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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
didericis a79b2b7be0 docs(prd-0017): nest auth.scheme + auth.token_ref under optional auth
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 18s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 1m38s
Earlier draft had `auth_scheme: "none"` as the unauthenticated
signal — awkward sentinel. Nest the two credential-injection
fields under an optional `auth` key instead. Presence of the key
= authenticated; absence = unauthenticated. Empty `auth: {}` is
an error (omission is what means "no auth").

Touches: scope bullet, manifest example, mitmproxy addon
description's auth-handling step. Two trailing `auth_scheme:
"none"` references kept as historical context for what the new
shape replaces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 13:35:47 -04:00
didericis b0d9802469 docs(prd-0017): pivot to mitmproxy-based egress-proxy
test / unit (pull_request) Successful in 18s
test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 1m34s
Significant rewrite of PRD 0017 based on PR #25 design discussion.

Original draft proposed adding `path_allowlist` to the existing
cred-proxy. That bought opt-in path filtering for tools that
voluntarily routed through cred-proxy (Claude Code, git, npm) —
but raw `curl https://github.com/foo` from the agent goes to
HTTPS_PROXY=pipelock and bypasses cred-proxy entirely, so any
universal enforcement claim was a lie.

New design: replace cred-proxy with a mitmproxy-based egress-proxy
that becomes the agent's HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY. Every agent
HTTP/HTTPS request flows through it before reaching pipelock.
Path-level allow/deny enforcement is universal because the proxy
is on every leg. The proxy also absorbs cred-proxy's credential
injection role (mitmproxy addon hooks request → strip + inject
Authorization).

Net sidecar count: unchanged. cred-proxy is replaced 1:1 by
egress-proxy. Pipelock stays as hostname allow + DLP downstream
of egress-proxy.

Decisions baked in per PR-#25 discussion:
- Tool: mitmproxy (designed for this; Python addons; well-maintained).
- CA custody: egress-proxy holds the per-bottle MITM CA key
  (concentration accepted; documented in trust-domain section).
- Migration: hard cutover. Existing `bottle.cred_proxy.routes[]`
  manifests fail-fast at load time with a pointer at this PRD.

Open questions retained for the implementation PRs: addon
distribution (bake vs mount), prefix-vs-glob match, double-strip
of Authorization between egress-proxy and pipelock, whether
pipelock keeps TLS interception or stays hostname-only post-cutover,
performance under two-MITM-hops.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 13:28:53 -04:00