Expand the PRD from a schema sketch to the full contract the issue mandates
(issue is spec-only: 'defines the contract; implementation may be split
into follow-up PRs'):
- Envelope: add observed vs event timestamps, bottle/activation ids,
manifest_digest + policy_version, actor/action/resource/outcome,
correlation_id/causation_id, sensitivity class, typed payload, segment id.
- Add a per-field trust-provenance table (trusted vs claimed for every
common field); per-type trusted/claimed in the registry.
- Canonicalization: normative, reproducible hash-chain test vectors;
idempotency (id key, UPSERT), ordering guarantees, and behavior across
rotation/restart/import/truncation (truncated-tail vs gap).
- Storage: indexable fields + local audit query/verify/rebuild/import CLI.
- Registry: cover all mandated groups incl hostctl.*, egress
request/decision/cutoff/anomaly, commit.signed (#480), auth/authz, and
audit.* self-events; schema-evolution + backward-compatible reader rules.
- Export: #324 delivery contract (payload, (epoch,seq) cursor, dedup,
backpressure, retention ordering); #480 mapping preserving its
byte-to-activation-key guarantee.
- No raw prompt/response/body capture by default.
- Add an acceptance-criteria coverage table mapping each #487 checkbox to a
section.
Refs #487
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove the trusted sub-block: everything outside untrusted (chain
metadata, producer/host, bottled_agent, ts_*) is trusted by construction.
A field is trusted unless deliberately placed under untrusted (#495).
- Add Export/interoperability section: the flattened envelope projects
cleanly onto CloudEvents JSON (top-level scalars -> context/extension
attributes, untrusted -> data) and the OpenTelemetry Logs data model
(ts_wall -> Timestamp, trusted -> botbottle.* attributes, untrusted ->
botbottle.untrusted.*). Attribution preserved structurally; integrity
fields carried as data with verification always on the native journal.
Satisfies #487's export/interop requirement. Export adapters = chunk 6.
Refs #487
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Move ts_wall/ts_mono and producer inside the trusted block (host-supplied).
- Rename subject to bottled_agent everywhere (field + lifecycle.bottled_agent_* leaves).
- Add explicit epoch (writer-boot) counter + chain-head carry for ordering across host-controller restarts.
- Commit to a single writer per host (host controller owns it).
- Reuse egress dlp_detectors (scan_token_patterns/redact_tokens) for redaction; exclude scan_entropy as brittle on structured audit values.
- Retention: carry rotated-out chain head as new segment genesis prev.
- Fold resolved points into design; trim open questions.
Refs #487
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Draft PRD for a unified, versioned audit-event envelope with a
trusted/untrusted field split, canonical JSON + per-writer hash chain,
an append-only JSONL journal as source of truth, a rebuildable SQLite
index for local query, and an initial event registry. Scheduled to land
immediately after the host controller (#468), which becomes its first
producer.
Refs #487
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the third review round on PR #481.
- `bot-bottle doctor` now checks `is_backend_ready()` (a full backend
status() probe: daemon reachable, network pool present, KVM usable)
instead of the cheap PATH-only `is_backend_available()`. A host with a
stopped Docker daemon or half-configured Firecracker no longer reports
`ok: backend` / exit 0 when `start` can't actually work; each not-ready
backend prints its own diagnostics, and doctor passes only if at least
one backend is ready.
- `install.sh` resolves the pip `--user` scripts directory from the
interpreter (`sysconfig.get_path("scripts", get_preferred_scheme("user"))`)
instead of hardcoding `~/.local/bin`, which is wrong on a python.org
macOS interpreter (`~/Library/Python/<X.Y>/bin`). The PATH guidance now
prints the actual directory.
Tests: doctor tests mock `is_backend_ready` (the readiness contract) and
cover the not-ready → fail path; a new install-script test drives the
macOS `osx_framework_user` scheme and asserts it resolves a
non-~/.local/bin directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses the review on PR #481.
Self-contained wheel (review point 1): the gateway/infra/orchestrator
images build from a context that must hold bot_bottle/, pyproject.toml,
and the root-level Dockerfiles. Modules previously located these by
walking __file__ to the repo root, so an installed wheel (package in
site-packages, no repo root) passed `doctor` but failed `start`.
- Add bot_bottle/resources.py: build_root() returns the repo root in a
checkout (unchanged) or a staged copy from the wheel's bundled
_resources/ otherwise; dockerfile()/nix_netpool_module()/
netpool_script() derive from it.
- setup.py bundles the root Dockerfiles, nix module, netpool script, and
pyproject.toml into bot_bottle/_resources/ at build; MANIFEST.in ships
them in the sdist.
- Route every _REPO_ROOT/_REPO_DIR call site (docker/macos launch, macos
infra, firecracker infra_vm/infra_artifact/setup, orchestrator
lifecycle/gateway) through resources. Checkout behavior is unchanged.
install.sh prerequisites (review point 2): check for git when installing
a git+ spec, and — before the pip fallback — that pip is usable and the
interpreter isn't externally managed (PEP 668), pointing at pipx.
Tests: test_resources covers checkout + staged-wheel layouts;
test_wheel_install builds the wheel, installs it into an isolated venv,
and asserts `doctor` runs and build_root() yields a valid context.
Running `start` end-to-end still needs a Docker/KVM host (CI).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Give bot-bottle a real distribution path so new users can install
without cloning the repo:
- pyproject.toml: full project metadata, a `bot-bottle` console-script
entry point (bot_bottle.cli:main), and package-data for the runtime
assets (Dockerfiles, egress entrypoint, netpool defaults, macos init).
Still zero runtime pip dependencies.
- install.sh: POSIX, sudo-free, idempotent bootstrapper — checks Python
>= 3.11, creates ~/.bot-bottle/{agents,bottles,contrib}, installs via
pipx (pip --user fallback), then runs `bot-bottle doctor`.
- `bot-bottle doctor`: new store-free subcommand reporting Python
version, backend availability (reuses is_backend_available rather than
hardcoding Docker), and config-dir presence. Exits non-zero when a hard
prerequisite is unmet.
- PRD prd-new-install-script and unit tests for doctor, the packaging
contract, and the install script.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the advisory macOS Apple Container job run on workflow_dispatch
only, removing the push-to-`main` trigger so a single non-redundant
laptop never runs unattended on every push. Updates the job comment,
docs/ci.md, README CI note, and the PRD accordingly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
git-gate is fully implemented on the macos-container backend via the
gateway's consolidated git-http daemon with dynamic key
provisioning/revocation; only the legacy per-bottle git:// daemon is
unused. Fixes a stale README claim that git-gate is "deferred" and
removes the PRD open-question built on that false premise (sandbox-escape
attack 5 runs the same on macOS as on the other backends).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an `integration-macos` job that runs the integration suite against
BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND=macos-container on a self-hosted host-mode macOS runner
(label `macos`), plus the PRD and provisioning docs.
The job is advisory (push-to-main + workflow_dispatch only, never PRs, not
in coverage.needs) since it targets a single non-redundant laptop. It
preflights `container`/`backend status` so a misprovisioned runner fails
loudly, serializes on a concurrency group, and tears down the
`bot-bottle-mac-infra` singleton on exit (#425).
Also relaxes the TestSandboxEscape CI skip guard: it skipped every backend
but firecracker under GITEA_ACTIONS, which would also skip on a host-mode
macOS runner. The guard's real target is the containerized act_runner, so
it now allows both host-mode backends (firecracker, macos-container)
through — otherwise the macOS job would go green while skipping the one
end-to-end test that proves the backend launches.
Closes#426
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remove the empty-key opt-out codex flagged: ControlPlaneProvisioning
no longer lets the orchestrator start without a signing key when a
backend declares an "isolated" topology. Host separation is not the
safety condition — the gateway (and any other caller) must reach the
control-plane listener for /resolve, so an open orchestrator would
still grant them full `cli`. The signing key is now mandatory for
every backend.
Drops the now-purposeless Topology/COLOCATED machinery (no backend
declared a non-default topology) and the contractual
test_orchestrator_key_allows_empty_when_isolated. Updates the PRD's
invariant 4 and lifecycle docstring accordingly. Docs/behaviour only
otherwise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address review on #482: drop the generic "credential boundary" framing in the
PRD and docstrings and talk about the specific services — the orchestrator holds
the control-plane key; the host controller (#468) gets a separate key the
orchestrator never holds, so the orchestrator can't mint the credentials it uses
to talk to the host controller that owns its lifecycle. Lead with that concrete
win. No code behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Hoist control-plane auth provisioning out of the per-backend launchers into
one shared contract, parameterized per trust domain (#476). Every blocking
finding in PR #471 was the same integration-bug class: each launcher
re-derived, by hand, how to generate the signing key, scope it to the
orchestrator, mint the gateway JWT, and keep the host key canonical.
Introduces `trust_domain.py`:
* `TrustDomain` — one credential boundary (host-canonical key file + role
set + env vars). `mint`/`verify` are scoped to the domain's roles, so a
future host-controller domain (#468) uses its own key/verifier/roles
rather than a `host` role on the control plane's frozenset (which the
orchestrator key could then forge).
* `ControlPlaneProvisioning` — the single seam answering the four
invariants: host-canonical key, split key-vs-token credential, CLI token
valid across co-running backends, and fail-closed (no open mode) for any
co-located topology.
* `Topology` — the backend declares what it is; the default is co-located +
fail-closed, so a backend need not redeclare it.
The `Orchestrator` ABC gets `control_plane_key()` (fail-closed) and routes
`mint_gateway_token()` through the contract; docker/macOS/firecracker
orchestrators, the server (verify), and the host CLI client (mint cli) all go
through the domain instead of reading the host key directly. `orchestrator_auth`
gains an optional `roles=` arg (default unchanged) so a domain scopes its own
role set; `paths.host_signing_key(filename)` generalizes host_orchestrator_token.
Adds unit coverage for the domain boundary + provisioning invariants and a PRD
capturing the durable rationale. No change to the auth primitive's HMAC, the
plane split, or the server's documented open-mode fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#476
Reevaluated against the actual nft ruleset: the firecracker split's isolation
is nearly free, not "the real work." Agent VMs are already dropped except the
DNAT'd gateway ports, so re-pointing that single DNAT rule at the gateway VM
(dnat to $(gw_guest)) isolates agents from a separate orchestrator VM with zero
new agent rules; the only added nft is a mirrored gateway link + one
gateway->orchestrator forward rule. The effort is the mechanical second-VM
lifecycle, and it's validatable on a Firecracker host.
Sharpened the Access bullet accordingly and added a note to Sequencing
decoupling the original consolidation's "real work" (the broker shim) from the
split, whose difficulty actually runs the other way (docker/macOS do the real
work — new control network, dual-homed gateway, the token-only->L3 upgrade;
firecracker is nearly free).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in main's 8 commits — #470 (backend-agnostic CI guards: BackendStatus
enum, quiet status(), is_backend_available/is_backend_ready, tests/_backend.py
skip_unless_backend) plus firecracker status() readiness checks (kvm/kernel/
dropbear/mke2fs).
Reconciled #470's additions into the reorg'd backend structure:
* BackendStatus enum + the status(*, quiet=) ABC signature -> backend/base.py
* is_backend_available / is_backend_ready -> backend/selection.py
* exposed all three through the lazy backend facade (__init__).
Integration-test conflicts were our control_plane->orchestrator renames vs
main's skip_unless_docker -> skip_unless_backend swap: kept our refactored
import paths + main's guard. Repointed main's new is_backend_* tests to patch
selection._backends (our moved home) instead of the facade.
pyright: 0 errors. Full unit suite green (2272).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review feedback: the hand-rolled `/dev/kvm` + docker-daemon capability
probes duplicated logic the CLI already owns. Delegate instead.
- tests/_backend.py skip guards now gate on `bot_bottle.backend.has_backend`
(each backend's `is_available()` classmethod — the same probe behind
`./cli.py backend status`), dropping the bespoke `Capability` probes.
- Remove tests/backend_preflight.py; the docker integration job runs
`./cli.py backend status --backend=docker` as its preflight (clear
per-check summary, non-zero exit when unready), matching the firecracker
job. The firecracker preflight reverts to its original binary/KVM checks
(backend status doesn't cover those).
- Unit test + docs updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Integration tests now select their backend from BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND and
skip on the capability that backend actually needs, instead of gating
every backend on unrelated Docker availability.
Task 1 — backend-agnostic guards (tests/_backend.py):
- Capability probes: docker_capability() (reachable daemon) and
firecracker_capability() (accessible /dev/kvm + firecracker on PATH,
Docker-independent). backend_capability()/selected_backend() resolve
the target from BOT_BOTTLE_BACKEND (default docker).
- skip_unless_selected_backend_available() for backend-agnostic tests
(test_sandbox_escape) — runs through whichever backend is selected and
checks that backend's real capability.
- skip_unless_backend("docker") for Docker-implementation tests
(DockerBroker, DockerGateway, backend.docker.*) — they no-op under a
non-Docker run rather than testing internals that run doesn't target.
- Retires tests/_docker.py; the KVM job no longer needs SKIP_DOCKER_TESTS
to steer Docker-only classes.
Task 2 — explicit per-backend skip visibility:
- tests/backend_preflight.py prints a clear PASS/FAIL capability line and
exits non-zero when the selected backend is missing.
- Both integration jobs run it as a preflight, so absent infrastructure
is surfaced at the job level instead of hidden among unittest.skip
lines. The docker job replaces its soft "Show environment" step; the
firecracker job keeps its richer backend-status check.
Docs (tests/README.md, docs/ci.md) updated; unit coverage for the probes,
guards, and preflight in test_backend_skip_guards.py.
Closes#414
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remote terminal is an orchestrator operation, not a data-plane one: the
agent PTY is exec_agent-sourced (ssh -t / container exec --tty / docker
exec), which the orchestrator owns — the gateway never holds a PTY. A
--remote flag publishes a running agent's session; local + remote clients
share it via a session multiplexer (one PTY, many clients),
operator-role-gated, so the split's "one authenticated remote door" holds
for terminals too. Detailed design (multiplexer location, input
arbitration, per-client rendering, always-on vs --remote) tracked in #478.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
v1 decision: agent-image builds run in the orchestrator (the control-plane
side already owns launches and hosts builds in today's combined unit; the
data-plane gateway must not build). Consequence recorded in the memory
section: the orchestrator keeps the ~4 GB buildah ceiling and the gateway
is the slim unit (~1 GB), so the split is ~memory-neutral-to-+1 GB for now
— the ~1.5 GB win waits on a later move to a dedicated slim build unit
(#468-adjacent). Also flags the tension of co-locating buildah with the
control plane. Removed the corresponding open question.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Now that #469 got the DB off the data plane (removing the cross-kernel
SQLite-coherence reason the planes were consolidated), separating them
into distinct runtimes is possible again. Adds a Design subsection to
0070 covering:
* Access — the only hop that changes is gateway->orchestrator (loopback
-> network). A dedicated `bot-bottle-orchestrator` --internal control
network with a dual-homed gateway gives Docker/macOS the L3 agent
isolation that only Firecracker's nft currently has (both are
token-only today); Firecracker gets it nearly free (agents already
can't reach non-DNAT'd ports).
* Memory — firecracker's mem_size_mib is a fixed ceiling (no reclaim
without a balloon); the 4 GB combined VM is really buildah headroom.
Right-sized: ~512 MiB orchestrator + ~1 GB gateway < today's 4 GB,
if agent-image builds move off the gateway.
* iroh belongs in the orchestrator (control-plane remote entry point);
keep the data-plane gateway slim and P2P-free.
Plus open questions: where agent-image builds run post-split, and whether
agent-PTY-to-mobile relays through the orchestrator's iroh endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings in the two commits main gained: #472 (CLI cleanup — remove `info`,
split `list active` into a top-level `active`, simplify `list`) and the
terminology glossary. #472 was written against the old flat cli/ layout,
so its semantics are reconciled into the reorg'd cli/commands/ structure:
* new `active` command lives at cli/commands/active.py, registered in
the lazy registry and listed in `help` (not left at the flat path).
* `info` removed: deleted cli/commands/info.py, dropped from the
registry and `help`.
* `list` simplified to list-available-only, using the reorg's
os.getcwd()/constants.PROG conventions.
* the `list active` -> `active` doc wording applied to the backend
docstrings that our split moved into base.py / selection.py.
Our reorg wins for the fully-rewritten dispatcher (cli/__init__ shim,
backend facade). pyright: 0 errors. Full unit suite green (2243).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Defines Agent Provider, Agent Runtime, Agent/Agent Definition,
Bottle/Bottle Definition, Sealed Bottle, Bottled Agent, and Active Bottle.
Links from docs/README.md and AGENTS.md for discoverability.
Closes#474
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PRD 0070's rule — only the orchestrator opens bot-bottle.db; the data
plane reaches state through the control-plane RPC — was not in force.
Three data-plane daemons held a direct read-write handle on the shared
SQLite file: the supervise MCP server, the egress DLP addon (the most
attack-exposed process, TLS-bumping hostile traffic), and the git-gate
pre-receive hook. An RCE in any of them could read every bottle's
plaintext identity_token and forge attribution fleet-wide (issue #469).
Add the agent half of the supervise flow to the control plane:
POST /supervise/propose -> queue a proposal, 201 {proposal_id}
POST /supervise/poll -> non-blocking decision poll, 200 {status,...}
Both attribute the caller by (source_ip, identity_token) exactly like
/resolve — never a caller-supplied slug — so a bottle can only ever queue
or read its own proposals even if the data plane is compromised. A decided
poll archives server-side, preserving the archive-after-read contract.
Data plane: the supervise server, egress addon, and git-gate hook now
queue/poll through PolicyResolver.propose_supervise / poll_supervise
instead of opening the DB. supervise_server keeps its ~30s grace window
by polling the RPC; egress keeps its safelist keyed by resolved bottle;
the git-gate hook gets (source_ip, identity_token) from the CGI env.
Packaging: drop the DB bind-mount and SUPERVISE_DB_PATH from the
data-plane containers/VMs (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra,
firecracker infra). The orchestrator remains the sole opener of the one
file via BOT_BOTTLE_ROOT / host_db_path().
Update PRD 0070: the rule is now in force; remove the transitional caveat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The orchestrator holds each bottle's egress auth tokens in process memory
only, so recreating the infra container strips every already-running
bottle of its upstream credentials. The registry row and the gateway CA
both survive; the tokens do not, so /resolve serves an intact policy with
an empty token map and the addon fails closed on `token_env unset`.
Drafts the interim slice of #355: persist the tokens encrypted so they
survive a restart, without regressing to plaintext at rest and without
foreclosing the per-request minting end state. Design section is left for
the author to fill in.
Documents the proxy-layer precedence that took four attempts to get
right, the blob-CDN routes every registry needs alongside its own, the
podman 5 networking packages and how each one fails when absent, and
the BusyBox wget caveat. Closes the DNS open question: public
resolution inside a nested container fails by design; reaching the
proxy was the real problem.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the `nested_containers` bottle flag. On the macOS backend it starts
a rootless podman service inside the bottle and exposes its
Docker-compatible API socket, so the agent still runs `docker` and
`docker compose`. No host daemon socket is mounted and the guest gains
no capabilities; backends that cannot run a guest-local engine reject
the flag in the shared prepare template rather than ignoring it.
Podman rather than rootless Docker because Apple Container's capability
bounding set omits CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which the kernel requires to write a
multi-range uid_map via newuidmap. With no subordinate UID range podman
falls back to a single-UID self-mapping an unprivileged process may
write itself, so the image build strips /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid
entries rather than adding them.
That mapping is also why nested containers are not an isolation layer:
root inside one is the agent user outside it. They are a build/test
convenience; the bottle remains the boundary.
Ports the spike branch onto main, renaming docker_access — it implied
Docker and granted access to nothing on the host — and drops podman
from the derived layer now that every built-in image ships it (#451).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Investigates storage candidates, retention policy design, and
image-size reduction techniques in response to the PR #459 comment
on a secure remote store for committed Firecracker snapshots.
The shared gateway self-generates a mitmproxy CA that every bottle installs
to trust its TLS interception. It was persisted on a Docker named volume,
which survives `docker rm` but is silently wiped by `docker volume prune` /
`docker system prune --volumes` during routine host maintenance. When that
happens the gateway mints a fresh CA on restart, and every already-running
bottle fails the TLS handshake even after it re-resolves and reconnects to
the moved gateway — a re-attachment blocker distinct from #443/#445.
Move CA persistence to a host bind-mount under the app-data root
(`bot_bottle_root()/gateway-ca`, via `host_gateway_ca_dir()`), mirroring how
the shared DB and control-plane token already live on the host. Docker never
prunes a path under the root, and it stays inspectable + rotatable from the
host. mitmproxy already adopts an existing CA and generates one only on first
run, so the bind-mount gives adopt-existing/generate-on-first-run for free.
Add an explicit rollover path: `rotate_gateway_ca()` clears the persisted CA
so the next start remints it, and `python -m bot_bottle.orchestrator.rotate_ca`
wires that together with dropping the running gateway container (whose
mitmproxy still holds the old CA in memory). Rotation stays an operator action
— it doesn't auto-re-provision running bottles, which re-attach to pick up the
new anchor.
Scope: the Docker infra/gateway path (the "infra container" in the report).
The macOS (`container`-only volume) and Firecracker (VM-attached ext4) backends
persist the CA differently and are unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reads the host's Claude OAuth session key from ~/.claude.json at launch
and forwards it only to the egress sidecar (never to the agent), placing
a placeholder CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN in the agent env so Claude Code
starts without seeing the real credential.
Mirrors the existing Codex forward_host_credentials flow (PRD 0029).
Adds claude_auth.py to extract and validate the sessionKey, a
CLAUDE_HOST_CREDENTIAL_TOKEN_REF constant in egress.py, and updates
manifest_agent.py to allow the flag for both 'codex' and 'claude'
templates. Also adds a mutual-exclusion check that rejects setting
both auth_token and forward_host_credentials together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(claude): read credentials from ~/.claude/.credentials.json
The actual OAuth token is in ~/.claude/.credentials.json under
claudeAiOauth.accessToken, not in ~/.claude.json.
~/.claude.json holds only UI state and profile metadata (oauthAccount
has no token fields). expiresAt in the credentials file is milliseconds,
not seconds.
Discovered after testing against Claude Code 2.1.198.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
fix(claude): fall back to macOS Keychain for credentials
On macOS, Claude Code stores credentials in the Keychain under
service "Claude Code-credentials" rather than in a file. When
~/.claude/.credentials.json is absent, shell out to:
security find-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" -w
and parse the result as the same JSON schema.
~/.claude.json holds only profile/UI metadata (oauthAccount has
no token fields). expiresAt in the credentials is milliseconds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs(prd): fix credential path references (~/.claude/.credentials.json)
fix(test): suppress gitleaks false positives on synthetic Claude tokens
Each test job now runs once under coverage and uploads a small .coverage.*
artifact. The coverage job combines them on ubuntu-latest — no test reruns,
no KVM dependency. The infra candidate is built directly on the KVM runner,
eliminating the build-infra job and the ~70 s upload + ~83 s combined
download. For PRs, no rootfs artifact is transferred at all. Main-branch
pushes upload the tested rootfs and matching dropbear so publish-infra
publishes the byte-identical artifact. relative_files = True in .coveragerc
lets coverage files from different runners combine without path remapping.
Closes#446
Extract the shared CA cert polling loop into `backend/util.poll_ca_cert`
(firecracker and macos backends were duplicating deadline/sleep/raise logic).
Each caller now wraps a fetch lambda and converts TimeoutError to its own
error type. Also corrects the PRD port publication line from {port}:{port}
to {host_port}:8099.
Collapses the two-container Docker model (gateway + orchestrator) into one
bot-bottle-infra container, matching the macOS and Firecracker backends.
- Dockerfile.infra: now a shared gateway+orchestrator base (COPY bot_bottle
from orchestrator build, no CMD override)
- Dockerfile.infra.fc: new Firecracker-specific layer (buildah/crun/netavark)
- gateway_init: adds orchestrator daemon with _OPT_IN_DAEMONS gating so it
only starts when BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS explicitly includes it
- orchestrator/lifecycle: OrchestratorService manages one infra container;
builds orchestrator (intermediate) then infra; live source bind-mounted at
/bot-bottle-src with PYTHONPATH so the subprocess uses the checkout
- backend/consolidated_util: extracts provision_bottle + teardown_consolidated
shared across all three backends; removes duplication in docker/fc/macos
consolidated_launch modules
- firecracker/infra_vm: builds four images (orchestrator→gateway→infra→infra.fc)
- All unit tests updated and passing (1878 tests)
- PRD status: Draft → Active
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