Chunk 2 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's **durable
secret** gap and replace chunk 1's BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET stopgap.
- trust_domain.py: two new domains. LAUNCH_BROKER holds the durable
HS256 key both the orchestrator (signer) and the host control server
(verifier) share for the broker's launch JWT — a host-canonical key
file minted 0600 on first use, so a restarted orchestrator re-verifies
against the same key (re-adoption). HOST_CONTROLLER is the separate
domain for the controller's own lifecycle endpoints, keyed by a key the
orchestrator never holds (its lifecycle role is `host`, deliberately
outside the control-plane ROLES). LaunchBrokerProvisioning is the
fail-closed seam, mirroring ControlPlaneProvisioning.
- orchestrator_auth.py: ROLE_HOST, outside ROLES so the orchestrator's
control-plane key can neither mint nor accept it.
- paths.py: key-file + env-var constants for both domains.
- host_server.py / __main__.py: broker_secret() now resolves the durable
LAUNCH_BROKER key — env-injected for a containerized launcher, else the
host key file for a host-side dev-harness process — so `--broker http`
and the host controller "just work" on one host without exporting a
secret, and stay fail-closed when the root is unwritable.
Tested: domain boundary (host role unmintable by the control plane,
cross-domain tokens don't verify), distinct keys/env vars per domain,
provisioning fail-closed, and broker_secret env/file resolution +
durability. Full unit suite green; pyright clean; pylint 9.90.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Chunk 1 of the host-control-server stack: close the PRD's **transport**
gap. Today LaunchBroker.submit(token) is an in-process method call from
OrchestratorCore; this makes it a real out-of-process service reached
over HTTP.
- host_server.py: the host control server. A pure dispatch() (POST
/broker verifies a signed token via the existing verify_request +
_launch/_teardown path, GET /health) wrapped by a thin http.server
adapter, mirroring orchestrator/server.py. Only the signed token
crosses the wire; provenance/schema failures are fail-closed 401s that
never touch the backend, a backend launch failure is a 502.
- broker_client.py: BrokerClient — a drop-in submit(token) that POSTs the
signed token to the host controller. A 401 re-raises as BrokerAuthError
so the launch path's rollback is identical local or remote.
- broker.py: SubmitBroker Protocol — the one method OrchestratorCore
depends on, satisfied by both LaunchBroker and BrokerClient, so the
core is unchanged (service.py annotation only).
- __main__.py: wire `--broker http` behind the shared-secret env var
(BOT_BOTTLE_BROKER_SECRET, hex) — a chunk-1 stopgap the durable
TrustDomain key (chunk 2, #476) replaces.
Tested: pure-dispatch cases, BrokerClient with HTTP mocked, and a
real-socket sign -> POST -> verify -> act round-trip (incl. fail-closed
forged token). pyright clean; pylint 9.86.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
didericis-claude