fix(macos): name the gateway instead of addressing it, so bottles survive it moving
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The shared gateway's address is DHCP-assigned and changes whenever the infra container is recreated — a source-hash bump, an image upgrade, a crash. Every agent-facing URL embedded that address, and the proxy URL reaches the agent as process environment at `container exec` time. A running process's environ cannot be rewritten from outside, so a moved gateway stranded every running bottle permanently: not degraded, unreachable, until relaunched and its agent session thrown away. Give the agent a stable name instead. `GATEWAY_HOSTNAME` replaces the address in the egress proxy URL, NO_PROXY, git-http, and supervise URLs, and resolves through the bottle's own /etc/hosts. Unlike environ that is a file, so it can be rewritten inside a container that is already running — which is the whole point: a gateway that returns at a new address is picked up by live bottles. Launch writes the entry before anything execs (every agent URL names the gateway, so it must resolve for the first connection), and re-points every running bottle once the gateway is up, so one stranded by an earlier restart re-attaches instead of needing a relaunch. The write needs root and the agent runs as `node`: the host can repoint a bottle's gateway name, the agent cannot repoint its own. Keep that asymmetry. Apple Container 1.0 has no container-name DNS on a user network and `container run` has no --add-host, so the entry is written by exec after start rather than declared at run. Does not address the other half of #443: per-bottle egress auth tokens are held in memory by the orchestrator and are still lost across a restart, so a re-attached bottle resolves its policy but not its injected credentials. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ from ..docker.egress import EGRESS_PORT
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from ..util import AGENT_CA_BUNDLE, AGENT_CA_PATH
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from . import util as container_mod
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from .bottle import MacosContainerBottle
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from .gateway_hosts import (
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GATEWAY_HOSTNAME,
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refresh_gateway_host,
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set_gateway_host,
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)
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from .bottle_plan import MacosContainerBottlePlan
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from .consolidated_launch import (
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GatewayEndpoint,
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@@ -100,6 +105,11 @@ def launch(
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# Step 1: the per-host singletons. Must precede the agent run — its
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# proxy env needs the gateway's address at `container run` time.
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endpoint = ensure_gateway()
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# The gateway's address may have changed since these bottles launched
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# (any infra recreate re-runs DHCP). They name the gateway rather than
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# address it, so re-pointing /etc/hosts re-attaches them in place
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# instead of leaving them stranded until relaunch.
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refresh_gateway_host(endpoint.gateway_ip)
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# Step 2: mint this bottle's deploy keys, then point it at the SHARED
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# gateway's CA + git-http/supervise ports.
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@@ -117,6 +127,9 @@ def launch(
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# attribution key; `--cap-drop CAP_NET_RAW` at run is what makes it
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# unforgeable. Poll: `container run --detach` can return before vmnet's
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# DHCP has assigned the address.
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# Resolve the gateway name before anything execs: every agent-facing
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# URL uses it, so the entry must exist for the first connection.
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set_gateway_host(plan.container_name, endpoint.gateway_ip)
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source_ip = container_mod.wait_container_ipv4_on_network(
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plan.container_name, endpoint.network,
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)
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@@ -231,13 +244,20 @@ def _stamp_agent_urls(
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) -> MacosContainerBottlePlan:
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"""Point the agent's git-gate insteadOf rewrites + supervise MCP at the
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shared gateway's ports. Both bypass the egress proxy (NO_PROXY covers the
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gateway address)."""
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gateway name).
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Addressed by `GATEWAY_HOSTNAME`, never by IP: these URLs are baked into
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the agent's gitconfig and MCP config at provision time, so an address here
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would strand the bottle the moment the gateway moved. The name is resolved
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per connection through `/etc/hosts`, which stays rewritable while the
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bottle runs."""
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del endpoint # addressed by name; the address reaches the bottle via /etc/hosts
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git_gate_url = (
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f"http://{endpoint.gateway_ip}:{_GIT_HTTP_PORT}"
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f"http://{GATEWAY_HOSTNAME}:{_GIT_HTTP_PORT}"
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if plan.git_gate_plan.upstreams else ""
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)
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supervise_url = (
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f"http://{endpoint.gateway_ip}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
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f"http://{GATEWAY_HOSTNAME}:{SUPERVISE_PORT}/"
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if plan.supervise_plan is not None else ""
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)
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return dataclasses.replace(
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@@ -247,19 +267,25 @@ def _stamp_agent_urls(
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)
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def _proxy_url(gateway_ip: str, identity_token: str = "") -> str:
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def _proxy_url(identity_token: str = "") -> str:
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"""The agent's egress proxy URL. The identity token rides as proxy
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credentials — the gateway reads Proxy-Authorization, resolves the
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(source_ip, token) pair against the control plane, and strips it before
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upstream. Without a valid pair `/resolve` denies the request (#366)."""
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upstream. Without a valid pair `/resolve` denies the request (#366).
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Names the gateway rather than addressing it: this URL reaches the agent as
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process environment, which cannot be rewritten once the agent is running,
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so an address baked here is unfixable if the gateway moves."""
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cred = f"bottle:{identity_token}@" if identity_token else ""
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return f"http://{cred}{gateway_ip}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
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return f"http://{cred}{GATEWAY_HOSTNAME}:{EGRESS_PORT}"
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def _no_proxy(gateway_ip: str) -> str:
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def _no_proxy() -> str:
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# git-http + supervise live on the gateway and must NOT go through the
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# egress proxy — the agent reaches them directly by its address.
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return f"localhost,127.0.0.1,{gateway_ip}"
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# egress proxy — the agent reaches them directly by name. Deliberately
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# address-free: NO_PROXY is baked into the run-time env and is therefore
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# just as unfixable as the proxy URL if the gateway moves.
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return f"localhost,127.0.0.1,{GATEWAY_HOSTNAME}"
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def _identity_proxy_env(
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@@ -276,7 +302,8 @@ def _identity_proxy_env(
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`_agent_env_entries`."""
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if not identity_token:
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return {}
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url = _proxy_url(endpoint.gateway_ip, identity_token)
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del endpoint # the gateway is named, not addressed
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url = _proxy_url(identity_token)
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return {
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"HTTPS_PROXY": url, "HTTP_PROXY": url,
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"https_proxy": url, "http_proxy": url,
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@@ -338,7 +365,7 @@ def _agent_env_entries(
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# silently dropping attribution for. Without it a process that egresses
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# before the exec-time env still fails closed — the agent network is
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# host-only, so there is no route off it except the gateway.
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no_proxy = _no_proxy(endpoint.gateway_ip)
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no_proxy = _no_proxy()
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env = [
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f"NO_PROXY={no_proxy}",
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f"no_proxy={no_proxy}",
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