refactor(docker): absorb claude_bottle/ssh.py into DockerBottleBackend
test / run tests/run_tests.py (pull_request) Successful in 17s
test / run tests/run_tests.py (pull_request) Successful in 17s
Mirrors the skills.py absorb. ssh_validate_entries -> validate_ssh_entries (called from prepare); ssh_setup body -> provision_ssh; the _docker_exec_root and _expand_tilde helpers become private methods on the backend. The detailed isolation-model docstring from the old module moves to provision_ssh, where the code lives now. ssh.py deleted.
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@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ import subprocess
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import sys
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from contextlib import contextmanager
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Iterator
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from typing import Iterator, Sequence
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from ... import pipelock
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from ... import ssh as ssh_mod
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from ...env_resolve import env_resolve
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from ...log import die, info
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from ...manifest import SshEntry
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from .. import BottleBackend, BottleCleanupPlan, BottlePlan, BottleSpec
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from . import network as network_mod
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from . import util as docker_mod
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@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend):
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if agent.skills:
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self.validate_skills(list(agent.skills))
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if bottle.ssh:
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ssh_mod.ssh_validate_entries(bottle.ssh)
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self.validate_ssh_entries(bottle.ssh)
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env_file = stage_dir / "agent.env"
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args_file = stage_dir / "docker-args"
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@@ -353,16 +353,198 @@ class DockerBottleBackend(BottleBackend):
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check=True,
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)
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def validate_ssh_entries(self, entries: Sequence[SshEntry]) -> None:
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"""Each entry's IdentityFile must exist on the host (after
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expanding leading ~). Host and IdentityFile shape are already
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enforced by Manifest validation. Called from `prepare` before
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the y/N so the user doesn't get prompted for a plan with a
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missing key."""
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for entry in entries:
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key = self._expand_tilde(entry.IdentityFile)
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if not os.path.isfile(key):
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die(f"ssh key file not found for host '{entry.Host}': {key}")
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def provision_ssh(self, plan: BottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
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"""If the bottle has SSH entries, set up the in-container
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ssh-agent and config so node can authenticate without ever
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seeing the key bytes. No-op when the bottle has no SSH."""
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"""Set up SSH in the container so node can authenticate using
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each entry's key without the key file being readable by node.
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No-op when the bottle has no SSH entries.
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Isolation strategy:
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- Keys live at /root/.claude-bottle-keys/ (mode 700,
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root-owned). /root is mode 700 in node:22-slim, so node
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(uid 1000) can't even traverse in.
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- ssh-agent runs as root, listening on
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/run/claude-bottle-agent.sock. Each key is loaded with
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ssh-add, then deleted; the bytes now live only in the
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agent process's memory.
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- ssh-agent's SO_PEERCRED-based UID match rejects every
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connection whose peer euid is neither 0 nor the agent's.
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To bridge that, a root-owned socat forwarder listens on
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/run/claude-bottle-agent-public.sock (mode 666) and
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proxies bytes to the real agent socket.
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- node can't ptrace root-owned agent or socat, so
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/proc/<pid>/mem is off-limits and key bytes never leave
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root-owned memory.
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- ~/.ssh/config in node's home points each Host at the
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public socket via IdentityAgent.
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Why an in-container agent (not bind-mounted from host):
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Docker Desktop on macOS does not forward Unix-domain socket
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connect() across the VM boundary — connect() returns
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ENOTSUP. Running ssh-agent inside the container sidesteps
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that entirely.
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Limitation: keys must be passphrase-less. ssh-add prompts on
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/dev/tty for passphrases, but our docker exec has no TTY."""
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assert isinstance(plan, DockerBottlePlan)
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bottle = plan.spec.manifest.bottle_for(plan.spec.agent_name)
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if not bottle.ssh:
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return
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container = target
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proxy_host_port = pipelock.pipelock_proxy_host_port(plan.slug)
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ssh_mod.ssh_setup(target, plan.stage_dir, proxy_host_port, bottle.ssh)
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container_home = os.environ.get("CLAUDE_BOTTLE_CONTAINER_HOME", "/home/node")
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container_ssh = f"{container_home}/.ssh"
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agent_socket = "/run/claude-bottle-agent.sock"
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public_socket = "/run/claude-bottle-agent-public.sock"
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keys_dir = "/root/.claude-bottle-keys"
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# ~/.ssh for node (700, owned by node).
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["mkdir", "-p", container_ssh])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "node:node", container_ssh])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "700", container_ssh])
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# /root/.claude-bottle-keys for root (700, root-owned).
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["mkdir", "-p", keys_dir])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "root:root", keys_dir])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "700", keys_dir])
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config_file = plan.stage_dir / "ssh_config"
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known_hosts_file = plan.stage_dir / "ssh_known_hosts"
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config_file.write_text("")
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config_file.chmod(0o600)
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known_hosts_file.write_text("")
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known_hosts_file.chmod(0o600)
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proxy_host, _, proxy_port = proxy_host_port.partition(":")
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container_key_paths: list[str] = []
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for entry in bottle.ssh:
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name = entry.Host
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key = self._expand_tilde(entry.IdentityFile)
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hostname = entry.Hostname
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user = entry.User
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port = entry.Port
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known_host_key = entry.KnownHostKey
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key_basename = os.path.basename(key)
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container_key_path = f"{keys_dir}/{key_basename}"
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info(f"copying ssh key for '{name}' -> {container} (root-only staging)")
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subprocess.run(
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["docker", "cp", key, f"{container}:{container_key_path}"],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=True,
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)
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "root:root", container_key_path])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "600", container_key_path])
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container_key_paths.append(container_key_path)
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# ProxyCommand tunnels SSH through pipelock via HTTP
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# CONNECT. %h / %p expand to this block's HostName /
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# Port. socat's PROXY: mode does CONNECT host:port to
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# the proxy.
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block = (
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f"Host {name}\n"
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f" HostName {hostname}\n"
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f" User {user}\n"
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f" Port {port}\n"
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f" IdentityAgent {public_socket}\n"
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f" ProxyCommand socat - PROXY:{proxy_host}:%h:%p,proxyport={proxy_port}\n"
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f"\n"
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)
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with config_file.open("a") as f:
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f.write(block)
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if known_host_key:
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entries_to_write: list[str] = []
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if port == "22":
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entries_to_write.append(f"{name} {known_host_key}\n")
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if hostname != name:
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entries_to_write.append(f"{hostname} {known_host_key}\n")
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else:
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entries_to_write.append(f"[{name}]:{port} {known_host_key}\n")
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if hostname != name:
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entries_to_write.append(f"[{hostname}]:{port} {known_host_key}\n")
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with known_hosts_file.open("a") as f:
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for e in entries_to_write:
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f.write(e)
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# Boot the agent, load each key, delete the key files, then
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# start the root-owned socat forwarder. One docker exec so the
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# whole sequence is atomic.
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info(f"starting in-container ssh-agent at {agent_socket} (forwarded via {public_socket})")
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setup_lines = [
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"set -eu",
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f"ssh-agent -a {agent_socket} >/dev/null",
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]
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for kp in container_key_paths:
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setup_lines.append(f"SSH_AUTH_SOCK={agent_socket} ssh-add {kp}")
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setup_lines.append(f"rm -f {kp}")
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setup_lines.append(f"rmdir {keys_dir} 2>/dev/null || true")
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# Forwarder: socat (uid 0) connects to the agent on node's behalf.
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setup_lines.append(
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f"nohup socat UNIX-LISTEN:{public_socket},fork,reuseaddr,mode=666 "
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f"UNIX-CONNECT:{agent_socket} </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 &"
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)
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# Wait briefly for the forwarder to bind.
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setup_lines.extend([
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"i=0",
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"while [ $i -lt 20 ]; do",
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f" [ -S {public_socket} ] && break",
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" i=$((i + 1))",
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" sleep 0.1",
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"done",
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f"[ -S {public_socket} ] || {{ echo 'claude-bottle: socat forwarder failed to bind {public_socket}' >&2; exit 1; }}",
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])
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setup_script = "\n".join(setup_lines) + "\n"
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subprocess.run(
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["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, "sh", "-c", setup_script],
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check=True,
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)
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info(f"writing {container_ssh}/config")
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subprocess.run(
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["docker", "cp", str(config_file), f"{container}:{container_ssh}/config"],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=True,
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)
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "node:node", f"{container_ssh}/config"])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "600", f"{container_ssh}/config"])
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if known_hosts_file.stat().st_size > 0:
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info(f"writing {container_ssh}/known_hosts")
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subprocess.run(
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["docker", "cp", str(known_hosts_file), f"{container}:{container_ssh}/known_hosts"],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=True,
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)
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chown", "node:node", f"{container_ssh}/known_hosts"])
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self._docker_exec_root(container, ["chmod", "600", f"{container_ssh}/known_hosts"])
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def _docker_exec_root(self, container: str, argv: list[str]) -> None:
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subprocess.run(
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["docker", "exec", "-u", "0", container, *argv],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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check=True,
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)
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def _expand_tilde(self, path: str) -> str:
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if path.startswith("~"):
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home = os.environ.get("HOME", "")
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return home + path[1:]
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return path
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def provision_git(self, plan: BottlePlan, target: str) -> None:
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"""If --cwd was set and the host cwd has a .git directory, copy
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