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4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis d2d50be65a Restructure PRD 0062 to the init-prd template
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Update Quality Badges / update-badges (push) Successful in 1m32s
Conform the PRD to the standard PRD-new skeleton: add a Scope section
(In scope / Out of scope), rename Design -> Proposed Design and split
its prose into New services / Existing code touched / Data model
changes / External dependencies, fold the old Implementation chunks
into In scope, and add a References section. No change in substance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-24 21:10:31 -04:00
didericis 1ad710a041 Default agent-provider routes to the redact on-match policy
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Provider routes (the agent talking to its own LLM API — api.anthropic.com,
the Codex backend, etc.) carry the whole conversation payload, which is the
worst source of token-shaped false positives. egress_routes_for_bottle now
fills outbound_on_match=redact on any provider route that doesn't set it
explicitly, so a match there is scrubbed and forwarded rather than blocked
or queued for the operator. A provider that sets the policy keeps its
choice; manifest routes still default to supervise.

Tests: provider route gets redact default, explicit provider policy
preserved, manifest route unaffected. README + PRD 0062 updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HnvBjPZC5V7qeQpFbQdDmS
2026-06-24 20:40:36 -04:00
didericis cdfaaa3de8 Add dlp.outbound_on_match policy (block | redact | supervise)
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Give each egress route a policy for what the proxy does when an outbound
DLP detector matches a token, defaulting to the supervise flow added in
the previous commit. The goal is cutting false-positive friction without
weakening default-deny.

- redact: scrub the matched value(s) from the body, non-host headers, and
  path/query via redact_tokens, then re-scan. Forward if clean; fail
  closed with a 403 if a match remains on a surface redaction can't
  rewrite (the hostname, or a unicode-evasion token). For routes where a
  token-shaped value is noise the upstream doesn't need.
- block: the original hard 403, never overridable.
- supervise (default, unset): hold the request for operator approval.

Structural blocks (CRLF, no safelist-able value) stay hard 403s under
every policy.

Threads outbound_on_match from the bottle manifest (manifest_egress)
through the resolved EgressRoute and rendered routes.yaml (egress.py) to
the addon's Route (egress_addon_core), and round-trips it via the
list-egress-routes introspection endpoint. The allow/egress-block tool
descriptions document the new key.

Tests: manifest parse/validation, core parse/validation, full
manifest->render->addon round-trip for redact. README + PRD 0062 updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HnvBjPZC5V7qeQpFbQdDmS
2026-06-24 16:50:13 -04:00
didericis 7f2352287e PRD 0062: supervisor override for egress token blocks
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test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 31s
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When the outbound DLP catches a token, route the block through the
existing supervisor approval queue instead of returning 403 outright.
The egress proxy holds the request open until the operator answers, then
remembers an approved value for the life of the proxy so the request --
and later ones carrying it -- flow through. Fails closed on rejection,
timeout, malformed response, or when supervise is disabled.

- ScanResult.matched carries the raw matched substring (sidecar-only;
  never logged or written to the proposal). scan_outbound and the token
  detectors take a safe_tokens set and skip approved values, continuing
  past a safelisted match so a second secret in the same request is
  still caught.
- New egress-token-allow proposal tool, written directly to the queue by
  the addon (the gitleaks-allow pattern from PRD 0061). build_token_allow
  _payload renders host/method/path/detector reason + redacted context.
- Async request hook polls the queue without stalling the proxy event
  loop; EGRESS_TOKEN_ALLOW_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (default 300) bounds the wait.
- Supervisor TUI renders egress-token-allow like gitleaks-allow: report
  only, modify unavailable, approval requires a recorded reason.
- Unit tests for the matched/safe-tokens plumbing, payload builder, tool
  constant round-trip, and TUI paths; README + PRD 0062.

Closes #261.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HnvBjPZC5V7qeQpFbQdDmS
2026-06-24 16:12:50 -04:00