refactor: remove leftovers from the orchestrator/gateway consolidation
Sweep for vestiges of the old combined-plane model and the pre-split shared rootfs. Two are load-bearing, the rest are stale docs/comments: - Bug: macOS `enumerate_active` only excluded the gateway container from the agent list, so after the split the orchestrator container (`bot-bottle-mac-orchestrator`, also `bot-bottle-`-prefixed) was enumerated as a phantom agent. Exclude both infra containers; test covers it. - Dead code: the gateway `bootstrap.py` still carried an `orchestrator` daemon spec + `_OPT_IN_DAEMONS` + a signing-key/JWT env branch, all for the old combined container where the gateway process could also run the control plane. No backend ever requests it now — removed; the key-stripping stays as defense-in-depth. Stale-comment reframes: "the/single infra container" -> the orchestrator + gateway pair (or the specific plane); "shared rootfs / bb_role init / one published rootfs" -> the per-plane rootfs + `role_init`; the deleted Dockerfile.infra references in Dockerfile.orchestrator/.gateway; and the macOS "one infra container ... same address" docstring + its now-false share-one-address test (the planes are distinct containers with distinct addresses). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -54,19 +54,15 @@ class _DaemonSpec:
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_EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = ("EGRESS_TOKEN_",)
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_READY_GATED_DAEMONS: tuple[str, ...] = ("git-gate", "git-http")
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# The control-plane signing key is the orchestrator's alone — verifying tokens.
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# The data-plane daemons instead hold the pre-minted `gateway` JWT they present.
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# Scoping each to its process (even in the combined infra container) keeps a
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# compromised data-plane daemon from reading the key and minting a `cli` token
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# (issue #469 review). Values match paths.ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV /
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# ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT_ENV; hardcoded here so this supervisor stays import-light.
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# The control-plane signing key is the orchestrator's alone (it verifies
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# tokens), and the orchestrator runs in a separate container/VM — the gateway
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# only ever holds the pre-minted `gateway` JWT its daemons present. Strip the
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# key from every daemon's env as defense-in-depth, so a compromised data-plane
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# daemon can't read it and mint a `cli` token even if it somehow leaked into the
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# gateway container (issue #469 review). Value matches
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# paths.ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN_ENV; hardcoded here so this supervisor stays
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# import-light.
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_SIGNING_KEY_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN"
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_GATEWAY_JWT_ENV = "BOT_BOTTLE_ORCHESTRATOR_AUTH_JWT"
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# Daemons that must be requested explicitly via BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS
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# and are NOT started in the default (env-var-unset) case. The orchestrator
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# only runs in the combined infra container, never in a standalone gateway.
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_OPT_IN_DAEMONS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"orchestrator"})
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def _env_for_daemon(name: str, base_env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
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@@ -74,30 +70,20 @@ def _env_for_daemon(name: str, base_env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
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Returns a fresh dict — callers can mutate without affecting `base_env`.
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* `EGRESS_TOKEN_*` upstream-auth slots go to egress only.
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* the control-plane signing key goes to the orchestrator only.
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* the pre-minted `gateway` JWT goes to the data-plane daemons only (the
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orchestrator verifies tokens, it never presents one)."""
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* the control-plane signing key is stripped from every daemon — the
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gateway never holds it (it's the orchestrator's); the data-plane daemons
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present the pre-minted `gateway` JWT instead."""
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env = dict(base_env)
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if name != "egress":
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env = {
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k: v for k, v in env.items()
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if not any(k.startswith(p) for p in _EGRESS_ONLY_ENV_PREFIXES)
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}
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if name == "orchestrator":
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env.pop(_GATEWAY_JWT_ENV, None)
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else:
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env.pop(_SIGNING_KEY_ENV, None)
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env.pop(_SIGNING_KEY_ENV, None)
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return env
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# The orchestrator is listed first so it starts before the gateway daemons,
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# giving the control plane a head start to accept /resolve calls. The gateway
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# daemons tolerate early /resolve failures and retry per-request.
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_DAEMONS: tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...] = (
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_DaemonSpec("orchestrator", (
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"python3", "-m", "bot_bottle.orchestrator",
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"--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8099", "--broker", "stub",
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)),
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_DaemonSpec("egress", ("/bin/sh", "/app/egress-entrypoint.sh")),
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_DaemonSpec("git-gate", ("/bin/sh", "/git-gate-entrypoint.sh")),
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_DaemonSpec("git-http", ("python3", "-m", "bot_bottle.gateway.git_gate.http_backend")),
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@@ -127,10 +113,8 @@ def _selected_daemons(
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) -> tuple[_DaemonSpec, ...]:
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"""Filter the daemon set by the BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS env var.
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When the var is unset/empty, return all non-opt-in daemons (the
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standard gateway subset). Opt-in daemons (e.g. `orchestrator`) only
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run when explicitly named — they never start in a plain gateway
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container that doesn't set the env var. Unknown names are ignored.
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When the var is unset/empty, return all daemons (the standard gateway
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subset). Unknown names are ignored.
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`all_daemons` defaults to `_DAEMONS` resolved at call time (not at
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definition time), so tests can pass a custom list."""
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@@ -138,7 +122,7 @@ def _selected_daemons(
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all_daemons = _DAEMONS
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raw = env.get("BOT_BOTTLE_GATEWAY_DAEMONS", "").strip()
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if not raw:
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return tuple(d for d in all_daemons if d.name not in _OPT_IN_DAEMONS)
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return tuple(all_daemons)
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wanted = {n.strip() for n in raw.split(",") if n.strip()}
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return tuple(d for d in all_daemons if d.name in wanted)
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