diff --git a/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md b/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md index 920d5652..f8b4c7b0 100644 --- a/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md +++ b/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md @@ -19,17 +19,25 @@ field names, timestamps, or how a bottled agent is identified. This PRD defines **one canonical audit-event contract** every producer emits into: -1. A **versioned envelope** — schema version, event id, event type, - monotonic + wall-clock timestamps, and an explicit **trust boundary** - between host-supplied and agent-claimed fields. -2. **Canonical JSON serialization + a per-writer hash chain**, so any - deletion or edit of a past record breaks the chain and is detectable - offline. +1. A **versioned envelope** — schema version, event id, event/observed + timestamps, host-attributed identity (`bottle`/`bottled_agent`/ + `activation`), provenance (`manifest_digest`, `policy_version`), + host-observed `actor`/`action`/`resource`/`outcome`, correlation/ + causation ids, a sensitivity class, a typed payload, and an explicit + **trust boundary** between host-supplied and agent-claimed fields. +2. **Canonical JSON serialization + a per-writer hash chain** (with + normative test vectors), so any deletion, edit, or reorder of a past + record breaks the chain and is detectable offline. 3. An **append-only JSONL journal as the source of truth**, with a - **rebuildable SQLite index** for local search — no paid platform, no - network dependency. -4. An **initial event registry** covering lifecycle, decision, egress, - auth, and forge events. + **rebuildable SQLite index** and a local `audit query`/`verify` surface + — no paid platform, no network dependency. +4. An **initial event registry** covering lifecycle, host-controller, + supervise decision, egress (request/decision/cutoff/anomaly), git-gate + and signed-commit (#480), auth/authz, and audit self-events — each with + its trusted-vs-claimed fields and redaction rules. +5. A **stable export projection** (CloudEvents / OpenTelemetry Logs) and + the **#324 delivery contract** (payload, `(epoch, seq)` cursor, dedup, + backpressure, retention ordering). It is explicitly scheduled to land **immediately after the host controller (#468)** so the host controller's lifecycle transitions are the @@ -126,44 +134,108 @@ stable top level: ``` { - // --- everything at the top level is host-established (trusted) --- + // ---- schema + integrity (host-owned) ---- "v": 1, // schema version — bumped only on a breaking change - "id": "", // globally unique event id + "id": "", // globally unique event id; stable across export/replay (dedup key) "type": "egress.decision", // dotted event type from the registry "epoch": 7, // writer-boot counter, bumped once per host-controller (writer) start "seq": 1287, // monotonic sequence within this epoch (gap-detectable) - "prev": "", // hash of the previous record in the chain ("" for genesis) + "segment": "20260726T000000Z", // journal segment id (rotation boundary); chain continues across segments + "prev": "", // hash of the previous record in the chain ("" for a segment genesis) "hash": "", // sha256(prev + canonical(this event with hash="")) - "producer": "host-controller", // which host component wrote this - "host": "mac-studio-1", - "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12", // slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events) - "ts_wall": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // host wall-clock, RFC3339 UTC - "ts_mono": 90142.55, // host monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only) - // --- the ONLY untrusted region: anything the agent or a remote claimed --- + // ---- timestamps (host-owned) ---- + "ts_event": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.061Z", // when the underlying event occurred at the boundary + "ts_recorded": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // when the single writer appended it (authoritative) + "ts_mono": 90142.55, // monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only) + + // ---- attribution + provenance (host-established) ---- + "producer": "egress", // host component that emitted the event + "host": "mac-studio-1", + "bottle": "amber-fox", // bottle (container/VM) identity + "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12", // bottled-agent slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events) + "activation": "01J8Z...", // activation id: one run/session of the bottled agent (null if n/a) + "manifest_digest": "sha256:9f2…", // digest of the manifest the bottled agent is running (null if n/a) + "policy_version": "egress-2026-07-20", // policy/config version in force at decision time (null if n/a) + + // ---- semantics: host-observed facts of what happened ---- + "actor": "bottled-agent:amber-fox-12", // who acted, as a host-attributed identity + "action": "egress.connect", // what was attempted / done + "resource": "registry.npmjs.org:443", // what it acted on, as observed at the boundary + "outcome": "blocked", // host-decided result: allowed|blocked|deferred|success|failure + "sensitivity": "security", // classification: normal|security|restricted (drives redaction + export) + + // ---- correlation (host-assigned) ---- + "correlation_id": "flow-9c2a…", // groups a related flow (request → decision → cutoff) + "causation_id": "", // the event that directly caused this one ("" if root) + + // ---- typed, trusted, event-specific payload (shape fixed per type in the registry) ---- + "payload": { + "route_id": 4, + "detector": "token_patterns" + }, + + // ---- the ONLY untrusted region: agent- or remote-claimed data ---- "untrusted": { - "reason": "npm install needs registry.npmjs.org", - "target": "registry.npmjs.org:443" + "reason": "npm install needs registry.npmjs.org" // the agent's stated justification } } ``` The **trust boundary is a single region, not a split.** Everything outside -`untrusted` is trusted by construction — the host established it: the -schema/chain metadata (`v`, `id`, `type`, `epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`), -the producer and host identity, the source-IP → `bottled_agent` slug -attribution, and the host clock (`ts_wall`/`ts_mono`). `untrusted` is the -**one** place anything an agent or a remote claimed may go. A reader (or a -future policy engine) trusts every top-level field for attribution and -treats `untrusted.*` — and only `untrusted.*` — as adversarial claims. +`untrusted` is trusted by construction — the host established it: schema and +chain metadata, both timestamps, the attribution/provenance fields +(source-IP → `bottled_agent`/`bottle`/`activation`, `manifest_digest`, +`policy_version`), the host-observed semantics +(`actor`/`action`/`resource`/`outcome`), the host-assigned correlation ids, +and the typed `payload`. `untrusted` is the **one** place anything an agent +or a remote claimed may go (e.g. the agent's free-text `reason`). A reader +(or a future policy engine) trusts every field outside `untrusted` for +attribution and treats `untrusted.*` — and only `untrusted.*` — as +adversarial claims. -Framing it as "one untrusted region, everything else trusted" (rather than -two parallel `trusted`/`untrusted` blocks) removes the mistake where a -producer forgets to nest a host field under `trusted`: a field is trusted -unless it is deliberately placed inside `untrusted`. The construction API -enforces this — producers pass trusted fields positionally and hand all -agent/remote-claimed data as the single `untrusted` mapping, so there is no -way to emit a top-level field that *looks* authoritative but isn't. +Framing it as "one untrusted region, everything else trusted" removes the +mistake where a producer forgets to mark a claimed field: a field is +trusted unless it is deliberately placed inside `untrusted`. The +construction API enforces this — producers pass trusted fields explicitly +and hand all agent/remote-claimed data as the single `untrusted` mapping, +so there is no way to emit a top-level field that *looks* authoritative but +isn't. + +**Two timestamps** because they answer different questions and can diverge +under backpressure: `ts_event` is when the thing happened at the boundary +(the proxy saw the connect, the gate saw the push); `ts_recorded` is when +the single writer durably appended it. Ordering and the chain use +`(epoch, seq)`, never either wall clock. Both are host-set — a bottled +agent never supplies a timestamp. + +**Optionality.** `bottle`/`bottled_agent`/`activation`, `manifest_digest`, +`policy_version`, and `payload`/`untrusted` are `null`/absent for events +that have no such subject (a host-level `hostctl.*` or `audit.*` event has +no bottled agent). Absent ≠ empty: a reader distinguishes "no subject" from +"unknown". `id`, `type`, the chain fields, both timestamps, `producer`, +`host`, `actor`, `action`, `outcome`, and `sensitivity` are always present. + +#### Trust provenance of every common field + +| Field | Trust | Set by | +|---|---|---| +| `v` `id` `type` `epoch` `seq` `segment` `prev` `hash` | trusted | the single writer | +| `ts_event` | trusted | emitting host component (boundary) | +| `ts_recorded` `ts_mono` | trusted | the single writer | +| `producer` `host` | trusted | the single writer | +| `bottle` `bottled_agent` `activation` | trusted | gateway source-IP → slug attribution | +| `manifest_digest` `policy_version` | trusted | control plane (what was in force) | +| `actor` `action` `resource` `outcome` | trusted | host component that observed/decided it | +| `sensitivity` | trusted | registry default for `type`, overridable up (never down) by the producer | +| `correlation_id` `causation_id` | trusted | the single writer (assigned as it threads the flow) | +| `payload.*` | trusted | emitting host component (shape fixed per `type`) | +| `untrusted.*` | **claimed** | copied verbatim from a bottle / gateway / forge / remote | + +Every registry entry (below) restates, per event type, which `payload` +keys are required and names any `untrusted` keys it carries — so "trusted +vs claimed" is explicit for every event-specific attribute, not just the +common ones. ### Canonical serialization + hash chain @@ -183,11 +255,92 @@ The `hash` field is computed over the canonical form of the event **with digest = sha256_hex(prev_hash + canonical({**event, "hash": ""})) ``` -`prev` is the prior record's `hash`; genesis uses `prev = ""`. This makes -the journal an append-only Merkle-style chain: editing or deleting record -*n* changes its hash, so record *n+1*'s `prev` no longer matches — the -break is local and points at the tampered record. Verification needs only -the journal itself (no keys), so it runs offline and in CI. +`prev` is the prior record's `hash`; a segment genesis uses `prev = ""`. +Two exact rules pin the bytes so the chain is reproducible anywhere: + +1. **Serialize the record with its own `hash` field set to `""`** (present, + empty), never omitted — the key set is identical before and after + hashing. +2. **Digest = `sha256_hex(prev + canonical(record_with_empty_hash))`**, + where `prev` is the previous record's `hash` string (`""` at genesis), + `+` is string concatenation, and `canonical` is the function above. + `ts_mono`, being a float, is serialized by Python's shortest-round-trip + `repr` via `json.dumps`; producers therefore emit it as a JSON number + they do not post-process. (All other fields are strings/ints/objects, + which serialize unambiguously.) + +Editing or deleting record *n* changes its hash, so record *n+1*'s `prev` +no longer matches — the break is local and names the tampered record. +Verification needs only the journal itself (no keys), so it runs offline +and in CI. + +#### Test vectors (normative) + +Two records, reduced to the chain-relevant fields, demonstrate the exact +serialization and linkage. An implementation is conformant iff it +reproduces these bytes and hashes. + +``` +# Record 0 — segment genesis (prev = "") +canonical(record0, hash=""): +{"hash":"","id":"11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111","prev":"","seq":0,"type":"audit.segment_open"} +hash0 = sha256("" + canonical) = + 942ea5729bcac6efdbdea942396bfa574ab0d6ebf5615402595359422f2aeb83 + +# Record 1 — chains onto record 0 (prev = hash0) +canonical(record1, hash=""): +{"hash":"","id":"22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222","prev":"942ea5729bcac6efdbdea942396bfa574ab0d6ebf5615402595359422f2aeb83","seq":1,"type":"lifecycle.bottled_agent_start"} +hash1 = sha256(hash0 + canonical) = + bc082347680405fee50b60a9c304611aa026950b15d869b7e3ae56e1c451b856 + +# Tamper check: flip record0.type → recompute → +# 4553eda647f33f0c608cfea44be28efbbaca45ed30b873fcbd4405fa5ce737ed +# which no longer equals record1.prev (942ea5…) — the break is detected at record1. +``` + +The implementation PR ships these plus full-envelope vectors (every field +populated, and a redaction case) as committed fixtures, so a schema-version +bump that changes the bytes fails a golden test loudly. + +### Ordering, idempotency, and duplicate handling + +- **Ordering.** `(epoch, seq)` is a strict total order per host and, because + the writer is single, a strict order per bottle/activation within that + host — satisfying "at least strict causal order per activation/bottle". + `causation_id` records the explicit cause edges (a DAG) on top of the + total order, so a consumer can reconstruct request → decision → cutoff + even if unrelated events interleave between them. +- **Idempotency.** `id` is the idempotency key. A producer that retries an + emit (e.g. after a writer restart mid-handoff) **reuses the same `id`**; + the writer drops a second append bearing an `id` already present in the + current segment's in-memory set, and the index `UPSERT`s by `id`, so a + duplicate never double-counts or forks the chain. +- **Deduplication downstream.** Because `id` is stable across export and + replay, #324's cursor replay and any cross-host merge dedup on `id` — no + consumer needs to invent a second identity. + +### Behavior across rotation, restart, import, truncation + +- **Rotation.** At a segment boundary the writer opens a new segment file, + sets its `segment` id, and carries the rotated-out segment's head as the + new genesis `prev` — so the chain is continuous *across* segments while + each file stays independently openable. `verify` walks segments in order + and checks the head-to-genesis link at each seam. +- **Restart.** Covered above: read last line → adopt its `hash` as `prev`, + bump `epoch`, reset `seq`. The chain never restarts even though the + counters do. +- **Import.** `audit import ` appends an externally supplied + segment (e.g. recovered from another host or a backup). Import verifies + the incoming chain in isolation first, then links it only if its genesis + `prev` matches a known head or is explicitly grafted; imported records + keep their original `id` (dedup) and are marked with their origin host so + attribution is not laundered. +- **Truncation.** A crash can leave a partial final line; `verify` reports + it as `truncated-tail` (recoverable — replay resumes from the last intact + record). A chain that ends before a persisted head, or a missing interior + `seq`, is reported as `gap`/`missing-suffix` (evidence of deletion, not a + clean crash). The two are distinguished so an operator can tell "power + loss" from "someone trimmed the log". ### Single writer; ordering across restarts @@ -209,7 +362,7 @@ start the writer: 0 for the new boot. Total order is therefore `(epoch, seq)` — monotonic across restarts by -construction — with `ts_wall` for human reading and `ts_mono` for +construction — with `ts_event`/`ts_recorded` for human reading and `ts_mono` for sub-second ordering inside an epoch. A crash mid-append truncates at most the last (partial) line; the verifier flags it and replay resumes from the last intact record. @@ -220,35 +373,91 @@ last intact record. alongside `host_db_path()`), one canonical event per line, opened `O_APPEND`. This is authoritative. - **Index:** a new `audit_events` table via the existing `DbStore` / - `TableMigrations` machinery, holding the envelope columns plus JSON - blobs, indexed on `(bottled_agent, type, ts_wall)`. It is a **derived - cache**: `audit rebuild` truncates and replays the journal, re-verifying - the chain as it goes. If the DB is deleted or drifts, it is regenerated - from the journal with no data loss. (This supersedes the free-standing - `supervise_audit_entries` table, which becomes a view/producer onto the - new index.) + `TableMigrations` machinery. It is a **derived cache, not a second source + of truth**: `audit rebuild` truncates and replays the journal, + re-verifying the chain as it goes, so a deleted or drifted DB is + regenerated from the journal with no data loss. On a `verify` failure + during rebuild it stops and reports rather than indexing past a break. + (This supersedes the free-standing `supervise_audit_entries` table, which + becomes a producer onto the new index.) + +**Indexable fields** (columns + indices): `ts_event`, `ts_recorded`, +`type`, `host`, `bottle`, `bottled_agent`, `activation`, `actor`, +`outcome`, `sensitivity`, `correlation_id`, `causation_id`, plus two +event-specific projections promoted out of `payload` for query — +`repository` and `commit_sha` (populated for `forge.*`/`commit.*`, null +otherwise). The full canonical record is stored verbatim in a `raw` column +so the index never loses fidelity to the journal. + +**Local query surface** — `audit query`, no egress, no paid platform: + +``` +audit query \ + [--since T] [--until T] [--type egress.*] [--host H] [--bottle B] \ + [--activation A] [--agent SLUG] [--actor ID] [--outcome blocked] \ + [--repository R] [--correlation-id C] [--commit SHA] \ + [--follow BOTTLE] # a bottled agent's events in (epoch, seq) order + [--json | --table] +audit verify [--segment S] # offline chain check; exit non-zero on any break +audit rebuild # drop + replay journal → index +audit import # graft an external segment (see above) +``` + +Type filters accept a `group.*` glob. A read-only local HTTP endpoint +mirrors the same filters for the future review console; both are pure reads +over the index and can never mutate the journal. ### Event registry (initial) -Dotted `type` names, grouped; the registry is a table mapping type → -required `untrusted` keys so producers and the verifier agree on shape: +Dotted `type` names, grouped. The registry is a table mapping each type to +its required `payload` keys, its `untrusted` keys (if any), a default +`sensitivity`, and its correlation behavior — so producers and the verifier +agree on shape and "trusted vs claimed" is pinned per type. Initial +coverage (the issue's mandated set): -- **lifecycle.*** — `lifecycle.bottled_agent_start`, - `lifecycle.bottled_agent_stop`, `lifecycle.bottled_agent_crash` - (producer: host-controller, #468). Leaf names use `bottled_agent` to match - the top-level `bottled_agent` field — one term for the subject everywhere. -- **decision.*** — `decision.proposed`, `decision.resolved` - (producer: supervise; carries operator action + justification, replacing - PRD 0013's row shape). -- **egress.*** — `egress.decision` (allow/block at the proxy), - `egress.route_added`. -- **auth.*** — `auth.token_minted`, `auth.token_rejected` (control-plane; - **never** the token itself — see redaction). -- **forge.*** — `forge.push_accepted`, `forge.push_rejected` (git-gate), - `forge.pr_opened`. +| Group / type | Producer | Required `payload` (trusted) | `untrusted` | Default sensitivity | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| **lifecycle.*** — `bottled_agent_start` / `_stop` / `_crash` | host-controller (#468) | `manifest_digest`, `exit` (for stop/crash) | — | normal | +| **hostctl.*** — `broker_launch`, `broker_teardown`, `broker_reject` | host-controller (#468) | `op`, `request_digest` | — | security | +| **decision.*** — `proposed`, `resolved` | supervise | `tool`, `operator_action`, `justification`, `diff_digest` | `agent_rationale` | security | +| **egress.*** — `request`, `decision`, `cutoff`, `anomaly` | egress proxy | `route_id`, `detector` (on match), `bytes` (cutoff) | `reason`, `target_claimed` | security | +| **forge.*** — `push_accepted`, `push_rejected`, `pr_opened` | git-gate | `repository`, `ref`, `gitleaks_result` | `title`, `description` | security | +| **commit.signed** (#480) | git-gate | `repository`, `commit_sha`, `activation_key_id`, `signature_ref` | `commit_message` | security | +| **auth.*** — `token_minted`, `token_rejected`, `authz_denied` | control plane | `role`, `token_id`, `reason_code` | — | security | +| **audit.*** — `segment_open`, `verify_failed`, `truncation_detected`, `export_failed` | audit writer/verifier | `segment`, `detail` | — | security | -New types are additive; adding one does not bump `v`. Removing or -re-typing a field bumps `v`. +Notes: +- **`egress.request` vs `egress.decision`** share a `correlation_id`; the + `decision`'s `causation_id` points at the `request`, and a later `cutoff` + chains onto the `decision` — so a flow is reconstructable. +- **`audit.*` self-events** make the audit subsystem audit itself: a failed + verification, a detected truncation, or a dropped export is itself a + chained, tamper-evident record — you cannot silence the alarm without + breaking the chain that carries it. +- **Free-text and remote-echoed fields are always `untrusted`** (`reason`, + `agent_rationale`, PR `title`/`description`, `target_claimed`), because + they originate in the bottle or a remote response; the host-observed + counterpart (`resource`, `outcome`, `gitleaks_result`) is the trusted + fact. + +**Sensitivity + redaction per type.** Every type's default `sensitivity` +is listed above; a producer may raise it (never lower it). `restricted` +events keep their `payload` in the journal but the export projection ships +only the envelope + a payload digest unless the consumer is authorized — +so a `security`/`restricted` record is still counted and correlated +downstream without leaking its body. The credential-shape redaction rules +(next) apply to **every** type regardless of sensitivity. + +**Schema evolution & backward-compatible readers.** The registry is +append-only: **adding** a type, an optional `payload` key, or an +`untrusted` key does **not** bump `v`; readers ignore unknown fields +(forward-compatible) and treat absent optional fields as `null`. +**Removing** or **re-typing** a field, or making an optional field +required, bumps `v`. A reader declares the max `v` it understands and +refuses to *interpret* a higher-`v` record, but the **verifier is +version-agnostic** — the hash covers whatever fields exist, so chain +integrity is checkable across versions without understanding semantics. +Every `v` bump ships a migration note and updated golden vectors. ### Redaction rule @@ -288,6 +497,14 @@ and keep the event) rather than drop, so a producer bug can never make an audit event vanish; the key deny-list stays a hard refusal because a credential in a named field is always a producer bug worth surfacing. +**No raw-payload capture by default.** The envelope carries *decisions and +metadata*, not traffic. Prompts, model responses, request/response bodies, +and file contents are **not** recorded unless a producer opts a specific, +reviewed field in — and such a field is `untrusted` and subject to both +redaction layers. This keeps the audit log from becoming a covert copy of +the very data the sandbox exists to contain (the issue's "unsafe payload +capture" non-goal). + ### Export / interoperability (CloudEvents, OpenTelemetry Logs) #487 requires the envelope to map onto the **OpenTelemetry Logs data @@ -302,14 +519,14 @@ subtree. cannot be a context attribute — so a nested `trusted` block would have had to be flattened for CloudEvents anyway. Our flat top level maps directly: `id`→`id`, `type`→`type`, `producer`+`host`→`source`, -`bottled_agent`→`subject`, `ts_wall`→`time`; the integrity/chain fields +`bottled_agent`→`subject`, `ts_event`→`time` (`ts_recorded` as an extension); the integrity/chain fields (`epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`, `v`) ride as **extension attributes** (scalars — legal). The `untrusted` map goes in `data`. Only mechanical transform needed: extension attribute names must be lowercase-alphanumeric, so `bottled_agent`/`ts_mono`/etc. are renamed at export (e.g. a `botbottle`-prefixed form) — a naming rule, not a schema conflict. -**OpenTelemetry Logs.** `ts_wall`→`Timestamp`; `type`→the `event.name` +**OpenTelemetry Logs.** `ts_event`→`Timestamp`, `ts_recorded`→`ObservedTimestamp`; `type`→the `event.name` attribute; the flat trusted fields → `Attributes` under a `botbottle.*` namespace (`botbottle.bottled_agent`, `botbottle.producer`, `botbottle.chain.hash`, …); `untrusted.*` → `Attributes` under @@ -334,9 +551,47 @@ integrity fields along; verification stays on the canonical journal. This satisfies "without losing integrity or attribution semantics": both are carried, neither is *relied upon* in the foreign format. -The export adapters themselves (and #324's webhook delivery / causal -ordering) are follow-up implementation — this PRD fixes the *schema* so -that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat. +The export adapters themselves are follow-up implementation — this PRD +fixes the *schema* so that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat. + +#### The #324 delivery contract (payload, cursor, backpressure) + +#324 transports events off-box; it must not invent a second envelope. This +PRD fixes the contract it depends on: + +- **Payload.** #324 ships the **native canonical record verbatim** (the + exact bytes the hash covers), optionally wrapped in the CloudEvents + projection whose `data` *is* that record. Either way the integrity fields + travel intact and the receiver can verify against the same bytes. +- **Cursor.** The export cursor is `(epoch, seq)` (equivalently the last + exported `hash`). It advances **only on acknowledgement**, so delivery is + at-least-once and gap-free; a crash re-sends from the last acked cursor. +- **Idempotency / replay.** Dedup is on `id` (stable across replay), so + at-least-once delivery is safe — the receiver collapses re-sends. +- **Backpressure.** The outbox is the journal itself plus a cursor; when + the endpoint is slow the cursor simply lags — the writer never blocks on + export, and audit never applies backpressure to the data plane it + records. +- **Retention interaction.** Retention/rotation **must not** prune a + segment whose records are still behind the export cursor; the reaper + honors `min(cursor)` across all configured consumers. (The schedule + itself stays the retention follow-up; this is the *ordering* constraint + that follow-up must respect.) + +#### #480 signed-commit attribution maps in without weakening it + +#480 binds a commit's bytes to a per-activation signing key. It maps to the +`commit.signed` event: `payload` carries `repository`, `commit_sha`, +`activation_key_id`, and a `signature_ref` (the detached-signature +location or its digest) — **not** the private key and not a re-derived +signature. The audit event therefore *references and timestamps* #480's +existing byte-to-activation-key proof inside the tamper-evident chain; it +does not re-implement or replace it, so #480's guarantee is unweakened — +the signature still verifies against the commit bytes independently, and +the audit record adds only "this binding was observed at this point in the +chain". The trusted `actor`/`activation` fields and the `commit_sha` +payload are host-observed at the gate, so attribution cannot be forged by +the committing agent. ## Implementation chunks @@ -349,21 +604,49 @@ that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat. `redact_tokens`); unit tests for determinism, chain-break detection, `epoch`/`seq` continuity across a simulated restart, and redaction of both a deny-listed key and a token-shaped value. -3. **SQLite index + `audit rebuild` / `audit verify` CLI.** New - `audit_events` migration; replay-from-journal; offline chain verifier; - local query commands (by bottled-agent / type / time / producer). +3. **SQLite index + `audit` CLI.** New `audit_events` migration (indexable + fields above); replay-from-journal; offline chain verifier + (`truncated-tail` vs `gap`); `query` / `verify` / `rebuild` / `import`; + idempotent `UPSERT` by `id`. 4. **Host controller as first producer (#468).** Wire - `lifecycle.bottled_agent_*` emission into the host controller's - start/stop/crash paths; establish the `epoch` bump + chain-head carry on - writer restart here (the host controller owns the single writer). + `lifecycle.bottled_agent_*` and `hostctl.*` emission into the host + controller; establish the `epoch` bump + chain-head carry + segment + rotation on writer restart here (it owns the single writer). 5. **Migrate existing producers.** Re-emit supervise `decision.*` (retiring the standalone `supervise_audit_entries` shape behind the index), egress - `egress.*`, git-gate `forge.*`, control-plane `auth.*`. -6. **CloudEvents / OTel export adapters.** A projection layer emitting each - event as a CloudEvents JSON envelope and/or an OTel LogRecord (field - re-map per *Export / interoperability*); feeds #324's webhook delivery. -7. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport (#324); per-writer signing + - external anchoring on the chain head; retention/rotation policy. + `egress.*`, git-gate `forge.*` + `commit.signed` (#480), control-plane + `auth.*`; add the `audit.*` self-events (verify/truncation/export + failure). +6. **CloudEvents / OTel export adapters + #324 delivery.** Projection layer + (field re-map per *Export / interoperability*) plus the outbox cursor, + ack-driven advance, and retention-ordering guard the #324 contract + specifies. +7. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport; per-writer signing + + external anchoring on the chain head; retention/rotation *schedule*. + +## Acceptance-criteria coverage (#487) + +The issue defines the contract; implementation is explicitly split into +follow-up PRs. This PRD is the durable decision record; each acceptance box +maps to a section: + +| #487 acceptance criterion | Where | +|---|---| +| Durable PRD defines versioned envelope + initial registry | *The envelope*, *Event registry* | +| Canonical JSON + hash-chain rules, unambiguous, with test vectors | *Canonical serialization + hash chain* → *Test vectors* | +| Trust provenance explicit for every common + event-specific field | *Trust provenance of every common field*; per-type `untrusted` in *Event registry* | +| Redaction prohibits credentials / raw secrets / unsafe capture by default | *Redaction rule*; `untrusted`-only claims; sensitivity classes | +| JSONL journal canonical; SQLite index fully rebuildable | *Journal + SQLite index* (`audit rebuild`) | +| Minimum local search/query contract | *Journal + SQLite index* → *Local query surface* | +| #324 can transport/replay without a second envelope | *The #324 delivery contract* | +| #480 maps in without weakening its byte-to-activation-key guarantee | *#480 signed-commit attribution maps in…* | +| Schema evolution + backward-compatible readers | *Schema evolution & backward-compatible readers* | +| Integrity detects modification / deletion / reorder / bad continuation | *Test vectors* (tamper), *Behavior across rotation…truncation*, `audit verify` | + +Two acceptance items are **specified here, implemented later** by design +(the issue permits this): the concrete test-vector *fixtures* and the +`audit` CLI land in impl chunks 2–3; the #324 outbox lands in chunk 6. +Nothing in the contract is left undefined — only its code is deferred. ## Resolved in review (#495)