Three coupled fixes that close a documented bypass of git-gate's
gitleaks pre-receive hook:
1. cred-proxy refuses git smart-HTTP push at runtime. Any path
ending in /git-receive-pack or /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack
returns 403 with a pointer at the bottle.git SSH path. Fetch
(upload-pack) is still allowed — the bypass we're closing is
push, where gitleaks is the load-bearing scanner. Hard guarantee.
2. The provisioner suppresses the cred-proxy `~/.gitconfig` insteadOf
rewrite for any host already declared in bottle.git. git-gate is
the canonical git path there; we don't write a competing rule
that would let `git clone https://<host>/...` succeed in ways
that confuse on push. Defense in depth — (1) is the hard guarantee.
3. cred-proxy routes its outbound HTTPS through pipelock. The
sidecar's environ now sets HTTPS_PROXY=<pipelock-url>, and the
image's entrypoint runs `update-ca-certificates` over the
per-bottle pipelock CA (docker cp'd into
/usr/local/share/ca-certificates/pipelock.crt before start) so
the proxy's HTTPS client trusts pipelock's bumped certs.
Consequence: pipelock's allowlist + body scanner now sit in the
cred-proxy egress path the same way they sit in front of direct
agent traffic. The cred-proxy upstream hosts (api.github.com,
github.com, gitea hosts, registry.npmjs.org) come OFF
pipelock's passthrough_domains. Only api.anthropic.com remains
on passthrough (LLM body content legitimately trips DLP).
PRD 0010 updated to reflect all three. Tests adjusted: the
"cred-proxy hosts go on passthrough" assertion in
test_pipelock_allowlist flips to "they don't", a new
TestIsGitPushRequest exercises the smart-HTTP refusal predicate,
and the gitconfig renderer tests cover the per-host suppression
matrix.
Stdlib-only Python proxy: reads /run/cred-proxy/routes.json on boot,
listens on 0.0.0.0:9099, strips inbound Authorization, injects the
configured header (Bearer or token) using the route's token_env env
var, forwards over HTTPS to the upstream, and streams the response
back chunk-by-chunk (SSE-safe).
Hop-by-hop headers are stripped per RFC 7230, including anything
listed in `Connection:`. Content-Length is dropped so http.client
recomputes it on the upstream leg. Tokens never reach routes.json —
they arrive via the container's environ.
Dockerfile.cred-proxy builds on python:3.13-alpine pinned by digest;
mkdir /run/cred-proxy is baked in so docker cp can drop the route
table at start time. No pip install layer.
Smoke-tested: container boots, logs listen line, returns 404 for
unmatched paths. Full request/response cycle covered by the
integration tests in a follow-up commit.
didericis