feat(egress): implement PRD 0053 — DLP addon with Gateway API matches
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Replace path_allowlist with Gateway API HTTPRoute match vocabulary
(paths, methods, headers with AND/OR semantics) and add DLP scanning
to the egress proxy:

- Token pattern detection (AWS, GitHub, Anthropic, OpenAI, Stripe, JWT)
- Known secret detection (EGRESS_TOKEN_* with base64/URL/hex variants)
- Naive prompt injection detection (disclosure + credential, jailbreak)
- Per-route DLP configuration via manifest dlp block
- Inbound response scanning with block/warn severity

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-05 19:53:23 +00:00
parent 5265e25f9b
commit 726713d081
18 changed files with 1738 additions and 651 deletions
+51 -63
View File
@@ -1,28 +1,7 @@
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017).
"""mitmproxy addon entrypoint for the egress sidecar (PRD 0017, PRD 0053).
Loaded by `mitmdump -s /app/egress_addon.py` inside the
egress container. Wraps the pure logic from
`egress_addon_core` with mitmproxy's HTTPFlow API:
- At startup, read `EGRESS_ROUTES` (default
`/etc/egress/routes.yaml`, JSON content) → routes table.
- SIGHUP re-reads the file and atomically swaps the in-memory
table. A parse error keeps the old table in place — better to
keep serving the old config than to leave the proxy with no
routes after a typo.
- On each `request`: strip the inbound Authorization header, then
consult `decide()` for forward / block / inject-auth and apply
the decision to the flow.
This file imports `mitmproxy` and is never imported on the host —
mitmproxy is a container-only dependency. The host's tests target
`egress_addon_core`.
Dockerfile.sidecars copies both this file and
`egress_addon_core.py` flat into `/app/`; the absolute import
below works because mitmdump runs with `/app` on its sys.path. The
parallel file in the package source tree (bot_bottle/) is the
build input — not a module the host imports."""
egress container."""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -35,35 +14,23 @@ from pathlib import Path
from mitmproxy import http # type: ignore[import-not-found]
# Absolute import (NOT `from .egress_addon_core`) — the
# container drops both files flat into /app/ so they are sibling
# top-level modules to mitmdump's loader, not a package.
from egress_addon_core import ( # type: ignore[import-not-found]
Route,
decide,
is_git_push_request,
load_routes,
match_route,
scan_inbound,
scan_outbound,
)
DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH = "/etc/egress/routes.yaml"
# Magic hostname the addon recognises as an introspection target.
# Requests through the proxy for `_egress.local/<path>` are
# intercepted and answered with synthetic responses (the addon's
# `request` hook sets `flow.response` before any upstream connection).
# The hostname is not in DNS — only clients dialing through this
# specific egress can reach it, and only via HTTP (no TLS).
# Used by the supervise sidecar's `list-egress-routes` MCP
# tool to surface the live route table to the agent.
INTROSPECT_HOST = "_egress.local"
class EgressAddon:
"""The mitmproxy addon. One instance per `mitmdump` process; the
request hook is invoked on every CONNECT-decapsulated HTTP/HTTPS
request the agent makes."""
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.routes_path = os.environ.get("EGRESS_ROUTES", DEFAULT_ROUTES_PATH)
self.routes: tuple[Route, ...] = ()
@@ -80,9 +47,6 @@ class EgressAddon:
f"egress: {tag} load failed: {e}\n"
)
if initial:
# No baseline to fall back on; serve nothing rather
# than masquerade as a proxy with a route table the
# operator never declared.
self.routes = ()
return
self.routes = new_routes
@@ -102,11 +66,6 @@ class EgressAddon:
signal.signal(signal.SIGHUP, handler)
def _serve_introspection(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow, path: str) -> None:
"""Synthesize a response for `_egress.local` requests.
Currently supports `/allowlist` which returns the in-memory
route table as JSON (host, path_allowlist, auth_scheme,
token_env per route — no token VALUES, those live in the
container's environ)."""
if path == "/allowlist":
payload = json.dumps(
{"routes": [dataclasses.asdict(r) for r in self.routes]},
@@ -123,32 +82,34 @@ class EgressAddon:
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
# mitmproxy's addon API: this method name + signature is how
# mitmdump discovers the request hook.
def request(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
request_path, _, query = flow.request.path.partition("?")
# Introspection: requests to the magic `_egress.local`
# host are answered locally with a synthetic response. Check
# before the strip-auth + route logic — these requests aren't
# real upstream traffic, the agent isn't injecting auth, and
# the addon's own decide() would 403 the magic host (it's
# never in the routes table).
if flow.request.pretty_host == INTROSPECT_HOST:
self._serve_introspection(flow, request_path)
return
# Inbound Authorization is always stripped — the agent cannot
# smuggle a stolen token through the proxy. If the matched
# route declares an auth pair, a fresh header is injected
# below.
# DLP outbound scan BEFORE stripping auth — catches tokens the
# agent tried to smuggle in the Authorization header.
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is not None:
body = flow.request.get_text(strict=False) or ""
auth_header = flow.request.headers.get("authorization", "")
scan_text = body
if auth_header:
scan_text = auth_header + "\n" + body
dlp_result = scan_outbound(route, scan_text, os.environ)
if dlp_result is not None and dlp_result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
f"egress DLP: {dlp_result.reason}".encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
return
# Strip inbound Authorization — agent cannot smuggle tokens.
flow.request.headers.pop("authorization", None)
# Universal HTTPS git-push block. Defense-in-depth: git-gate
# (PRD 0008) is the only sanctioned outbound path for git
# writes — its pre-receive runs gitleaks. Letting HTTPS push
# through egress + auth injection would route around
# that scan, so we 403 before any route logic.
if is_git_push_request(request_path, query):
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
@@ -161,11 +122,16 @@ class EgressAddon:
)
return
# Build headers mapping for match evaluation
req_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in flow.request.headers.items()}
decision = decide(
self.routes,
flow.request.pretty_host,
request_path,
os.environ,
request_method=flow.request.method,
request_headers=req_headers,
)
if decision.action == "block":
@@ -179,5 +145,27 @@ class EgressAddon:
if decision.inject_authorization is not None:
flow.request.headers["authorization"] = decision.inject_authorization
def response(self, flow: http.HTTPFlow) -> None:
"""DLP inbound scan on response bodies (PRD 0053)."""
route = match_route(self.routes, flow.request.pretty_host)
if route is None:
return
if flow.response is None:
return
body = flow.response.get_text(strict=False) or ""
if not body:
return
result = scan_inbound(route, body)
if result is None:
return
if result.severity == "block":
flow.response = http.Response.make(
403,
f"egress DLP: {result.reason}".encode("utf-8"),
{"Content-Type": "text/plain; charset=utf-8"},
)
elif result.severity == "warn":
sys.stderr.write(f"egress DLP warn: {result.reason}\n")
addons = [EgressAddon()]