fix(pipelock): allow route ssrf ip policy

bot_bottle/manifest.py

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Bottle schema (frontmatter):
     remotes:    { <host>: <git-entry>, ... }    # optional
   egress: { routes: [ <egress-route>, ... ] }
     # route keys: host, path_allowlist, auth, role, pipelock
-    # pipelock: { tls_passthrough: <bool> }
+    # pipelock: { tls_passthrough: <bool>, ssrf_ip_allowlist: [<cidr>, ...] }
   supervise:    <bool>                          # optional
 
 Agent schema (frontmatter):
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ on-disk files.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import ipaddress
 import json
 import os
 import re
@@ -329,9 +330,13 @@ class PipelockRoutePolicy:
     `tls_interception.passthrough_domains`, so pipelock still enforces
     the hostname allowlist but does not MITM/decrypt request bodies or
     headers for that host.
+
+    `SsrfIpAllowlist` adds explicit IPs/CIDRs to pipelock's SSRF
+    allowlist for private/internal destinations behind this route.
     """
 
     TlsPassthrough: bool = False
+    SsrfIpAllowlist: tuple[str, ...] = ()
 
     @classmethod
     def from_dict(
@@ -340,10 +345,11 @@ class PipelockRoutePolicy:
         label = f"bottle '{bottle_name}' egress.routes[{idx}] pipelock"
         d = _as_json_object(raw, label)
         for k in d:
-            if k not in ("tls_passthrough",):
+            if k not in ("tls_passthrough", "ssrf_ip_allowlist"):
                 die(
                     f"{label} has unknown key {k!r}; "
-                    f"only 'tls_passthrough' is accepted"
+                    f"only 'tls_passthrough' and 'ssrf_ip_allowlist' "
+                    f"are accepted"
                 )
         tls_passthrough_raw = d.get("tls_passthrough", False)
         if not isinstance(tls_passthrough_raw, bool):
@@ -351,7 +357,31 @@ class PipelockRoutePolicy:
                 f"{label}.tls_passthrough must be a boolean "
                 f"(was {type(tls_passthrough_raw).__name__})"
             )
-        return cls(TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw)
+        ssrf_raw = d.get("ssrf_ip_allowlist", [])
+        if not isinstance(ssrf_raw, list):
+            die(
+                f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist must be an array "
+                f"(was {type(ssrf_raw).__name__})"
+            )
+        ssrf_ip_allowlist: list[str] = []
+        for j, item in enumerate(ssrf_raw):
+            if not isinstance(item, str) or not item:
+                die(
+                    f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be a non-empty "
+                    f"string (was {type(item).__name__})"
+                )
+            try:
+                ipaddress.ip_network(item, strict=False)
+            except ValueError as e:
+                die(
+                    f"{label}.ssrf_ip_allowlist[{j}] must be an IP address "
+                    f"or CIDR (was {item!r}): {e}"
+                )
+            ssrf_ip_allowlist.append(item)
+        return cls(
+            TlsPassthrough=tls_passthrough_raw,
+            SsrfIpAllowlist=tuple(ssrf_ip_allowlist),
+        )
 
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)