feat(supervise): list-egress-proxy-routes MCP tool, defaults on egress-proxy
Reshape the allowlist topology so the egress-proxy is the bottle's
single allowlist surface, and replace the agent-side
routes/allowlist file mounts with a live MCP tool.
Policy change (move defaults to egress-proxy):
- `egress_proxy_routes_for_bottle(bottle)` now folds in
DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST (the claude-code defaults) and
`bottle.egress.allowlist` (user adds) as bare-pass routes (no
auth, no path filter), on top of the bottle's
`egress_proxy.routes`. Manifest routes win on host collision.
- `pipelock_effective_allowlist(bottle)` mirrors egress-proxy's
effective host set when egress-proxy is in use. Pipelock is
no longer the bottle's primary allowlist authority; it
enforces a downstream copy as defense-in-depth + does DLP body
scanning.
- Split out `egress_proxy_manifest_routes(bottle)` for callers
that want just the manifest entries (tests, internal use).
- DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST moves from `pipelock.py` to `egress_proxy.py`
(pipelock re-imports for the no-egress-proxy fallback path).
- Dropped the `egress-proxy` auto-allow on pipelock's allowlist
— the agent never dials egress-proxy via the proxy mechanism;
pipelock only sees upstream hostnames from egress-proxy's
CONNECTs.
Introspection endpoint (existing mitmproxy feature):
- Egress-proxy addon recognises requests to the magic host
`_egress-proxy.local` and synthesizes responses via
`flow.response = http.Response.make(...)` — no upstream
connection, no allowlist enforcement on the magic host.
- `GET /allowlist` returns the in-memory route table as JSON
(host + path_allowlist + auth_scheme + token_env per route;
no token VALUES).
- Smoke-tested end-to-end against a real egress-proxy container.
MCP tool (existing supervise plumbing):
- New `list-egress-proxy-routes` tool (no inputs, no operator
approval). Handler fetches via egress-proxy's introspection
endpoint using urllib's ProxyHandler against
`EGRESS_PROXY_FORWARD_PROXY`. Returns the JSON payload as the
tool's text content; `isError: true` if the proxy is
unreachable.
- `egress-proxy-block` description now points the agent at
`list-egress-proxy-routes` instead of a staged file path.
- `pipelock-block` description acknowledges the mirror — agents
should prefer `egress-proxy-block` to add hosts; pipelock-block
stays for the rare divergence case.
Drop agent-side file mounts:
- Supervise's `current-config` dir staging no longer writes
routes.yaml / allowlist. Only `Dockerfile` remains
(capability-block still reads it from
`/etc/claude-bottle/current-config/Dockerfile`).
- `prepare.py` stops passing `routes_content` /
`allowlist_content` to `supervise.prepare`.
- `Supervise.prepare` signature simplified to one
`dockerfile_content` kwarg.
Tests: 400 unit + integration pass. Added coverage for
defaults-folding (`TestRoutesForBottleFoldsDefaults`), the new
tool definition + handler, and the updated supervise.prepare
shape.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -67,20 +67,29 @@ class TestAllowlistWithRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
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self.assertIn("registry.npmjs.org", eff)
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self.assertIn("api.github.com", eff)
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def test_egress_proxy_hostname_auto_added_when_routes_exist(self):
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# Egress-proxy's outbound leg uses HTTPS_PROXY=pipelock, so
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# any request that flows through egress-proxy → pipelock
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# would otherwise be rejected by pipelock's hostname gate.
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def test_egress_proxy_hostname_NOT_in_pipelock_allowlist(self):
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# The agent never dials egress-proxy via the proxy mechanism
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# — it IS the proxy. Pipelock receives upstream hostnames
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# from egress-proxy's CONNECT requests, not the
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# `egress-proxy` hostname itself.
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eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(_bottle(_routes([
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{"host": "x.example",
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"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"}},
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])))
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self.assertIn("egress-proxy", eff)
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def test_egress_proxy_hostname_NOT_added_when_no_routes(self):
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eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(_bottle({}))
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self.assertNotIn("egress-proxy", eff)
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def test_pipelock_mirrors_egress_proxy_defaults_when_routes_present(self):
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# When egress_proxy is in use, pipelock's allowlist mirrors
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# the egress-proxy effective routes — which fold in
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# DEFAULT_ALLOWLIST + bottle.egress.allowlist.
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eff = pipelock_effective_allowlist(_bottle(_routes([
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{"host": "x.example",
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"auth": {"scheme": "Bearer", "token_ref": "T"}},
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])))
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for default in ("api.anthropic.com", "sentry.io"):
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self.assertIn(default, eff)
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self.assertIn("x.example", eff)
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def test_supervise_hostname_auto_added_when_supervise_enabled(self):
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# The agent's MCP client opens long-polled requests to
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# http://supervise:9100/. They bypass the agent's HTTP_PROXY
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