feat(gateway): mandatory identity-token attribution on every data plane (PR #354 review)
Codex review: the /31 TAP doesn't make source IP unspoofable, and the app-layer token was returned by launch but never delivered or enforced, so a spoofed source could select a victim bottle's policy/tokens. Make the token mandatory and deliver it on each attributed plane (anti-spoof landed separately as the network boundary). Enforcement (control plane): - `Orchestrator.resolve` now requires a matching (source_ip, identity_token) pair (constant-time) — no source-IP-only fallback. `/resolve` fail-closes (403) on a missing/empty/mismatched token. Delivery, per plane (the token is `token_urlsafe`, safe in a URL): - egress: proxy credentials (`HTTPS_PROXY=http://bottle:<token>@gw`). The addon reads `Proxy-Authorization` — from the request (HTTP) or captured at the CONNECT for HTTPS tunnels (keyed by client conn, cleared on disconnect) — validates, and strips it (+ the legacy header) before upstream. - git-http: a URL-scoped `http.<gate>/.extraHeader: x-bot-bottle-identity` in the agent's git config (only over the http transport). - supervise: `mcp add --header x-bot-bottle-identity: <token>` (claude + codex); the server reads the header and passes it to resolve. Wiring: thread `ctx.identity_token` onto the firecracker + docker plans and into the agent env/config at launch. Verified on a KVM host: egress with the correct proxy-cred token returns 200 (HTTP and HTTPS/CONNECT), and no-token / wrong-token return 403; a real `cli.py start --backend=firecracker` launch provisions git config + the supervise MCP header and reaches the agent session, all under mandatory enforcement. Fixed a `claude mcp add` arg-order bug (--header must follow the positional name/url) found by that launch. Transparent proxy for tools that ignore proxy env is deferred to a follow-up (see thread); anti-spoof + host firewall remain the fail-closed boundary. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WBMWTEtQdJ4W5UrWuLHCck
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@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ from .manifest import ManifestBottle, ManifestGitEntry
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# Short network alias for git-gate inside the gateway. The
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# agent's `.gitconfig` insteadOf rewrites resolve through this name.
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GIT_GATE_HOSTNAME = "git-gate"
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# App-layer identity token header the agent's git sends to git-http and the
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# gateway validates (mirrors egress_addon / git_http_backend IDENTITY_HEADER).
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IDENTITY_HEADER = "x-bot-bottle-identity"
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# Shared timeout (seconds) for all git-gate subprocess and CGI calls:
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# git daemon (--timeout/--init-timeout), the access-hook subprocess in
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# git_http_backend, and the git http-backend CGI subprocess.
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@@ -75,6 +78,7 @@ def _gitconfig_validate_value(field: str, value: str) -> None:
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def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
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entries: tuple[ManifestGitEntry, ...], gate_host: str, *, scheme: str = "git",
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identity_token: str = "",
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) -> str:
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"""Render the agent's ~/.gitconfig content for git-gate
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`insteadOf` rewrites. Pure host-side, no docker / VM;
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@@ -96,6 +100,15 @@ def git_gate_render_gitconfig(
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"# the upstream bidirectionally (gitleaks-scanned push;\n",
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"# fetch-from-upstream-before-every-upload-pack via access-hook).\n",
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]
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# Over the smart-HTTP transport (VM backends), attach the per-bottle
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# identity token as a request header on requests to the gate, scoped to
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# its URL so it never goes to any other remote. git-http requires it (the
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# gateway's mandatory (source_ip, token) attribution). git:// (single-tenant
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# docker) carries no header — attribution there is the network alias.
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if identity_token and scheme == "http":
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_gitconfig_validate_value("identity_token", identity_token)
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out.append(f'[http "http://{gate_host}/"]\n')
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out.append(f"\textraHeader = {IDENTITY_HEADER}: {identity_token}\n")
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for entry in entries:
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_gitconfig_validate_value(f"repos[{entry.Name!r}].url", entry.Upstream)
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out.append(f'[url "{scheme}://{gate_host}/{entry.Name}.git"]\n')
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