The orchestrator owns the single DB *and* the live policy, so operator
decisions belong there — applied server-side, reached over HTTP. Adds:
GET /supervise/proposals -> pending proposals across bottles
POST /supervise/respond -> apply + record an operator decision
`supervise_respond` is one atomic server-side op on the one DB: approve/
modify on an egress tool rewrites the bottle's policy (so the gateway
serves the new routes on its next /resolve — the live "apply" that was a
documented TODO), then writes the queued Response (unblocking the agent's
MCP call) and an audit entry. reject records the response + audit only.
Fails closed (409) when the proposal is unknown or the bottle was torn
down before the operator acted (an egress apply would have no target).
This is the server half of unifying every backend onto one HTTP path for
supervise; the host TUI (direct-DB today) moves onto this client next.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Codex review: the /31 TAP doesn't make source IP unspoofable, and the
app-layer token was returned by launch but never delivered or enforced, so
a spoofed source could select a victim bottle's policy/tokens. Make the
token mandatory and deliver it on each attributed plane (anti-spoof landed
separately as the network boundary).
Enforcement (control plane):
- `Orchestrator.resolve` now requires a matching (source_ip, identity_token)
pair (constant-time) — no source-IP-only fallback. `/resolve` fail-closes
(403) on a missing/empty/mismatched token.
Delivery, per plane (the token is `token_urlsafe`, safe in a URL):
- egress: proxy credentials (`HTTPS_PROXY=http://bottle:<token>@gw`). The
addon reads `Proxy-Authorization` — from the request (HTTP) or captured at
the CONNECT for HTTPS tunnels (keyed by client conn, cleared on disconnect)
— validates, and strips it (+ the legacy header) before upstream.
- git-http: a URL-scoped `http.<gate>/.extraHeader: x-bot-bottle-identity`
in the agent's git config (only over the http transport).
- supervise: `mcp add --header x-bot-bottle-identity: <token>` (claude +
codex); the server reads the header and passes it to resolve.
Wiring: thread `ctx.identity_token` onto the firecracker + docker plans and
into the agent env/config at launch.
Verified on a KVM host: egress with the correct proxy-cred token returns
200 (HTTP and HTTPS/CONNECT), and no-token / wrong-token return 403; a real
`cli.py start --backend=firecracker` launch provisions git config + the
supervise MCP header and reaches the agent session, all under mandatory
enforcement. Fixed a `claude mcp add` arg-order bug (--header must follow
the positional name/url) found by that launch.
Transparent proxy for tools that ignore proxy env is deferred to a
follow-up (see thread); anti-spoof + host firewall remain the fail-closed
boundary.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The cut-over dropped the per-bottle token flow, so an authed egress route on
the shared gateway failed with 'env var EGRESS_TOKEN_0 is unset' — the gateway
reads the token from its env, but a shared gateway has no per-bottle env.
Now the bottle's egress auth tokens travel to the gateway over /resolve and
the addon injects from them, mirroring what the per-bottle sidecar's env did:
- launch resolves the token values from the host env and hands them to the
orchestrator, which holds them IN MEMORY (keyed by bottle_id, never written
to the registry DB) and serves them on /resolve;
- PolicyResolver.resolve_policy_and_bottle_id + resolve_client_context now
return the token map alongside policy + bottle_id (one round-trip);
- the egress addon overlays the process env with the bottle's tokens per
request and uses that env for auth injection AND DLP — the agent never sees
the credential.
Secrets stay off disk (validated: /resolve returns the token, the registry DB
does not contain it). SecretProvider (#355) is the future hardening.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Retire "sidecar" for the consolidated per-host path (PRD 0070 naming
decision): the orchestrator is the umbrella/control plane, and the
egress/git/supervise data-plane unit it runs is the "gateway".
- git mv sidecar.py -> gateway.py and the two integration + one unit test
files; DockerSidecar->DockerGateway, Sidecar->Gateway,
SidecarError->GatewayError, SIDECAR_*->GATEWAY_*, ensure_sidecar->
ensure_gateway, sidecar_status->gateway_status, container name
bot-bottle-orch-sidecar->bot-bottle-orch-gateway.
- Prose rename across broker/registry/egress/policy_resolver + PRD 0070.
- Preserved: the image name bot-bottle-sidecars, the
BOT_BOTTLE_SIDECAR_IMAGE env var, Dockerfile.sidecars, and PRD 0069's
own stage-name cross-references (that doc still uses "sidecar").
No behavior change. Full unit suite green (1679 tests; the 13
test_sidecar_init /bin/sleep errors are pre-existing NixOS-local noise).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The egress addon now selects each request's Config by the calling bottle's
source IP, so one shared sidecar serves every bottle. Opt-in and fail-closed;
single-tenant behaviour is unchanged.
Orchestrator side (source-IP-primary attribution, per the PRD invariant):
* registry: `by_source_ip` (the single active bottle at a source IP —
network-layer attribution); `attribute` now composes it + the token.
* service: `resolve(source_ip, token="")` — with a token, strict
attribution; without, source IP alone.
* control_plane: `POST /resolve`'s identity_token is now OPTIONAL (absent
→ source-IP-only); split cleanly from the token-required `/attribute`.
* policy_resolver: `resolve` token now optional.
Egress side:
* egress_addon_core: `resolve_client_config(resolver, client_ip, token)` —
fetches + parses the client's Config, **fail-closed**: unattributed, a
resolver error, or an unparseable policy all yield deny-all (no routes).
Host-testable; `PolicyResolverLike` Protocol keeps it import-free.
* egress_addon: consolidated mode when `BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_URL` is
set → `_active_config(flow)` resolves per client IP (reads + strips the
`x-bot-bottle-identity` header); `request()` uses it. Unset → the static
routes file, exactly as before. `PolicyResolver` added to the bundle.
Security note: source-IP-only resolution is safe where the IP is unspoofable
(Firecracker /31 + nft) AND the control plane is reachable only by the
trusted sidecar; the identity token, when the agent injects it, strengthens
it on weaker backends.
Scope note: the egress data plane is now multi-tenant. Remaining to be fully
live: the network topology routing every bottle's proxy to the one shared
sidecar, git-gate multitenancy, and agent-side identity-token injection.
Tests: registry by_source_ip; orchestrator resolve (with/without token);
control-plane /resolve token-optional; resolver token-optional;
resolve_client_config fail-closed matrix. All 182 egress tests still pass
(single-tenant unchanged). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The orchestrator side of the multi-tenant consolidated sidecar: hold each
bottle's sidecar policy and serve it by verified source IP, with live
reload. One shared sidecar can now get per-bottle config keyed on who's
calling.
* registry.py — a `policy` column (migration v3, opaque JSON the sidecar
interprets) on BottleRecord; `register(..., policy=)` stores it,
`set_policy(bottle_id, policy)` updates it live, and `attribute` returns
it (the source-IP-keyed resolution).
* service.py — `launch_bottle(..., policy=)` and `set_policy`.
* control_plane.py — `POST /bottles` accepts `policy`; `PUT
/bottles/<id>/policy` live-reloads it; `POST /resolve` returns
{bottle_id, policy} for a verified (source_ip, token) — the per-request
call the multi-tenant sidecar makes; `/attribute` stays identity-only.
Scope note: this is the control-plane / state half. The data-plane half —
the egress mitmproxy addon (and git-gate) selecting allowlist / DLP /
token-injection per client IP by calling `/resolve` — is the next slice
(route agent bottles through the shared sidecar). The orchestrator stays
policy-agnostic: it stores and serves the blob verbatim.
Tests: registry policy store/update/persist; Orchestrator launch-with-policy
+ live set_policy; control-plane resolve returns policy (403 on bad token),
PUT policy updates / 404 / 400. Verified live over HTTP (launch -> resolve
-> PUT reload -> resolve reflects). Full suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Answers "where do we build the consolidated sidecar": nowhere, until now.
* sidecar.py — `Sidecar.ensure_built()` (default no-op) + `DockerSidecar`
now defaults its image to the real bundle (`bot-bottle-sidecars`) and
`ensure_built()` builds it from `Dockerfile.sidecars` when
`docker image inspect` shows it's missing (no-op when present or when no
dockerfile is configured, e.g. a pre-pulled image). `image_exists()`
added.
* service.py — `ensure_sidecar()` now builds then runs.
* __main__.py — `--sidecar` runs the consolidated bundle (build-if-missing).
Scope note: this builds + launches the bundle *container*; making the
running instance functional across bottles needs the per-bottle,
source-IP-keyed multi-tenant config + registration/reload, and routing
agent bottles to it — the next slices (added to PRD 0070's roadmap).
Tests: unit (docker mocked) — image_exists, ensure_built builds when
missing / no-op when present / no-op without a dockerfile / raises on build
failure; ensure_sidecar builds-then-runs; integration (gated, no heavy
build) — image_exists reflects real docker state. Full suite green (only
pre-existing /bin/sleep errors).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
The core consolidation win: one persistent sidecar per host, shared by
every bottle, instead of a sidecar bundle per bottle. Safe to share
because the attribution invariant (source IP + identity token) lets the
sidecar map each request to the right bottle.
* orchestrator/sidecar.py — a backend-neutral `Sidecar` lifecycle
contract (mirrors LaunchBroker) + a `DockerSidecar` impl. The defining
behaviour is idempotent singleton: `ensure_running` starts the instance
if absent and is a no-op if it's already up, so N launches never spawn
N sidecars; `stop` is idempotent.
* orchestrator/dockerutil.py — a shared `run_docker` helper; DockerBroker
now uses it too (DRY with slice 3).
* service.py — the Orchestrator holds an optional `Sidecar`, exposes
`ensure_sidecar()` + `sidecar_status()`.
* control_plane.py — `GET /sidecar` reports it; __main__ gains
`--sidecar-image` and ensures the single sidecar on startup.
Tests: unit (docker mocked) — is_running, ensure idempotent (no-op when up,
starts when absent), failure raises, stop idempotent; Orchestrator sidecar
wiring/status; control-plane /sidecar; integration (gated) — ensure is a
real idempotent singleton (one container after two ensures), stop removes.
Full suite green (only pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); integration
verified locally against real docker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
Second slice of PRD 0070, still a backend-neutral dev-harness:
* orchestrator/broker.py — the launch-broker contract. A LaunchRequest is
structured (static ids/flags only — bottle id, pool slot, a
content-addressed image_ref; never a path/argv) and signed as a compact
HS256 JWT so the broker verifies PROVENANCE before acting: a compromised
co-located component can't forge a launch without the shared secret.
verify_request is fail-closed (bad sig / malformed / off-schema -> raise).
Stdlib only (no runtime deps). Ships a StubBroker that records verified
requests for the harness/tests.
* orchestrator/service.py — the Orchestrator: owns the registry and brokers
the lifecycle. launch_bottle mints the bottle + sends a signed launch,
rolling the registry entry back if the launch fails (no orphans);
teardown_bottle brokers teardown then deregisters; attribute delegates.
* control_plane.py — POST /bottles now launches, DELETE tears down (both go
through the Orchestrator + broker). dispatch/server take an Orchestrator.
* __main__.py wires an ephemeral secret + StubBroker for the harness.
Tests: broker sign/verify round-trip, tamper/wrong-secret/malformed/off-schema
rejection, StubBroker fail-closed; Orchestrator launch->registry->attribute,
teardown, rollback-on-broker-failure; control-plane updated for launch/teardown.
Full suite green (only the pre-existing /bin/sleep errors); harness does
launch -> attribute -> teardown over HTTP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
didericis