feat(control-plane): role-scoped signed tokens so the gateway can't drive operator routes
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Review follow-up on #469: the data plane held the same control-plane secret that authorizes every route, so a compromised egress/git-gate could queue a supervise proposal AND approve it (or rewrite policy, read injected tokens) — the (source_ip, identity_token) checks attribute the *bottle*, not the caller. Replace the single shared bearer secret with role-scoped, HMAC-signed tokens (compact HS256 JWTs, stdlib-only — no new dependency): * new `control_auth` mints/verifies `{role}` tokens; roles are `gateway` (data plane) and `cli` (host operator/launcher). * the orchestrator holds only the signing *key* and verifies; `dispatch` gates each route by role — `gateway` reaches /resolve + /supervise/ {propose,poll}, everything else is `cli`-only (401 unauthenticated, 403 wrong role). * the gateway is handed a pre-minted `gateway` token it cannot rewrite into `cli`; the host CLI mints its own `cli` token from the host key. * `gateway_init` scopes the signing key to the orchestrator process and the gateway token to the data-plane daemons, so even in the combined infra container a compromised data-plane daemon never sees the key. Launchers (docker gateway + infra, macOS infra) inject the minted token(s); Firecracker stays open behind its nft boundary. Open mode (no key) still grants full `cli` access — the fail-visible fallback for tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -7,15 +7,30 @@ import unittest
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import urllib.error
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from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
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from bot_bottle.control_auth import ROLE_CLI, verify
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from bot_bottle.orchestrator.client import (
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OrchestratorClient,
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OrchestratorClientError,
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RegisteredBottle,
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_host_auth_token,
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)
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_URLOPEN = "bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.urllib.request.urlopen"
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class TestHostAuthToken(unittest.TestCase):
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def test_mints_a_cli_token_from_the_host_key(self) -> None:
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with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.host_control_plane_token",
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return_value="signing-key"):
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tok = _host_auth_token()
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self.assertEqual(ROLE_CLI, verify(tok, "signing-key"))
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def test_returns_empty_when_key_unreadable(self) -> None:
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with patch("bot_bottle.orchestrator.client.host_control_plane_token",
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side_effect=OSError("no host root")):
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self.assertEqual("", _host_auth_token())
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def _resp(status: int, payload: object) -> MagicMock:
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m = MagicMock()
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inner = m.__enter__.return_value
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