refactor!: rename project to bot-bottle
Assisted-by: Codex
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"""Env resolver. Walks the env entries for one agent and produces a
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backend-neutral ResolvedEnv describing how the bottle should receive
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each variable:
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- `forwarded` — name→value pairs the backend must inject into the
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launched process's environment directly (e.g. via
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`subprocess.run(env=...)`), so the value never appears on argv,
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in a file, or in a log line. The dict is excluded from the
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dataclass-generated repr so accidental logging doesn't leak it.
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- `literals` — name→value pairs that the manifest carries verbatim.
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The backend serializes these however its launcher accepts env
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(an env-file, an API payload, etc.).
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Each env entry is a string. Mode is selected by sentinel prefix:
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"?" -> secret (prompt at runtime). Bare "?" uses default prompt;
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"?<message>" uses <message> as the prompt body.
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"${HOST_VAR}" -> interpolated from $HOST_VAR in the host process env
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any other str -> literal (the string is the value verbatim)
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Critical rules:
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- NEVER echo, log, or interpolate the value of a secret or
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interpolated env var. Both are treated as potentially sensitive:
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nothing about their value (other than presence) ever lands on
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disk, in a log line, or on argv.
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- resolve_env does NOT mutate the host process's os.environ; the
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backend builds a child env dict and passes it to its launcher.
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- Errors mention only the variable NAME, never any portion of the value.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import getpass
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import os
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import re
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import sys
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from .log import die
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from .manifest import Manifest
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_INTERPOLATED_RE = re.compile(r"^\$\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\}$")
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class ResolvedEnv:
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"""Backend-neutral env resolution result.
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`forwarded` maps name→value for entries whose values must not land
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on argv or in a file; backends inject them into the launched
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process's environment directly. `repr=False` so a stray `repr(...)`
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or log of the dataclass doesn't dump secret values.
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`literals` carry values verbatim and are serialized by the backend
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however its launcher accepts non-secret env."""
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forwarded: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict[str, str], repr=False)
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literals: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict[str, str])
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def env_entry_kind(raw: str) -> str:
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"""Returns 'secret', 'interpolated', or 'literal'."""
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if raw.startswith("?"):
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return "secret"
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if _INTERPOLATED_RE.match(raw):
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return "interpolated"
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return "literal"
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def env_entry_secret_prompt(raw: str) -> str:
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"""For a secret entry, the prompt body (after the leading '?').
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Empty for bare '?', meaning use default."""
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if raw.startswith("?"):
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return raw[1:]
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return ""
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def env_entry_interpolated_from(raw: str) -> str:
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"""For an interpolated entry, the host var name between '${' and '}'."""
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m = _INTERPOLATED_RE.match(raw)
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if not m:
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return ""
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return m.group(1)
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def _read_secret_silent(name: str, prompt_body: str) -> str:
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"""Read a secret value from the controlling tty without echoing.
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The "(input hidden): " tail is always appended; manifest authors
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write only the message text."""
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if not (sys.stdin.isatty() or sys.stderr.isatty()):
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# Fall back to /dev/tty so this still works when stdin is a pipe.
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try:
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tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+")
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except OSError:
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die(
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f"cannot prompt for secret '{name}': no tty available. "
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f"Run from an interactive shell."
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)
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prompt = (
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f"{prompt_body} (input hidden): "
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if prompt_body
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else f"bot-bottle: secret value for {name} (input hidden): "
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)
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value = getpass.getpass(prompt, stream=tty)
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tty.close()
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else:
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prompt = (
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f"{prompt_body} (input hidden): "
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if prompt_body
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else f"bot-bottle: secret value for {name} (input hidden): "
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)
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value = getpass.getpass(prompt)
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if not value:
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die(f"empty value provided for secret '{name}'. Re-run and supply a value.")
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return value
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def resolve_env(manifest: Manifest, agent: str) -> ResolvedEnv:
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"""Iterate the agent's env entries:
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- secret: prompt at runtime; carry value in forwarded
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- interpolated: read $HOST_VAR from os.environ; carry value in forwarded
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- literal: include in the literals map verbatim
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The host process's os.environ is read but never mutated; the
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backend injects forwarded values via its launcher's env parameter."""
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forwarded: dict[str, str] = {}
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literals: dict[str, str] = {}
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bottle = manifest.bottle_for(agent)
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for name, raw in bottle.env.items():
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if not name:
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continue
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kind = env_entry_kind(raw)
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if kind == "secret":
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prompt_body = env_entry_secret_prompt(raw)
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forwarded[name] = _read_secret_silent(name, prompt_body)
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elif kind == "interpolated":
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host_var = env_entry_interpolated_from(raw)
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host_value = os.environ.get(host_var, "")
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if not host_value:
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die(
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f"env entry {name} is interpolated from ${host_var}, "
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f"but ${host_var} is unset or empty in the host environment."
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)
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forwarded[name] = host_value
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else: # literal
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literals[name] = raw
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return ResolvedEnv(forwarded=forwarded, literals=literals)
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