable=receive-pack) and the shared pre-receive hook
(gitleaks-scan, then forward each accepted ref to the real
upstream using the per-repo credential).
Failure in either hook phase aborts the push so the agent sees a
real rejection, not a silent success. KnownHostKey absence is
fail-closed: the hook refuses to forward without a pinned key
rather than TOFU-trusting the upstream from inside the gate.
PRD: docs/prds/0008-git-gate.md
didericis