Two related changes the PRD 0022 sandbox-escape test surfaced:
1. `pipelock_build_config` now emits
`request_body_scanning.scan_headers: true` and
`header_mode: all`. Pipelock's default `header_mode:
sensitive` only checks Authorization / Cookie / X-Api-Key
/ X-Token / Proxy-Authorization / X-Goog-Api-Key — an
agent attempting exfil could trivially pick a
non-sensitive header (`X-Custom: $SECRET`) and slip
through. `all` closes the gap; pipelock caps it by the
same max_body_bytes the body scan uses.
2. Test 3 (HTTP exfil shapes) now targets
raw.githubusercontent.com instead of api.anthropic.com.
api.anthropic.com is in `DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH` —
pipelock can't MITM it because real LLM conversation
bodies false-positive on DLP scanners (BIP-39 etc.). The
trade-off is documented in `pipelock.DEFAULT_TLS_PASSTHROUGH`;
the test now exercises a host where the sandbox is
actually supposed to block.
All 5 sandbox-escape attacks now produce HTTP 403 with the
expected sandbox marker (`egress:`, `pipelock`, or `blocked:`):
- Attack 1 (non-allowlisted host) ✓ egress
- Attack 2 (non-allowlisted IP + spoof) ✓ egress
- Attack 3a (URL path) ✓ pipelock DLP
- Attack 3b (URL query) ✓ pipelock DLP
- Attack 3c (request body) ✓ pipelock DLP
- Attack 3d (request header) ✓ pipelock DLP (scan_headers)
- Attack 4a (crafted subdomain) ✓ egress
- Attack 4b (direct dig @8.8.8.8) ✓ network isolation
- Attack 5 (README push, 3 secret shapes) ✓ gitleaks (pre-upstream)
489 unit tests pass (1 updated for the new request_body_scanning
shape). Full integration suite passes in ~6s.
End-to-end test that brings up a real bottle with allowlisted
egress + git-gate + three planted secrets, then runs five
attacks from inside the agent container.
Chunks 1-5 implemented in one pass against the Docker backend:
Attack 1 — non-allowlisted hostname (curl evil.example.com)
✓ blocked by egress
Attack 2 — non-allowlisted IP literal (198.51.100.1) + host-
header spoof via curl --resolve
✓ both blocked by egress
Attack 3 — HTTP exfil to allowlisted destination via path /
query / body / header
✗ ALL FOUR LEAK — request reaches api.anthropic.com
with the secret embedded. Pipelock's DLP doesn't
catch the anthropic-key shape in the body, and
nothing scans path / query / headers.
Attack 4 — DNS exfil via crafted subdomain + direct
dig @8.8.8.8 query
✓ both blocked (egress rejects subdomain, internal
network has no path to 8.8.8.8)
Attack 5 — README push through git-gate with secret-bearing
attacker URL (parameterized over anthropic / AWS /
generic shapes); ordering check that gitleaks fires
BEFORE any upstream attempt
✓ all three secret shapes blocked by gitleaks
Per PRD 0022 Q1 the assertion in attack 3 is authoritative —
HTTP 403 with an egress/pipelock marker in the body is the only
acceptable outcome. Any 4xx from upstream means the secret
reached the network. The four failing sub-tests are real
sandbox gaps that need their own remediation PRDs before this
test merges green.
Also adds `dnsutils` (dig) to the base agent image so attack 4's
direct-DNS check has a tool to run.
CI: no changes needed — `.gitea/workflows/test.yml` already runs
`tests/integration/` and the suite skip_unless_dockers cleanly
when the runner has no Docker socket.
didericis