diff --git a/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md b/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md
index d458ac88..920d5652 100644
--- a/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md
+++ b/docs/prds/prd-new-audit-event-schema.md
@@ -66,10 +66,11 @@ shared schema. Concretely:
 ## Goals / Success Criteria
 
 - A single `AuditEvent` envelope type, versioned, that every producer
-  emits. Fields are split into a **`trusted`** block (host-supplied:
-  bottled-agent slug from source-IP attribution, host wall-clock, producer
-  identity) and an **`untrusted`** block (anything the agent or a remote
-  claimed), and the split is structural, not a convention.
+  emits. The trust boundary is **one `untrusted` region**: everything
+  outside it is host-established and trusted (source-IP → bottled-agent
+  attribution, host wall-clock, producer identity, chain metadata);
+  `untrusted` is the sole place anything an agent or a remote claimed may
+  go. The boundary is structural, not a convention.
 - **Canonical serialization** (`sort_keys`, `(",", ":")` separators,
   UTF-8, `ensure_ascii=False`) is defined once and reused, so the same
   logical event always hashes identically across producers and hosts.
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ shared schema. Concretely:
 - A **redaction rule** is enforced at the envelope boundary: known
   credential-shaped fields are rejected/redacted before a record is
   written; the writer refuses raw secrets rather than storing them.
+- The envelope **projects onto the OpenTelemetry Logs data model and a
+  CloudEvents JSON envelope** by field re-mapping alone (no reformat),
+  preserving the trust boundary and carrying the integrity fields — per
+  #487's export/interop requirement. (The export adapters are follow-up;
+  the *schema* must make them a re-map.)
 - The **host controller (#468)** emits `lifecycle.*` events through this
   contract as the first consumer; existing supervise/egress producers are
   migrated behind the same envelope without changing operator-facing
@@ -120,26 +126,21 @@ stable top level:
 
 ```
 {
+  // --- everything at the top level is host-established (trusted) ---
   "v": 1,                          // schema version — bumped only on a breaking change
   "id": "<uuid4>",                 // globally unique event id
   "type": "egress.decision",       // dotted event type from the registry
-
-  // --- chain / ordering (structural, host-owned) ---
   "epoch": 7,                      // writer-boot counter, bumped once per host-controller (writer) start
   "seq": 1287,                     // monotonic sequence within this epoch (gap-detectable)
   "prev": "<hex>",                 // hash of the previous record in the chain ("" for genesis)
   "hash": "<hex>",                 // sha256(prev + canonical(this event with hash=""))
+  "producer": "host-controller",   // which host component wrote this
+  "host": "mac-studio-1",
+  "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12", // slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events)
+  "ts_wall": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // host wall-clock, RFC3339 UTC
+  "ts_mono": 90142.55,             // host monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only)
 
-  // --- trusted: everything the *host* established; authoritative ---
-  "trusted": {
-    "producer": "host-controller",         // which host component wrote this
-    "host": "mac-studio-1",
-    "bottled_agent": "amber-fox-12",       // slug from source-IP attribution (null for host-level events)
-    "ts_wall": "2026-07-26T18:22:04.113Z", // host wall-clock, RFC3339 UTC
-    "ts_mono": 90142.55                    // host monotonic secs since this epoch's boot (intra-epoch ordering only)
-  },
-
-  // --- untrusted: anything the agent or a remote claimed; never authoritative ---
+  // --- the ONLY untrusted region: anything the agent or a remote claimed ---
   "untrusted": {
     "reason": "npm install needs registry.npmjs.org",
     "target": "registry.npmjs.org:443"
@@ -147,22 +148,22 @@ stable top level:
 }
 ```
 
-The **`trusted` / `untrusted` split is the core invariant.** A producer may
-only place a field in `trusted` if the *host* established it: the
-source-IP → `bottled_agent` slug attribution, the host's own clock
-(`ts_wall`/`ts_mono`), and the producer's own identity. **`producer` and
-`ts_*` live inside `trusted` on purpose** — they are host-supplied, so
-grouping them there (rather than as loose top-level fields) keeps the
-"authoritative ⇔ inside `trusted`" rule structural, with nothing
-host-established leaking outside it. Everything an agent or a remote said
-goes in `untrusted`. A reader (or a future policy engine) can therefore
-trust `trusted.bottled_agent` for attribution and treat `untrusted.*` as
-adversarial claims — the distinction the current stores lack.
+The **trust boundary is a single region, not a split.** Everything outside
+`untrusted` is trusted by construction — the host established it: the
+schema/chain metadata (`v`, `id`, `type`, `epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`),
+the producer and host identity, the source-IP → `bottled_agent` slug
+attribution, and the host clock (`ts_wall`/`ts_mono`). `untrusted` is the
+**one** place anything an agent or a remote claimed may go. A reader (or a
+future policy engine) trusts every top-level field for attribution and
+treats `untrusted.*` — and only `untrusted.*` — as adversarial claims.
 
-Only the small structural set — `v`, `id`, `type`, `epoch`, `seq`, `prev`,
-`hash` — sits at the top level; it is host-owned too, but it is chain
-metadata rather than event data, so it stays out of the `trusted` body to
-keep that body purely about *what happened*.
+Framing it as "one untrusted region, everything else trusted" (rather than
+two parallel `trusted`/`untrusted` blocks) removes the mistake where a
+producer forgets to nest a host field under `trusted`: a field is trusted
+unless it is deliberately placed inside `untrusted`. The construction API
+enforces this — producers pass trusted fields positionally and hand all
+agent/remote-claimed data as the single `untrusted` mapping, so there is no
+way to emit a top-level field that *looks* authoritative but isn't.
 
 ### Canonical serialization + hash chain
 
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ required `untrusted` keys so producers and the verifier agree on shape:
 - **lifecycle.*** — `lifecycle.bottled_agent_start`,
   `lifecycle.bottled_agent_stop`, `lifecycle.bottled_agent_crash`
   (producer: host-controller, #468). Leaf names use `bottled_agent` to match
-  the `trusted.bottled_agent` field — one term for the subject everywhere.
+  the top-level `bottled_agent` field — one term for the subject everywhere.
 - **decision.*** — `decision.proposed`, `decision.resolved`
   (producer: supervise; carries operator action + justification, replacing
   PRD 0013's row shape).
@@ -287,6 +288,56 @@ and keep the event) rather than drop, so a producer bug can never make an
 audit event vanish; the key deny-list stays a hard refusal because a
 credential in a named field is always a producer bug worth surfacing.
 
+### Export / interoperability (CloudEvents, OpenTelemetry Logs)
+
+#487 requires the envelope to map onto the **OpenTelemetry Logs data
+model** and/or a **CloudEvents JSON** envelope *without losing integrity or
+attribution semantics*. The flattened shape (one `untrusted` region,
+everything else trusted at top level) does **not** conflict with either — it
+maps *more* cleanly than a nested `trusted`/`untrusted` pair would, because
+both target models expect a flat set of top-level fields plus one payload
+subtree.
+
+**CloudEvents.** Context attributes MUST be scalar simple types — a map
+cannot be a context attribute — so a nested `trusted` block would have had
+to be flattened for CloudEvents anyway. Our flat top level maps directly:
+`id`→`id`, `type`→`type`, `producer`+`host`→`source`,
+`bottled_agent`→`subject`, `ts_wall`→`time`; the integrity/chain fields
+(`epoch`, `seq`, `prev`, `hash`, `v`) ride as **extension attributes**
+(scalars — legal). The `untrusted` map goes in `data`. Only mechanical
+transform needed: extension attribute names must be lowercase-alphanumeric,
+so `bottled_agent`/`ts_mono`/etc. are renamed at export (e.g. a
+`botbottle`-prefixed form) — a naming rule, not a schema conflict.
+
+**OpenTelemetry Logs.** `ts_wall`→`Timestamp`; `type`→the `event.name`
+attribute; the flat trusted fields → `Attributes` under a `botbottle.*`
+namespace (`botbottle.bottled_agent`, `botbottle.producer`,
+`botbottle.chain.hash`, …); `untrusted.*` → `Attributes` under
+`botbottle.untrusted.*` (or `Body`). OTel attributes are a dotted map that
+happily carries the nested subtree.
+
+**Attribution is preserved** precisely because the boundary is now
+structural: on export, top-level fields become trusted context/attributes
+and the `untrusted` subtree stays a single, clearly-named region — so a
+downstream consumer still sees exactly which fields an agent claimed.
+Nothing agent-claimed is promoted to a trusted-looking position.
+
+**Integrity has one deliberate caveat.** CloudEvents/OTel are
+representation envelopes with their own (or no) canonicalization; `hash`
+and `prev` are computed over **our** canonical JSON, not over the exported
+form. So the chain fields travel *as data* for reference, but
+tamper-evidence is always verified against the **native journal** (the
+source of truth) — never re-derived from an exported CloudEvents/OTel
+record, whose key ordering / number formatting the exporter may change.
+Export is thus a lossless-for-attribution **projection** that carries the
+integrity fields along; verification stays on the canonical journal. This
+satisfies "without losing integrity or attribution semantics": both are
+carried, neither is *relied upon* in the foreign format.
+
+The export adapters themselves (and #324's webhook delivery / causal
+ordering) are follow-up implementation — this PRD fixes the *schema* so
+that projection is a field re-map, never a reformat.
+
 ## Implementation chunks
 
 1. **(this PR — PRD only.)** The contract above. No code; scheduled to land
@@ -308,7 +359,10 @@ credential in a named field is always a producer bug worth surfacing.
 5. **Migrate existing producers.** Re-emit supervise `decision.*` (retiring
    the standalone `supervise_audit_entries` shape behind the index), egress
    `egress.*`, git-gate `forge.*`, control-plane `auth.*`.
-6. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport (#324); per-writer signing +
+6. **CloudEvents / OTel export adapters.** A projection layer emitting each
+   event as a CloudEvents JSON envelope and/or an OTel LogRecord (field
+   re-map per *Export / interoperability*); feeds #324's webhook delivery.
+7. **(follow-up.)** Cross-host merge transport (#324); per-writer signing +
    external anchoring on the chain head; retention/rotation policy.
 
 ## Resolved in review (#495)
@@ -320,10 +374,12 @@ credential in a named field is always a producer bug worth surfacing.
   carrying the last chain head as the next `prev` gives a total order of
   `(epoch, seq)` that survives restarts; `ts_mono` orders only within an
   epoch. (Design → *ordering across restarts*.)
-- **`ts_*` and `producer` belong in `trusted`.** They are host-supplied, so
-  they now sit inside the `trusted` block; only chain metadata stays at the
-  top level. (Design → *The envelope*.)
-- **Subject term is `bottled_agent` everywhere** — the `trusted` field and
+- **Flatten to one `untrusted` region — decided.** Everything outside
+  `untrusted` (chain metadata, `producer`/`host`, `bottled_agent`, `ts_*`)
+  is trusted by construction, so the separate `trusted` sub-block is
+  removed; a field is trusted unless deliberately placed under `untrusted`.
+  (Design → *The envelope*.)
+- **Subject term is `bottled_agent` everywhere** — the top-level field and
   the `lifecycle.bottled_agent_*` leaf names. (Design → *The envelope* /
   *Event registry*.)
 - **Retention head-carry — yes.** When a journal segment is rotated out,