docs(agent): clarify claude oauth env
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test / integration (pull_request) Successful in 43s

This commit is contained in:
2026-05-28 18:20:09 -04:00
parent cacba087c9
commit cdb1870b1c
14 changed files with 41 additions and 40 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ entry and pushes straight at gitea/github with ssh-gate doing dumb
L4 forwarding. There is no boundary between "the agent thinks this
commit is fine" and "the secret hits an external remote." If a
compromised or careless agent stages a `.env`, slips a token into
a fixture, or commits the `BOT_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN` itself, `git
a fixture, or commits the `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` itself, `git
push` ships it.
Host-side pre-commit / pre-push hooks are the usual defense, but
+2 -2
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@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ common upstreams (Anthropic, GitHub, Gitea, npm) as
```
┌── Host (macOS) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Secrets at rest (keychain / .env): │
│ BOT_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, │
│ BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, │
│ GITEA_SERVER_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN │
│ │ docker run -e KEY (no =VALUE on argv) │
│ ▼ │
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ Why the agent can't reach the sidecar's environ:
+ validate route shape, role enum, path uniqueness, singleton-
role constraints.
- **`bot_bottle/backend/docker/prepare.py`** — drop the
legacy `BOT_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN` → `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
legacy `BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN` → `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
forward entirely. cred-proxy is the only path the Anthropic
OAuth token reaches the bottle. When a route claims the
`anthropic-base-url` role, write `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`
+1 -1
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@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ cred_proxy:
- path: /anthropic/
upstream: https://api.anthropic.com
auth_scheme: Bearer
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_OAUTH_TOKEN
token_ref: BOT_BOTTLE_CLAUDE_OAUTH_TOKEN
role: anthropic-base-url
- path: /gitea/dideric/
upstream: https://gitea.dideric.is