docs(research): add Agent Safehouse HN launch and Apple Container 1.0 stable

- agent-sandbox-landscape.md: update agent-safehouse star count (~1.4k →
  ~1.8k), add HN thread #47301085 link and key discussion notes (creator
  framing, Simon Willison observation, top community quote on sandboxing
  being THE major challenge), note Apple Container 1.0 stable (Jun 9 2026)
- hn-agent-safety-discourse-july-2026.md: add Agent Safehouse March 12
  launch to the sandboxing boom section as context that prefigures the
  June–July shift in community tone

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/research/agent-sandbox-landscape.md

@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ claim that the monetization positioning leans on. See the addendum.
 
 ### agent-safehouse
 - **Source**: https://agent-safehouse.dev/ ; https://github.com/eugene1g/agent-safehouse
-- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~1,400 stars)
+- **HN launch**: [#47301085](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47301085) (March 12 2026) — 823 points
+- **License**: Apache 2.0 (~1,781 stars at launch)
 - **Isolation**: macOS `sandbox-exec` (Seatbelt) profiles — kernel-level
   syscall interception, no container.
 - **Locality**: Local, macOS only.
@@ -107,6 +108,16 @@ claim that the monetization positioning leans on. See the addendum.
 - **Config**: Shell functions or custom `sandbox-exec` profile files;
   LLM-assisted profile generation supported.
 - **Network policy**: Not addressed.
+- **Notable from HN thread**: Creator acknowledged the project is "just a
+  policy-generator for `sandbox-exec` — no dependencies, no daemons, no
+  subscription; I did put in many hours to identify the minimum required
+  permissions for agents to continue working." Simon Willison noted that
+  evaluating whether a sandboxing tool actually works as intended is hard.
+  Top community sentiment: *"I honestly think that sandboxing is currently
+  THE major challenge that needs to be solved for the tech to fully realise
+  its potential."* The macOS Docker gap (Docker for Mac runs inside a Linux
+  VM, so `sandbox-exec` is the only native primitive for bare-metal macOS
+  processes) was the stated motivation.
 - **Maturity**: Active through March 2026.
 
 ### matchlock
@@ -372,7 +383,7 @@ them.
 | DX: run Claude yolo-style | One command → interactive yolo Claude (`start <agent>`, `--dangerously-skip-permissions` default) | n/a (lib demo) | Wizard + build, then run claude inside (Linux only) | One-command wrapper (`safehouse claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`) | CLI: run a cmd in a VM (not a Claude wrapper) | Hosted (`tilde exec`), not local-native | SDK code required (build the run yourself) | CLI/MCP: sandbox-as-a-tool for the agent, not a wrapper around it | SSH into a named machine, run claude there | Stand up a cluster + drive via E2B SDK | CI-oriented, not a Claude wrapper | MCP server: `claude mcp add container-use -- container-use stdio` | One command: `sbx` wraps claude with `--dangerously-skip-permissions` default | Library/wrapper, not a standalone CLI |
 | Config | JSON manifest (bottles + agents) | Programmatic refs | CLI wizard | Profile files / shell fns | CLI / SDK | DSL + CLI + SDK | SDK | CLI / SDK / MCP | TOML Smolfile | E2B-compatible SDK | cleanroom.yaml in repo | None (no policy config) | Preset levels at launch | Programmatic per-invocation (allow/deny lists) |
 | Agent-tailored policy | Yes — bottle/agent split; declarative per-role egress + credentials; composable via `extends:` | Partial — capability model scopes per-agent, but no declarative role manifest | No | Partial — per-agent profile files (Seatbelt); no egress | No | Yes — per-agent DSL RBAC (allow/deny/approve per action/repo/agent) | No | No | No | No — per-sandbox SDK config, not role-scoped | Partial — per-repo cleanroom.yaml, not per-role | No | No — network presets only | No |
-| Maturity | Active July 2026 | Research (2022+) | Early (~66 ⭐) | Active (~1.4k ⭐) | Experimental (~574 ⭐) | Private preview | YC, ~4.7k ⭐ | YC, ~6k ⭐, beta | ~3.1k ⭐ | Tencent, prod, ~10.4k ⭐ | Active (Buildkite product) | Early development | GA 2026 | Early research preview |
+| Maturity | Active July 2026 | Research (2022+) | Early (~66 ⭐) | Active (~1.8k ⭐) | Experimental (~574 ⭐) | Private preview | YC, ~4.7k ⭐ | YC, ~6k ⭐, beta | ~3.1k ⭐ | Tencent, prod, ~10.4k ⭐ | Active (Buildkite product) | Early development | GA 2026 | Early research preview |
 
 ## What's closest, what's different
 
@@ -385,7 +396,9 @@ keeping Docker only as a legacy fallback; agent-safehouse uses
 `sandbox-exec`; litterbox uses Podman + Landlock. matchlock and
 smolmachines are close on *both* the policy side (default-deny net,
 per-host allowlist) and — now that bot-bottle has moved off
-containers-by-default — the microVM isolation primitive.
+containers-by-default — the microVM isolation primitive. Note: Apple
+Container 1.0 stable shipped June 9 2026 (frozen CLI and APIs), which
+makes the macOS backend stable surface area rather than a moving target.
 
 **New closest on agent-tailored policy.** Two governance tools are the
 direct competitors on the "coarse-grained sandbox" axis. **tilde.run**

docs/research/hn-agent-safety-discourse-july-2026.md

@@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ surveyed what developers were actually deploying: "containers or YOLO"
 dominated. The honest community mood was that most teams hadn't solved
 this and were shipping anyway.
 
+The March 12 launch of **Agent Safehouse**
+([#47301085](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47301085), 823 points)
+crystallised the community framing: a zero-dep `sandbox-exec` wrapper for
+macOS that attracted the top comment *"I honestly think that sandboxing is
+currently THE major challenge that needs to be solved for the tech to fully
+realise its potential."* The creator's own framing — "no dependencies, no
+daemons, no subscription; the simplicity is the feature" — and Simon
+Willison's observation that evaluating whether a sandboxing tool works as
+intended is itself hard, both prefigure the June–July shift in tone. See
+[`agent-sandbox-landscape.md`](agent-sandbox-landscape.md) for a full
+per-project breakdown.
+
 ## The June–July attack cascade
 
 Six attack patterns broke in quick succession. Together they form the