97294074309360949a42a7b49d88b87a856eb278
5 Commits
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9729407430 |
feat(orchestrator): list_live broker op + reconcile via broker (#468)
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Chunk 3 of the host-control-server stack: grow the broker op vocabulary
(PRD gap 3), starting with `list_live`, and invert `reconcile` onto it.
- broker: split the closed op vocabulary into mutation (`launch`/`teardown`,
carry a bottle id + static flags) and query (`list_live`, carries nothing
but its op name) kinds. `verify_request` now enforces a **strict schema**
(open question 1, resolved yes): unknown claim keys are rejected, a mutation
must name its bottle, and a query that smuggles any id/flag is refused.
- broker verb: `LaunchBroker.list_live` / `SubmitBroker.list_live` return the
backend's live source IPs; a backend enumeration failure is converted to the
single `BrokerUnavailableError` "live set unknown" signal. `DockerBroker`
enumerates its labelled containers; `StubBroker` derives from launches (or a
test override).
- host controller: `POST /broker/live` verifies a signed `list_live` token and
returns `{source_ips}`; `BrokerClient.list_live` is its drop-in client.
- reconcile: `OrchestratorCore.reconcile()` drops the `live_source_ips`
parameter and pulls the live set from the broker itself — the tell that the
orchestrator couldn't see the backend goes away. **Fail-safe**: if the broker
can't return an authoritative set the sweep is skipped, never run against an
empty/partial set (which would reap healthy rows). The `/reconcile` HTTP
contract + `OrchestratorClient.reconcile` become a bare trigger.
The macOS launcher's Apple-container enumeration stays for now; it becomes the
host controller's `list_live` when launch itself moves behind the broker (the
pulled-forward chunk 5, next in the stack).
Tests + pyright clean; pylint 10.0 on broker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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45f3cefbc5 |
refactor(orchestrator): uniform control-plane auth provisioning per trust domain
Hoist control-plane auth provisioning out of the per-backend launchers into one shared contract, parameterized per trust domain (#476). Every blocking finding in PR #471 was the same integration-bug class: each launcher re-derived, by hand, how to generate the signing key, scope it to the orchestrator, mint the gateway JWT, and keep the host key canonical. Introduces `trust_domain.py`: * `TrustDomain` — one credential boundary (host-canonical key file + role set + env vars). `mint`/`verify` are scoped to the domain's roles, so a future host-controller domain (#468) uses its own key/verifier/roles rather than a `host` role on the control plane's frozenset (which the orchestrator key could then forge). * `ControlPlaneProvisioning` — the single seam answering the four invariants: host-canonical key, split key-vs-token credential, CLI token valid across co-running backends, and fail-closed (no open mode) for any co-located topology. * `Topology` — the backend declares what it is; the default is co-located + fail-closed, so a backend need not redeclare it. The `Orchestrator` ABC gets `control_plane_key()` (fail-closed) and routes `mint_gateway_token()` through the contract; docker/macOS/firecracker orchestrators, the server (verify), and the host CLI client (mint cli) all go through the domain instead of reading the host key directly. `orchestrator_auth` gains an optional `roles=` arg (default unchanged) so a domain scopes its own role set; `paths.host_signing_key(filename)` generalizes host_orchestrator_token. Adds unit coverage for the domain boundary + provisioning invariants and a PRD capturing the durable rationale. No change to the auth primitive's HMAC, the plane split, or the server's documented open-mode fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Closes #476 |
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57d32d2c5c |
refactor(orchestrator): rename in-guest core Orchestrator -> OrchestratorCore
Free the `Orchestrator` name for the incoming host-side control-plane service ABC (parallel to `Gateway`). The in-guest control-plane core (registry + broker, in orchestrator/service.py) becomes `OrchestratorCore`; server.py, __main__.py, the lazy facade, and the two service/server tests updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ca1d341d4f |
refactor: unify component naming — control_plane/control_auth -> orchestrator
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The codebase used "control plane" both as an architectural role term AND
as an identifier alias for the orchestrator component, producing
duplicate names for one thing (control_plane_url vs orchestrator_url,
CONTROL_PLANE_PORT, host_control_plane_token, …). Going forward the
concrete component is always named for what it is — Gateway or
Orchestrator — and the plane vocabulary is reserved for prose (module
descriptions, the security argument).
Renamed (identifiers + the in-repo env/wire/file string values, all
setters/getters are in this repo so the change is atomic):
ControlPlaneServer -> OrchestratorServer
control_plane_url -> orchestrator_url
probe_control_plane_url -> probe_orchestrator_url
host_control_plane_token -> host_orchestrator_token
CONTROL_PLANE_PORT -> ORCHESTRATOR_PORT
CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN_ENV/FILE -> ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV/FILENAME
BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN-> BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN
control-plane-token (file) -> orchestrator-token
control_auth (module) -> orchestrator_auth (stays top-level;
the gateway imports it and must not
import the orchestrator/ package)
CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER -> ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_HEADER
x-bot-bottle-control-auth -> x-bot-bottle-orchestrator-auth
CONTROL_AUTH_JWT_ENV -> ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV
BOT_BOTTLE_CONTROL_AUTH_JWT -> BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT
_control_auth_headers -> _orchestrator_auth_headers
Prose plane-terms ("control plane", "data plane") are preserved,
including the test name test_data_plane_daemons_get_jwt_not_key (it
names the security invariant). Gateway and orchestrator verified to
agree on the renamed wire header; full unit suite green (2243).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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4166057abc |
refactor(orchestrator): rename control_plane module to server
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orchestrator/control_plane.py -> orchestrator/server.py. Within the orchestrator package the "control_plane" filename stutters (the orchestrator *is* the control plane), and `orchestrator.server` reads as "the orchestrator's HTTP server", pairing with service.py (domain logic) and matching gateway/supervisor/server.py. Scope is the module name only. The class ControlPlaneServer, the CONTROL_AUTH_HEADER constant, and the "control plane" architectural term (CONTROL_PLANE_PORT, host_control_plane_token, control_plane_url, …) are deliberately unchanged — that's the load-bearing control-plane/data-plane distinction. Test file renamed to match; full unit suite green (2243). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |