The harness's second run hit the wall the first one predicted: a fresh account
has no pipx, so install.sh fell to `pip install --user`, and every Python a Mac
offers — Homebrew and python.org alike — is externally managed, so PEP 668
blocked it. That fallback was never a fallback on macOS; it was a dead end that
printed instructions.
Replace it with a venv at ~/.bot-bottle/venv (BOT_BOTTLE_VENV to move it),
with the console script symlinked into ~/.local/bin. PEP 668 does not apply
inside a venv, and venv is stdlib, so unlike pipx there is nothing to bootstrap
first. pipx stays the preferred path when present, so anyone already managing
their Python apps that way is unaffected — and the post-install PATH check now
asks pipx for PIPX_BIN_DIR instead of assuming ~/.local/bin.
Keeping the venv under ~/.bot-bottle rather than ~/.local/share means the whole
footprint stays in one directory, which is what lets the throwaway-account
teardown remain a complete reset.
This removes the PEP 668 pre-flight and the sysconfig user-scheme lookup, both
of which existed only to serve the --user path. Their tests go with them:
* `detects_externally_managed_python` asserted the check that is now moot;
replaced by one asserting pipx is still preferred when present.
* `checks_pip_usable_before_fallback` pinned a pip probe that no longer runs;
replaced by one asserting the venv's own pip does the install, since using
the base interpreter's would install outside the venv.
* `resolves_user_scripts_dir_not_hardcoded` and
`macos_user_scheme_is_not_dot_local_bin` guarded the ~/Library/Python
scripts-dir lookup. Nothing installs there now. The surviving "don't
hardcode" concern is pipx's bin dir, which has its own test.
Five tests are added for the new path: the venv fallback exists, no --user path
survives, the venv is under the config dir, venv creation failure names
python3-venv (Debian ships it separately), and the entry point is exposed
outside the venv.
Verified end to end in a sandbox HOME with a fresh-account PATH and no pipx:
venv built, package installed, symlink created, `doctor` reached and green
(python 3.14.5, macos-container ready), exit 0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEfZZhakx13bxTfXcZCoS5
The PATH story was wrong in an instructive way. I said a Homebrew Python is on
PATH only because of a shell-profile line; on this host /etc/paths.d/homebrew
puts /opt/homebrew/bin on every login shell's PATH, fresh accounts included.
The stub still wins, because path_helper appends /etc/paths.d/* *after*
/etc/paths and /usr/bin is in the latter. Ordering, not absence, is what makes
bare `python3` the 3.9.6 stub — which is also why the versioned `python3.14`
candidate is the one that matched during the real run, rather than the
/opt/homebrew/bin/python3 fallback I expected.
The harness header also credited install.sh with writing a PATH line into the
login shell. It does not write one. The reset argument is unaffected (such a
line would live in the deleted home either way), but the claim was untrue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEfZZhakx13bxTfXcZCoS5
`test` chains up -> run -> status -> down, which is the loop you actually want
when verifying a clean install. Three things make it more than a convenience
wrapper:
* It refuses to start against an existing account. A reused home is not a clean
install, so testing one silently would defeat the harness.
* It tears the account down from an EXIT/INT trap armed the moment the account
exists, so a failed run — or a Ctrl-C mid-install — still leaves the machine
clean. BB_TEST_KEEP=1 opts out to poke at a failure.
* Its verdict is stricter than the installer's. install.sh exits 0 when it
finishes but `doctor` reports unmet prerequisites, so "the installer
succeeded" is not a useful assertion; `test` fails if the install fails, if
bot-bottle never reached the new user's PATH, or if doctor is unhappy. That
meant giving cmd_status a real exit status instead of swallowing doctor's.
Also fixes two bugs in `run`'s installer staging, by removing the staging
entirely and feeding install.sh in on stdin:
* `mktemp /tmp/bb-install.XXXXXX.sh` did not do what it looks like. BSD mktemp
only substitutes trailing Xs, so every run wrote the *same* predictable path,
as root, mode 644, in a world-writable directory.
* The cleanup only ran on the normal and failure returns, so an interrupted run
leaked the file.
Piping on stdin sidesteps both: root opens the redirect before sudo drops
privileges, so the mode-700 home that motivated the staging is a non-issue,
there is no file to leak, and `sh -s` matches the documented `curl … | sh`
shape more closely than executing a staged copy did.
The command-level `exit 1`s become `return 1` so the steps compose under the
trap, and the "next, run this" hints are suppressed inside `test`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WEfZZhakx13bxTfXcZCoS5
Add scripts/macos-install-test.sh, a throwaway-user harness for exercising
install.sh the way a brand-new user would on macOS, plus the research note
that motivates the approach.
The harness has up/run/status/down/deep-reset subcommands. Because install.sh
writes only to the user home (pipx venv, ~/.bot-bottle, a PATH line) and never
installs the backend, deleting the account is a complete, deterministic reset
of the install surface. A disposable macOS VM can't stand in on M1/M2: the
Apple `container` backend needs Virtualization.framework, and running it inside
a guest VM requires nested virtualization (M3+ only), so a throwaway user is
the only way to reach the real host backend from a clean $HOME.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lower the diff-coverage gate from 90% to 80% and the critical-module
target from 90% to 85%. The 90% diff gate forced back-fill tests on
nearly every changed line; 80% keeps new code honest without the churn.
Global coverage stays informational per ADR 0004 (no new gate added).
Updates scripts/diff_coverage.py, scripts/coverage.sh,
scripts/critical-modules.txt, .gitea/workflows/test.yml, and records the
change as a dated revision in ADR 0004.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Now that #469 got the DB off the data plane, the Firecracker infra runs as
two microVMs instead of one — mirroring the docker/macos plane split:
* orchestrator VM (ORCH_IFACE) — control plane + buildah image builds; sole
DB opener; host-seeded signing key. No gateway daemons.
* gateway VM (new GW_IFACE) — egress / git-http / supervise data plane;
mitmproxy CA + a host-minted `gateway` JWT (never the key). Reaches the
orchestrator only over the one nft forward rule its link allows.
Both boot the SAME shared infra rootfs; a `bb_role=` kernel-cmdline arg
selects which plane a VM's PID-1 init starts, so there is still one published
artifact. The gateway learns the orchestrator's address via `bb_orch=` on the
cmdline (no IP baked into the artifact).
Isolation is nearly free: agents were already nft-dropped except the DNAT'd
gateway ports, so re-pointing that single DNAT rule at the gateway VM
(`dnat to gw_guest`) severs every agent's L3 route to the control plane. The
only added nft is the second infra link's mirror block (masquerade egress +
forward accept, which subsumes gateway->orchestrator) in the shared shell
script and the NixOS module.
netpool gains GW_IFACE + gw_slot() (the /31 above the orch link);
firecracker_vm.boot gains extra_boot_args for the role cmdline; infra_vm
ensure_running() boots + adopts the pair (orchestrator first, then the gateway
that resolves policy against it) and returns an InfraEndpoint mirroring the
docker/macos shape. Builds stay in the orchestrator (PRD 0070 v1); the gateway
is the slim unit.
Unit-tested (test_firecracker_infra_vm rewritten for two VMs; gw_slot helper
test added); the KVM boot / L3-isolation checks are validated on a Firecracker
host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Group the gateway's data-plane modules into three service sub-packages
mirroring the host-side trio (bot_bottle.egress / .supervisor / .git_gate):
gateway/egress/ addon_core, addon, dlp_config, dlp_detectors
gateway/supervisor/ server (was supervise_server)
gateway/git_gate/ render, http_backend
Prefix-stripped filenames now that the package namespaces them; each
sub-package has a thin docstring __init__ (no eager imports, cheap leaf
loads). The two cross-cutting files stay at the gateway root:
policy_resolver (shared per-client lookup) and gateway_init, renamed to
bootstrap now that gateway/ already namespaces it.
Updated all importers (bot_bottle + tests), the in-VM/container `-m`
launch strings, the Dockerfile.gateway addon shim + ENTRYPOINT, and the
five gateway entries in scripts/critical-modules.txt. Full unit suite
green (2243).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Each test job now runs once under coverage and uploads a small .coverage.*
artifact. The coverage job combines them on ubuntu-latest — no test reruns,
no KVM dependency. The infra candidate is built directly on the KVM runner,
eliminating the build-infra job and the ~70 s upload + ~83 s combined
download. For PRs, no rootfs artifact is transferred at all. Main-branch
pushes upload the tested rootfs and matching dropbear so publish-infra
publishes the byte-identical artifact. relative_files = True in .coveragerc
lets coverage files from different runners combine without path remapping.
Closes#446
Docker integration tests are already covered by the integration-docker
job on ubuntu-latest. On the KVM runner the Firecracker TAP/nftables
pool conflicts with Docker networking, causing those tests to hang
and the coverage job to never complete.
Add SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS env-var support to docker_available() and set
it for the integration phase of coverage.sh so only Firecracker
integration tests run there.
The /31 point-to-point TAP does NOT make a guest source address
unspoofable: root in an agent VM can source another bottle's guest IP on
its own bbfc TAP. The isolation table only matched iifname class + port
(DNAT) and never bound iifname to its assigned ip saddr — so a spoofed
source was DNAT'd to the gateway and attributed to the *victim* bottle,
getting the victim's policy/tokens. Source-IP attribution was therefore
not actually sound.
Add one anti-spoof rule per slot in the isolation forward chain, before
the established/DNAT accepts: `iifname bbfcN ip saddr != <guestN> drop`.
Generated in the existing setup loop — no new dependency, ~pool_size
lines. Legit traffic (correct saddr) is unchanged; a spoofed saddr on any
bbfc TAP is dropped before it can be attributed.
Apply with a nixos-rebuild (the systemd unit re-runs this script). Codex
review blocker; the app-layer identity token (defense-in-depth) is wired
separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Each nft table (isolation, orchestrator-egress nat, agent->gateway route)
was re-applied as a plain `table {...}` block, which on a bare `up`
re-apply (not the systemd down->up path) would append duplicate rules or
error on the existing base chains. Use the standard delete-first pattern
(create empty, delete, recreate) so `up` lands identical state regardless
of history — the setup reproduces cleanly on a fresh install and on
re-apply, not just via a full down->up cycle.
No functional change to the resulting ruleset; only its idempotency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Agent VMs must reach the shared gateway that now runs in the infra VM
(egress:9099 / supervise:9100 / git-http:9420 at the orchestrator link's
guest IP). Add a PREROUTING DNAT: agents keep addressing their own
host-side TAP IP on the gateway ports, and the rule redirects that to the
infra VM. The isolation table's existing `ct status dnat accept` forward
rule lets the DNAT'd traffic through; every other agent egress stays
dropped, so a bottle still reaches only the gateway and nothing else.
Source IP is deliberately NOT masqueraded: the gateway attributes each
request to the originating bottle by its guest IP, which the /31 TAP + the
bot_bottle_fc nft table make unspoofable. Keeping the agent addressed at
its own host TAP IP means no per-bottle config change vs the docker-DNAT
path it replaces.
- scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh: `_install_gateway_route` adds
`table ip <table>_gw` (prerouting dstnat -> orch_guest on the gateway
ports); wired into up/down/status. The nix module needs no change — it
runs this script, and the ports are baked in.
Verified on a KVM host: an agent VM's `curl -x http://<its-host-tap>:9099`
reaches mitmproxy in the infra VM and gets a 403 (correct policy denial
for an unregistered bottle) — i.e. the route lands end-to-end. Persist
with a nixos-rebuild; the imperative rule holds until then.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The orchestrator/gateway VM is trusted infra, not an isolated agent: it
builds agent images in-VM (buildah must FROM-pull + apt/npm) and, in the
Stage B cutover, forwards agent egress upstream. Give it a dedicated TAP
(`bborch0`) on a /31 at the top of the IP_BASE /16 (clear of the bbfc*
agent pool at the bottom), NAT'd out the host uplink — while agent VMs
keep their fail-closed, gateway-only isolation table.
- netpool.defaults.env / netpool.py: new BOT_BOTTLE_FC_ORCH_IFACE +
`orch_slot()` (index -1 sentinel; host x.y.255.0 / guest x.y.255.1).
- scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh: create + address the orchestrator TAP;
`bot_bottle_fc_nat` table masquerades its /31 out the uplink and
accepts its forward path. Because bootstrap still runs Docker (whose
FORWARD policy is DROP), a best-effort, guarded, idempotent DOCKER-USER
ACCEPT is added too (skipped once Docker is gone). down/status updated.
- nix/firecracker-netpool.nix: mirror the option, pass it via the unit
Environment= (the store-copied script can't read the defaults file),
and add iptables to the unit path for the DOCKER-USER step.
Agent isolation is unchanged: the new rules only ever accept/masquerade
the orchestrator link and never drop, so they can't weaken the bbfc*
drops. Applied by re-running `sudo ./scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh up`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Completes the de-sidecar cleanup: no live code, test, current doc,
script, or nix file mentions or is named "sidecar" any more. Only the
dated PRD/research docs keep the term as historical record (agreed on
the #385 thread).
- Rename `sidecar_init.py`→`gateway_init.py` was done earlier; this pass
sweeps the remaining descriptive uses: the egress / git-gate / supervise
components are the gateway's *daemons*, the shared container is the
*gateway*, the old per-bottle container was the *companion container*.
- Rename `tests/integration/test_sidecar_bundle_image.py`→`test_gateway_image.py`
and its class; update `docs/ci.md` + `tests/README.md` for the renamed/
removed integration tests.
- `SIDECAR_PORTS` shell var in `scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh`→`GATEWAY_PORTS`.
Full unit suite green (bar the pre-existing `/bin/sleep`-missing env
errors in test_gateway_init); docker integration — gateway singleton,
broker, real two-bottle multitenant isolation, and the gateway-image
build — all pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The pool params (size, IP base, iface prefix, nft table) were triplicated
— hardcoded in netpool.py, scripts/firecracker-netpool.sh, and
nix/firecracker-netpool.nix — plus the IP math (3x) and the nft ruleset
(2x). Nothing enforced agreement; changing the base (ce3fad9, off CGNAT)
forced a coordinated three-file edit, and a missed one would silently
provision a range the launcher doesn't expect.
Collapse to one source of truth:
* netpool.defaults.env — a plain KEY=VALUE file (bash-sourceable,
systemd EnvironmentFile-compatible, Python- and Nix-parseable) holding
the four defaults. A BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* env var still overrides any key.
* netpool.py reads it for the Python defaults (missing file = hard
error, not confusing empty defaults).
* the shell script falls back to it (no literal `:-8` / `10.243.0.0`),
and its `up` is now non-destructive/idempotent (only creates a
missing TAP), so re-running never cuts a live VM.
* the Nix module readFile-parses it for its option defaults and
delegates bring-up to the SAME shell script (dropping its duplicate
IP math, nft ruleset, and TAP loop) — passing every value as
Environment= so the store-detached script never needs the file.
Net: defaults 3x -> 1x, nft ruleset 2x -> 1x, TAP loop 2x -> 1x. The one
remaining IP-math dup (Python launch-addressing vs bash bring-up) is
justified — different runtimes. Tests now guard the invariant (Python
reads the shared file; the script/module hold no literals) instead of
pinning duplicated strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Add a `group` option to the netpool NixOS module + BOT_BOTTLE_FC_GROUP to
the shell script: when set, the pool's TAP devices are owned by a group
instead of a single user, so any group member can open them (the kernel
lets a TAP's owning-group members attach). This lets an interactive user
and, say, a CI-runner user share one pool. `owner`/`group` are mutually
exclusive (asserted). Single-user `owner` remains the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The default TAP-pool base was 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC-6598 CGNAT) — chosen to
dodge RFC-1918, but that's exactly the range Tailscale assigns node
addresses from, so on a Tailscale host it's the worst pick. Move the
default to 10.243.0.0/16, an obscure RFC-1918 block that steers clear of
docker/libvirt/k8s/LAN and Tailscale.
No default is collision-proof, so add netpool.overlapping_routes(): it
parses `ip -json route show table all` and flags any route intersecting
the pool range (excluding our own bbfc* TAPs and the default route). The
launch preflight warns on overlap; `backend status` reports it.
Distribute the NixOS host setup as a flake module instead of a
copy-pasted blob: nix/firecracker-netpool.nix computes the taps / nft
table from typed options (poolSize, ipBase, ifacePrefix, owner) with a
/31-alignment assertion, and flake.nix exposes it as
nixosModules.firecracker-netpool. Defaults mirror the backend constants;
writeEnvFile emits the matching BOT_BOTTLE_FC_* so the host pool and the
launcher can't drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Adds a Firecracker-based backend for Linux, providing mature KVM-based
microVM isolation to replace smolmachines/libkrun (issue #342, closes
the dead-end tracked in #332).
Architecture:
- Guest control over SSH (dropbear injected into the rootfs) on a
point-to-point TAP link. `ssh -t` forwards SIGWINCH natively, so no
resize bridge is needed.
- Networking: a one-time, root-provisioned pool of user-owned TAP
devices (no shared bridge → no docker0/virbr0/cni0 collisions) plus a
dedicated `table inet bot_bottle_fc` nftables table (independent of
Docker/ufw/firewalld rules). `./cli.py firecracker setup` prints the
host-appropriate config (NixOS module or sudo script).
- Rootfs: `docker export` → ext4 via `mke2fs -d` (rootless, no mount),
cached by image digest; per-bottle SSH pubkey + IP passed via the
kernel cmdline.
- Sidecar: reuses the Docker bundle, published on the slot's host TAP IP.
- Fail-closed isolation: TAP pool verified at preflight; the egress
boundary is proven empirically post-boot (before the agent runs) by a
canary probe — the VM must fail to reach the host directly, or launch
is refused.
Linux hosts with Firecracker + KVM now default to this backend;
macOS stays on macos-container.
Not yet validated end-to-end on live hardware (requires the one-time
network pool). Unit tests + pyright pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01G8p32HJgPoS1hLPWubbftM
git_gate.py (699 LOC) mixed three responsibilities. Split into:
- git_gate_render.py — pure host-side rendering: the gate constants,
GitGateUpstream, gitconfig/known-hosts rendering, and the entrypoint /
pre-receive / access-hook script builders.
- git_gate_provision.py — the gitea deploy-key lifecycle
(_provision_dynamic_key / revoke / _resolve_identity_file).
- git_gate.py — the GitGate ABC + GitGatePlan, now 169 LOC, re-exporting
all moved names (see __all__) so the 19 importers are unchanged.
Host-side only (not flat-bundled), so no sidecar import shim. The one
test that patched the internal `_provision_dynamic_key` lookup is
repointed to its new module (public API unchanged). The two new modules
are added to scripts/critical-modules.txt so the decompose doesn't move
security code out of the measured core — critical aggregate stays 95%
(git_gate 100%, render 100%, provision 97%).
Closes#303
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9
Surface the metric ADR 0004 says matters — the critical security/logic
core, currently 95% — as a README badge, distinct from the
informational global `coverage` badge.
- scripts/critical-modules.txt: single source of truth for the core
module list. scripts/coverage.sh now reads it (instead of a hardcoded
string) and update-badges.yml reads the same file, so the badge and
the `critical` report cannot drift.
- update-badges.yml: a `core coverage` step reuses the unit-coverage
data (every core module is unit-tested, so unit-only is accurate for
it) and sed-updates the new badge, like the existing ones.
- README: `core coverage 95%` badge linking to ADR 0004 so a reader can
find out what "core" means.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9
Adopt ADR 0004: stop chasing a single global coverage number and
measure what matters instead.
- Omit the genuinely-interactive `cli/init.py` shell (read_tty_line
prompt loops) alongside the existing `cli/tui.py`, with a rationale
comment in .coveragerc. Subprocess/backend orchestration is NOT
omitted — it stays visible and is scored via the integration suite.
- scripts/coverage.sh runs unit + integration under one coverage
measurement (the policy's yardstick) and can report the critical
security/logic core held to the >=90% target.
- scripts/diff_coverage.py is a stdlib-only gate (no diff-cover dep):
new/changed executable lines must be >=90% covered. This is the
enforced regression guard; the global number is informational.
- CI gains a `coverage` job: combined report + the diff-coverage gate.
- Unit-test `cli/__init__.py` dispatch/exit-code mapping (it's logic,
not I/O, so it earns tests rather than an omit).
Combined unit+integration coverage now reports 83% global / 87% across
the critical modules; per-module ratcheting toward 90% is the ongoing
work this policy frames.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NkwFXLFff9PYPy4wgVBJp9
Dockerfile.claude and Dockerfile.codex move from the repo root into
bot_bottle/contrib/claude/Dockerfile and bot_bottle/contrib/codex/Dockerfile
respectively, so all per-provider assets live alongside the provider code.
Closes#215
Squashes the demo-build arc: initial GIF + scripts, refactor to drive
recording through real cli.py, theme/timing tweaks, and the switch to
prompt-driven probes.
didericis
didericis-claude
didericis-codex