1e82aed54be3e15e28a4beb54bf84b3504753b60
13 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 didericis-claude
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2f143c7142 |
fix(smolmachines): include per-bottle alias in NO_PROXY
claude's HTTPS_PROXY was catching the supervise MCP URL (`http://<alias>:<port>/`) because NO_PROXY was hardcoded to `localhost,127.0.0.1` and didn't include the per-bottle loopback alias. Claude proxied the MCP POST through egress, egress had no route for the alias, and the connection failed — `/mcp` showed "supervise · ✘ failed" inside the bottle. Append the loopback alias to NO_PROXY in launch.py so direct MCP calls bypass the proxy. The git-gate URL uses `git://`, which proxies don't touch, so this only affects MCP / HTTP paths to the bundle. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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7eda2a66ec |
feat(smolmachines): patch smolvm state DB to actually enforce per-bottle allowlist
Earlier commit framed this PR as "infrastructure landed, TSI enforcement blocked on upstream smolvm 0.8.0." Found a clean workaround that lets us enforce now. Smolvm persists each machine's config (including `allowed_cidrs`) as a JSON BLOB in `~/Library/Application Support/smolvm/server/smolvm.db`, `vms.data`. `machine create --allow-cidr X/32` silently writes `allowed_cidrs: null` to that row when combined with `--from`, but smolvm reads the row at `machine start` — so patching the row between create and start sets the allowlist for real. New `loopback_alias.force_allowlist(machine_name, cidrs)` opens the SQLite DB, JSON-decodes the row, sets `allowed_cidrs`, and writes back as BLOB (Text type silently corrupts smolvm's later reads). launch.py calls it immediately after `machine_create` and before `machine_start`. Verified end-to-end on macOS / Docker Desktop: VM allowlist after start: ["127.0.0.16/32"] VM → 127.0.0.1:3000 → BLOCKED (Permission denied) VM → 8.8.8.8:53 → BLOCKED (Permission denied) VM → 127.0.0.16:<bundle> → CONNECTED The DB-patch hack is correct only because smolvm reads `allowed_cidrs` from the row at start time (not derived in- process). When upstream honors `--allow-cidr` with `--from`, the call becomes redundant — drop the call and the workaround is gone. Tests: 4 new for `force_allowlist` (BLOB round-trip; Linux no-op; missing DB; missing row). Total 593 unit tests pass. README + PRD updated to reflect the fix landed (no longer "infrastructure pending upstream"). gitea#75 can close. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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2edc1abb9a |
feat(smolmachines): per-bottle loopback alias scopes TSI to single /32
PR #74's Docker-Desktop fix routed the agent through `127.0.0.1:<random>` loopback forwards, but TSI filters by IP only — so the allowlist `127.0.0.1/32` let the agent VM reach **any** host service on macOS loopback (postgres, dev servers, other bottles' published ports, mDNSResponder, ...). Real downgrade vs the docker backend's `--internal` network. Resolution: per-bottle loopback alias. - New `loopback_alias` module manages a pool of `127.0.0.16` .. `127.0.0.31` on `lo0`. macOS only routes `127.0.0.1` by default; the extras need `sudo ifconfig lo0 alias`. `ensure_pool()` lazily adds the missing entries via one sudo prompt on first launch per reboot — aliases persist on `lo0` until reboot, so subsequent launches skip the prompt entirely. - `allocate(slug)` picks the lowest-numbered unused alias by inspecting running bundle containers' port-binding HostIps. No on-disk reservation — docker is the source of truth. - Bundle bringup binds published ports to the allocated alias (`docker run -p <alias>::<port>`) instead of `127.0.0.1`. - TSI allowlist becomes the alias's /32 — narrows reachability to this bottle's bundle only. - Linux native daemons share the host's network namespace; `127.0.0.0/8` works without aliases, so the module no-ops on non-Darwin and returns `127.0.0.1` from `allocate`. Tracking issue closed: gitea/issues/75. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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515306cd4a |
fix(smolmachines): restore /tmp + /var/tmp perms after smolvm pack remap
smolvm's pack process remaps OCI-layer ownership to the host invoker's uid for *every* directory, not just /home/node — so /tmp lands as `0755 501:dialout` instead of the standard `1777 root:root`. Non-root processes can't create per-uid scratch dirs in there. Claude-code's first Bash tool call fails with `EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/tmp/claude-1000'`. Same workaround folded into the existing perms-repair sh -c: `chown root:root /tmp /var/tmp && chmod 1777 /tmp /var/tmp` next to the /home/node chown. One machine_exec round trip total. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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5486170be1 |
fix(smolmachines): route agent through egress when routes declared, wait for VM warm-up
Two related bugs: 1. Auth chain bypassed egress. After the Docker-Desktop port pivot, the agent always dialed pipelock directly — meaning egress (which holds the real OAuth token and rewrites the Authorization header) wasn't in the request path. Bearer placeholder reached anthropic verbatim → 401 "Invalid bearer token". Fix: when the bottle declares egress.routes, the agent's first hop is egress (publish egress port 9099 to host loopback, leave pipelock bundle-internal). Without routes, the agent dials pipelock directly. Same hop order as the docker backend. 2. provision_ca's update-ca-certificates SIGKILLed at ~100ms on Docker Desktop. Back-to-back `smolvm machine exec` calls immediately after machine_start hit a VM warm-up race in libkrun's exec channel; the second exec's child got SIGKILL'd before producing more than the first line of stdout. The agent's trust store never got the egress MITM CA's hash symlink, so curl/openssl couldn't validate the TLS chain. Fix: 1.5s sleep after machine_start (empirically enough), plus fold provision_ca's chown + chmod + update-ca-certificates into one `sh -c` so we only pay one exec round trip. Bail with a clear error if update-ca- certificates doesn't report "1 added" (failing silently was how the original SIGKILL went unnoticed). Net effect on Docker Desktop / macOS: claude's HTTPS_PROXY is `http://127.0.0.1:<egress port>`, egress rewrites auth, pipelock allowlists + DLPs, request reaches api.anthropic.com with a real token. End-to-end verified. Also drops the PRD-0023-chunk-3 EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1 mitigation. The original concern (agent bypassing pipelock by dialing egress's port on the bundle IP) doesn't apply in this topology: the agent can only reach whatever port we publish on host loopback, and egress is the only HTTP/HTTPS chokepoint that gets published. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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4f136a9932 |
fix(smolmachines): agent dials bundle via host loopback ports, not docker bridge IP
Claude hung on outbound network calls under CLAUDE_BOTTLE_BACKEND=smolmachines: Unable to connect to API (FailedToOpenSocket) Root cause: the PRD-0023 design pinned the bundle at a docker bridge IP (192.168.X.2) and set the smolvm guest's TSI allowlist to `<bundle-ip>/32`. On native Linux this works — host shares the docker bridge's network namespace, TSI's syscall impersonation reaches the bridge IP directly. On Docker Desktop (macOS), the daemon runs in its own Linux VM and docker bridge IPs aren't reachable from macOS networking, so the smolvm guest's TSI requests die "Network is unreachable" before they hit pipelock. Fix: publish each agent-facing bundle daemon's port on host loopback (-p 127.0.0.1::PORT), discover the random host-side ports after start, and route the agent through `127.0.0.1:<host port>` instead of the bridge IP. macOS loopback is the surface Docker Desktop's gvproxy forwards into the daemon's VM, so the chain (guest TSI -> macOS loopback -> daemon VM port-forward -> bundle container) works on both Docker Desktop and native Linux. Concrete changes: - BundleLaunchSpec: add `ports_to_publish` so start_bundle adds `-p 127.0.0.1::PORT` for the agent-facing ports (pipelock always; git-gate when upstreams declared; supervise when enabled). Egress's port stays bundle-internal. - sidecar_bundle.bundle_host_port(): wrap `docker port <bundle> <container_port>/tcp` so launch can look up the random host-side mapping after start. - launch.py: discover the host ports, build URLs of the form `http://127.0.0.1:<host port>` / `git://127.0.0.1:<host port>`, stamp onto guest_env + new agent_*_url fields on the plan. - launch.py: TSI allow_cidrs flips to `["127.0.0.1/32"]`. The bundle IP is no longer the agent's target. - prepare.py: stop synthesizing HTTPS_PROXY / GIT_GATE_URL / MCP_SUPERVISE_URL at prepare time — launch owns those now (the values depend on a port docker hasn't assigned yet). - provision_git: gate_host from plan.agent_git_gate_host. - provision_supervise: URL from plan.agent_supervise_url. End-to-end verified on Docker Desktop / macOS: guest dials pipelock through TSI, pipelock forwards to api.anthropic.com, the API responds with 401 (i.e. it received the request). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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91955ec59f |
fix(smolmachines): forward guest env on every exec + chown /home/node
Two issues kept claude's TUI from drawing after launch: 1. smolvm pack remaps OCI-layer ownership to the host invoker's uid (501 on macOS) instead of preserving the image's USER node (uid 1000). /home/node ends up owned by some uid that doesn't exist in the VM, so when claude runs as node it can't appendFileSync to ~/.claude.json on startup — fails with ENOENT and the TUI hangs. Fix: chown -R node:node /home/node after machine_start, before provision. 2. smolvm machine_create -e sets env on PID 1 but it doesn't propagate to fresh exec process trees (verified empirically: `smolvm machine exec -- printenv` shows none of the machine_create env vars). Claude was running with no HTTPS_PROXY / CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN / NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, so even the auth-validation step bailed silently. Fix: thread `guest_env` through to the SmolmachinesBottle handle and re-pass every entry via `-e K=V` on every machine_exec call (interactive claude and shell exec both). Also fills in the same `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=egress- placeholder` + telemetry-off env the docker backend's forwarded_env carries, plus the NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS / SSL_CERT_FILE / REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE trust trio. Verified end-to-end on Docker Desktop / macOS: claude's TUI renders cleanly with the bypass-permissions banner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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727f30d422 |
refactor(docker): drop legacy per-sidecar container_name functions
Same line of cleanup as the supervise rename: the per-sidecar container names (`claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>`, `claude-bottle-egress-<slug>`, `claude-bottle-git-gate-<slug>`) were docker-network aliases pointing at the bundle, kept so legacy URLs would keep resolving. Replaces them with short hostnames (`pipelock`, `egress`, `git-gate`) matching the existing `EGRESS_HOSTNAME` pattern, and inlines the bundle-loopback URL (`http://127.0.0.1:8888`) for the in-bundle egress→pipelock hop — matching what smolmachines already does. Drops the three `*_container_name` functions, `pipelock_proxy_url`, and `git_gate_host`. Their callers move to the new constants: - `PIPELOCK_HOSTNAME = "pipelock"` (claude_bottle/pipelock.py) - `GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"` (claude_bottle/git_gate.py) - `BUNDLE_LOCAL_PIPELOCK_URL` (backend/docker/pipelock.py) The agent's HTTP_PROXY now reads `http://pipelock:8888` (vs the old `http://claude-bottle-pipelock-<slug>:8888`); the gitconfig insteadOf rewrites become `git://git-gate/<repo>.git`. The prepare- time orphan probe is collapsed onto the bundle container name (`claude-bottle-sidecars-<slug>`) instead of the four legacy per-sidecar names that no backend creates anymore. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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73dc0d4a40 |
refactor(sidecars): instantiate sidecar ABCs directly from any backend
The four sidecar prepare-time helpers (PipelockProxy, Egress, GitGate, Supervise) had docker-flavored subclasses that existed only as instantiation shims for ABCs that already had no abstract methods. PipelockProxy.prepare() reached for class-level CA path constants that were only defined on the docker subclass — so smolmachines had to import DockerPipelockProxy to render pipelock yaml, reaching across the backend boundary for what's actually a platform-neutral operation. This moves the universal in-container CA paths (PIPELOCK_CA_CERT_IN_CONTAINER / PIPELOCK_CA_KEY_IN_CONTAINER) to claude_bottle/pipelock.py, drops the class-attr indirection on the ABC, and deletes the four empty docker subclasses. Both backends now instantiate the ABCs directly; the docker-side modules keep the docker-flavored helpers (image pin, container naming, host CA mint) and re-export the moved pipelock constants for compat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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1dfc359141 |
feat(smolmachines): thread inner Plans + bundle daemons run (PRD 0023 chunk 4b)
Bundle daemons (pipelock, egress, optionally git-gate + supervise)
now actually start with their config files bind-mounted from the
inner Plans the docker backend already produces. Chunks 2d + 3
ran with daemons_csv="" so the bundle's init supervisor idled;
chunk 4b wires up the real path: agent → pipelock → egress →
internet (when routes declared) is now functional, modulo agent-
image gaps (claude-code / TLS-trust-store / git in the guest)
that chunk 4c addresses.
bottle_plan.py — added the four inner Plan fields:
proxy_plan: PipelockProxyPlan
git_gate_plan: GitGatePlan
egress_plan: EgressPlan
supervise_plan: SupervisePlan | None
Same shape the docker backend's plan uses. Docker-network-only
fields (internal_network, egress_network) stay at dataclass
defaults — the smolmachines bundle is on a per-bottle bridge
with a pinned IP, not docker's --internal + egress topology.
prepare.py — instantiates DockerPipelockProxy / DockerEgress /
DockerGitGate / DockerSupervise and calls their .prepare()
methods to write the per-bottle config files (pipelock.yaml,
routes.yaml, git-gate entrypoint/hooks, supervise queue dir)
under the per-bottle state dir. (The "Docker" prefix on the
class names is a misnomer here — .prepare() is platform-neutral,
inherited from each sidecar's ABC. A future cleanup could factor
the prepare logic out of the docker subpackage.)
launch.py — major rewrite:
- pipelock_tls_init at launch (always); egress_tls_init only
when the bottle declares routes (otherwise the CA files
aren't bind-mounted and openssl runs would be wasted).
- Inner Plans updated in place with launch-time CA paths +
EGRESS_UPSTREAM_PROXY = http://127.0.0.1:8888 (egress's
upstream is pipelock on the bundle's own loopback; same
container's network namespace).
- BundleLaunchSpec env + volumes built from the inner Plans:
pipelock.yaml + CA + key (always); egress routes + CAs +
upstream env + token-slot bare names (when routes); git-gate
entrypoint + hooks + per-upstream identity files (when
upstreams); supervise queue dir + env (when enabled).
- daemons_csv = ["egress", "pipelock"] + ["git-gate"] (if
upstreams) + ["supervise"] (if enabled).
- Token env values resolved from host env via
`egress_resolve_token_values` and threaded into the
docker-run subprocess env (bare-name -e entries in spec
inherit from there — values never land on argv).
Tests:
- 552 unit passing (no new unit cases; fixture updated to
populate the new plan fields).
- 5 integration cases passing locally (Darwin + smolvm + docker
+ not GITEA_ACTIONS):
* test_smoke_exec_echo — still works.
* test_localhost_reach_probe — host loopback still refused.
* test_egress_port_bypass_probe — <bundle-ip>:9099 still
refused, NOW WITH EGRESS ACTUALLY RUNNING (chunk 3's
127.0.0.1 bind-address is doing its job).
* test_prompt_file_lands_in_guest — still works.
* test_pipelock_answers_on_bundle_ip — NEW. From inside the
guest, wget to <bundle-ip>:8888 gets an HTTP response
(not "connection refused") — proves pipelock is actually
listening and the bind-mount + CA generation path works.
What's left in chunk 4:
- 4c: agent-image-conversion (claude-code + git + curl +
ca-certificates in the guest). Chunk 2d's alpine placeholder
stays for now.
- 4d: provision_ca + provision_git + provision_supervise once
the agent image has the required tools.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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didericis-claude
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9e3b7e441e |
feat(smolmachines): provision_prompt + provision_skills (PRD 0023 chunk 4a)
First slice of chunk 4: implement the two provisioning methods
that don't depend on agent-image tooling beyond `cp` and
`mkdir`. provision_ca / provision_git / provision_supervise
land once the agent-image gap is solved (chunk 4b+) — they need
update-ca-certificates, git, and the claude binary respectively,
none of which the chunk-2d alpine placeholder provides.
What this PR ships:
- `claude_bottle/backend/smolmachines/provision/` subpackage
with `prompt.py` + `skills.py`. Each routes through
`smolvm.machine_cp` / `machine_exec`. provision_prompt mirrors
the docker contract (file always copied; return value drives
--append-system-prompt-file iff the agent has a non-empty
prompt). provision_skills mkdir + cp per skill, matching
the docker backend's loop.
- prepare.py now writes the prompt file under
agent_state_dir(slug) with the agent's `prompt` body, mode
0o600. The in-guest path is `/root/.claude-bottle-prompt.txt`
(alpine has no `node` user; will become `/home/node/...` once
the real claude-bottle image lands).
- launch.py calls `provision(plan, machine_name)` after
machine_start. The returned prompt path threads to
SmolmachinesBottle so exec_claude can add
--append-system-prompt-file when the agent has a prompt.
- backend.py: provision_prompt / provision_skills now real;
provision_git is a deliberate stub (waiting on the git-gate
inner Plan + git in the agent image). provision_supervise
stays the chunk-2d stub.
Tests:
- 7 new unit cases (test_smolmachines_provision.py): argv
shape (mocked smolvm.machine_cp / .machine_exec),
prompt return-value contract, no-op-with-no-skills,
CLAUDE_BOTTLE_GUEST_SKILLS_DIR override, fail-on-missing-skill.
- 1 new integration case in test_smolmachines_launch.py:
end-to-end verification that the prompt file lands in the
alpine guest at /root/.claude-bottle-prompt.txt with the
expected content (via `bottle.exec("cat ...")`). The smoke +
the two TSI probes stay green.
552 unit + 4 integration (Darwin+smolvm+docker gated) passing.
What's left in chunk 4:
- 4b: thread the inner Plans (PipelockProxyPlan / EgressPlan /
GitGatePlan / SupervisePlan) through prepare + launch so the
bundle daemons actually run (currently daemons_csv="").
- 4c: the agent-image-conversion gap — get claude-code + git +
curl + ca-certificates into the guest image (build a
.smolmachine via `pack create --from-vm` after manual setup,
or push the docker image to a registry smolvm can pull).
- 4d: provision_ca + provision_git + provision_supervise once
4b + 4c land.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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didericis-claude
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909029085e |
feat(sidecars): egress binds 127.0.0.1 when EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST is set (PRD 0023 chunk 3)
Egress's bind address is now env-driven via EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST. Unset → mitmdump's default (all interfaces) — the docker backend's behavior, unchanged. Set to `127.0.0.1` → mitmdump binds localhost only. The smolmachines launch sets EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1 in the bundle's env unconditionally. TSI's allowlist is `<bundle-ip>/32` (IP-only, not port-granular), which would otherwise let the agent dial `<bundle-ip>:9099` and bypass pipelock's DLP by talking to egress directly. Binding egress to localhost inside the bundle closes that gap at the socket level — the agent still reaches the IP (TSI permits it) but egress refuses the connect because it's not listening on the docker bridge interface. The docker backend doesn't set the env var because its agent dials egress directly via the docker network alias — egress MUST be reachable from outside the bundle there. The asymmetry is documented in the entrypoint script's comment. Changes: - egress_entrypoint.sh: read EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST, conditionally pass `--listen-host <host>` to mitmdump. - smolmachines/launch.py: BundleLaunchSpec.environment now includes `EGRESS_LISTEN_HOST=127.0.0.1`. - New unit tests (5): the entrypoint script's argv shape under various env combinations, verified via a fake mitmdump shim that prints its argv. 545 unit + 3 integration tests passing. The egress-port-bypass probe from chunk 2d still passes (chunk 2d ran with daemons_csv="" so no egress was up; chunk 3 makes the probe preserve its property once egress IS up in chunk 4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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didericis-claude
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9f65b137b9 |
feat(smolmachines): end-to-end launch + Bottle.exec + smoke + probes (PRD 0023 chunk 2d)
End-to-end launch flow for the smolmachines backend. Brings up
the per-bottle docker bridge + sidecar bundle, creates and
starts the smolvm guest pointed at the bundle's pinned IP via
TSI's `--allow-cidr <bundle-ip>/32`, yields a SmolmachinesBottle
handle that routes exec/cp through `smolvm machine exec / cp`,
tears everything down on context exit.
launch.py:
- ExitStack-managed: create_bundle_network → start_bundle →
machine_create → machine_start (each registered for reverse
teardown).
- daemons_csv="" for chunk 2d — bundle init logs "no daemons
selected" and idles. Real daemon bringup with inner-Plan-driven
env + volumes lands in chunk 4.
bottle.py:
- SmolmachinesBottle.exec → smolvm.machine_exec (captured).
- SmolmachinesBottle.exec_claude → direct subprocess.run with
inherited TTY for interactive sessions.
- SmolmachinesBottle.cp_in → smolvm.machine_cp.
Architecture pivots forced by smolvm 0.8.0's CLI shape:
1. `--from <smolmachine>` and `--smolfile <toml>` are MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE in smolvm 0.8.0. We need --from to avoid the
registry-pull race that bit us on machine_start (libkrun
agent's network attempt got refused by macOS with
"connect: permission denied" on IPv6). So Smolfile is dropped
entirely; per-bottle env + allow_cidrs flow as CLI flags
(`--allow-cidr CIDR`, `-e K=V`) directly to machine_create.
2. `smolvm pack create --image` doesn't pull from the local
docker daemon — only OCI registries via crane. The real
claude-bottle:latest image lives in the local docker daemon
and isn't reachable that way. Chunk 2d ships with an alpine
placeholder; the agent-image-conversion gap belongs to
chunk 4 (push the image to a registry, or smolvm grows a
docker-daemon transport).
Other changes:
- machine_create grew `image=` / `from_path=` / `allow_cidrs=`
/ `env=` kwargs; smolfile= dropped.
- bottle_plan: smolfile_path → agent_from_path + guest_env.
- prepare: pack_create against `alpine:latest`, cached under
~/.cache/claude-bottle/smolmachines/ keyed by image ref.
- Deleted smolfile.py + test_smolfile.py (dead code now).
Tests:
- Unit: 540 passing (smolvm wrapper grew 4 new flag forms; one
test renamed to reflect --from + --allow-cidr + -e combo).
- Integration: 3 new cases in tests/integration/
test_smolmachines_launch.py, gated on Darwin + smolvm on PATH
+ docker + not GITEA_ACTIONS:
* smoke: bottle.exec("echo hello-from-vm") round-trips with
the correct stdout + returncode.
* localhost-reach probe: agent dials 127.0.0.1:9 → connect
refused (TSI's <bundle-ip>/32 allowlist doesn't include
loopback). The regression test for the gap the PRD design
pivot was about.
* egress-port-bypass probe: agent dials <bundle-ip>:9099
(egress's port) → connect refused. Chunk 2d has no
daemons running so nothing's listening anyway; chunk 3
will preserve this property once egress is up but bound
to 127.0.0.1 inside the bundle.
End-to-end smoke + both probes green locally on macOS with
smolvm 0.8.0.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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